
### TEEP Architecture draft-ietf-teep-architecture-15

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### Timeline

- JAN 2020: WGLC completed
- Before IETF 110: Draft -14 addressed remaining comments
- Issues raised since IETF 110, now addressed (next slides)
  - #222: Indicate the possibility to terminate TLS in the TEE
  - #224: Figure 4 Improve readability
  - #225: Clarification regarding Data Protection
  - #226: Replace certificate chain with certificate path
- JUL 2021: Tiru did doc shepherd review and submitted to IESG



### #224: Figure 4 - Improve readability

Purpose	Cardinality & Location of Private Ke Private Key Signs	Location of y Trust Anchor Store
Authenticating <del>TEE</del> TEEP Agent	1 per TEE TEEP re	esponses TAM
Authenticating TAM	1 per TAM TEEP reques	sts TEEP Agent
Code Signing	1 per Trusted TA binary Component Signer	/ TEE
	Figure 4: Signature Keys	5

• TAM authenticates messages from TEEP Agent, not TEE per se

## #225: Clarification regarding Data Protection

• Hannes rewrote last paragraph of Data Protection security consideration section:

The protocol between TEEP Agents and TAMs similarly is responsible for securely providing integrity and confidentiality protection against adversaries between them. Since It is a design choice at what layers to best provide protection against network adversaries. As discussed in Section 6, the transport protocol and any security mechanism associated with it (e.g., the Transport Layer Security protocol) under the TEEP protocol might be implemented may terminate outside a TEE, as discussed in Section 6, TEE. If it cannot be relied upon for sufficient protection. The does, the TEEP protocol provides itself must provide integrity protection, but protection and confidentiality must protection to secure data end-to-end. For example, confidentiality protection for payloads may be provided by payload encryption, i.e., using utilizing encrypted TA binaries and encrypted attestation information. See [I-D.ietf-teep-protocol] for more discussion. how a specific solution addresses the design question of how to provide integrity and confidentiality protection.

# #226: Replace certificate chain with certificate path

- RFC 4949 says for certificate chain:
  - Deprecated Term: IDOCs SHOULD NOT use this term; it duplicates the meaning of a standardized term. Instead, use "certification path".
- Issue raised by RATS WG on text copied from TEEP architecture doc
- Now replaced throughout

# OPEN #223: Defined what we mean by 'Software Update'

- Hannes proposed putting a definition of "Software Update" in terminology section
- But term occurs only once in the doc, way *before* terminology section
- Introduction has:
  - "To simplify the life of TA developers interacting with TAs in a TEE, an interoperable protocol for managing TAs running in different TEEs of various devices is needed. This **software update** protocol needs to make sure that compatible trusted and untrusted components (if any) of an application are installed on the correct device. In this TEE ecosystem, there often arises a need for an external trusted party to verify the identity, claims, and rights of TA developers, devices, and their TEEs. This trusted third party is the Trusted Application Manager (TAM)."
- Proposed resolution: No change