L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS)

draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-09

Nils Mäurer, Thomas Gräupl, Corinna Schmitt

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L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-09

Abstract

This document gives an overview of the architecture of the L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS), which provides a secure, scalable and spectrum efficient terrestrial data link for civil aviation. LDACS is a scheduled, reliable multi-application cellular broadband system with support for IPv6. LDACS provides a data link for IPv6 network-based aircraft guidance. High reliability and availability for IP connectivity over LDACS, as well as security, are therefore essential.

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Overall changes


- Adressed entire feedback from the Routing Directorate
- Clarified normative and informative references
- Streamlined work
- (Re-)Moved chapters to better fitting location in text
- Reworked LDACS security section
- Added post-quantum security to LDACS security

Chapter 1 – Introductions

- Transition from analogue to digital in aeronautical communications
 - Analogue to digital datalinks
 - Introduction of IPv6 based networking protocols
- Regulatory documents:
 - ICAO 9896 v03
 - RTCA DO-379
 - ARINC P-858
 - EUROCAE ED-262
- LDACS regarded as "access network" in larger Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN)/Internet Protocol Suite(IPS) framework
- Initial LDACS rollout in Europe

Chapter 7 – Characteristics

Moved LDACS protocol stack details here



Chapter 9 – Security

- Clarified view from regulatory documents:
 - LDACS is network access technology in ATN/IPS
 - RTCA DO-350A specifies 10s for RCP 130/A1 message types
- Presented user-/control data protection of LDACS
- LDACS PKI with corresponding certificates
 - AS certificates valid 3 years
 - GS certificates valid 1 day (sent via LDACS)
 - OCSP for certification revocation
 - CSP for certificate roll-out

Chapter 9 – Security

- LDACS cell-attachment procedure:
 - LDACS cell-entry procedure: basic communications enabled, security protocols and algorithms negotiated
 - LDACS Mutual Authentication and Key Establishment (MAKE) procedure: mutual authentication, key establishment derivation, group key establishment
- LDACS security levels
 - Pre-Quantum: Elliptic-curve based
 - Post-Quantum:
 - Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) KEM
 - FALCON signature
- LDACS user-data protection
 - AES-CMAC for data integrity/authenticity only
 - AES-CCM for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)

Chapter 9 – Security

LDACS control-channel protection: •

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No protection at RACH, BCCH _ DCCH protection uses AS-GS point-to-point key for creating/verifying MACs for DC messages CCCH protection uses group key for creating DCH FL CCCH | DCH /verifying MACs for CC messages <---- Multi-Frame (MF) - 58.32ms --> Λ a FL BCCH MF MF MF MF DCCH DCH RL u e <----- Super-Frame (SF) - 240ms ------<---- Multi-Frame (MF) - 58.32ms --> e RL RACH MF MF MF MF u e <----- Super-Frame (SF) - 240ms --</pre> n Time -----_____

Thanks

