Oblivious HITP

<u>draft-thomson-http-oblivious</u> BoF, IETF 111, notSF *Martin Thomson, Chris Wood


What?

A system and method for making **unlinkable** HTTP requests Comprising

A proxy to hide source addressing and mix requests for traffic analysis resistance An additional layer of encryption to hide information from the proxy

How?

Server publishes its HPKE configuration; a fresh HPKE context is used for every exchange



Why?

Clients might not want a server to link requests Examples

DNS queries to a resolver (see oblivious DNS) Telemetry queries Less overhead than alternatives

> A regular HTTP proxy with a connection per request has a lot of overhead Tor has much stronger requirements, and much higher overheads Prio is great for counting sensitive data, but adds delays and requires more infrastructure

Why not?

Not reasons not to standardize, just reasons not to use this always It is no good for general purpose HTTP (no state can carry between requests) It is more expensive than a direct request It isn't good enough where there is less trust (use something better suited)

Compared to one request per connection

Oblivious HTTP trades replay protection, post-compromise security, and changes for performance A TLS connection for each request involves

1 ECDH keygen, 1 ECDH multiplication, 1 ECDSA signing or verification, lots of hashing 2 round trips (minimum) and lots of extra bytes Oblivious HTTP involves

1 ECDH keygen (client only), 1 ECDH multiplication, a little less hashing

1 round trip and extra bytes (min. 75/46 for requests/responses in HTTP/2 w/ compression)

Conditions

The proxy has limited trust from both client and server: The client trusts the proxy not to leak their identity to the server The server trusts the proxy not to overload it Clients, proxies, and servers might need to pad to resist traffic analysis Servers might need to protect against replay attacks from the proxy Server compromise allows reading of messages if the proxy colludes

HITP message format

This could work with message/http That is very difficult to implement correctly Lots of security vulnerabilities there draft-thomson-http-binary-message is a simplified binary encoding based on HTTP/3 No header compression Only flexibility is to allow streaming processing

TLS interception

Concerns on-list have been raised about interaction with interception regimes Primarily, where TLS interception is enabled through the use of custom trust anchors That is,

If clients add OHTTP when configured for interception, Intercepting devices will not be able to see request content Answer: don't do that then; see <u>https://github.com/unicorn-wg/oblivious-http/pull/63</u> (OHTTP requests are identifiable via the media type, which can be used)

Consolidation

Could OHTTP make consolidation worse?

Using OHTTP for DoH exists specifically to reduce information concentration in DNS resolvers Less clear about other design choices like fixed proxy and request relationship This trades security for flexibility, which might affect consolidation

Where?

Specification is small and largely self-contained Interoperable implementations in Go and Rust (with test client and server) https://github.com/chris-wood/ohttp-go https://github.com/martinthomson/ohttp Is there interest in doing the work? Where should this be done?

Suggest a short-lived working group (protocol only; defer discovery mechanisms)