draft-patton-cfrg-vdaf-00

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Motivation

- PRIV BoF (Wednesday): Privacy preserving aggregation of user measurements
 - Privacy made possible by distributing the computation across multiple servers
 - Coordination required to ensure correctness of the computation
- Lots of recent work in the literature, but...
 - There is no "one-size-fits-all" solution
 - Each protocol is tailored to a particular (class of) aggregation functions
 - Protocols vary in their security and operational considerations
 - Lack consistent abstraction boundary for PRIV (and other standardization efforts) to build upon

Objective of this draft

- Provide an abstraction boundary (VDAF) that:
 - addresses the security/operational considerations of real-world deployments (ENPA, Origin Telemetry)
 - provides design criteria for cryptographers to build new and improved schemes
- Standardize a few VDAFs from the literature
 - in particular, those discussed in PRIV so far

- Want to compute A := F(p, m[1], ..., m[n])
 - m[1], ..., m[n] are the client measurements
 - p is the aggregation parameter
 - A is the aggregate result
- Examples:
 - A is arithmetic mean
 - A is a histogram estimating the distribution
 - A counts how many times p occurs in m[1], ..., m[n]



- Privacy via secret sharing
 - Shard(m)→(x, x): Client shards its measurement into input shares and distributes them among the Aggregators.
 - Prepare(p, x)→y: Aggregator maps the aggregation parameter and its input share to its output share (e.g., DPFs).
 - Aggregate(y[1], ..., y[n])→Y: Aggregator combines output shares to get its aggregate share.
 - Unshard(Y, Y)→A: Collector combines aggregate shares to get aggregate.
- Correctness
 - (y[1] + y[2] + y[3]) + (y[1] + y[2] + y[3])= Y + Y = A



• What about malicious (or merely misconfigured) clients?

 $\circ \quad (\ref{2} + y[2] + y[3]) + (\ref{2} + y[2] + y[3]) = \ref{2}?$



- Robustness via multi-party computation
 - Shard(m)→(x, x): Client shards its measurement into input shares and distributes them among the Aggregators.
 - **Prepare:** Aggregators engage in a secure MPC of $(y, \underline{y}) :=$ **Dist-Prepare** (p, x, \underline{x}) .
 - Aggregate(y[1], ..., y[n])→Y: Aggregator combines output shares to get its aggregate share.
 - Unshard(Y, Y)→A: Collector combines aggregate shares to get aggregate.
- Not general-purpose MPC!



Constructions of VDAFs

- prio3 [CBG17, BBCG+19]
 - \circ Encode each measurement m as vector x of elements of a finite field
 - Aggregation parameter: number of measurements n
 - Any aggregation function of the form f(n, x[1] + ... + x[n])
 - Any number of aggregators
 - **Dist-Prepare**: C(x)=0 for arithmetic circuit C that defines validity
- hits [BBCG+21]
 - Measurement: N-bit string (encoded as IDPF shares)
 - Aggregation parameter: sequence of P-bit strings (the "candidate prefixes") where P <= N
 - Aggregation function: how many inputs are prefixed by each candidate
 - Two aggregators
 - **Dist-Prepare**: input is prefixed by at most one candidate
- ... and many more!

Implementations (so far)

- Rust <u>github.com/abetterinternet/libprio-rs</u>
 - o prio3
 - hits (proof-of-concept only, missing efficient IDPF)
 - \circ "Prio v2" (used in ENPA)
- C++ github.com/google/distributed_point_functions
 - IPDF
- C++ <u>github.com/google/libprio-cc</u>
 - "Prio v2" (used in ENPA)
- C github.com/mozilla/libprio
 - "Prio v1" (used in Origin Telemetry)

aggregation function	shard time	communication
count	8 µs	208 bytes
histogram (10 buckets)	15 µs	432 bytes
sum (32 bit integers)	35 µs	960 bytes

prio3 client perf (two aggregators)

References

- [CGB17] Corrigan-Gibbs-Boneh. "Prio: Private, Robust, and Scalable Computation of Aggregate Statistics". NSDI 2017.
- [BBCG+19] Boneh et al. "Zero-Knowledge Proofs on Secret-Shared Data via Fully Linear PCPs". CRYPTO 2019.
- [BBCG+21] Boneh et al. "Lightweight Techniques for Private Heavy Hitters". IEEE S&P 2021.