SDP Security Descriptions is NOT RECOMMENDED and Historic

draft-mattsson-dispatch-sdes-dont-dont-dont

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SDES has many known security weaknesses...

— Security Descriptions is vulnerable to SSRC collisions, which leads to so called "two-time pad" [RFC7201].
  — Worse than using a 32-bit MAC, as "two-time pad" may lead to loss of both confidentiality and integrity.
  — In addition to happening by itself with a non-negligible probability, the SSRC collision attack can also be triggered by an attacker in different ways. See e.g. [Replay-SDES].

— As Security Descriptions use plaintext keys [RFC7201], the keys often end up in logs and data retention systems. These systems are often accessible by many more user accounts than Lawful Interception (LI) systems.

— As explained in [Baiting-SDES] the model of slitting the security between two independent layers is flawed, is vulnerable to the Baiting attack [I-D.kaplan-sip-baiting-attack], and "This situation leads to security vulnerability and attacker could get master key by spoofing in unencrypted path.”

— Security Descriptions [RFC4568] requires use of an encapsulating data-security protocol on each hop in the path giving at best hop-by-hop security. Several deployed systems are known to use Security Descriptions without any encapsulating data-security protocol to protect the SDP messages. A huge problem with SDP Security Descriptions is that the endpoints have no way of verifying if the path is protected or not.
SDES has many known security weaknesses...

— If the encapsulating data-security protocol without Diffie-Hellman is used, access to long-term keys enables attackers to compromise past and future sessions. Entities can get access to (and have gotten access to) long-term key material in many different ways: physical attacks, hacking, software bugs, social engineering attacks, espionage, weaknesses injected in hardware, software, or standards, buying access, or demanding access to keying material with or without a court order.

— The situation is maybe best summarized by [Hacking-SDES] that writes: “the false sense of security might be more dangerous than simply leaving your voice calls unencrypted.”


— Using DTLS-SRTP with an ephemeral Diffie–Hellman key exchange (DHE or ECDHE) forces attackers to perform dynamic key exfiltration instead of static key exfiltration [RFC7624]. As required by [RFC7258], work on IETF protocols needs to consider the effects of pervasive monitoring and mitigate them when possible.
The question is not if SDES should be phased out but how

- The security level SDP Security Description provide is not on the level expected by an IETF in force proposed standard and there exist alternatives.

- Many implementations, devices, and libraries support DTLS-SRTP.

- Current draft suggestion:

  This document reclassifies [RFC4568] (SDP Security Descriptions) to Historic Status and also obsoletes RFC 4568.

  This document updates [RFC7201] (Options for Securing RTP Sessions) to note that SDP Security Descriptions SHOULD NOT be used.

  This document specifies that use of the SDP Security Descriptions [RFC4568] is NOT RECOMMENDED. Existing deployments SHOULD mandate support of DTLS-SRTP [RFC5764] and long-term phase out use of SDP Security Descriptions. If it is known by out-of-band means that the other party supports DTLS-SRTP, then SDP Security Descriptions MUST NOT be offered or accepted. If it is not known if the other party supports DTLS-SRTP, both DTLS-SRTP and SDP Security Descriptions SHOULD be offered during a transition period. New deployments SHOULD forbid support of Security Descriptions [RFC4568].

- Should this be handled in MMUSIC WG or somewhere else?