

draft-friel-tls-eap-dpp-03

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TLS WG, IETF 111

Changes since IETF110 / draft-02


- As agreed on mailer...
- No longer
 - Using draft-jhoyla-tls-extended-key-schedule
 - Injecting additional static-ephemeral ECDH keypair into key schedule
- Instead
 - Derive PSK from DPP bootstrap public key
 - Using RFC 8733 “TLS1.3 Cert Based Authentication with an External PSK”
 - Using RFC 7250 “Using Raw Public Keys in TLS and DTLS”
 - Server proves knowledge of bootstrap public key via PSK
 - Client proves knowledge of private key using RFC 7250 based authentication

Context

- Wi-Fi alliance Device Provisioning Protocol defines how a supplicant's bootstrap keypair can be used to authenticate the supplicant and provision it for a Wi-Fi network
- DPP and bootstrap keypair guarantee that:
 - The supplicant is connecting to a network that knows its bootstrap public key
 - The supplicant proves to the network that it knows the associated private key
- Trust model and security is based on knowledge of bootstrap key
 - The bootstrap public key is 'secret' and known only to the owner / network operator
 - Bootstrap public key is never sent in cleartext in DPP protocol
 - The private key is known only to the supplicant (e.g. embedded in the device)
- Bootstrap Public key:
 - Encoded using the ASN.1 SEQUENCE SubjectPublicKeyInfo from RFC5280
`DPP:I:GS-803XL;K:MDkwEwYHKOZlZj0CAQYIKoZlZj0DAQcDIgAC8YIhb0MFjXZzwIS3Ry9c4UAR+VZutTkYnjNLNWWGedE=;;`
 - A raw keypair – does not have to be part of a PKI
 - May be static, embedded in the supplicant, and printed in a QR label, included in a BOM, etc.
 - Could be obtained from vendor cloud for true zero-touch experience
 - May be dynamically generated and displayed on a GUI
- We want to reuse the same bootstrap public key to enable a device to securely bootstrap against a wired network using EAP-TLS




DPP Overview




TLS Authentication w/DPP Bootstrapping keys

- Bootstrapping key is used to derive two pieces of data
 - Identifier to signal which bootstrapping key to use for authentication
 - PSK for TLS authentication
- Use RFC 8773 “TLS1.3 Cert Based Authentication with an External PSK”
 - PSK derived from bootstrapping key is injected into key schedule
 - Client and server prove knowledge of PSK (and therefore bootstrapping public key)
- Use RFC 7250 “Using Raw Public Keys in TLS”
 - Client signs with bootstrapping private key, proves possession of private key to server
- Use draft-group-tls-extensible-psks
 - Client signals the derived PSK identity and type in extended_psk extension
- No TLS changes/extensions required over and above defining new BSK type for draft-group-tls-extensible-psks

TLS authentication w/DPP bootstrapping keys



DPP Bootstrap Key usable across Wired and Wi-Fi networks



Where we are and where to?

- Specification:

draft-friel-tls-eap-dpp-03

- Running code:

<https://github.com/upros/mint/tree/tls-pok>

- EMU

Interest in progressing at IETF109

Update being presented at IETF111 on Thursday