DTLS OVER SCTP BIS

DRAFT-IETF-TSVWG-DTLS-OVER-SCTP-BIS-01

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-01 UPDATE

- Switched to use SCTP Adaptation Layer Indication for the initial negotiation
- Clarified Replay Protection
- Clarified some behavior in failure scenarios
 - Receiver side resource exhaustion
 - SCTP user message and DTLS record mismatch
- Defined Socket API extensions for SCTP-AUTH
 - Allow the secure usage of non-mandatory algorithms
- Receiver dropping old DTLS keys after one full epoch based on SCTP-AUTH key

- Clarified Differences between DTLS 1.2 and 1.3
 - DTLS 1.3 removed renegotiation
 - No Perfect Forward Secrecy rekeying
 - No Server re-authentication
 - Current draft does not have feature parity
- Potential key-epoch limitation (16-bit field)
 - DTLS 1.3 may address this going to 32/64 bits
- DTLS requires dropping old keys in the time frame of one Maximum Segment Lifetime
 - SCTP can't ensure processing of all user message using old Key in that time frame

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REKEYING HEADACHES

Issue 1: DTLS 1.3 and semi-permanent sessions

- No PFS rekeying
- No mutual re-authentication
- No updated TLS Exporter secret for SCTP-AUTH
- Significant issue for long lived sessions
- Uncertain if DTLS 1.3 extensions will be defined
- Some Applications can not restart their SCTP association without significant cost

Key 2

Key 1

Issue 2: Knowing when old key is no longer needed

key 2

Key 1

- DTLS Sender side can track when all DTLS records protected by old key in all streams have been received by the SCTP stack of the peer.
- DTLS Receiver struggles due to multi-streaming knowing for certainty that it has received all DTLS records using the old key
- Current Solution based on SCTP-AUTH Key-ID
 - Limits a single user message to one key epoch
 - Application impact?

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DESIGN DIRECTIONS

Issue 1: DTLS 1.3

- A. Instead of rekeying: Create a new DTLS connection and seamlessly switch over to it
 - DTLS have DTLS Connection ID
 - Issue #1 still needs to be handled on Connection level
- B. Work towards DTLS extension to solve issue before DTLS 1.2 needs to be replaced

Solution for DTLS 1.3 may require separate draft for timely conclusion

Issue 2: Knowing when rekeying is completed

- 1. Use current mechanism with SCTP-Auth Key-ID
 - Accept limitations
- 2. Require SCTP API changes to enable SCTP-AUTH rekeying at any point
- 3. Have DTLS use multiple SCTP user messages per ULP User Message
- 4. Add other explicit signal that key change is completed in SCTP or DTLS layer?

CONCLUSION

- Authors will continue work on solutions
 - Target solution proposal before end of September

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- Appreciate any input
- Want to avoid significant delay