Oblivious HTTP

draft-thomson-http-oblvious

Bof, IETF 111, notSF

*Martin Thomson, Chris Wood
What?

A system and method for making **unlinkable** HTTP requests

Comprising

A proxy to hide source addressing and mix requests for traffic analysis resistance

An additional layer of encryption to hide information from the proxy
How?

Server publishes its HPKE configuration; a fresh HPKE context is used for every exchange.
**Why?**

Clients might not want a server to link requests

Examples

- DNS queries to a resolver (see oblivious DNS)
- Telemetry queries

Less overhead than alternatives

- A regular HTTP proxy with a connection per request has a lot of overhead
- Tor has much stronger requirements, and much higher overheads
- Prio is great for counting sensitive data, but adds delays and requires more infrastructure
Why not?

Not reasons not to standardize, just reasons not to use this always

- It is no good for general purpose HTTP (no state can carry between requests)
- It is more expensive than a direct request
- It isn’t good enough where there is less trust (use something better suited)
Compared to one request per connection

Oblivious HTTP trades replay protection, post-compromise security, and changes for performance.

A TLS connection for each request involves:
- 1 ECDH keygen, 1 ECDH multiplication, 1 ECDSA signing or verification, lots of hashing
- 2 round trips (minimum) and lots of extra bytes

Oblivious HTTP involves:
- 1 ECDH keygen (client only), 1 ECDH multiplication, a little less hashing
- 1 round trip and extra bytes (min. 75/46 for requests/responses in HTTP/2 w/ compression)
Conditions

The proxy has limited trust from both client and server:
  The client trusts the proxy not to leak their identity to the server
  The server trusts the proxy not to overload it
Clients, proxies, and servers might need to pad to resist traffic analysis
Servers might need to protect against replay attacks from the proxy
Server compromise allows reading of messages if the proxy colludes
HTTP message format

This could work with message/http

That is very difficult to implement correctly

Lots of security vulnerabilities there

draft-thomson-http-binary-message is a simplified binary encoding based on HTTP/3

No header compression

Only flexibility is to allow streaming processing
**TLS interception**

Concerns on-list have been raised about interaction with interception regimes. Primarily, where TLS interception is enabled through the use of custom trust anchors. That is,

- If clients add OHTTP when configured for interception,
  - Intercepting devices will not be able to see request content.

**Answer:** don’t do that then; see [https://github.com/unicorn-wg/oblivious-http/pull/63](https://github.com/unicorn-wg/oblivious-http/pull/63)

(OHTTP requests are identifiable via the media type, which can be used)
Consolidation

Could OHTTP make consolidation worse?
Using OHTTP for DoH exists specifically to reduce information concentration in DNS resolvers
Less clear about other design choices like fixed proxy and request relationship
This trades security for flexibility, which might affect consolidation
Where?

Specification is small and largely self-contained
Interoperable implementations in Go and Rust (with test client and server)
  https://github.com/chris-wood/ohttp-go
  https://github.com/martinthomson/ohttp

Is there interest in doing the work?

Where should this be done?
  Suggest a short-lived working group (protocol only; defer discovery mechanisms)