# Securing field communications within intelligent transportation systems (ITS): SNMP and TLS1.3


9 November 2021, for IETF Operations and Maintenance Area WG

K. Vaughn M. Vanderveen

## **Existing usage of SNMP within ITS**

- Primary protocol for ITS field devices
  - Center-to-field
  - Field-to-field
- Used Internationally
- Includes safety-critical data

- O Many types of devices, including:
  - Signal controllers
  - Electronic signage
  - Various sensors
  - Highway lighting
  - Ramp meters



## Secure SNMP deployment (2018)



- SNMPv3 over (D)TLS using RFC 6353
  - Uses the (D)TLS X.509 certificate for access control
  - Uses bi-directional X.509 certificates
  - Uses TLSv1.2



O (D)TLSv1.2 has known security vulnerabilities

#### **Potential solutions**

- Migrate to an alternative protocol
  - Experts have recently reasserted their support for using SNMP.
    - Supported by both private and public sector
    - O Deemed SNMP to be an appropriate design for our environment
    - Cost to migrate to different protocol would be high
- Update RFC 6353 recommendations
  - Not currently being addressed within IETF
  - ITS experts interested in working with IETF
    - O Could develop as NTCIP standard, if needed



## Change overview

- O Changes necessitating a new document
  - O Update fingerprint algorithm and related MIB objects to reflect 2-octet cipher suite
    - O Alternative: Require IANA to maintain 1-octet hash ID for (D)TLS 1.3; clarify rules for fingerprint
- Other clarifications needed as part of update
  - Update references (e.g., (D)TLS 1.3 vs (D)TLS 1.2)
  - Clarify that authentication and privacy are always provided (i.e., a part of 1.3)

## Change overview

- Subjective changes
  - Prohibit use of 0-RTT mode of TLS 1.3 to prevent playback attacks
  - Recommend disabling of USM
  - Mandate previous recommendations
    - Prohibit the use of SSL or TLS versions prior to 1.2
    - Prohibit use of prior versions of SNMP over TLSTM
    - Requiring each command generator to have its own certificate
    - Prohibit use of CommonNames
- Subjective non-changes
  - Retain use of same port numbers

## **Major Questions to Resolve**

- Does the OPSAWG wish to adopt this work?
- How to best address the fingerprint issue
  - Revise MIB
  - Require IANA to maintain 1-octet hash identifier
- Document format
  - O Update to RFC 6353
  - Obsolete RFC 6353 and replace
  - New RFC without obsoleting RFC 6353

Can be resolved via the reflector