Authorized update to MUD URLs

Michael Richardson IETF111 OPSAWG meeting July 30, 2021

draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-acceptableurls-02



MUD URLs vs MUD files


- Update MUD file in place
 - PRO: no security problems
 - CON: opens issues with mis-matches of firmware
 - e.g., TLS profiles!

- Update MUD URL, provide new MUD file
 - PRO: every major revision can have specific rules
 - PRO: different operating modes for device can express different preferences
 - (commercial, pro-user, residential)
 - Features enabled via accessories
 - CON: risk that MUD file link could be changed by malware

Two ideas

- Update RFC8520 to say that the base URL must always be the same
- Add extension to RFC8520 say allow base URL to be specified

Shape of Solution



- IoT device tells MUD manager about it's URL
 - The first time, using IDevID
 - Or may TOFU on DHCP/LLDP
- Updates to URL would be restricted to the last component

What kind of updates?

 Updates to URL would be restricted to the last component



https://attacker.example/mudfiles/printer-4567/mud002.json


Now what?



- WG adopted in January, 2021
- Eliminated one of two solutions
 - Thus, this document has to normatively Update (Amends) RFC8520, so needs to be Standards Track
- Stable for awhile: ready for reviews and WGLC
- QUESTIONS?



What is the problem?



- IoT device tells MUD manager about it's URL
 - MUD manager fetches the file
- Malicious device could lie in DHCP or LLD



Updates to IDevID?

- If IDevID is the most secure, why not update that?
 - Not easy to do for many products, IDevID is ideally stored in TPM
- If the IDevID can be updated, then can a malware update it too?