STIR for Messaging

IETF 111

STIR WG

SF, from afar - Jul 2021

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draft-ietf-stir-messaging

- Now a working group item
- A draft about leveraging STIR for text and multimedia instant messaging services
 - Helpful for those that use telephone numbers as identifiers,
 specifically for the originator of messages
 - For the moment, that's a scope restriction of the draft
- Why?
 - Message spam is a problem, and while email-style content analysis helps, it doesn't help for encrypted messaging
 - STIR certificates bestow authority for communication from a TN
 - Would make little sense to develop a separate PKI for messaging from telephone numbers

Integrity over messaging

- Two paths for STIR:
 - 1. SDP-negotiated message stream security
 - Aiming for RCS-like (or RTT-like) deployments
 - 2. Individual message (MESSAGE) security
 - Previous group discussion was to protect individual messages at the MIME level
 - Avoid worrying about SMPP or whatever
 - Draft now just says that
 - Though likely underspecified really just suggests taking a digest over the whole body
 - » Should be more narrow?

What Else is New

- Added some text on RTT
- Added some caveats on what "end to end" means
 - Inheriting the constraints of SIPBRANDY
- Cut out some TBDs and added some starting Sec Considerations
 - Will probably need privacy considerations too

Open Issues

- Conferencing (multiparty messaging)
 - For Path 1 (dialog streams), even two-party messaging requires connected identity
 - Which I'll be talking about in a minute (rfc4916bis)
 - The multiparty messaging is more of a problem
 - Various strategies for dialog conferencing in SIP overall
 - » Centralized v. decentralized
 - I gather RCS is centralized conferencing
 - » Or punt this to the connected identity draft?
 - For Path 2 (MESSAGE, etc.) should be okay?
 - Each individual message gets signed as appropriate

Next Steps

- Resolve open issues
- Had some review, more welcome

WGLC after another rev or two?