Abstract

The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP, [RFC7252]) is available over different transports (UDP, DTLS, TCP, TLS, WebSockets), but lacks a way to unify these addresses. This document provides terminology and provisions based on Web Linking [RFC8288] to express alternative transports available to a device, and to optimize exchanges using these.

Discussion Venues

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Discussion of this document takes place on the Constrained RESTful Environments Working Group mailing list (core@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/core/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://gitlab.com/chrysn/transport-indication.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 September 2022.
1. Introduction ..................................................... 3
   1.1. Terminology ................................................. 3
       1.1.1. Using URIs to identify protocol endpoints ....... 4
   1.2. Goals ....................................................... 5
2. Indicating alternative transports ............................... 6
   2.1. Example ..................................................... 7
   2.2. Security context propagation ............................... 8
   2.3. Choice of transports ...................................... 8
   2.4. Selection of a canonical origin ........................... 9
   2.5. Advertisement through a Resource Directory .............. 9
3. Elision of Proxy-Scheme and Uri-Host ............................ 9
   3.1. Impact on caches ........................................... 11
   3.2. Using unique proxies securely ............................. 12
4. Third party proxy services ..................................... 13
   4.1. Generic proxy advertisements ............................. 14
5. Client picked proxies .......................................... 15
6. Security considerations ......................................... 16
   6.1. Security context propagation ............................. 16
   6.2. Traffic misdirection ..................................... 16
   6.3. Protecting the proxy ..................................... 17
7. IANA considerations ............................................. 17
   7.1. Link Relation Types ...................................... 17
   7.2. Resource Types ........................................... 17
8. References ....................................................... 18
   8.1. Normative References ...................................... 18
   8.2. Informative References .................................... 18
Appendix A. Change log ............................................ 20
Appendix B. Related work and applicability to related fields .... 21
   B.1. On HTTP ................................................... 22
   B.2. Using DNS ................................................ 22
   B.3. Using names outside regular DNS .......................... 23
   B.4. Multipath TCP ............................................. 23
1. Introduction

The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) provides transport mechanisms (UDP and DTLS since [RFC7252], TCP, TLS and WebSockets since [RFC8323]), with some additional being used in LwM2M [lwm2m] and even more being explored ([I-D.bormann-t2trg-slipmux], [I-D.amsuess-core-coap-over-gatt]). These are mutually incompatible on the wire, but CoAP implementations commonly support several of them, and proxies can translate between them.

CoAP currently lacks a way to indicate which transports are available for a given resource, and to indicate that a device is prepared to serve as a proxy; this document solves both by introducing the "has-proxy" terminology to Web Linking [RFC8288] that expresses the former through the latter. The additional "has-unique-proxy" term is introduced to negate any per-request overhead that would otherwise be introduced in the course of this.

CoAP also lacks a unified scheme to label a resource in a transport-independent way. This document does _not_ attempt to introduce any new scheme here, or raise a scheme to be the canonical one. Instead, each host or application can pick a canonical address for its resources, and advertise other transports in addition.

1.1. Terminology

Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts described in CoAP [RFC7252] and link format ([RFC6690] (or, equivalently, web links as described in [RFC8288]).

**Same-host proxy:** A CoAP server that accepts forward proxy requests (i.e., requests carrying the Proxy-Scheme option) exclusively for URIs that it is also the authoritative server for is defined as a "same-host proxy".

The distinction between a same-host and any other proxy is only relevant on a practical, server-implementation and illustrative level; this specification does not use the distinction in normative requirements, and clients need not make the distinction at all.

**hosts:** The verb "to host" is used here in the sense of the link relation of the same name defined in [RFC6690].
For resources discovered via CoAP's discovery interface, a hosting statement is typically provided by the defaults implied by [RFC6690] where a link like </sensor/temp> is implied to have the relation "hosts" and the anchor /, such that a statement "coap://hostname hosts coap://hostname/sensor/temp" is implied in the link.

The link relation has been occasionally used with different interpretations, which ascribe more meaning to the term than it has in its definition. In particular,

* the "hosts" relation can not be inferred merely by two URIs having the same scheme, host and port (and vice versa), and

* the "hosts" relation on its own does not make any statement about the physical devices that hold the resource’s representation.

[ TBD: The former could probably still be used without too many ill effects; but things might also get weird when a dynamic resource created with one transport from use with another transport unless explicitly cleared. ]

When talking of proxy requests, this document only talks of the Proxy-Scheme option. Given that all URIs this is usable with can be expressed in decomposed CoAP URIs, the need for using the Proxy-URI option should never arise. The Proxy-URI option is still equivalent to the decomposed options, and can be used if the server supports it.

1.1.1. Using URIs to identify protocol endpoints

The URI coap://device.example.com identifies a particular resource, possibly a "welcome" text. It is, colloquially, also used to identify the combination of a host (identified through a name), the default port, and the CoAP method of sending requests to the host.

For precision, this document uses the term "the transport address indicated by (a URI)" to refer to the host / port / protocol combination, but otherwise no big deal is made of it.
For the CoAP schemes (coap, coaps, coap+tcp, coaps+tcp, coap+ws, coaps+ws), URIs indicating a transport are always given with an empty path (which under their URI normalization rules is equivalent to a path containing a single slash). For the coap and coap+tcp schemes, URIs with different host names can indicate the same transport as long as the names resolve to the same addresses. For the other protocols, the given host name informs the name set in TLS’s Server Name Indication (SNI) and/or the host sent in the "Host" header of the underlying HTTP request.

If an update to this document extends the list, for new schemes it might be allowed to have paths, queries or fragment identifiers present in the URI indicating the transport address. No guidance can be given here for these, as no realistic example is known. (Note that while the coap+ws scheme does use the well-known path /.well-known/coap internally, that is used purely on the HTTP side, and not part of the CoAP URI, not even for indicating the transport address).

URIs indicating a transport are especially useful when talking about proxies; this use is aligned with the way they are expressed in the conventional environment variables http_proxy etc. [ cite https://about.gitlab.com/blog/2021/01/27/we-need-to-talk-no-proxy/ ]. Furthermore, URIs processing is widespread in CoAP systems, and when that changes (e.g. through the introduction of [I-D.ietf-core-href]), URIs indicating a transport will still be efficient to encode. And last but not least, it lines up well with the colloquial identity mentioned above. (An alternative would be using a dedicated naming scheme, say, transport:coap:device.example.com:port, but that would needlessly introduce implementation complexity).

Note that this mechanism can only used with proxies that use CoAP’s native address indication mechanisms. Proxies that perform URI mapping (as described in Section 5 of [RFC8075], especially using URI templates) are not supported in this document.

[ TBD: Do we want to extend this to HTTP proxies? Probably just not, and if so, only to those that can just take coap://... for a URI. ]

1.2. Goals

This document introduces provisions for the seamless use of different transport mechanisms for CoAP. Combined, these provide:

* Enablement: Inform clients of the availability of other transports of servers.
* No Aliasing: Any URI aliasing must be opt-in by the server. Any defined mechanisms must allow applications to keep working on the canonical URIs given by the server.

* Optimization: Do not incur per-request overhead from switching protocols. This may depend on the server’s willingness to create aliased URIs.

* Proxy usability: All information provided must be usable by aware proxies to reduce the need for duplicate cache entries.

* Proxy announcement: Allow third parties to announce that they provide alternative transports to a host.

For all these functions, security policies must be described that allow the client to use them as securely as the original transport.

This document will not concern itself with changes in transport availability over time, neither in causing them ("Please take up your TCP interface, I’m going to send a firmware update") nor in advertising their availability in advance. Hosts whose transport’s availability changes over time can utilize any suitable mechanism to keep client updated, such as placing a suitable Max-Age value on their resources or having them observable.

2. Indicating alternative transports

While CoAP can set the authority component of the requested URI in all requests (by means of Uri-Host and Uri-Port), setting the scheme of a requested URI (by means of Proxy-Scheme) makes the request implicitly a proxy request. However, this needs to be of only little practical concern: Any device can serve as a proxy for itself (a "same-host proxy") by accepting requests that carry the Proxy-Scheme option. If it is to be a well-behaved proxy, the device should then check whether it recognizes the name set in Uri-Host as one of its own (as it should if no Proxy-Scheme option accompanied it). If the name is not recognized, it should reject the request with 5.05 (Proxying Not Supported) -- unless, of course, it implements forward proxy functionality exceeding the same-host proxy. If the name is recognized, it should process the request as it would process a request coming in on the given protocol (which, for many hosts, is the same as if the option were absent completely).

A server can advertise a recommended proxy by serving a Web Link with the "has-proxy" relation to a URI indicating its transport address. In particular (and that is a typical case), it can indicate its own transport address on an alternative transport when implementing same-host proxy functionality.
The semantics of a link from S to P with relations has-proxy ("S has-proxy P", <P>;rel=has-proxy;anchor="S") are that for any resource R hosted on S ("S hosts R"), the proxy with the transport address indicated by P can be used to obtain R.

2.1. Example

A constrained device at the address 2001:db8::1 that supports CoAP over TCP in addition to CoAP can self-describe like this:

Req: to [ff02::fd]:5683 on UDP
Code: GET
Uri-Path: /.well-known/core
Uri-Query: if=tag:example.com,sensor

Res: from [2001:db8::1]:5683
Content-Format: application/link-format
Payload:
</sensors/temp>;if="tag:example.com,sensor",
<coap+tcp://[2001:db8::1]>;rel=has-proxy;anchor="/"

Req: to [2001:db8::1]:5683 on TCP
Code: GET
Proxy-Scheme: coap
Uri-Path: /sensors/temp
Observe: 0

Res: 2.05 Content
Observe: 0
Payload:
39.1°C

Figure 1: Discovery and follow-up request through a has-proxy relation

Note that generating this discovery file needs to be dynamic based on its available addresses; only if queried using a link-local source address, the server may also respond with a link-local address in the authority component of the proxy URI.

Unless the device makes resources discoverable at coap+tcp://[2001:db8::1]/.well-known/core or another discovery mechanism, clients may not assume that coap+tcp://[2001:db8::1]/sensors/temp is a valid resource (let alone is equivalent to the other resource on the same path). The server advertising itself like this may reject any request on CoAP-over-TCP unless it contains a Proxy-Scheme option.
Clients that want to access the device using CoAP-over-TCP would send a request by connecting to 2001:db8::1 TCP port 5683 and sending a GET with the options Proxy-Scheme: coap, no Uri-Host or -Port options (utilizing their default values), and the Uri-Paths "sensors" and "temp".

2.2. Security context propagation

If the originally requested URI R or the application requirements demand a security mechanism is used, the client MUST only use the proxy P if the proxy can provide suitable credentials. (The hosting URI S is immaterial to these considerations).

For example, if the application uses the host name and a public key infrastructure and R is coap://example.com/ the proxy accessed as coap+tcp://[2001:db8::1] still needs to provide a certificate chain for the name example.com to one of the system’s trust anchors. If, on the other hand, the application is doing a firmware update and requires any certificate from its configured firmware update issuer, the proxy needs to provide such a firmware update certificate.

Some applications have requirements exceeding the requirements of a secure connection, e.g., (explicitly or implicitly) requiring that name resolution happen through a secure process and packets are only routed into networks where it trusts that they will not be intercepted on the path to the server. Such applications need to extend their requirements to the source of the has-proxy statement; a sufficient (but maybe needlessly strict) requirement is to only follow has-proxy statements that are part of the same resource that advertises the link currently being followed. Section Section 6.2 adds further considerations.

2.3. Choice of transports

It is up to the client whether to use an advertised proxy transport, or (if multiple are provided) which to pick.

Links to proxies may be annotated with additional metadata that may help guide such a choice; defining such metadata is out of scope for this document.

Clients MAY switch between advertised transports as long as the document describing them is fresh; they may even do so per request. (For example, they may perform individual requests using CoAP-over-UDP, but choose CoAP-over-TCP for requests with large expected responses). When the describing document approaches expiry, the client can use the representation’s ETag to efficiently renew its justification for using the alternative transport.
2.4. Selection of a canonical origin

While a server is at liberty to provide the same resource independently on different transports (i.e. to create aliases), it may make sense for it to pick a single scheme and authority under which it announces its resources. Using only one address helps proxies keep their caches efficient, and makes it easier for clients to avoid exploring the same server twice from different angles.

When there is a predominant scheme and authority through which an existing service is discovered, it makes sense to use these for the canonical addresses.

Otherwise, it is suggested to use the coap or coaps scheme (given that these are the most basic and widespread ones), and the most stable usable name the host has.

2.5. Advertisement through a Resource Directory

In the Resource Directory specification [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory], protocol negotiation was anticipated to use multiple base values. This approach was abandoned since then, as it would incur heavy URI aliasing.

Instead, devices can submit their has-proxy links to the Resource Directory like all their other metadata.

A client performing resource lookup can ask the RD to provide available (same-host-)proxies in a follow-up request by asking for ?anchor=<the-discovered-host>&rel=has-proxy. The RD may also volunteer that information during resource lookups even though the has-proxy link itself does not match the search criteria.

[ It may be useful to define RD parameters for use with lookup here, which'd guide which available proxies to include. For example, asking ?if=tag:example.com,sensor&proxy-links=tcp could give as a result: <coap://[2001:db8::1]/s>;rt=tag:example.com,sensor,<coap+tcp://[2001:db8::1]/>;rel=has-proxy;anchor="coap://[2001:db8::1]/" ]

3. Elision of Proxy-Scheme and Uri-Host

A CoAP server may publish and accept multiple URIs for the same resource, for example when it accepts requests on different IP addresses that do not carry a Uri-Host option, or when it accepts requests both with and without the Uri-Host option carrying a registered name. Likewise, the server may serve the same resources on different transports. This makes for efficient requests (with no Proxy-Scheme or Uri-Host option), but in general is discouraged.
To make efficient requests possible without creating URI aliases that propagate, the "has-unique-proxy" specialization of the has-proxy relation is defined.

If a proxy is unique, it means that requests arriving at the proxy are treated the same no matter whether the scheme, authority and port of the link context are set in the Proxy-Scheme, Uri-Host and Uri-Port options, respectively, or whether all of them are absent.

[ The following two paragraphs are both true but follow different approaches to explaining the observable and implementable behavior; it may later be decided to focus on one or the other in this document. ]

While this creates URI aliasing in the requests as they are sent over the network, applications that discover a proxy this way should not "think" in terms of these URIs, but retain the originally discovered URIs (which, because Cool URIs Don’t Change[cooluris], should be long-term usable). They use the proxy for as long as they have fresh knowledge of the has-(unique-)proxy statement.

In a way, advertising has-unique-proxy can be viewed as a description of the link target in terms of SCHC [I-D.ietf-lpwan-coap-static-context-hc]: In requests to that target, the link source’s scheme and host are implicitly present.

While applications retain knowledge of the originally requested URI (even if it is not expressed in full on the wire), the original URI is not accessible to caches both within the host and on the network (for the latter, see Section 5). Thus, cached responses to the canonical and any aliased URI are mutually interchangeable as long as both the response and the proxy statement are fresh.

A client MAY use a unique-proxy like a proxy and still send the Proxy-Scheme and Uri-Host option; such a client needs to recognize both relation types, as relations of the has-unique-proxy type are a specialization of has-proxy and typically don’t carry the latter (redundant) annotation. [ To be evaluated -- on one hand, supporting it this way means that the server needs to identify all of its addresses and reject others. Then again, is a server that (like many now do) fully ignore any set Uri-Host correct at all? ]

Example:
Fig. 2: Follow-up request through a has-unique-proxy relation. Compared to the last example, 5 bytes of scheme indication are saved during the follow-up request.

It is noteworthy that when the URI reference /sensors/temperature is resolved, the base URI is coap://device0815.example.com and not its coaps+ws counterpart -- as the request is still for that URI, which both the client and the server are aware of. However, this detail is of little practical importance: A simplistic client that uses coaps+ws://device0815.proxy.rd.example.com as a base URI will still arrive at an identical follow-up request with no ill effect, as long as it only uses the wrongly assembled URI for dereferencing resources, the security context is the same, the state is kept no longer than the has-unique-proxy statement is fresh, and it does not (for example) pass the URI on to other devices.

3.1. Impact on caches

[ This section is written with the "there is implied URI aliasing" mindset; it should be possible to write it with the "compression" mindset as well (but there is no point in having both around in the document at this time).

It is also slightly duplicating, but also more detailed than, the brief note on the topic in Section 5 ]
When a node that performs caching learns of a has-unique-proxy statement, it can utilize the information about the implied URI aliasing: Requests to resources hosted by S can be answered with cached entries from P (because by the rules of has-unique-proxy a request can be crafted that is sent to P for which a fresh response is available). The inverse direction (serving resources whose URI "starts with" P from a cached request that was sent to S) is harder to serve because it additionally requires a fresh statement that "S hosts R" for the matching resource R.

3.2. Using unique proxies securely

[ This section is work in progress, it is more a flow of considerations turning back on each other. This is all made a bit trickier by not applying to OSCORE which is usually the author’s go-to example, because OSCORE’s requirements already preclude all these troubles. ]

The use of unique proxies requires slightly more care in terms of security.

No requirements are necessary on the client side; those of {#secctx-propagation} suffice. (In particular, it is not necessary for the statement to originate from the original server unless that were already a requirement without the uniqueness property).

The extra care is necessary on the side of servers that are commissioned with wide ranging authorization [ or is it? ]: These may now be tricked into serving a resource of which the client assumes a different name. For example, if the desired resource is coaps://high-security.example.org/configuration, and there exists a "home page" style service for employees with patterns of coaps+tcp://user-${username}.example.org/ at which they can store files, and the server operating that service is commissioned with a wild-card certificate "*.example.org", then a device that receives the (malicious) information <coaps+tcp://user-mave.example.org>;rel=has-unique-proxy;anchor="coaps://high-security.example.org" might use this statement to contact the transport address indicated by coaps+tcp://user-mave.example.org and ask for /config (which, to the server, is indistinguishable from coaps+tcp://user-mave.example.org/config) and obtain a malicious configuration.

In a non-unique proxy situation, the error would have been caught by the server, which would have seen the request for coaps://high-security.example.com and refused to serve a request containing critical options it can not adequately process.
In the unique proxy situation, ... [ TBD: now whose fault is it? Can only be the client’s ... because it looked at the wildcard certificate rather than whether the host-name it was narrowing it down to is authorized to speak for high-security.example.com? The server (operator) can barely be blamed, for while the certificate is needlessly wide, to the server it did look precisely like a good request. ]

4. Third party proxy services

A server that is aware of a suitable cross proxy may use the has-proxy relation to advertise that proxy. If the protocol used towards the proxy provides name indication (as CoAP over TLS or WebSockets does), or by using a large number of addresses or ports, it can even advertise a (more efficient) has-unique-proxy relation. This is particularly interesting when the advertisements are made available across transports, for example in a Resource Directory.

How the server can discover and trust such a proxy is out of scope for this document, but generally involves the same kind of links. In particular, a server may obtain a link to a third party proxy from an administrator as part of its configuration.

The proxy may advertise itself without the origin server’s involvement; in that case, the client needs to take additional care (see Section 6.2).


Res:
Content-Format: application/link-format
Payload:
<coap://device0815.example.com/sensors/>;if="tag:example.com,collection",
<coap+wss://device0815.proxy.rd.example.com>;rel=has-unique-proxy;anchor="coap://device0815.example.com/"

Req: to device0815.proxy.rd.example.com on WebSocket
Host (indicated during upgrade): device0815.proxy.rd.example.com
Code: GET
Uri-Path: /sensors/

Res: 2.05 Content
Content-Format: application/link-format
Payload:
</sensors/temperature>;if="tag:example.com,sensor"

Figure 3: HTTP based discovery and CoAP-over-WS request to a CoAP resource through a has-unique-proxy relation
4.1. Generic proxy advertisements

A third party proxy may advertise its availability to act as a proxy for arbitrary CoAP requests. This use is not directly related to the protocol indication in other parts of this document, but sufficiently similar to warrant being described in the same document.

The resource type "TBDcore.proxy" can be used to describe such a proxy. The link target attribute "proxy-schemes" can be used to indicate the scheme(s) supported by the proxy, separated by the space character.

Req: GET coap://[fe80::1]/.well-known/core?rt=TBDcore.proxy

Res:
  Content-Format: application/link-format
  Payload:
  <>;rt=TBDcore.proxy;proxy-schemes="coap coap+tcp coap+ws http"

Req: to [fe80::1] via CoAP
Code: GET
Proxy-Scheme: http
Uri-Host: example.com
Uri-Path: /motd
Accept: text/plain

Res: 2.05 Content
  Content-Format: text/plain
  Payload:
  On Monday, October 25th 2021, there is no special message of the day.

  Figure 4: A CoAP client discovers that its border router can also serve as a proxy, and uses that to access a resource on an HTTP server.

The considerations of Section 6.2 apply here.

A generic advertised proxy is always a forward proxy, and can not be advertised as a "unique" proxy as it would lack information about where to forward. (A proxy limited to a single outbound protocol might in theory work as a unique proxy when using a transport in which the full default Uri-Host value is configured at setup time, but these are considered impractical and thus not assigned a resource type here.)
The use of a generic proxy can be limited to a set of devices that have permission to use it. Clients can be allowed by their network address if they can be verified, or by using explicit client authentication using the methods of [I-D.tiloca-core-oscore-capable-proxies].

5. Client picked proxies

This section is purely informative, and serves to illustrate that the mechanisms introduced in this document do not hinder the continued use of existing proxies.

When a resource is accessed through an "actual" proxy (i.e., a host between the client and the server, which itself may have a same-host proxy in addition to that), the proxy’s choice of the upstream server is originally (i.e., without the mechanisms of this document) either configured (as in a "chain" of proxies) or determined by the request URI (where a proxy picks CoAP over TCP and resolves the given name for a request aimed at a coap+tcp URI).

A proxy that has learned, by active solicitation of the information or by consulting links in its cache, that the requested URI is available through a (possibly same-host) proxy, may use that information in choosing the upstream transport, to correct the URI associated with a cached response, and to use responses obtained through one transport to satisfy requests on another.

For example, if a host at coap://h1.example.com has advertised 
</res>,<coap+tcp://h1.example.com>;rel=has-proxy;anchor="/", then a proxy that has an active CoAP-over-TCP connection to h1.example.com can forward an incoming request for coap://h1.example.com/res through that CoAP-over-TCP connection with a suitable Proxy-Scheme on that connection.

If the host had marked the proxy point as 
<coap+tcp://h1.example.com>;rel=has-unique-proxy instead, then the proxy could elide the Proxy-Scheme and Uri-Host options, and would (from the original CoAP caching rules) also be allowed to use any fresh cache representation of coap+tcp://h1.example.com/res to satisfy requests for coap://h1.example.com/res.

A client that uses a forward proxy and learns of a different proxy advertised to access a particular resource will not change its behavior if its original proxy is part of its configuration. If the forward proxy was only used out of necessity (e.g., to access a resource on the protocol not supported by the client) it can be practical for the client to use the advertised proxy instead.
6. Security considerations

6.1. Security context propagation

Clients need to strictly enforce the rules of Section 2.2. Failure to do so, in particular using a thusly announced proxy based on a certificate that attests the proxy’s name, would allow attackers to circumvent the client’s security expectation.

When security is terminated at proxies (as is in DTLS and TLS), a third party proxy can usually not satisfy this requirement; these transports are limited to same-host proxies.

6.2. Traffic misdirection

Accepting arbitrary proxies, even with security context propagation performed properly, would allow attackers to redirect traffic through systems under their control. Not only does that impact availability, it also allows an attacker to observe traffic patterns.

This affects both OSCORE and (D)TLS, as neither protect the participants’ network addresses.

Other than the security context propagation rules, there are no hard and general rules about when an advertised proxy is a suitable candidate. Aspects for consideration are:

* When no direct connection is possible (e.g. because the resource to be accessed is served as coap+tcp and TCP is not implemented in the client, or because the resource’s host is available on IPv6 while the client has no default IPv6 route), using a proxy is necessary if complete service disruption is to be avoided.

  While an adversary can cause such a situation (e.g. by manipulating routing or DNS entries), such an adversary is usually already in a position to observe traffic patterns.

* A proxy advertised by the device hosting the resource to be accessed is less risky to use than one advertised by a third party.

Note that in some applications, servers produce representations based on unverified user input. In such cases, and more so when multiple applications share a security context, the advertisements’ provenance may need to be considered.
6.3. Protecting the proxy

A widely published statement about a host’s availability as a proxy can cause many clients to attempt to use it.

This is mitigated in well-behaved clients by observing the rate limits of [RFC7252], and by ceasing attempts to reach a proxy for the Max-Age of received errors.

Operators can further limit ill-effects by ensuring that their client systems do not needlessly use proxies advertised in an unsecured way, and by providing own proxies when their clients need them.

7. IANA considerations

7.1. Link Relation Types

IANA is asked to add two entries into the Link Relation Type Registry last updated in [RFC8288]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relation Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>has-proxy</td>
<td>The link target can be used as a proxy to reach the link context.</td>
<td>RFCthis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>has-unique-proxy</td>
<td>Like has-proxy, and using this proxy implies scheme and host of the target.</td>
<td>RFCthis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: New Link Relation types

7.2. Resource Types

IANA is asked to add an entry into the "Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values" registry under the Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters:

[ The RFC Editor is asked to replace any occurrence of TBDcore.proxy with the actually registered attribute value. ]

Attribute Value: core.proxy

Description: Forward proxying services

Reference: [ this document ]
Notes: The schemes for which the proxy is usable may be indicated using the proxy-schemes target attribute as per Section 4.1 of [this document].

8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References


[I-D.ietf-core-href]

[I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]

[I-D.ietf-lpwan-coap-static-context-hc]

[I-D.silverajan-core-coap-protocol-negotiation]

[I-D.tiloca-core-oscore-capable-proxies]

[lwm2m]


Appendix A. Change log

Since -02 (mainly processing reviews from Marco and Klaus):

* Acknowledge that 'coap://hostname/' is not the proxy but a URI that (in a particular phrasing) is used to stand in for the proxy’s address (while it regularly identifies a resource on the server)

* Security: Referencing traffic misdirection already in the first security block.

* Security: Add (incomplete) considerations for unique-proxy case.

* Narrow down "unique" proxy semantics to those properties used by the client, allowing unique proxies to be co-hosted with forward proxies.

* "Client picked proxies" clarified to merely illustrate how this is compatible with them.

* Use of "hosts" relation sharpened.

* Precision on how this does and does not consider changing transports.

* "Related work" section demoted to appendix.
* Add note on DTLS session resumption.
* Variable renaming.
* Various editorial fixes.

Since -01:

* Removed suggestion for generally trusted proxies; now stating that with (D)TLS, "a third party proxy can usually not satisfy [the security context propagation requirement]."
* State more clearly that valid cache entries for resources aliased through has-unique-proxy can be used.
* Added considerations for Multipath TCP.
* Added concrete suggestion and example for advertisement of general proxies.
* Added concrete suggestion for RD lookup extension that provides proxies.
* Minor editorial and example changes.

Since -00:

* Added introduction
* Added examples
* Added SCHC analogy
* Expanded security considerations
* Added guidance on choice of transport, and canonical addresses
* Added subsection on interaction with a Resource Directory
* Added comparisons with related work, including rdlink and DNS-SD sketches
* Added IANA considerations
* Added section on open questions

Appendix B. Related work and applicability to related fields
B.1. On HTTP

The mechanisms introduced here are similar to the Alt-Svc header of [RFC7838] in that they do not create different application-visible addresses, but provide dispatch through lower transport implementations.

Unlike in HTTP, the variations of CoAP protocols each come with their unique URI schemes and thus enable the "transport address indicated by a URI" concept. Thus, there is no need for a distinction between protocol-id and scheme.

To accommodate the message size constraints typical of CoRE environments, and accounting for the differences between HTTP headers and CoAP options, information is delivered once at discovery time.

Using the has-proxy and has-unique-proxy with HTTP URIs as the context is NOT RECOMMENDED; the HTTP provisions of the Alt-Svc header and ALPN are preferred.

B.2. Using DNS

As pointed out in [RFC7838], DNS can already serve some of the applications of Alt-Svc and has-unique-proxy by providing different CNAME records. These cover cases of multiple addresses, but not different ports or protocols.

While not specified for CoAP yet (and neither being specified here),

[ which is an open discussion point for CoRE -- should we? Here? In a separate DNS-SD document? ]

DNS SRV records (possibly in combination with DNS Service Discovery [RFC6763]) can provide records that could be considered equivalent to has-unique-proxy relations. If _coap._tcp, _coaps._tcp, _coap._udp, _coap+ws._tcp etc. were defined with suitable semantics, these can be equivalent:

_coap._udp.device.example.com SRV 0 0 device.example.com 61616
device.example.com AAAA 2001:db8::1

<coap://[2001:db8::1];rel=has-unique-proxy;anchor="coap://device.example.com"

It would be up to such a specification to give details on what the link’s context is; unlike the link based discovery of this document, it would either need to pick one distinguished context scheme for which these records are looked up, or would introduce aliasing on its own.
B.3. Using names outside regular DNS

Names that are resolved through different mechanisms than DNS, or names which are defined within the scope of DNS but have no universally valid answers to A/AAAA requests, can be advertised using the relation types defined here and CoAP discovery.

In Figure 5, a server using a cryptographic name as described in [I-D.amsuess-t2trg-rdlink] is discovered and used.

Req: to [ff02::fd]:5683 on UDP
Code: GET
Uri-Path: /.well-known/core
Uri-Query: rel=has-proxy
Uri-Query: anchor=coap://nbswy3dpo5xxe3denbswy3dpo5xxe3de.ab.rdlink.arpa

Res: from [2001:db8::1]:5683
Content-Format: application/link-format
Payload:
<coap+tcp://[2001:db8::1]>;rel=has-unique-proxy;
anchor="coap://nbswy3dpo5xxe3denbswy3dpo5xxe3de.ab.rdlink.arpa"

Req: to [2001:db8::1]:5683 on TCP
Code: GET
OSCORE: ...
Uri-Path: /sensors/temp
Observe: 0

Res: 2.05 Content
OSCORE: ...
Observe: 0
Payload:
39.1°C

Figure 5: Obtaining a sensor value from a local device with a global name

B.4. Multipath TCP

When CoAP-over-TCP is used over Multipath TCP and no Uri-Host option is sent, the implicit assumption is that there is aliasing between URIs containing any of the endpoints’ addresses.

As these are negotiated within MPTCP, this works independently of this document’s mechanisms. As long as all the server’s addresses are equally reachable, there is no need to advertise multiple addresses that can later be discovered through MPTCP anyway. When
advertisements are long-lived and there is no single more stable address, several available addresses can be advertised (independently of whether MPTCP is involved or not). If a client uses an address that is merely a proxy address (and not a unique proxy address), but during MPTCP finds out that the network location being accessed is actually an MPTCP alternative address of the used one, the client MAY forego sending of the Proxy-Scheme and Uri-Path option.

[ This follows from multiple addresses being valid for that TCP connection; at some point we may want to say something about what that means for the default value of the Uri-Host option -- maybe something like "has the default value of any of the associated addresses, but the server may only enable MPTCP if there is implicit aliasing between all of them" (similar to OSCORE’s statement)? ]

[ TBD: Do we need a section analog to this that deals with (D)TLS session resumption in absence of SNI? ]

Appendix C. Open Questions / further ideas

* OSCORE interaction: [RFC8613] Section 4.1.3.2 requirements place OSCORE use in a weird category between has-proxy and has-unique-proxy (because if routing still works, the result will be correct). Not sure how to write this down properly, or whether it’s actionable at all.

Possibly there is an inbetween category of "The host needs the Uri-Host etc. when accessed through CoAP, but because the host does not use the same OSCORE KID across different virtual hosts, it’s has-unique-proxy as soon as you talk OSCORE".

* Self-uniqueness:

A host that wants to indicate that it doesn’t care about Uri-Host can probably publish something like </>;rel=has-unique-proxy to do so.

This’d help applications justify when they can elide the Uri-Host, even when no different protocols are involved.

* Advertising under a stable name:

If a host wants to advertise its host name rather than its IP address during multicast, how does it best do that?

Options, when answering from 2001:db8::1 to a request to ff02::fd are:
<coap://myhostname/foo>,...
<coap://[2001:db8::1]>;rel=has-unique-proxy;anchor="coap://myhostname"

which is verbose but formally clear, and

</foo>,...
<coap://[2001:db8::1]>;rel=has-unique-proxy;anchor="coap://myhostname"

which is compatible with unaware clients, but its correctness with respect to canonical URIs needs to be argued by the client, in this sequence

- understanding the has-unique-proxy line,

- understanding that the request that went to 2001:db8::1 was really a Proxy-Scheme/Uri-Host-elided version of a request to coap://myhostname, and then

- processing any relative reference with this new base in mind.

(Note that it’d need to happen in software in that sequence, but that’s the sequence needed to understand how the /foo here is really coap://myhostname/foo).

If CoRAL is used during discovery, a base directive or reverse relation to has-unique-proxy would make this easier.

Appendix D. Acknowledgements

This document heavily builds on concepts explored by Bill Silverajan and Mert Ocak in [I-D.silverajan-core-coap-protocol-negotiation], and together with Ines Robles and Klaus Hartke inside T2TRG.

[ TBD: reviewers Marco Klaus ]

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CoAP: Non-traditional response forms
draft-bormann-core-responses-01

Abstract
In CoAP as defined by RFC 7252, responses are always unicast back to a client that posed a request. The present memo describes two forms of responses that go beyond that model. These descriptions are not intended as advocacy for adopting these approaches immediately, they are provided to point out potential avenues for development that would have to be carefully evaluated.

About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bormann-core-responses/.

Discussion of this document takes place on the Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Working Group mailing list (mailto:core@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/core/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/core-wg/core-responses.

Status of This Memo
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Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................. 3
   1.1. Terminology .............................................. 3
2. Sending non-traditional responses ............................... 4
   2.1. Preconditions to sending non-traditional responses ...... 4
   2.2. Responses without request ................................ 5
3. Response with embedded request .................................. 5
4. Response for configured request .................................. 5
4.1. Examples for configured requests ............................. 6
   4.1.1. Example: Periodic request ............................ 6
   4.1.2. Example: Event driven request ......................... 6
   4.1.3. Example: Configured observe ........................... 6
4.2. Multicast responses ........................................... 6
4.3. Respond-To option ............................................ 7
4.4. Leisure-For-Responses Option ............................... 7
5. IANA Considerations ............................................. 8
6. Security Considerations ......................................... 8
7. References ..................................................... 9
   7.1. Normative References .................................... 9
   7.2. Informative References ................................... 9
Appendix A. CoAP extensions explained by non-traditional responses ........................................... 10
   A.1. Observation ............................................. 10
   A.2. Responses to multicast requests .......................... 10
   A.3. Triangular responses (Response-To) ....................... 11
   A.4. Other current documents .................................. 11
Acknowledgements .................................................. 11
Authors’ Addresses .............................................. 11
1. Introduction

In CoAP as defined by RFC 7252, responses are always unicast back to a client that posed a request. A server may want to send a response to a request that it did not receive, may want to multicast a response, or both.

The descriptions in this specification are not intended as advocacy for adopting these approaches immediately, they are provided to point out potential avenues for development that would have to be carefully evaluated.

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The term "byte" is used in its now customary sense as a synonym for "octet".

Terms used in this draft:

Non-traditional response: A response that is not the single response generated for a request received on the same transport.

Non-matching response: A response that has properties (typically options) that make it incompatible with the original request, and thus in particular unsuitable as a cached response to that request (but possibly suitable to populate the cache for a similar request). Options that make a response non-matching need to be proxy unsafe.

For example, a Block2 response with a different value of block number × block size than indicated in the request is non-matching.

Configured request: A request that reaches the server in another way than by transmitting a usual CoAP request on the same communication channel a response is expected on.

Embedded request: A request that is provided by the server to the recipient of its response by embedding it into the response.
2. Sending non-traditional responses

Non-traditional responses are sets of responses produced for a single request, or responses sent without a transmitted request.

Where tokens are involved, all non-traditional responses use the request’s token; in any case, they are bound to the original request (e.g. by using the same request_kid/request_piv pair in OSCORE [RFC8613]). Where message IDs are involved, one of the non-traditional response (the first sent, not necessarily the first received as generally the network might reorder messages) can be sent as a piggybacked response in an ACK (thus sharing the request’s message ID), the others are CON or NON responses.

Some established responses (observations defined in [RFC7641], and multicast responses in [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis]) match this definition and already follow the guidance set out here for non-traditional responses; Appendix A gives details for them.

A second response differing from the first that can be sent by a non-deduplicating server responding to a retransmission of a request is not non-traditional because there is a second request -- that is probably the last corner case at the line separating traditional from non-traditional responses.

2.1. Preconditions to sending non-traditional responses

A server may send multiple responses to a request if there is any property in the request that indicates the client’s intention to receive them. This is typically indicated by a request option, and rarely in external properties of the message (in the multicast case, the destination address).

A mechanism for eliciting multiple responses must specify the conditions under which a token gets freed, as the traditional arrival of the response is insufficient. It may also specify for which requests the token can be reused immediately in follow-up requests. On unordered transports, or when it’s a client’s follow-up request and not a response that terminates the token, the client needs to wait until no reordered non-traditional responses can be expected anymore.

If a non-traditional response answers the original request, no further action is required (this is the case of observation: ordering is added on top of that to ensure that only the latest response is used). If the response does not answer the original request, it must be non-matching, either by an option introduced with the eliciting option or by a generic option like Response-For.
2.2. Responses without request

Endpoints may agree out of band on a token (or other request-matching details). One way to do that is to exchange a "phantom request", which is a request that client and server will agree to have sent and received, respectively, without it actually being sent between those endpoints.

As tokens are managed by the client, that request needs to be generated by the client, or in close collaboration with the client (for example by the client allowing a third party to use a subset of its token values in order to set up non-traditional responses).

3. Response with embedded request

A server can send a response to a request that it did not actually receive by embedding the request which the response answers in the response.

The option "Response-For" contains a request packaged as in Section 5.3 of [RFC8613]. The response is then intended to serve as a response to this request.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>U</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Default</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Response-For</td>
<td>opaque</td>
<td>0-1023</td>
<td>(none)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: The Response-For Option

The CoAP Token becomes meaningless for this form of response; responses with embedded requests are therefore sent with a zero-length Token. (In essence, the "Response-For" option takes the place of the request the Token usually stands for.)

The congestion control considerations for confirmable and non-confirmable messages apply unchanged.

4. Response for configured request

A request may reach the server using a different means than that used for the response. For instance, the request may be configured in the server. Without limiting generality, we speak about _configured requests_.

The client MUST be cognizant of that configuration as the request uses a token from the token namespace it controls.
4.1. Examples for configured requests

4.1.1. Example: Periodic request

A server may be configured to act on a configured request every day at 12:00.

4.1.2. Example: Event driven request

A server may be configured to act on a configured request each time it reboots.

4.1.3. Example: Configured observe

A server may be configured with a GET request from a client that includes an Observe option with value 0. This means that the server will send updates to the state of the resource addressed by the GET request to the configured address of the client.

The considerations of Section 4.5 of [RFC7641] apply. How losing interest reflects back into configuration and whether there is some form of error notification to the source of the configuration is out of scope of the present specification.

4.2. Multicast responses

A server MAY send a response to a multicast address. (This needs to be a response to a configured request as a normal request cannot be sent _from_ a multicast address.)

Note that, as the originator of a multicast response is a unicast address, the relaxation of matching rules described in Section 8.2 of [RFC7252] does not apply.

The token space in CoAP is owned by the client, which is identified by a transport endpoint (address/port). Here, the address is a multicast address, so the token name space is shared by all nodes joined to that multicast address. The assumption for multicast responses is that, for each multicast group, there is some form of management for the token space (and the port number) that everyone can participate that needs to join that multicast group; the specific form of management is out of the scope of this specification. Note that this means that multicast responses MUST NOT be sent to unmanaged multicast addresses such as All CoAP Nodes (Section 12.8 of [RFC7252]).
Multicast responses are always non-confirmable. The congestion control considerations for non-confirmable multicast messages apply unchanged.

4.3. Respond-To option

What has been called "configured request" here may also be triggered by a usual CoAP request that carries the Respond-To option. (The term "configured request" is still appropriate as the server ought to be configured to accept this option; see Section 6.)

If a single client wants to request a server to send the response to a specific multicast address, it can include the "Respond-To" option. This contains an opaque string with the port number as a 16-bit number (in network byte order), followed by the IP address (4-byte IPv4 or 16-byte IPv6).

```
+-----+---+---+---+---+------------+--------+--------+---------+
| No. | C | U | N | R | Name       | Format | Length | Default |
+=====+===+===+===+===+============+========+========+=========+
| TBD | C | U | - | - | Respond-To | opaque |   6-18 | (none)  |
+-----------------------------+--------+--------+---------+
```

Table 2: The Respond-To Option

4.4. Leisure-For-Responses Option

This new option indicates a number expressed as a uint. It allows the server to send that number of non-traditional response messages in addition to the requested response. They are to be sent without undue delay after the original response.

```
+-----+---+---+---+---+------------+--------+-------+----------+
| No. | C | U | N | R | Name                  | Format | Length | Default |
+=====+===+===+===+===+=======================+========+-------+----------+
| TBD |   | U | - | - | Leisure-For-Responses | uint   | 1-4    | 0        |
+-----------------------------------------------+
```

Table 3: The Leisure-For-Responses Option

The option is elective, but unsafe for proxies (as the option would otherwise cause multiple responses to a proxy that expects only one and that needs to be a matching response). A proxy that chooses not to implement it may forward the request with the Leisure-For-Responses option removed.
On its own, the option does not indicate which kind of additional responses the client would expect (though further elective proxy-safe no-cache-key options can be added on top of that to give better guidance), and the server may choose not to send any at all.

Intermediaries may add or remove the option, and use incoming responses to populate their cache. They may serve additional responses from their cache, but in most cases the sensible course of action is to forward the additional responses the origin server sends.

Use cases for Leisure-For-Responses include sending further blocks in a Block2 transfer (which are obviously non-matching and thus don’t need a Response-For), or serving follow-up documents (a response containing a single link can be followed by a representation of the linked resource, which needs a Request-For header that indicates the URI).

5. IANA Considerations

This draft adds the following option numbers to the CoAP Option Numbers registry of [RFC7252]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Response-For</td>
<td>RFCthis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Respond-To</td>
<td>RFCthis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Leisure-For-Responses</td>
<td>RFCthis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: CoAP Option Numbers

6. Security Considerations

TBD

(Clearly, multicast responses pose a potential for amplification, in particular if unverified sources can cause them via Respond-To. Discuss how to mitigate.)

A Respond-To option can be used to incite a server to send data to a third party. This ought not be done blindly, i.e., only with considered application assent.
The CoAP request/response mechanism allows the client to ascertain a level of authentication (not resistant though to on-path attackers unless the communication is protected) and freshness of the response: The Token echoed in the response shows that the responder had knowledge of the (fresh) request (Section 5.3.1 of [RFC7252]). Responses with embedded requests can not be authenticated or checked for freshness this way. Their content therefore is less trustworthy than normal responses unless authenticated in another way (e.g., via [RFC8613]).

7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


Appendix A. CoAP extensions explained by non-traditional responses

A.1. Observation

This section describes the Observe option [RFC7641] in the terms of this document, [ so nothing in here should contradict that document ].

When Observe:0 is present in a request, this sets up non-traditional responses until either of the following conditions is met:

* A follow-up request on the same token carries an Observe:1 option.

  (This is primarily in here because; Observe:1 and No-Response:any could be combined; otherwise, the other conditions suffice).

* Any response does not carry an Observe option.

* Any response has a non-successful status.

Follow-up requests are limited to extending the request ETag set. Responses are obviously non-matching by their Observe option; each hop discards the Observe option for the purpose of caching and refreshes its cache with the most recent one as per the Observe value.

A.2. Responses to multicast requests

As with observe, this just phrases the existing mechanism in the context of this generalization.

When the destination address of a CoAP request is a multicast address, that token is valid for any member of that group (which, for the purpose of the client, is any server at all) on any port.
(Except for that the implications of having received a multicast request still need to be followed, it might be seen as a template for creating a phantom request to any endpoint, if that suits the reader’s mental model.)

Responses can only be sent for up to the deployment’s Leisure time (see Section 8.2 of [RFC7252]) plus the application’s timeout (in proxy situations, this needs to be communicated explicitly in the Multicast-Signaling option of [I-D.tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy]).

A.3. Triangular responses (Response-To)

The Response-To option can be viewed as a shorthand notation for "Consider this a No-Response:any request, but take a copy of it, make it into a CoAP-over-UDP request with that particular address as a source and any address of yours as a response, and treat that as a phantom request".

[ It may make sense to add an explicit return token, and include a No-Response option; that might allow it to be used even across proxies. ]

A.4. Other current documents

[I-D.tiloca-core-observe-multicast-notifications] is a straightforward application of the phantom requests (the concept was developed there); Leisure-For-Responses could help it around the topic of joining a multicast group securely through a proxy.

[I-D.tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy] seems to fit well with the concepts here as well, and might be simplified by it both in terminology and by replacing Response-Forwarding with Response-For(Proxy-Scheme, Uri-Host).

Acknowledgements

TBD

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Conditional Attributes for Constrained RESTful Environments
draft-ietf-core-conditional-attributes-04

Abstract

This specification defines Conditional Notification and Control Attributes that work with CoAP Observe (RFC7641).

Editor note

The git repository for the draft is found at https://github.com/core-wg/conditional-attributes/

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on November 11, 2022.

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1. Introduction

IETF Standards for machine to machine communication in constrained environments describe a REST protocol [RFC7252] and a set of related information standards that may be used to represent machine data and machine metadata in REST interfaces.
This specification defines Conditional Notification and Control Attributes for use with CoRE Observe [RFC7641].

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

This specification requires readers to be familiar with all the terms and concepts that are discussed in [RFC7641]. This specification makes use of the following additional terminology:

Notification Band: A resource value range that may be bounded by a minimum and maximum value or may be unbounded having either a minimum or maximum value.

3. Conditional Attributes

This specification defines conditional attributes for use with CoRE Observe [RFC7641]. Conditional attributes provide fine-grained control of notification and synchronization of resource states. When observing a resource, a CoAP client conveys conditional attributes as metadata using the query component of a CoAP URI. A conditional attribute can be represented as a "name=value" query parameter or simply a "name" without a value. Multiple conditional attributes in a query component are separated with an ampersand "&". A resource marked as Observable in its link description SHOULD support these conditional attributes.

Note: In this draft, we assume that there are finite quantization effects in the internal or external updates to the value representing the state of a resource; specifically, that a resource state may be updated at any time with any valid value. We therefore avoid any continuous-time assumptions in the description of the conditional attributes and instead use the phrase "sampled value" to refer to a member of a sequence of values that may be internally observed from the resource state over time.

3.1. Conditional Notification Attributes

Conditional Notification Attributes define the conditions that trigger a notification. Conditional Notification Attributes SHOULD be evaluated on all potential notifications from a resource, whether resulting from an internal server-driven sampling process or from external update requests to the server.
The set of Conditional Notification Attributes defined here allow a client to control how often a client is interested in receiving notifications and how much a value should change for the new representation state to be interesting. One or more Conditional Notification Attributes MAY be included in an Observe request.

Conditional Notification Attributes are defined below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater Than</td>
<td>c.gt</td>
<td>xs:decimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Than</td>
<td>c.lt</td>
<td>xs:decimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Step</td>
<td>c.st</td>
<td>xs:decimal (&gt;0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notification Band</td>
<td>c.band</td>
<td>(none)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edge</td>
<td>c.edge</td>
<td>xs:boolean</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Conditional Notification Attributes

3.1.1. Greater Than (c.gt)

When present, Greater Than indicates the upper limit value the sampled value SHOULD cross before triggering a notification. A notification is sent whenever the sampled value crosses the specified upper limit value, relative to the last reported value, and the time for "c.pmin" has elapsed since the last notification. The sampled value is sent in the notification. If the value continues to rise, no notifications are generated as a result of "c.gt". If the value drops below the upper limit value then a notification is sent, subject again to the "c.pmin" time.

The Greater Than parameter can only be supported on resources with a scalar numeric value.

3.1.2. Less Than (c.lt)

When present, Less Than indicates the lower limit value the resource value SHOULD cross before triggering a notification. A notification is sent when the samples value crosses the specified lower limit value, relative to the last reported value, and the time for "c.pmin" has elapsed since the last notification. The sampled value is sent in the notification. If the value continues to fall no notifications are generated as a result of "c.lt". If the value rises above the
lower limit value then a new notification is sent, subject to the “c.pmin” time.

The Less Than parameter can only be supported on resources with a scalar numeric value.

3.1.3. Change Step (c.st)

When present, the change step indicates how much the value representing a resource state SHOULD change before triggering a notification, compared to the old state. Upon reception of a query including the "c.st" attribute, the current resource state representing the most recently sampled value is reported, and then set as the last reported value (last_rep_v). When a subsequent sampled value or update of the resource state differs from the last reported state by an amount, positive or negative, greater than or equal to st, and the time for "c.pmin" has elapsed since the last notification, a notification is sent and the last reported value is updated to the new resource state sent in the notification. The change step MUST be greater than zero otherwise the receiver MUST return a CoAP error code 4.00 "Bad Request" (or equivalent).

The Change Step parameter can only be supported on resource states represented with a scalar numeric value.

Note: Due to sampling and other constraints, e.g. "c.pmin", the change in resource states received in two sequential notifications may differ by more than "c.st".

3.1.4. Notification band (c.band)

The notification band attribute allows a bounded or unbounded (based on a minimum or maximum) value range that may trigger multiple notifications. This enables use cases where different ranges results in differing behaviour. For example, in monitoring the temperature of machinery, whilst the temperature is in the normal operating range, only periodic updates are needed. However as the temperature moves to more abnormal ranges more frequent state updates may be sent to clients.

Without a notification band, a transition across a less than (c.lt), or greater than (c.gt) limit only generates one notification. This means that it is not possible to describe a case where multiple notifications are sent so long as the limit is exceeded.

The "c.band" attribute works as a modifier to the behaviour of "c.gt" and "c.lt". Its use is determined only by its presence, and not its
value. Therefore, if "c.band" is present in a query, "c.gt", "c.lt" or both, MUST be included.

When "c.band" is present with the "c.lt" attribute, it defines the lower bound for the notification band (notification band minimum). Notifications occur when the resource value is equal to or above the notification band minimum. If "c.lt" is not present there is no minimum value for the band.

When "c.band" is present with the "c.gt" attribute, it defines the upper bound for the notification band (notification band maximum). Notifications occur when the resource value is equal to or below the notification band maximum. If "c.gt" is not present there is no maximum value for the band.

If "c.band" is present with both the "c.gt" and "c.lt" attributes, notification occurs when the resource value is greater than or equal to "c.gt" or when the resource value is less than or equal to "c.lt".

If "c.band" is specified in which the value of "c.gt" is less than that of "c.lt", in-band notification occurs. That is, notification occurs whenever the resource value is between the "c.gt" and "c.lt" values, including equal to "c.gt" or "c.lt".

If "c.band" is specified in which the value of "c.gt" is greater than that of "c.lt", out-of-band notification occurs. That is, notification occurs when the resource value not between the "c.gt" and "c.lt" values, excluding equal to "c.gt" and "c.lt".

The Notification Band parameter can only be supported on resources with a scalar numeric value.

3.1.5. Edge (c.edge)

When present, the "c.edge" attribute indicates interest for receiving notifications of either the falling edge or the rising edge transition of a boolean resource state. When the value of the "c.edge" attribute is 0 (False), the server notifies the client each time a resource state changes from True to False. When the value of the "c.edge" attribute is 1 (True), the server notifies the client each time a resource state changes from False to True.

The "c.edge" attribute can only be supported on resources with a boolean value.
3.2. Conditional Control Attributes

Conditional Control Attributes define the time intervals between consecutive notifications as well as the cadence of the measurement of the conditions that trigger a notification. Conditional Control Attributes can be used to configure the internal server-driven sampling process for performing measurements of the conditions of a resource. One or more Conditional Control Attributes MAY be included in an Observe request.

Conditional Control Attributes are defined below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Period (s)</td>
<td>c.pmin</td>
<td>xs:decimal (&gt;0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Period (s)</td>
<td>c.pmax</td>
<td>xs:decimal (&gt;0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Evaluation Period (s)</td>
<td>c.epmin</td>
<td>xs:decimal (&gt;0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Evaluation Period (s)</td>
<td>c.epmax</td>
<td>xs:decimal (&gt;0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmable Notification</td>
<td>c.con</td>
<td>xs:boolean</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Conditional Control Attributes

3.2.1. Minimum Period (c.pmin)

When present, the minimum period indicates the minimum time, in seconds, between two consecutive notifications (whether or not the resource state has changed). In the absence of this parameter, the minimum period is up to the server. The minimum period MUST be greater than zero otherwise the receiver MUST return a CoAP error code 4.00 "Bad Request" (or equivalent).

A server MAY update the resource state with the last sampled value that occurred during the "c.pmin" interval, after the "c.pmin" interval expires.

Note: Due to finite quantization effects, the time between notifications may be greater than "c.pmin" even when the sampled value changes within the "c.pmin" interval. "c.pmin" may or may not be used to drive the internal sampling process.
3.2.2. Maximum Period (c.pmax)

When present, the maximum period indicates the maximum time, in seconds, between two consecutive notifications (whether or not the resource state has changed). In the absence of this parameter, the maximum period is up to the server. The maximum period MUST be greater than zero and MUST be greater than, or equal to, the minimum period parameter (if present) otherwise the receiver MUST return a CoAP error code 4.00 "Bad Request" (or equivalent).

3.2.3. Minimum Evaluation Period (c.epmin)

When present, the minimum evaluation period indicates the minimum time, in seconds, the client recommends to the server to wait between two consecutive measurements of the conditions of a resource since the client has no interest in the server doing more frequent measurements. When the minimum evaluation period expires after the previous measurement, the server MAY immediately perform a new measurement. In the absence of this parameter, the minimum evaluation period is not defined and thus not used by the server. The server MAY use "c.pmin", if defined, as a guidance on the desired measurement cadence. The minimum evaluation period MUST be greater than zero otherwise the receiver MUST return a CoAP error code 4.00 "Bad Request" (or equivalent).

3.2.4. Maximum Evaluation Period (c.epmax)

When present, the maximum evaluation period indicates the maximum time, in seconds, the server MAY wait between two consecutive measurements of the conditions of a resource. When the maximum evaluation period expires after the previous measurement, the server MUST immediately perform a new measurement. In the absence of this parameter, the maximum evaluation period is not defined and thus not used by the server. The maximum evaluation period MUST be greater than zero and MUST be greater than the minimum evaluation period parameter (if present) otherwise the receiver MUST return a CoAP error code 4.00 "Bad Request" (or equivalent).

3.2.5. Confirmable Notification (c.con)

When present with a value of 1 (True) in a query, the "c.con" attribute indicates a notification MUST be confirmable, i.e., the server MUST send the notification in a confirmable CoAP message, to request an acknowledgement from the client. When present with a value of 0 (False) in a query, the "c.con" attribute indicates a notification can be confirmable or non-confirmable, i.e., it can be sent in a confirmable or a non-confirmable CoAP message.
3.3. Server processing of Conditional Attributes

Conditional Notification Attributes and Conditional Control Attributes may be present in the same query. However, they are not defined at multiple prioritization levels. The server sends a notification whenever any of the parameter conditions are met, upon which it updates its last notification value and time to prepare for the next notification. Only one notification occurs when there are multiple conditions being met at the same time. The reference code below illustrates the logic to determine when a notification is to be sent.

```c
bool notifiable( Resource * r ) {
    #define EDGE EXISTS(r->edge)
    #define BAND EXISTS(r->band)
    #define SCALAR_TYPE ( num_type == r->type )
    #define STRING_TYPE ( str_type == r->type )
    #define BOOLEAN_TYPE ( bool_type == r->type )
    #define PMIN_EX ( r->last_sample_time - r->last_rep_time >= r->pmin )
    #define PMAX_EX ( r->last_sample_time - r->last_rep_time > r->pmax )
    #define LT_EX ( r->v < r->lt ^ r->last_rep_v < r->lt )
    #define GT_EX ( r->v > r->gt ^ r->last_rep_v > r->gt )
    #define ST_EX ( abs( r->v - r->last_rep_v ) >= r->st )
    #define IN_BAND ( ( r->gt <= r->v && r->v <= r->lt ) ||
                    ( r->lt <= r->gt && r->gt <= r->v ) ||
                    ( r->v <= r->lt && r->lt <= r->gt )
                )
    #define VB_CHANGE ( r->vb != r->last_rep_vb )
    #define VB_EDGE ( r->vb && r->edge || !r->vb && !r->edge )
    #define VS_CHANGE ( r->vs != r->last_rep_vs )

    return ( PMIN_EX &&
             ( SCALAR_TYPE ?
                 ( ( !BAND && ( GT_EX || LT_EX || ST_EX || PMAX_EX ) ) ||
                   ( BAND && IN_BAND && ( ST_EX || PMAX_EX) ) )
             : STRING_TYPE ?
                 ( VS_CHANGE || PMAX_EX )
             : BOOLEAN_TYPE ?
                 ( ( !EDGE && VB_CHANGE ) ||
                   ( EDGE && VB_CHANGE && VB_EDGE ) ||
                   PMAX_EX )
             : false )
            );
}
```
4. Implementation Considerations

When "c.pmax" and "c.pmin" are equal, the expected behaviour is that notifications will be sent every \((c.pmin == c.pmax)\) seconds. However, these notifications can only be fulfilled by the server on a best effort basis. Because "c.pmin" and "c.pmax" are designed as acceptable tolerance bounds for sending state updates, a query from an interested client containing equal "c.pmin" and "c.pmax" values must not be seen as a hard real-time scheduling contract between the client and the server.

The use of the notification band minimum and maximum allow for a synchronization whenever a change in the resource value occurs. Theoretically this could occur in-line with the server internal sample period or the configuration of "c.epmin" and "c.epmax" values for determining the resource value. Implementors SHOULD consider the resolution needed before updating the resource, e.g. updating the resource when a temperature sensor value changes by 0.001 degree versus 1 degree.

When a server has multiple observations with different measurement cadences as defined by the "c.epmin" and "c.epmax" values, the server MAY evaluate all observations when performing the measurement of any one observation.

This specification defines conditional attributes that can be used with CoRE Observe relationships between CoAP clients and CoAP servers. However, it is recognised that the presence of 1 or more proxies between a client and a server can interfere with clients receiving resource updates, if a proxy does not supply resource representations when the value remains unchanged (eg if "c.pmax" is set, and the server sends multiple updates when the resource state contains the same value). A server SHOULD use the Max-Age option to mitigate this by setting Max-Age to be less than or equal to "c.pmax".

5. Security Considerations

The security considerations in Section 11 of [RFC7252] apply. Additionally, the security considerations in Section 7 of [RFC7641] also apply.

6. IANA Considerations

This memo requests a new Conditional Attributes registry to ensure attributes map uniquely to parameter names.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Period (s)</td>
<td>c.pmin</td>
<td>xs:decimal (&gt;0)</td>
<td>This memo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Period (s)</td>
<td>c.pmax</td>
<td>xs:decimal (&gt;0)</td>
<td>This memo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Evaluation Period (s)</td>
<td>c.epmin</td>
<td>xs:decimal (&gt;0)</td>
<td>This memo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Evaluation Period (s)</td>
<td>c.epmax</td>
<td>xs:decimal (&gt;0)</td>
<td>This memo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmable Notification</td>
<td>c.con</td>
<td>xs:boolean</td>
<td>This memo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Than</td>
<td>c.gt</td>
<td>xs:decimal</td>
<td>This memo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Than</td>
<td>c.lt</td>
<td>xs:decimal</td>
<td>This memo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Step</td>
<td>c.st</td>
<td>xs:decimal (&gt;0)</td>
<td>This memo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notification Band</td>
<td>c.band</td>
<td>(none)</td>
<td>This memo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edge</td>
<td>c.edge</td>
<td>xs:boolean</td>
<td>This memo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Acknowledgements

Hannes Tschofenig and Mert Ocak highlighted syntactical corrections in the usage of pmax and pmin in a query. David Navarro proposed allowing for pmax to be equal to pmin.

8. Contributors
9. Changelog

draft-ietf-core-conditional-attributes-04
  o Reference code updated to include behaviour for edge attribute.

draft-ietf-core-conditional-attributes-03
  o Attribute names updated to create uniqueness for use as conditional observe attributes.

draft-ietf-core-conditional-attributes-02
  o Clarifications on usage and value of the band parameter
  o Implementation considerations for proxies added
  o Security considerations added
  o IANA considerations added
Clarifications on True and False values for Edge and Con Attributes

Alan Soloway added as author

draft-ietf-core-conditional-attributes-00

Conditional Attributes section from draft-ietf-core-dynlink-13 separated into own WG draft

10. References

10.1. Normative References


10.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Examples

This appendix provides some examples of the use of binding attribute / observe attributes.

Note: For brevity the only the method or response code is shown in the header field.

A.1. Minimum Period (c.pmin) example
### A.2. Maximum Period (c.pmax) example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>t</th>
<th>Observed State</th>
<th>CLIENT</th>
<th>SERVER</th>
<th>Actual State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18.5 Cel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;------</td>
<td>Header: GET</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Token: 0x4a</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uri-Path: temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uri-Query: c.pmax=&quot;20&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Observe: 0 (register)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;------</td>
<td>Header: 2.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Token: 0x4a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>18.5 Cel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Observe: 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Payload: &quot;26 Cel&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>&lt;------</td>
<td>Header: 2.05</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>26 Cel</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Observe: 9</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Payload: &quot;26 Cel&quot;</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Client registers and receives one notification of the current state and one of a new state state when c.pmin time expires.
<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 12 | | | Payload: "18.5 Cel"
| 13 | | |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | | |
| 16 | | | Header: 2.05
| 17 | 2.05 | 23 Cel | Token: 0x4a
| 18 | 23 Cel | | Observe: 16
| 19 | | | Payload: "23 Cel"
| 20 | | |
| 21 | | |
| 22 | | |
| 23 | | |
| 24 | | |
| 25 | | |
| 26 | | |
| 27 | | |
| 28 | | |
| 29 | | |
| 30 | | |
| 31 | | |
| 32 | | |
| 33 | | |
| 34 | | |
| 35 | | | Header: 2.05
| 36 | | | Token: 0x4a
| 37 | 2.05 | 23 Cel | Observe: 37
| 38 | 23 Cel | | Payload: "23 Cel"
| 39 | | |
| 40 | | |
| 41 | | |
| 42 | | |

Figure 2: Client registers and receives one notification of the current state, one of a new state and one of an unchanged state when "c.pmax

A.3. Greater Than (c.gt) example
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Observed State</th>
<th>CLIENT State</th>
<th>SERVER State</th>
<th>Actual State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>___________</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18.5 Cel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>+-----+</td>
<td>GET</td>
<td></td>
<td>Header: GET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>GET</td>
<td></td>
<td>Token: 0x4a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uri-Path: temperature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uri-Query: c.gt=25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Observe: 0 (register)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>___________</td>
<td>&lt;-----+</td>
<td></td>
<td>Header: 2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>18.5 Cel</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td></td>
<td>Token: 0x4a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>18.5 Cel</td>
<td></td>
<td>Observe: 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Payload: &quot;18.5 Cel&quot;</td>
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<td>2.05</td>
<td>26 Cel</td>
<td>Token: 0x4a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>26 Cel</td>
<td></td>
<td>Observe: 16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Payload: &quot;26 Cel&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Client registers and receives one notification of the current state and one of a new state when it passes through the greater than threshold of 25.

A.4. Greater Than (c.gt) and Period Max (c.pmax) example
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>t</th>
<th>Observed State</th>
<th>CLIENT</th>
<th>SERVER</th>
<th>Actual State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18.5 Cel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Header: GET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Token: 0x4a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>GET</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uri-Path: temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uri-Query: c.pmax=20; c.gt=25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Observe: 0 (register)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
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Figure 4: Client registers and receives one notification of the current state, one when "c.pmax
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Group Communication for the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis-06

Abstract

This document specifies the use of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) for group communication, including the use of UDP/IP multicast as the default underlying data transport. Both unsecured and secured CoAP group communication are specified. Security is achieved by use of the Group Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE) protocol. The target application area of this specification is any group communication use cases that involve resource-constrained devices or networks that support CoAP. This document replaces RFC 7390, while it updates RFC 7252 and RFC 7641.

Discussion Venues

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Discussion of this document takes place on the CORE Working Group mailing list (core@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/core/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/core-wg/groupcomm-bis.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ............................................. 4
   1.1. Scope ............................................. 5
   1.2. Terminology ....................................... 5
   1.3. Changes to Other Documents ......................... 6
2. Group Definition and Group Configuration ................. 7
   2.1. Group Definition ................................... 7
       2.1.1. CoAP Group ................................... 7
       2.1.2. Application Group ............................ 7
       2.1.3. Security Group ............................... 8
       2.1.4. Relations Between Group Types ................. 8
   2.2. Group Configuration ................................. 11
       2.2.1. Group Naming .................................. 11
       2.2.2. Group Creation and Membership ................ 17
       2.2.3. Group Discovery ............................... 18
       2.2.4. Group Maintenance ............................. 25
3. CoAP Usage in Group Communication ....................... 26
   3.1. Request/Response Model .............................. 26
       3.1.1. General ....................................... 26
       3.1.2. Response Suppression ........................... 27
       3.1.3. Repeating a Request ............................ 27
       3.1.4. Request/Response Matching and Distinguishing Responses .................. 28
       3.1.5. Token Reuse .................................... 28
       3.1.6. Client Handling of Multiple Responses With Same Token .................. 29
1. Introduction

This document specifies group communication using the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252], together with UDP/IP multicast as the default transport for CoAP group communication messages. CoAP is a RESTful communication protocol that is used in resource-constrained nodes, and in resource-constrained networks where packet sizes should be small. This area of use is summarized as Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE).

One-to-many group communication can be achieved in CoAP, by a client using UDP/IP multicast data transport to send multicast CoAP request messages. In response, each server in the addressed group sends a response message back to the client over UDP/IP unicast. Notable CoAP implementations supporting group communication include the framework "Eclipse Californium" 2.0.x [Californium] from the Eclipse Foundation and the "Implementation of CoAP Server & Client in Go" [Go-OCF] from the Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF).

Both unsecured and secured CoAP group communication are specified in this document. Security is achieved by using Group Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE) [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], which in turn builds on Object Security for Constrained Restful Environments (OSCORE) [RFC8613]. This method provides end-to-end application-layer security protection of CoAP messages, by using CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct][I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs].

This document replaces and obsoletes [RFC7390], while it updates both [RFC7252] and [RFC7641]. A summary of the changes and additions to these documents is provided in Section 1.3.
All sections in the body of this document are normative, while appendices are informative. For additional background about use cases for CoAP group communication in resource-constrained devices and networks, see Appendix A.

1.1. Scope

For group communication, only those solutions that use CoAP messages over a "one-to-many" (i.e., non-unicast) transport protocol are in the scope of this document. There are alternative methods to achieve group communication using CoAP, using unicast only. One example is Publish-Subscribe [I-D.ietf-core-coap-pubsub] which uses a central broker server that CoAP clients access via unicast communication. These alternative methods may be usable for the same or similar use cases as the ones targeted in this document.

This document defines UDP/IP multicast as the default transport protocol for CoAP group requests, as in [RFC7252]. Other transport protocols (which may include broadcast, non-IP multicast, geocast, etc.) are not described in detail and are left for future work. Although UDP/IP multicast transport is assumed in most of the text in this document, we expect many of the considerations for UDP/IP multicast can be re-used for alternative transport protocols.

Furthermore, this document defines Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] as the default group communication security solution for CoAP. Security solutions for group communication and configuration other than Group OSCORE are left for future work. General principles for secure group configuration are in scope.

1.2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

This specification requires readers to be familiar with CoAP terminology [RFC7252]. Terminology related to group communication is defined in Section 2.1.

In addition, the following terms are extensively used.

* Group URI - This is defined as a CoAP URI that has the "coap" scheme and includes in the authority component either an IP multicast address or a group hostname (e.g., a Group Fully
Qualified Domain Name (FQDN)) that can be resolved to an IP multicast address. A group URI also contains an optional UDP port number in the authority component. Group URIs follow the regular CoAP URI syntax (see Section 6 of [RFC7252]).

* Security material - This refers to any security keys, counters or parameters stored in a device that are required to participate in secure group communication with other devices.

1.3. Changes to Other Documents

This document obsoletes and replaces [RFC7390] as follows.

* It defines separate definitions for CoAP groups, application groups and security groups, together with high-level guidelines on their configuration (see Section 2).

* It defines the use of Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] as the security protocol to protect group communication for CoAP, together with high-level guidelines on secure group maintenance (see Section 5).

* It updates all the guidelines about using group communication for CoAP (see Section 3).

* It strongly discourages unsecured group communication for CoAP based on the "NoSec" mode (see Section 4 and Section 6.1) and highlights the risk of amplification attacks (see Section 6.3).

This document updates [RFC7252] as follows.

* It updates the request/response model for group communication, as to response suppression (see Section 3.1.2) and token reuse time (see Section 3.1.5).

* It updates the freshness model and validation model to use for cached responses (see Section 3.2.1 and Section 3.2.2).

This document updates [RFC7641] as follows.

* It defines the use of the CoAP Observe Option in group requests, for both the GET method and the FETCH method [RFC8132], together with normative behavior for both CoAP clients and CoAP servers (see Section 3.7).
2. Group Definition and Group Configuration

In the following, different group types are first defined in Section 2.1. Then, Group configuration, including group creation and maintenance by an application, user or commissioning entity is considered in Section 2.2.

2.1. Group Definition

Three types of groups and their mutual relations are defined in this section: CoAP group, application group, and security group.

2.1.1. CoAP Group

A CoAP group is defined as a set of CoAP endpoints, where each endpoint is configured to receive CoAP group messages that are sent to the group’s associated IP multicast address and UDP port. That is, CoAP groups have relevance at the level of IP networks and CoAP endpoints.

An endpoint may be a member of multiple CoAP groups, by subscribing to multiple IP multicast addresses. A node may be a member of multiple CoAP groups, by hosting multiple CoAP server endpoints on different UDP ports. Group membership(s) of an endpoint or node may dynamically change over time. A node or endpoint sending a CoAP group message to a CoAP group is not necessarily itself a member of this CoAP group: it is a member only if it also has a CoAP endpoint listening on the group’s associated IP multicast address and UDP port.

A CoAP group is identified by information encoded within a group URI. Further details on identifying a CoAP group are provided in Section 2.2.1.1.

2.1.2. Application Group

An application group is a set of CoAP server endpoints (hosted on different nodes) that share a common set of CoAP resources. That is, an application group has relevance at the application level. For example, an application group could denote all lights in an office room or all sensors in a hallway.

An endpoint may be a member of multiple application groups. A client endpoint that sends a group communication message to an application group is not necessarily itself a member of this application group.
There can be a one-to-one or a one-to-many relation between a CoAP group and application group(s). Such relations are discussed in more detail in Section 2.1.4.

An application group name may be explicitly encoded in the group URI of a CoAP request, for example in the URI path component. If this is not the case, the application group is implicitly derived by the receiver, e.g., based on information in the CoAP request or other contextual information. Further details on identifying an application group are provided in Section 2.2.1.2.

2.1.3. Security Group

For secure group communication, a security group is required. A security group comprises endpoints storing shared group security material, such that they can use it to protect and verify mutually exchanged messages.

That is, a client endpoint needs to be a member of a security group in order to send a valid secured group communication message to that group. A server endpoint needs to be a member of a security group in order to receive and correctly verify a secured group communication message sent to that group. An endpoint may be a member of multiple security groups.

There can be a many-to-many relation between security groups and CoAP groups, but often it is one-to-one. Also, there can be a many-to-many relation between security groups and application groups, but often it is one-to-one. Such relations are discussed in more detail in Section 2.1.4.

A special security group named "NoSec" identifies group communication without any security at the transport layer nor at the CoAP layer. Further details on identifying a security group are provided in Section 2.2.1.3.

2.1.4. Relations Between Group Types

Using the above group type definitions, a CoAP group communication message sent by an endpoint can be represented as a tuple that contains one instance of each group type:

(application group, CoAP group, security group)

A special note is appropriate about the possible relation between security groups and application groups.
On one hand, multiple application groups may use the same security group. Thus, the same group security material is used to protect the messages targeting any of those application groups. This has the benefit that typically less storage, configuration and updating are required for security material. In this case, a CoAP endpoint is supposed to know the exact application group to refer to for each message that is sent or received, based on, e.g., the used server port number, the targeted resource, or the content and structure of the message payload.

On the other hand, a single application group may use multiple security groups. Thus, different messages targeting the resources of the application group can be protected with different security material. This can be convenient, for example, if the security groups differ with respect to the cryptographic algorithms and related parameters they use. In this case, a CoAP client can join just one of the security groups, based on what it supports and prefers, while a CoAP server in the application group would rather have to join all of them.

Beyond this particular case, applications should be careful in associating a same application group to multiple security groups. In particular, it is NOT RECOMMENDED to use different security groups to reflect different access policies for resources in a same application group. That is, being a member of a security group actually grants access only to exchange secured messages and enables authentication of group members, while access control (authorization) to use resources in the application group belongs to a separate security domain. It has to be separately enforced by leveraging the resource properties or through dedicated access control credentials assessed by separate means.

Figure 1 summarizes the relations between the different types of groups described above in UML class diagram notation. The class attributes in square brackets are optionally defined.
Figure 2 provides a deployment example of the relations between the different types of groups. It shows six CoAP servers (Srv1-Srv6) and their respective resources hosted (/resX). There are three application groups (1, 2, 3) and two security groups (1, 2). Security Group 1 is used by both Application Group 1 and 2. Three clients (Cli1, Cli2, Cli3) are configured with security material for Security Group 1. Two clients (Cli2, Cli4) are configured with security material for Security Group 2. All the shown application groups use the same CoAP group (not shown in the figure), i.e., one specific multicast IP address and UDP port number on which all the shown resources are hosted for each server.
2.2. Group Configuration

The following defines how groups of different types are named, created, discovered and maintained.

2.2.1. Group Naming

Different types of group are named as specified below, separately for CoAP groups, application groups and security groups.

2.2.1.1. CoAP Groups

A CoAP group is identified and named by the authority component in the group URI (see Section 2.1.1), which includes the host subcomponent (possibly an IP multicast address literal) and an optional UDP port number. Note that the two authority components <HOST> and <HOST>:5683 both identify the same CoAP group, whose members listen to the CoAP default port number 5683.

When configuring a CoAP group membership, it is recommended to configure an endpoint with an IP multicast address literal, instead of a group hostname. This is because DNS infrastructure may not be deployed in many constrained networks. In case a group hostname is configured, it can be uniquely mapped to an IP multicast address via DNS resolution, if DNS client functionality is available in the endpoint being configured and the DNS service is supported in the network.
Examples of hierarchical CoAP group FQDN naming (and scoping) for a building control application were shown in Section 2.2 of [RFC7390].

2.2.1.2. Application Groups

An application group can be named in many ways through different types of identifiers, such as name string, (integer) number, URI or other types of string. The decision of whether and how exactly an application group name is encoded and transported is application specific.

The following defines a number of possible methods to use. The shown examples consider a CoAP group identified by the group hostname grp.example.org. Its members are CoAP servers listening to the associated IP multicast address ff35:30:2001:db8:f1::8000:1 and port number 5685. Note that a group hostname is used here to have better-readable examples: in practice, an implementation would likely use an IP address literal as the host component of the Group URI in order to reduce the size of the CoAP request. In particular, the Uri-Host Option can be fully elided in this case. Also note that the Uri-Port Option does not appear in the examples, since the port number 5685 is already included in the CoAP request’s UDP header (which is not shown in the examples).

An application group name can be explicitly encoded in a group URI. In such a case, it can be encoded within one of the following URI components.

* URI path component - This is the most common and RECOMMENDED method to encode the application group name. When using this method in constrained networks, an application group name GROUPNAME should be as short as possible. A best practice for doing so is to use a URI path component such that: i) it includes a path segment as delimiter with a designated value, e.g., "gp", followed by ii) a path segment with value the name of the application group, followed by iii) the path segment(s) that identify the targeted resource within the application group. For example, both /gp/GROUPNAME/res1 and /base/gp/GROUPNAME/res1/res2 conform to this practice. Just like application group names, the path segment used as delimiter should be as short as possible in constrained networks.

A full-fledged example is provided in Figure 3. Another example of a compact CoAP request is provided in Figure 4, in which an IPv6 literal address and the default CoAP port number 5683 are used in the authority component. Also the resource structure is different in this example.
Application group name: gp1

CoAP group request
   Header: GET (T=NON, Code=0.01, MID=0x7d41)
   Uri-Host: grp.example.org
   Uri-Path: gp
   Uri-Path: gp1
   Uri-Path: light
   Uri-Query: foo=bar

Figure 3: Example of application group name in URI path 1/2

Application group name: gp1
Group URI: coap://[ff35:30:2001:db8:f1::8000:1]/g/gp1/li

CoAP group request
   Header: POST (T=NON, Code=0.02, MID=0x7d41)
   Uri-Path: g
   Uri-Path: gp1
   Uri-Path: li

Figure 4: Example of application group name in URI path 2/2

* URI query component - This method can use the following formats.
In either case, when using this method in constrained networks, an application group name GROUPNAME should be as short as possible.

   - As a first alternative, the URI query component consists of only one parameter, which has no value and has the name of the application group as its own identifier. That is, the query component ?GROUPNAME conforms to this format.

A full-fledged example is provided in Figure 5.

   - As a second alternative, the URI query component includes a query parameter as designated indicator, e.g., "gp", with value the name of the application group. That is, assuming "gp" to be used as designated indicator, both the query components ?gp=GROUPNAME and ?par1=v1&gp=GROUPNAME conform to this format.

A full-fledged example is provided in Figure 6.
Application group name: gp1

Group URI: coap://grp.example.org:5685/light?gp1

CoAP group request
   Header: GET (T=NON, Code=0.01, MID=0x7d41)
   Uri-Host: grp.example.org
   Uri-Path: light
   Uri-Query: gp1

Figure 5: Example of application group name in URI query (1/2)

Application group name: gp1

Group URI: coap://grp.example.org:5685/light?foo=bar&gp=gp1

CoAP group request
   Header: GET (T=NON, Code=0.01, MID=0x7d41)
   Uri-Host: grp.example.org
   Uri-Path: light
   Uri-Query: foo=bar
   Uri-Query: gp=gp1

Figure 6: Example of application group name in URI query (2/2)

* URI authority component - If this method is used, the application group is identified by the authority component as a whole.

In particular, the application group has the same name of the CoAP group expressed by the group URI (see Section 2.2.1.1). Thus, this method can only be used if there is a one-to-one mapping between CoAP groups and application groups (see Section 2.1.4).

A full-fledged example is provided in Figure 7.

Application group name: grp.example.org:5685

Group URI: coap://grp.example.org:5685/light?foo=bar

CoAP group request
   Header: GET (T=NON, Code=0.01, MID=0x7d41)
   Uri-Host: grp.example.org
   Uri-Path: light
   Uri-Query: foo=bar

Figure 7: Example of application group name in URI authority
* URI host subcomponent - If this method is used, the application
group is identified solely by the host subcomponent of the
authority component.

Since an application group can be associated with only one CoAP
group (see Section 2.1.4), using this method implies that any two
CoAP groups cannot differ only by the port subcomponent of the URI
authority component.

A full-fledged example is provided in Figure 8.

Application group name: grp.example.org

Group URI: coap://grp.example.org:5685/light?foo=bar

CoAP group request
  Header: GET (T=NON, Code=0.01, MID=0x7d41)
  Uri-Host: grp.example.org
  Uri-Path: light
  Uri-Query: foo=bar

Figure 8: Example of application group name in URI host

* URI port subcomponent - By using this method, the application
group is uniquely identified by the destination port number
encoded in the port subcomponent of the authority component.

Since an application group can be associated with only one CoAP
group (see Section 2.1.4), using this method implies that any two
CoAP groups cannot differ only by their host subcomponent of the URI
authority component.

A full-fledged example is provided in Figure 9.

Application group name: grpl, as inferable from port number 5685

Group URI: coap://grp.example.org:5685/light?foo=bar

CoAP group request
  Header: GET(T=NON, Code=0.01, MID=0x7d41)
  Uri-Host: grp.example.org
  Uri-Path: light
  Uri-Query: foo=bar

Figure 9: Example of application group name in URI port
Alternatively, there are also methods to encode the application group name within the CoAP request, even though it is not encoded within the group URI. An example of such method is summarized below.

* The application group name can be encoded in a new (e.g., custom, application-specific) CoAP Option, which the client adds to the CoAP request before sending it out.

Upon receiving the request as a member of the targeted CoAP group, each CoAP server would, by design, understand this Option, decode it and treat the result as an application group name.

A full-fledged example is provided in Figure 10.

Application group name: grp1

Group URI: coap://grp.example.org:5685/light?foo=bar

CoAP group request
  Header: GET (T=NON, Code=0.01, MID=0x7d41)
  Uri-Host: grp.example.org
  Uri-Path: light
  Uri-Query: foo=bar
  App-Group-Name: grp1  // new (e.g., custom) CoAP option

Figure 10: Example of application group name in a new CoAP Option

Furthermore, it is possible to encode the application group name neither in the group URI nor within a CoAP request, thus yielding the most compact representation on the wire. In this case, each CoAP server needs to determine the right application group based on contextual information, such as the client identity and/or the target resource. For example, each application group on a server could support a unique set of resources, such that it does not overlap with the set of resources of any other application group.

Finally, Appendix A of [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory] provides an example of application group registered to a Resource Directory (RD), along with the CoAP group it uses and the resources it supports. In that example, an application group name "lights" is encoded in the "ep" (endpoint) attribute of the RD registration entry. At the same time, the CoAP group is ff35:30:2001:db8:f1::8000:1 and the "NoSec" security group is used.
2.2.1.3. Security Groups

A security group is identified by a stable and invariant string used as group name. This is generally not related with other kinds of group identifiers that may be specific of the used security solution.

The "NoSec" security group name MUST be only used to represent the case of group communication without any security. This typically results in CoAP messages that do not include any security group name, identifier, or security-related data structures.

2.2.2. Group Creation and Membership

To create a CoAP group, a configuring entity defines an IP multicast address (or hostname) for the group and optionally a UDP port number in case it differs from the default CoAP port number 5683. Then, it configures one or more devices as listeners to that IP multicast address, with a CoAP endpoint listening on the group's associated UDP port. These endpoints/devices are the group members. The configuring entity can be, for example, a local application with pre-configuration, a user, a software developer, a cloud service, or a local commissioning tool. Also, the devices sending CoAP requests to the group in the role of CoAP client need to be configured with the same information, even though they are not necessarily group members.

One way to configure a client is to supply it with a group URI. The IETF does not define a mandatory protocol to accomplish CoAP group creation. [RFC7390] defined an experimental protocol for configuration of group membership for unsecured group communication, based on JSON-formatted configuration resources. For IPv6 CoAP groups, common multicast address ranges that are used to configure group addresses are ff1x::/16 and ff3x::/16.

To create an application group, a configuring entity may configure a resource (name) or a set of resources on CoAP endpoints, such that a CoAP request sent to a group URI by a configured CoAP client will be processed by one or more CoAP servers that have the matching URI path configured. These servers are the members of the application group.

To create a security group, a configuring entity defines an initial subset of the related security material. This comprises a set of group properties including the cryptographic algorithms and parameters used in the group, as well as additional information relevant throughout the group life-cycle, such as the security group name and description. This task MAY be entrusted to a dedicated administrator, that interacts with a Group Manager as defined in Section 5. After that, further security materials to protect group communications have to be generated, compatible with the specified group configuration.
To participate in a security group, CoAP endpoints have to be configured with the group security material used to protect communications in the associated application/CoAP groups. The part of the process that involves secure distribution of group security material MAY use standardized communication with a Group Manager as defined in Section 5. For unsecure group communication using the "NoSec" security group, any CoAP endpoint may become a group member at any time: there is no configuring entity that needs to provide security material for this group, as there is no security material for it. This means that group creation and membership cannot be tightly controlled for the "NoSec" group.

The configuration of groups and membership may be performed at different moments in the life-cycle of a device; for example during product (software) creation, in the factory, at a reseller, on-site during first deployment, or on-site during a system reconfiguration operation.

2.2.3. Group Discovery

The following describes how a CoAP endpoint can discover groups by different means, i.e., by using a Resource Directory or directly from the CoAP servers that are members of such groups.

2.2.3.1. Discovery through a Resource Directory

It is possible for CoAP endpoints to discover application groups as well as CoAP groups, by using the RD-Groups usage pattern of the CoRE Resource Directory (RD), as defined in Appendix A of [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory].

In particular, an application group can be registered to the RD, specifying the reference IP multicast address of its associated CoAP group. The registration of groups to the RD is typically performed by a Commissioning Tool. Later on, CoAP endpoints can discover the registered application groups and related CoAP group(s), by using the lookup interface of the RD.

When secure communication is provided with Group OSCORE (see Section 5), the approach described in [I-D.tiloca-core-oscore-discovery] also based on the RD can be used, in order to discover the security group to join.
In particular, the responsible OSCORE Group Manager registers its security groups to the RD, as links to its own corresponding resources for joining the security groups [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]. Later on, CoAP endpoints can discover the registered security groups and related application groups, by using the lookup interface of the RD, and then join the security group through the respective Group Manager.

2.2.3.2. Discovery from the CoAP Servers

It is possible for CoAP endpoints to discover application groups and CoAP groups from the CoAP servers that are members of such groups, by using a GET request targeting the /.well-known/core resource.

As shown below, such a GET request may be sent to the IP multicast address of an already known CoAP group associated with one or more application groups; or to the "All CoAP Nodes" multicast address, thus targeting all reachable CoAP servers in any CoAP group. Also, the GET request may specify a query component, in order to filter the application groups of interest.

These particular details concerning the GET request depend on the specific discovery action intended by the client and on application-specific means used to encode names of application groups and CoAP groups, e.g., in group URIs and/or CoRE target attributes used with resource links.

The following provides examples of methods to discover application groups and CoAP groups, building on the following assumptions. First, application group names are encoded in the path component of Group URIs (see Section 2.2.1.2), using the path segment "gp" as designated delimiter. Second, the type of an application group is encoded in the CoRE Link Format attribute "rt" of a group resource with a value "g.<GROUPTYPE>". Third, a CoAP group is used and is identified by the URI authority grp.example.org:5685.

* A CoAP client can discover all the application groups associated with a specific CoAP group.

This is achieved by sending the GET request above to the IP multicast address of the CoAP group, and specifying a wildcarded group type "g._" as resource type in the URI query parameter "rt". For example, the request can use a Group URI with path and query components "/.well-known/core?rt=g._", so that the query matches any application group resource type. Alternatively, the request can use a Group URI with path and query components "/.well-known/core?href=/gp/"", so that the query matches any application group resources and also matches any sub-resources of those.
Through the corresponding responses, the query result is a list of resources at CoAP servers that are members of the specified CoAP group and have at least one application group associated with the CoAP group. That is, the client gains knowledge of: i) the set of servers that are members of the specified CoAP group and member of any of the associated application groups; ii) for each of those servers, the name of the application groups where the server is a member and that are associated with the CoAP group.

A full-fledged example is provided in Figure 11.

Each of the servers S1 and S2 is identified by the IP source address of the CoAP response. If the client wishes to discover resources that a particular server hosts within a particular application group, it may use unicast discovery request(s) to this server i.e., to its respective unicast IP address. Alternatively, the client may use the discovered group resource type (e.g., rt=g.light) to infer which resources are present below the group resource.

// Request to all members of the CoAP group
Req: GET coap://grp.example.org:5685/.well-known/core?rt=g.*

// Response from server S1, as member of:
//   - The CoAP group "grp.example.org:5685"
//   - The application group "gp1"
Res: 2.05 Content
Payload:
</gp/gp1>;rt=g.light

// Response from server S2, as member of:
//   - The CoAP group "grp.example.org:5685"
//   - The application groups "gp1" and "gp2"
Res: 2.05 Content
Payload:
</gp/gp1>;rt=g.light,
</gp/gp2>;rt=g.temp

Figure 11: Discovery of application groups associated with a CoAP group

* A CoAP client can discover the CoAP servers that are members of a specific application group, the CoAP group associated with the application group, and optionally the resources that those servers host for each application group.
This is achieved by sending the GET request above to the "All CoAP Nodes" IP multicast address (see Section 12.8 of [RFC7252]), with a particular chosen scope (e.g., site-local or realm-local) if IPv6 is used. Also, the request specifies the application group name of interest in the URI query component, as defined in Section 2.2.1.2. For example, the request can use a Group URI with path and query components "/.well-known/core?href=/gp/gp1" to specify the application group with name "gp1".

Through the corresponding responses, the query result is a list of resources at CoAP servers that are members of the specified application group and for each application group the associated CoAP group. That is, the client gains knowledge of: i) the set of servers that are members of the specified application group and of the associated CoAP group; ii) for each of those servers, optionally the resources it hosts within the application group.

A full-fledged example is provided in Figure 12. Note that the servers need to respond now with an absolute URI and not a relative URI like in the previous example, because the group resource "gp1" is hosted at the authority indicated by the CoAP group (grp.example.org:5685) and not by the authority that is serving the Link Format document (which is [ff03::fd]:5683).

If the client wishes to discover resources that a particular server hosts within a particular application group, it may use unicast discovery request(s) to this server.

// Request to realm-local members of the application group "gp1"
Req: GET coap://[ff03::fd]/.well-known/core?href=/gp/gp1

// CoAP response from server S1, as member of:
//   - The CoAP group "grp.example.org:5685"
//   - The application group "gp1"
Res: 2.05 Content
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
<coap://grp.example.org:5685/gp/gp1>;rt=g.light

// CoAP response from server S2, as member of:
//   - The CoAP group "grp.example.org:5685"
//   - The application groups "gp1"
Res: 2.05 Content
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
<coap://grp.example.org:5685/gp/gp1>;rt=g.light
A CoAP client can discover the CoAP servers that are members of any application group of a specific type, the CoAP group associated with those application groups, and optionally the resources that those servers host as members of those application groups.

This is achieved by sending the GET request above to the "All CoAP Nodes" IP multicast address (see Section 12.8 of [RFC7252]), with a particular chosen scope (e.g., site-local or realm-local) if IPv6 is used. Also, the request can specify the application group type of interest in the URI query component as value of a query parameter "rt". For example, the request can use a Group URI with path and query components "/.well-known/core?rt=TypeA" to specify the application group type "TypeA".

Through the corresponding responses, the query result is a list of resources at CoAP servers that are members of any application group of the specified type and of the CoAP group associated with each of those application groups. That is, the client gains knowledge of: i) the set of servers that are members of the application groups of the specified type and of the associated CoAP group; ii) optionally for each of those servers, the resources it hosts within each of those application groups.

A full-fledged example is provided in Figure 13.

If the client wishes to discover resources that a particular server hosts within a particular application group, it may use unicast discovery request(s) to this server.
// Request to realm-local members of application groups
// with group type "g.temp"
Req: GET coap://[ff03::fd]/.well-known/core?rt=g.temp

// Response from server S1, as member of:
// - The CoAP group "grp.example.org:5685"
// - The application group "gp1" of type "g.temp"
Res: 2.05 Content
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
<coap://grp.example.org:5685/gp/gp1>;rt=g.temp

// Response from server S2, as member of:
// - The CoAP group "grp.example.org:5685"
// - The application groups "gp1" and "gp2" of type "g.temp"
Res: 2.05 Content
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
<coap://grp.example.org:5685/gp/gp1>;rt=g.temp,
<coap://grp.example.org:5685/gp/gp2>;rt=g.temp

Figure 13: Discovery of members of application groups of a
specified type, and of the associated CoAP group

* A CoAP client can discover the CoAP servers that are members of
any application group configured in the 6LoWPAN wireless mesh
network of the client, the CoAP group associated with each
application group, and optionally the resources that those servers
host as members of the application group.

This is achieved by sending the GET request above with a query
specifying a wildcarded group type in the URI query parameter for
"rt". For example, a Group URI with path and query components
"/well-known/core?rt=g.*", so that the query matches any
application group type. The request is sent to the "All CoAP
Nodes" IP multicast address (see Section 12.8 of [RFC7252]), with
a particular chosen scope if IPv6 is used. In this example the
scope is realm-local to address all servers in the current 6LoWPAN
wireless mesh network of the client.

Through the corresponding responses, the query result is a list of
group resources hosted by any server in the mesh network. Each
group resource denotes one application group membership of a
server. The CoAP group per application group is obtained as the
authority of each returned link.

A full-fledged example is provided in Figure 14.
If the client wishes to discover resources that a particular
server hosts within a particular application group, it may use
unicast discovery request(s) to this server.

// Request to realm-local members of any application group
Req: GET coap://[ff03::fd]/.well-known/core?rt=g.*

// Response from server S1, as member of:
//   - The CoAP groups "grp.example.org:5685" and "grp2.example.org"
//   - The application groups "gp1" and "gp5"
Res: 2.05 Content
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
<coap://grp.example.org:5685/gp/gp1>;rt=g.light,
<coap://grp2.example.org/gp/gp5>;rt=g.lock

// Response from server S2, as member of:
//   - The CoAP group "grp.example.org:5685"
//   - The application groups "gp1" and "gp2"
Res: 2.05 Content
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
<coap://grp.example.org:5685/gp/gp1>;rt=g.light,
<coap://grp.example.org:5685/gp/gp2>;rt=g.light

// Response from server S3, as member of:
//   - The CoAP group "grp2.example.org"
//   - The application group "gp5"
Res: 2.05 Content
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
<coap://grp2.example.org/gp/gp5>;rt=g.lock

Figure 14: Discovery of the resources and members of any
application group, and of the associated CoAP group

Note that all the above examples are application-specific. That is,
there is currently no standard way of encoding names of application
groups and CoAP groups in group URIs and/or CoRE target attributes
used with resource links. In particular, the discovery of groups
through the RD mentioned in Section 2.2.3.1 is only defined for use
with an RD, i.e., not directly with CoAP servers as group members.

For example, some applications may use the "rt" attribute on a parent
resource to denote support for a particular REST API to access child
resources, as detailed in the example in Figure 15. In this example
a custom Link Format attribute "gpt" is used to denote the group type
within the scope of the application/system. An alternative, shorter
encoding (not shown in the figure) is to use only the value "1" for each "gpt" attribute, to denote that the resource is of type application group. In that case information about the semantics/API of the group resource is disclosed only via the "rt" attribute as shown in the figure.

// Request to realm-local members of any application group
Req: GET coap://[ff03::fd]/.well-known/core?gpt=*  

// Response from server S1, as member of:
//   - The CoAP groups "grp.example.org:5685" and "grp2.example.org"
//   - The application groups "gp1" and "gp5"
Res: 2.05 Content
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
<coap://grp.example.org:5685/gp/gp1>;rt=oic.d.light;gpt=light,
<coap://grp2.example.org/gp/gp5>;rt=oic.d.smartlock;gpt=lock

// Response from server S2, as member of:
//   - The CoAP group "grp.example.org:5685"
//   - The application groups "gp1" and "gp2"
Res: 2.05 Content
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
<coap://grp.example.org:5685/gp/gp1>;rt=oic.d.light;gpt=light,
<coap://grp.example.org:5685/gp/gp2>;rt=oic.d.light;gpt=light

// Response from server S3, as member of:
//   - The CoAP group "grp2.example.org"
//   - The application group "gp5"
Res: 2.05 Content
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
<coap://grp2.example.org/gp/gp5>;rt=oic.d.smartlock;gpt=lock

Figure 15: Example of using a custom ‘gpt’ link attribute to denote group type

2.2.4. Group Maintenance

Maintenance of a group includes any necessary operations to cope with changes in a system, such as: adding group members, removing group members, changing group security material, reconfiguration of UDP port number and/or IP multicast address, reconfiguration of the group URI, renaming of application groups, splitting of groups, or merging of groups.
For unsecured group communication (see Section 4) i.e., the "NoSec" security group, addition/removal of CoAP group members is simply done by configuring these devices to start/stop listening to the group IP multicast address on the group’s UDP port.

For secured group communication (see Section 5), the maintenance operations of the protocol Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] MUST be implemented. When using Group OSCORE, CoAP endpoints participating in group communication are also members of a corresponding OSCORE security group, and thus share common security material. Additional related maintenance operations are discussed in Section 5.2.

3. CoAP Usage in Group Communication

This section specifies the usage of CoAP in group communication, both unsecured and secured. This includes additional support for protocol extensions, such as Observe (see Section 3.7) and block-wise transfer (see Section 3.8).

How CoAP group messages are carried over various transport layers is the subject of Section 3.9. Finally, Section 3.10 covers the interworking of CoAP group communication with other protocols that may operate in the same network.

3.1. Request/Response Model

3.1.1. General

A CoAP client is an endpoint able to transmit CoAP requests and receive CoAP responses. Since the underlying UDP transport supports multiplexing by means of UDP port number, there can be multiple independent CoAP clients operational on a single host. On each UDP port, an independent CoAP client can be hosted. Each independent CoAP client sends requests that use the associated endpoint’s UDP port number as the UDP source port number of the request.

All CoAP requests that are sent via IP multicast MUST be Non-confirmable, see Section 8.1 of [RFC7252]. The Message ID in an IP multicast CoAP message is used for optional message deduplication by both clients and servers, as detailed in Section 4.5 of [RFC7252]. A server sends back a unicast response to a CoAP group request. The unicast responses received by the CoAP client may be a mixture of success (e.g., 2.05 Content) and failure (e.g., 4.04 Not Found) codes, depending on the individual server processing results.
3.1.2. Response Suppression

A server MAY suppress its response for various reasons given in Section 8.2 of [RFC7252]. This document adds the requirement that a server SHOULD suppress the response in case of error or in case there is nothing useful to respond, unless the application related to a particular resource requires such a response to be made for that resource.

The CoAP No-Response Option [RFC7967] can be used by a client to influence the default response suppression on the server side. It is RECOMMENDED for a server to support this option only on selected resources where it is useful in the application context. If the option is supported on a resource, it MUST override the default response suppression of that resource.

Any default response suppression by a server SHOULD be performed consistently, as follows: if a request on a resource produces a particular Response Code and this response is not suppressed, then another request on the same resource that produces a response of the same Response Code class is also not suppressed. For example, if a 4.05 Method Not Allowed error response code is suppressed by default on a resource, then a 4.15 Unsupported Content-Format error response code is also suppressed by default for that resource.

3.1.3. Repeating a Request

A CoAP client MAY repeat a group request using the same Token value and same Message ID value, in order to ensure that enough (or all) group members have been reached with the request. This is useful in case a number of group members did not respond to the initial request and the client suspects that the request did not reach these group members. However, in case one or more servers did receive the initial request but the response to that request was lost, this repeat does not help to retrieve the lost response(s) if the server(s) implement the optional Message ID based deduplication (Section 4.5 of [RFC7252]).

A CoAP client MAY repeat a group request using the same Token value and a different Message ID, in which case all servers that received the initial request will again process the repeated request since it appears within a new CoAP message. This is useful in case a client suspects that one or more response(s) to its original request were lost and the client needs to collect more, or even all, responses from group members, even if this comes at the cost of the overhead of certain group members responding twice (once to the original request, and once to the repeated request with different Message ID).
3.1.4. Request/Response Matching and Distinguishing Responses

A CoAP client can distinguish the origin of multiple server responses by the source IP address of the message containing the CoAP response and/or any other available application-specific source identifiers contained in the CoAP response payload or CoAP response options, such as an application-level unique ID associated with the server. If secure communication is provided with Group OSCORE (see Section 5), additional security-related identifiers in the CoAP response enable the client to retrieve the right security material for decrypting each response and authenticating its source.

While processing a response on the client, the source endpoint of the response is not matched to the destination endpoint of the request, since for a group request these will never match. This is specified in Section 8.2 of [RFC7252], with reference to IP multicast.

Also, when UDP transport is used, this implies that a server MAY respond from a UDP port number that differs from the destination UDP port number of the request, although a CoAP server normally SHOULD respond from the UDP port number that equals the destination port number of the request -- following the convention for UDP-based protocols.

In case a single client has sent multiple group requests and concurrent CoAP transactions are ongoing, the responses received by that client are matched to an active request using only the Token value. Due to UDP level multiplexing, the UDP destination port number of the response MUST match to the client endpoint’s UDP port number, i.e., to the UDP source port number of the client’s request.

3.1.5. Token Reuse

For CoAP group requests, there are additional constraints on the reuse of Token values at the client, compared to the unicast case defined in [RFC7252] and updated by [RFC9175]. Since for CoAP group requests the number of responses is not bound a priori, the client cannot use the reception of a response as a trigger to "free up" a Token value for reuse.

Reusing a Token value too early could lead to incorrect response/request matching on the client, and would be a protocol error. Therefore, the time between reuse of Token values for different group requests MUST be greater than:

\[
\text{MIN\_TOKEN\_REUSE\_TIME} = (\text{NON\_LIFETIME} + \text{MAX\_LATENCY} + \text{MAX\_SERVER\_RESPONSE\_DELAY})
\]
where NON_LIFETIME and MAX_LATENCY are defined in Section 4.8 of [RFC7252]. This specification defines MAX_SERVER_RESPONSE_DELAY as was done in [RFC7390], that is: the expected maximum response delay over all servers that the client can send a CoAP group request to. This delay includes the maximum Leisure time period as defined in Section 8.2 of [RFC7252]. However, CoAP does not define a time limit for the server response delay. Using the default CoAP parameters, the Token reuse time MUST be greater than 250 seconds plus MAX_SERVER_RESPONSE_DELAY.

A preferred solution to meet this requirement is to generate a new unique Token for every new group request, such that a Token value is never reused. If a client has to reuse Token values for some reason, and also MAX_SERVER_RESPONSE_DELAY is unknown, then using MAX_SERVER_RESPONSE_DELAY = 250 seconds is a reasonable guideline. The time between Token reuses is in that case set to a value greater than MIN_TOKEN_REUSE_TIME = 500 seconds.

When securing CoAP group communication with Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], secure binding between requests and responses is ensured (see Section 5). Thus, a client may reuse a Token value after it has been freed up, as discussed above and considering a reuse time greater than MIN_TOKEN_REUSE_TIME. If an alternative security protocol for CoAP group communication is used which does not ensure secure binding between requests and responses, a client MUST follow the Token processing requirements as defined in [RFC9175].

Another method to more easily meet the above constraint is to instantiate multiple CoAP clients at multiple UDP ports on the same host. The Token values only have to be unique within the context of a single CoAP client, so using multiple clients can make it easier to meet the constraint.

3.1.6. Client Handling of Multiple Responses With Same Token

Since a client sending a group request with a Token T will accept multiple responses with the same Token T, it is possible in particular that the same server sends multiple responses with the same Token T back to the client. For example, this server might not implement the optional CoAP message deduplication based on Message ID; or it might be acting out of specification as a malicious, compromised or faulty server.

When this happens, the client normally processes at the CoAP layer each of those responses to the same request coming from the same server. If the processing of a response is successful, the client delivers this response to the application as usual.
Then, the application is in a better position to decide what to do, depending on the available context information. For instance, it might accept and process all the responses from the same server, even if they are not Observe notifications (i.e., they do not include an Observe option). Alternatively, the application might accept and process only one of those responses, such as the most recent one from that server, e.g., when this can trigger a change of state within the application.

3.2. Caching

CoAP endpoints that are members of a CoAP group MAY cache responses to a group request as defined in Section 5.6 of [RFC7252]. In particular, these same rules apply to determine the set of request options used as "Cache-Key".

Furthermore, building on what is defined in Section 8.2.1 of [RFC7252]:

* A client sending a GET or FETCH group request MAY update a cache with the responses from the servers in the CoAP group. Then, the client uses both cached-still-fresh and new responses as the result of the group request.

* A client sending a GET or FETCH group request MAY use a response received from a server, to satisfy a subsequent sent request intended to that server on the related unicast request URI. In particular, the unicast request URI is obtained by replacing the authority component of the request URI with the transport-layer source address of the cached response message.

* A client MAY revalidate a cached response by making a GET or FETCH request on the related unicast request URI.

Note that, in the presence of proxies, doing any of the above (optional) unicast requests requires the client to distinguish the different responses to a group request, as well as to distinguish the different origin servers that responded. This in turn requires additional means to provide the client with information about the origin server of each response, e.g., using the forward-proxying method defines in [I-D.tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy].

The following subsections define the freshness model and validation model to use for cached responses, which update the models defined in Sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 of [RFC7252], respectively.
3.2.1. Freshness Model

For caching of group communication responses at client endpoints, the same freshness model relying on the Max-Age Option as defined in Section 5.6.1 of [RFC7252] applies, and the multicast caching rules of Section 8.2.1 of [RFC7252] apply except for the one discussed below.

In Section 8.2.1 of [RFC7252] it is stated that, regardless of the presence of cached responses to the group request, the client endpoint will always send out a new group request onto the network because new group members may have joined the group since the last group request to the same group/resource. That is, a request is never served from cached responses only. This document updates [RFC7252] by adding the following exception case, where a client endpoint MAY serve a request by using cached responses only, and not send out a new group request onto the network:

* The client knows all current CoAP server group members; and, for each group member, the client’s cache currently stores a fresh response.

How the client in the case above determines the current CoAP server group members is out of scope for this document. It may be, for example, via a group manager server, or by observing group join requests, or observing IGMP/MLD multicast group join messages, etc.

For caching at proxies, the freshness model defined in [I-D.tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy] can be used.

3.2.2. Validation Model

For validation of cached group communication responses at client endpoints, the multicast validation rules in Section 8.2.1 of [RFC7252] apply, except for the last paragraph which states "A GET request to a multicast group MUST NOT contain an ETag option". This document updates [RFC7252] by allowing a group request to contain ETag Options as specified below.

For validation at proxies, the validation model defined in [I-D.tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy] can be used.
3.2.2.1. ETag Option in a Group Request/Response

A client endpoint MAY include one or more ETag Options in a GET or FETCH group request to validate one or more stored responses it has cached. In case two or more servers in the group have responded to a previous request to the same resource with an identical ETag value, it is the responsibility of the client to handle this case. In particular, if the client wishes to validate, using a group request, a response from server 1 with an ETag value N, while it does not wish to validate a response from server 2 with the same ETag value N, there is no way to achieve this. In such cases of identical ETag values returned by two or more servers, the client, by default, SHOULD NOT include an ETag Option in a group request containing that ETag value.

A server endpoint MUST process an ETag Option in a GET or FETCH group request in the same way it processes an ETag Option for a unicast request. A server endpoint that includes an ETag Option in a response to a group request SHOULD construct the ETag Option value in such a way that the value will be unique to this particular server with a high probability. This can be done, for example, by embedding a compact ID of the server within the ETag value, where the ID is unique (or unique with a high probability) in the scope of the group.

Note: a legacy CoAP server might treat an ETag Option in a group request as an unrecognized option per Sections 5.4 and 8.2.1 of [RFC7252], causing it to ignore this (elective) ETag Option regardless of its value, and process the request normally as if that ETag Option was not included.

3.3. URI Path Selection

The URI Path used in a group request is preferably a path that is known to be supported across all group members. However there are valid use cases where a group request is known to be successful only for a subset of the CoAP group, for example only members of a specific application group, while those group members for which the request is unsuccessful (for example because they are outside the application group) either ignore the group request or respond with an error status code.
3.4. Port Selection for UDP Transport

A server that is a member of a CoAP group listens for CoAP request messages on the group’s IP multicast address, usually on the CoAP default UDP port number 5683, or another non-default UDP port number if configured. Regardless of the method for selecting the port number, the same port number MUST be used across all CoAP servers that are members of a CoAP group and across all CoAP clients sending group requests to that group.

One way to create multiple CoAP groups is using different UDP ports with the same IP multicast address, in case the devices’ network stack only supports a limited number of multicast address subscriptions. However, it must be taken into account that this incurs additional processing overhead on each CoAP server participating in at least one of these groups: messages to groups that are not of interest to the node are only discarded at the higher transport (UDP) layer instead of directly at the network (IP) layer. Also, a constrained network may be additionally burdened in this case with multicast traffic that is eventually discarded at the UDP layer by most nodes.

The port number 5684 is reserved for DTLS-secured unicast CoAP and MUST NOT be used for any CoAP group communication.

For a CoAP server node that supports resource discovery as defined in Section 2.4 of [RFC7252], the default port number 5683 MUST be supported (see Section 7.1 of [RFC7252]) for the "All CoAP Nodes" multicast group as detailed in Section 3.9.

3.5. Proxy Operation

This section defines how proxies operate in a group communication scenario. In particular, Section 3.5.1 defines operations of forward-proxies, while Section 3.5.2 defines operations of reverse-proxies. Security operations for a proxy are discussed later in Section 5.3.

3.5.1. Forward-Proxies

CoAP enables a client to request a forward-proxy to process a CoAP request on its behalf, as described in Sections 5.7.2 and 8.2.2 of [RFC7252].

When intending to reach a CoAP group through a proxy, the client sends a unicast CoAP group request to the proxy. This request specifies the group URI where the request has to be forwarded to, either as a string in the Proxy-URI Option, or through the Proxy-
Scheme Option with the group URI constructed from the usual Uri-* Options. Then, the forward-proxy resolves the group URI to a destination CoAP group, i.e., it sends (e.g., multicasts) the CoAP group request to the group URI, receives the responses and forwards all the individual (unicast) responses back to the client.

However, there are certain issues and limitations with this approach:

* The CoAP client component that has sent the unicast CoAP group request to the proxy may be expecting only one (unicast) response, as usual for a CoAP unicast request. Instead, it receives multiple (unicast) responses, potentially leading to fault conditions in the component or to discarding any received responses following the first one. This issue may occur even if the application calling the CoAP client component is aware that the forward-proxy is going to forward the CoAP group request to the group URI.

* Each individual CoAP response received by the client will appear to originate (based on its IP source address) from the CoAP Proxy, and not from the server that produced the response. This makes it impossible for the client to identify the server that produced each response, unless the server identity is contained as a part of the response payload or inside a CoAP option in the response.

* The proxy does not necessarily know how many members there are in the CoAP group or how many group members will actually respond. Also, the proxy does not know for how long to collect responses before it stops forwarding them to the client. A CoAP client that is not using a Proxy might face the same problems in collecting responses to a group request. However, the client itself would typically have application-specific rules or knowledge on how to handle this situation, while an application-agnostic CoAP Proxy would typically not have this knowledge. For example, a CoAP client could monitor incoming responses and use this information to decide how long to continue collecting responses - which is something a proxy cannot do.

A forward-proxying method using this approach and addressing the issues raised above is defined in [I-D.tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy].

An alternative solution is for the proxy to collect all the individual (unicast) responses to a CoAP group request and then send back only a single (aggregated) response to the client. However, this solution brings up new issues:
* Like for the approach discussed above, the proxy does not know for
how long to collect responses before sending back the aggregated
response to the client. Analogous considerations apply to this
approach too, both on the client and proxy side.

* There is no default format defined in CoAP for aggregation of
multiple responses into a single response. Such a format could be
standardized based on, for example, the multipart content-format
[RFC8710].

Due to the above issues, it is RECOMMENDED that a CoAP Proxy
processes a request to be forwarded to a group URI only if it is
explicitly enabled to do so. If such functionality is not explicitly
enabled, the default response returned to the client is 5.01 Not
Implemented. Furthermore, a proxy SHOULD be explicitly configured
(e.g., by allow-listing and/or client authentication) to allow
proxied CoAP group requests only from specific client(s).

The operation of HTTP-to-CoAP proxies for multicast CoAP requests is
specified in Sections 8.4 and 10.1 of [RFC8075]. In this case, the
"application/http" media type is used to let the proxy return
multiple CoAP responses -- each translated to a HTTP response -- back
to the HTTP client. Of course, in this case the HTTP client sending
a group URI to the proxy needs to be aware that it is going to
receive this format, and needs to be able to decode it into the
responses of multiple CoAP servers. Also, the IP source address of
each CoAP response cannot be determined anymore from the
"application/http" response. The HTTP client still identify the CoAP
servers by other means such as application-specific information in
the response payload.

3.5.2. Reverse-Proxies

CoAP enables the use of a reverse-proxy, as an endpoint that stands
in for one or more other server(s), and satisfies requests on behalf
of these, doing any necessary translations (see Section 5.7.3 of
[RFC7252]).

In a group communication scenario, a reverse-proxy can rely on its
configuration and/or on information in a request from a client, in
order to determine that a group request has to be sent to a group of
servers over a one-to-many transport such as IP/UDP multicast.
For example, specific resources on the reverse-proxy could be allocated, each to a specific application group and/or CoAP group. Or alternatively, the application group and/or CoAP group in question could be encoded as URI path segments. The URI path encodings for a reverse-proxy may also use a URI mapping template as described in Section 5.4 of [RFC8075].

Furthermore, the reverse-proxy can actually stand in for (and thus prevent to directly reach) only the whole set of servers in the group, or also for each of those individual servers (e.g., if acting as firewall).

For a reverse-proxy that sends a request to a group of servers, the considerations as defined in Section 5.7.3 of [RFC7252] hold, with the following additions:

* The three issues and limitations defined in Section 3.5.1 for a forward proxy apply to a reverse-proxy as well, and have to be addressed, e.g., using the signaling method defined in [I-D.tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy] or other means.

* A reverse-proxy MAY have preconfigured time duration(s) that are used for the collecting of server responses and forwarding these back to the client. These duration(s) may be set as global configuration or resource-specific configurations. If there is such preconfiguration, then an explicit signaling of the time period in the client’s request as defined in [I-D.tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy] is not necessarily needed.

* A client that is configured to access a reverse-proxy resource (i.e., one that triggers a CoAP group communication request) SHOULD be configured also to handle potentially multiple responses with the same Token value caused by a single request. That is, the client needs to preserve the Token value used for the request also after the reception of the first response forwarded back by the proxy (see Section 3.1.6) and keep the request open to potential further responses with this Token. This requirement can be met by a combination of client implementation and proper proxied group communication configuration on the client.

* A client might re-use a Token value in a valid new request to the reverse-proxy, while the reverse-proxy still has an ongoing group communication request for this client with the same Token value (i.e., its time period for response collection has not ended yet).
If this happens, the reverse-proxy MUST stop the ongoing request and associated response forwarding, it MUST NOT forward the new request to the group of servers, and it MUST send a 4.00 Bad Request error response to the client. The diagnostic payload of the error response SHOULD indicate to the client that the resource is a reverse-proxy resource, and that for this reason immediate Token re-use is not possible.

If the reverse-proxy supports the signalling protocol of [I-D.tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy] it can include a Multicast-Signaling Option in the error response to convey the reason for the error in a machine-readable way.

For the operation of HTTP-to-CoAP reverse proxies, see the last paragraph of Section 3.5.1 which applies also to the case of reverse-proxies.

3.6. Congestion Control

CoAP group requests may result in a multitude of responses from different nodes, potentially causing congestion. Therefore, both the sending of CoAP group requests and the sending of the unicast CoAP responses to these group requests should be conservatively controlled.

CoAP [RFC7252] reduces IP multicast-specific congestion risks through the following measures:

* A server may choose not to respond to an IP multicast request if there is nothing useful to respond to, e.g., error or empty response (see Section 8.2 of [RFC7252]).

* A server should limit the support for IP multicast requests to specific resources where multicast operation is required (Section 11.3 of [RFC7252]).

* An IP multicast request MUST be Non-confirmable (Section 8.1 of [RFC7252]).

* A response to an IP multicast request SHOULD be Non-confirmable (Section 5.2.3 of [RFC7252]).

* A server does not respond immediately to an IP multicast request and should first wait for a time that is randomly picked within a predetermined time interval called the Leisure (Section 8.2 of [RFC7252]).
This document also defines these measures to be applicable to alternative transports (other than IP multicast), if not defined otherwise. Additional guidelines to reduce congestion risks defined in this document are as follows:

* A server in a constrained network SHOULD only support group requests for resources that have a small representation (where the representation may be retrieved via a GET, FETCH or POST method in the request). For example, "small" can be defined as a response payload limited to approximately 5% of the IP Maximum Transmit Unit (MTU) size, so that it fits into a single link-layer frame in case IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN, see Section 3.9.3) is used on the constrained network.

* A server SHOULD minimize the payload size of a response to a group GET or FETCH request on "/.well-known/core" by using hierarchy in arranging link descriptions for the response. An example of this is given in Section 5 of [RFC6690].

* A server MAY minimize the payload size of a response to a group GET or FETCH request (e.g., on "/.well-known/core") by using CoAP block-wise transfers [RFC7959] in case the payload is long, returning only a first block of the CoRE Link Format description. For this reason, a CoAP client sending a CoAP group request to "/.well-known/core" SHOULD support block-wise transfers. See also Section 3.8.

* A client SHOULD be configured to use CoAP groups with the smallest possible IP multicast scope that fulfills the application needs. As an example, site-local scope is always preferred over global scope IP multicast if this fulfills the application needs. Similarly, realm-local scope is always preferred over site-local scope if this fulfills the application needs.

3.7. Observing Resources

The CoAP Observe Option [RFC7641] is a protocol extension of CoAP, that allows a CoAP client to retrieve a representation of a resource and automatically keep this representation up-to-date over a longer period of time. The client gets notified when the representation has changed. [RFC7641] does not mention whether the Observe Option can be combined with CoAP (multicast) group communication.

This section updates [RFC7641] with the use of the Observe Option in a CoAP GET group request, and defines normative behavior for both client and server. Consistent with Section 2.4 of [RFC8132], it is also possible to use the Observe Option in a CoAP FETCH group request.
Multicast Observe is a useful way to start observing a particular resource on all members of a CoAP group at the same time. Group members that do not have this particular resource or do not allow the GET or FETCH method on it will either respond with an error status -- 4.04 Not Found or 4.05 Method Not Allowed, respectively -- or will silently suppress the response following the rules of Section 3.1.2, depending on server-specific configuration.

A client that sends a group GET or FETCH request with the Observe Option MAY repeat this request using the same Token value and the same Observe Option value, in order to ensure that enough (or all) members of the CoAP group have been reached with the request. This is useful in case a number of group members did not respond to the initial request. The client MAY additionally use the same Message ID in the repeated request to avoid that group members that had already received the initial request would respond again. Note that using the same Message ID in a repeated request will not be helpful in case of loss of a response message, since the server that responded already will consider the repeated request as a duplicate message. On the other hand, if the client uses a different, fresh Message ID in the repeated request, then all the group members that receive this new message will typically respond again, which increases the network load.

A client that has sent a group GET or FETCH request with the Observe Option MAY follow up by sending a new unicast CON request with the same Token value and same Observe Option value to a particular server, in order to ensure that the particular server receives the request. This is useful in case a specific group member, that was expected to respond to the initial group request, did not respond to the initial request. In this case, the client MUST use a Message ID that differs from the initial group request message.

Furthermore, consistent with Section 3.3.1 of [RFC7641] and following its guidelines, a client MAY at any time send a new group/multicast GET or FETCH request with the same Token value and same Observe Option value as the original request. This allows the client to verify that it has an up-to-date representation of an observed resource and/or to re-register its interest to observe a resource.

In the above client behaviors, the Token value is kept identical to the initial request to avoid that a client is included in more than one entry in the list of observers (Section 4.1 of [RFC7641]).

Before repeating a request as specified above, the client SHOULD wait for at least the expected round-trip time plus the Leisure time period defined in Section 8.2 of [RFC7252], to give the server time to respond.
A server that receives a GET or FETCH request with the Observe Option, for which request processing is successful, SHOULD respond to this request and not suppress the response. If a server adds a client (as a new entry) to the list of observers for a resource due to an Observe request, the server SHOULD respond to this request and SHOULD NOT suppress the response. An exception to the above is the overriding of response suppression according to a CoAP No-Response Option [RFC7967] specified by the client in the GET or FETCH request (see Section 3.1.2).

A server SHOULD have a mechanism to verify liveness of its observing clients and the continued interest of these clients in receiving the observe notifications. This can be implemented by sending notifications occasionally using a Confirmable message (see Section 4.5 of [RFC7641] for details). This requirement overrides the regular behavior of sending Non-confirmable notifications in response to a Non-confirmable request.

A client can use the unicast cancellation methods of Section 3.6 of [RFC7641] and stop the ongoing observation of a particular resource on members of a CoAP group. This can be used to remove specific observed servers, or even all servers in the group (using serial unicast to each known group member). In addition, a client MAY explicitly deregister from all those servers at once, by sending a group/multicast GET or FETCH request that includes the Token value of the observation to be cancelled and includes an Observe Option with the value set to 1 (deregister). In case not all the servers in the CoAP group received this deregistration request, either the unicast cancellation methods can be used at a later point in time or the group/multicast deregistration request MAY be repeated upon receiving another observe response from a server.

For observing a group of servers through a CoAP-to-CoAP proxy, the limitations stated in Section 3.5 apply. The method defined in [I-D.tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy] enables group communication including resource observation through proxies and addresses those limitations.

3.8. Block-Wise Transfer

Section 2.8 of [RFC7959] specifies how a client can use block-wise transfer (Block2 Option) in a multicast GET request to limit the size of the initial response of each server. Consistent with Section 2.5 of [RFC8132], the same can be done with a multicast FETCH request.

The client has to use unicast for any further request, separately addressing each different server, in order to retrieve more blocks of the resource from that server, if any. Also, a server (member of a
targeted CoAP group) that needs to respond to a group request with a particularly large resource can use block-wise transfer (Block2 Option) at its own initiative, to limit the size of the initial response. Again, a client would have to use unicast for any further requests to retrieve more blocks of the resource.

A solution for group/multicast block-wise transfer using the Block1 Option is not specified in [RFC7959] nor in the present document. Such a solution would be useful for group FETCH/PUT/POST/PATCH/iPATCH requests, to efficiently distribute a large request payload as multiple blocks to all members of a CoAP group. Multicast usage of Block1 is non-trivial due to potential message loss (leading to missing blocks or missing confirmations), and potential diverging block size preferences of different members of the CoAP group.

[I-D.ietf-core-new-block] specifies an alternative method for CoAP block-wise transfer. It specifies that "servers MUST ignore multicast requests that contain the Q-Block2 Option".

3.9. Transport Protocols

In this document UDP, both over IPv4 and IPv6, is considered as the default transport protocol for CoAP group communication.

3.9.1. UDP/IPv6 Multicast Transport

CoAP group communication can use UDP over IPv6 as a transport protocol, provided that IPv6 multicast is enabled. IPv6 multicast MAY be supported in a network only for a limited scope. For example, Section 3.10.2 describes the potential limited support of RPL for multicast, depending on how the protocol is configured.

For a CoAP server node that supports resource discovery as defined in Section 2.4 of [RFC7252], the default port number 5683 MUST be supported as per Sections 7.1 and 12.8 of [RFC7252] for the "All CoAP Nodes" multicast group. An IPv6 CoAP server SHOULD support the "All CoAP Nodes" groups with at least link-local (2), admin-local (4) and site-local (5) scopes. An IPv6 CoAP server on a 6LoWPAN node (see Section 3.9.3) SHOULD also support the realm-local (3) scope.

Note that a client sending an IPv6 multicast CoAP message to a port number that is not supported by the server will not receive an ICMPv6 Port Unreachable error message from that server, because the server does not send it in this case, per Section 2.4 of [RFC4443].
3.9.2. UDP/IPv4 Multicast Transport

CoAP group communication can use UDP over IPv4 as a transport protocol, provided that IPv4 multicast is enabled. For a CoAP server node that supports resource discovery as defined in Section 2.4 of [RFC7252], the default port number 5683 MUST be supported as per Sections 7.1 and 12.8 of [RFC7252], for the "All CoAP Nodes" IPv4 multicast group.

Note that a client sending an IPv4 multicast CoAP message to a port number that is not supported by the server will not receive an ICMP Port Unreachable error message from that server, because the server does not send it in this case, per Section 3.2.2 of [RFC1122].

3.9.3. 6LoWPAN

In 6LoWPAN [RFC4944] [RFC6282] networks, IPv6 packets (up to 1280 bytes) may be fragmented into smaller IEEE 802.15.4 MAC frames (up to 127 bytes), if the packet size requires this. Every 6LoWPAN IPv6 router that receives a multi-fragment packet reassembles the packet and refragnents it upon transmission. Since the loss of a single fragment implies the loss of the entire IPv6 packet, the performance in terms of packet loss and throughput of multi-fragment multicast IPv6 packets is typically far worse than the performance of single-fragment IPv6 multicast packets. For this reason, a CoAP request sent over multicast in 6LoWPAN networks SHOULD be sized in such a way that it fits in a single IEEE 802.15.4 MAC frame, if possible.

On 6LoWPAN networks, multicast groups can be defined with realm-local scope [RFC7346]. Such a realm-local group is restricted to the local 6LoWPAN network/subnet. In other words, a multicast request to that group does not propagate beyond the 6LoWPAN network segment where the request originated. For example, a multicast discovery request can be sent to the realm-local "All CoAP Nodes" IPv6 multicast group (see Section 3.9.1) in order to discover only CoAP servers on the local 6LoWPAN network.

3.9.4. Other Transports

CoAP group communication may be used over transports other than UDP/IP multicast. For example broadcast, non-UDP multicast, geocast, serial unicast, etc. In such cases the particular considerations for UDP/IP multicast in this document may need to be applied to that particular transport.

Because it supports unicast only, [RFC8323] (CoAP over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets) is not in scope as a transport for CoAP group communication.
3.10. Interworking with Other Protocols

3.10.1. MLD/MLDv2/IGMP/IGMPv3

CoAP nodes that are IP hosts (i.e., not IP routers) are generally unaware of the specific IP multicast routing/forwarding protocol being used in their network. When such a host needs to join a specific (CoAP) multicast group, it requires a way to signal to IP multicast routers which IP multicast address(es) it needs to listen to.

The MLDv2 protocol [RFC3810] is the standard IPv6 method to achieve this; therefore, this method SHOULD be used by members of a CoAP group to subscribe to its multicast IPv6 address, on IPv6 networks that support it. CoAP server nodes then act in the role of MLD Multicast Address Listener. MLDv2 uses link-local communication between Listeners and IP multicast routers. Constrained IPv6 networks that implement either RPL (see Section 3.10.2) or MPL (see Section 3.10.3) typically do not support MLDv2 as they have their own mechanisms defined for subscribing to multicast groups.

The IGMPv3 protocol [RFC3376] is the standard IPv4 method to signal multicast group subscriptions. This SHOULD be used by members of a CoAP group to subscribe to its multicast IPv4 address on IPv4 networks.

The guidelines from [RFC6636] on the tuning of MLD for mobile and wireless networks may be useful when implementing MLD in constrained networks.

3.10.2. RPL

RPL [RFC6550] is an IPv6 based routing protocol suitable for low-power, lossy networks (LLNs). In such a context, CoAP is often used as an application protocol.

If only RPL is used in a network for routing and its optional multicast support is disabled, there will be no IP multicast routing available. Any IPv6 multicast packets in this case will not propagate beyond a single hop (to direct neighbors in the LLN). This implies that any CoAP group request will be delivered to link-local nodes only, for any scope value >= 2 used in the IPv6 destination address.
RPL supports (see Section 12 of [RFC6550]) advertisement of IP multicast destinations using Destination Advertisement Object (DAO) messages and subsequent routing of multicast IPv6 packets based on this. It requires the RPL mode of operation to be 3 (Storing mode with multicast support).

In this mode, RPL DAO can be used by a CoAP node that is either an RPL router or RPL Leaf Node, to advertise its CoAP group membership to parent RPL routers. Then, RPL will route any IP multicast CoAP requests over multiple hops to those CoAP servers that are group members.

The same DAO mechanism can be used to convey CoAP group membership information to an edge router (e.g., 6LBR), in case the edge router is also the root of the RPL Destination-Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG). This is useful because the edge router then learns which IP multicast traffic it needs to pass through from the backbone network into the LLN subnet, and which traffic not. In LLNs, such ingress filtering helps to avoid congestion of the resource-constrained network segment, due to IP multicast traffic from the high-speed backbone IP network.

3.10.3. MPL

The Multicast Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (MPL) [RFC7731] can be used for propagation of IPv6 multicast packets throughout a defined network domain, over multiple hops. MPL is designed to work in LLNs and can operate alone or in combination with RPL. The protocol involves a predefined group of MPL Forwarders to collectively distribute IPv6 multicast packets throughout their MPL Domain. An MPL Forwarder may be associated with multiple MPL Domains at the same time. Non-Forwarders will receive IPv6 multicast packets from one or more of their neighboring Forwarders. Therefore, MPL can be used to propagate a CoAP multicast group request to all group members.

However, a CoAP multicast request to a group that originated outside of the MPL Domain will not be propagated by MPL - unless an MPL Forwarder is explicitly configured as an ingress point that introduces external multicast packets into the MPL Domain. Such an ingress point could be located on an edge router (e.g., 6LBR). Methods to configure which multicast groups are to be propagated into the MPL Domain could be:

* Manual configuration on each ingress MPL Forwarder.
MLDv2 protocol, which works only in case all CoAP servers joining a group are in link-local communication range of an ingress MPL Forwarder. This is typically not the case on mesh networks.

A new/custom protocol to register multicast groups at an ingress MPLForwarder. This could be for example a CoAP-based protocol offering multicast group subscription features similar to MLDv2.

For security and performance reasons also other filtering criteria may be defined at an ingress MPL Forwarder. See Section 6.6 for more details.

4. Unsecured Group Communication

CoAP group communication can operate in CoAP NoSec (No Security) mode, without using application-layer and transport-layer security mechanisms. The NoSec mode uses the "coap" scheme, and is defined in Section 9 of [RFC7252]. The conceptual "NoSec" security group as defined in Section 2.1 is used for unsecured group communication.

It is NOT RECOMMENDED to use CoAP group communication in NoSec mode, even in case of non-sensitive and non-critical applications.

Before possibly and exceptionally using the NoSec mode, the security implications in Section 6.1 must be very well considered and understood, especially as to the risk and impact of amplification attacks (see Section 6.3).

5. Secured Group Communication using Group OSCORE

This section defines how CoAP group communication can be secured. In particular, Section 5.1 describes how the Group OSCORE security protocol [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] can be used to protect messages exchanged in a CoAP group, while Section 5.2 provides guidance on required maintenance operations for OSCORE groups used as security groups.

5.1. Group OSCORE

The application-layer protocol Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) [RFC8613] provides end-to-end encryption, integrity and replay protection of CoAP messages exchanged between two CoAP endpoints. These can act both as CoAP Client as well as CoAP Server, and share an OSCORE Security Context used to protect and verify exchanged messages. The use of OSCORE does not affect the URI scheme and OSCORE can therefore be used with any URI scheme defined for CoAP.
OSCORE uses COSE [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct] [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs] to perform encryption operations and protect a CoAP message carried in a COSE object, by using an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm. In particular, OSCORE takes as input an unprotected CoAP message and transforms it into a protected CoAP message transporting the COSE object.

OSCORE makes it possible to selectively protect different parts of a CoAP message in different ways, while still allowing intermediaries (e.g., CoAP proxies) to perform their intended functionalities. That is, some message parts are encrypted and integrity protected; other parts are only integrity protected to be accessible to, but not modifiable by, proxies; and some parts are kept as plain content to be both accessible to and modifiable by proxies. Such differences especially concern the CoAP options included in the unprotected message.

Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] builds on OSCORE, and provides end-to-end security of CoAP messages exchanged between members of an OSCORE group, while fulfilling the same security requirements.

In particular, Group OSCORE protects CoAP group requests sent by a CoAP client, e.g., over UDP/IP multicast, as well as multiple corresponding CoAP responses sent as (IP) unicast by different CoAP servers. However, the same security material can also be used to protect CoAP requests sent over (IP) unicast to a single CoAP server in the OSCORE group, as well as the corresponding responses.

Group OSCORE ensures source authentication of all messages exchanged within the OSCORE group, by means of two possible methods.

The first method, called group mode, relies on digital signatures. That is, sender devices sign their outgoing messages using their own private key, and embed the signature in the protected CoAP message.

The second method, called pairwise mode, relies on a symmetric key, which is derived from a pairwise shared secret computed from the asymmetric keys of the message sender and recipient. This method is intended for one-to-one messages sent in the group, such as all responses individually sent by servers, as well as requests addressed to an individual server.
A Group Manager is responsible for managing one or multiple OSCORE groups. In particular, the Group Manager acts as repository of the group members' authentication credentials including the corresponding public keys; manages, renews and provides security material in the group; and handles the join process of new group members.

As defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-gm-admin], an administrator entity can interact with the Group Manager to create OSCORE groups and specify their configuration (see Section 2.2.2). During the lifetime of the OSCORE group, the administrator can further interact with the Group Manager, in order to possibly update the group configuration and eventually delete the group.

As recommended in [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], a CoAP endpoint can join an OSCORE group by using the method described in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore] and based on the ACE framework for Authentication and Authorization in constrained environments [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

A CoAP endpoint can discover OSCORE groups and retrieve information to join them through their respective Group Managers by using the method described in [I-D.tiloca-core-oscore-discovery] and based on the CoRE Resource Directory [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory].

If security is required, CoAP group communication as described in this specification MUST use Group OSCORE. In particular, a CoAP group as defined in Section 2.1 and using secure group communication is associated with an OSCORE security group, which includes:

* All members of the CoAP group, i.e., the CoAP endpoints configured to receive CoAP group messages sent to the particular group and -- in case of IP multicast transport -- are listening to the group’s multicast IP address on the group’s UDP port.

* All further CoAP endpoints configured only as CoAP clients, that may send CoAP group requests to the CoAP group.

5.2. Secure Group Maintenance

As part of group maintenance operations (see Section 2.2.4), additional key management operations are required for an OSCORE group, also depending on the security requirements of the application (see Section 6.2.1). Specifically:
* Adding new members to a CoAP group or enabling new client-only endpoints to interact with that group require also that each of such members/endpoints join the corresponding OSCORE group. When this happens, they are securely provided with the security material to use in that OSCORE group.

Applications may need backward security. That is, they may require that, after having joined an OSCORE group, a new group member cannot access messages exchanged in the group prior to its joining, even if it has recorded them.

In such a case, new security material to use in the OSCORE group has first to be generated and distributed to the current members of that group, before new endpoints are also provided with that new security material upon their joining.

* Removing members from a CoAP group or stopping client-only endpoints from interacting with that group requires removing such members/endpoints from the corresponding OSCORE group. To this end, new security material is generated and securely distributed only to the remaining members of the OSCORE group, together with the list of former members removed from that group.

This ensures forward security in the OSCORE group. That is, it ensures that only the members intended to remain in the OSCORE group are able to continue participating in the secure communications within that group, while the evicted ones are not able to after the distribution and installation of the new security material.

Also, this ensures that the members intended to remain in the OSCORE group are able to confidently assert the group membership of other sender nodes, when receiving protected messages in the OSCORE group after the distribution and installation of the new security material (see Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).

The key management operations mentioned above are entrusted to the Group Manager responsible for the OSCORE group [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], and it is RECOMMENDED to perform them as defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore].

5.3. Proxy Security

Different solutions may be selected for secure group communication via a proxy depending on proxy type, use case and deployment requirements. In this section the options based on Group OSCORE are listed.
For a client performing a group communication request via a forward-proxy, end-to-end security should be implemented. The client then creates a group request protected with Group OSCORE and unicasts this to the proxy. The proxy adapts the request from a forward-proxy request to a regular request and multicasts this adapted request to the indicated CoAP group. During the adaptation, the security provided by Group OSCORE persists, in either case of using the group mode or using the pairwise mode. The first leg of communication from client to proxy can optionally be further protected, e.g., by using (D)TLS and/or OSCORE.

For a client performing a group communication request via a reverse-proxy, either end-to-end-security or hop-by-hop security can be implemented. The case of end-to-end security is the same as for the forward-proxy case.

The case of hop-by-hop security is only possible if the proxy can be completely trusted and it is configured as a member of the OSCORE security group(s) that it needs to access, on behalf of clients. The first leg of communication between client and proxy is then protected with a security method for CoAP unicast, such as (D)TLS, OSCORE or a combination of such methods. The second leg between proxy and servers is protected using Group OSCORE. This can be useful in applications where for example the origin client does not implement Group OSCORE, or the group management operations are confined to a particular network domain and the client is outside this domain.

For all the above cases, more details on using Group OSCORE are defined in [I-D.tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy].

6. Security Considerations

This section provides security considerations for CoAP group communication, in general and for the particular transport of IP multicast.

6.1. CoAP NoSec Mode

CoAP group communication, if not protected, is vulnerable to all the attacks mentioned in Section 11 of [RFC7252] for IP multicast. Moreover, as also discussed in [I-D.mattsson-t2trg-amplification-attacks], the NoSec mode is susceptible to source IP address spoofing, hence amplification attacks are especially feasible to perform and greatly effective in their impact, since a single request can result in multiple responses from multiple servers (see Section 6.3).
Therefore, even in case of non-sensitive and non-critical applications, it is generally NOT RECOMMENDED to use CoAP group communication in NoSec mode, also in order to prevent an easy proliferation of high-volume amplification attacks as further discussed in Section 6.3.

Exceptionally, early discovery of devices and resources is a typical use case where NoSec mode is applied. In such a situation, the querying devices do not have yet configured any mutual security relations at the time they perform the discovery. Also, high-volume and harmful amplifications can be prevented through appropriate and conservative configurations, since only a few CoAP servers are expected to be configured for responding to the group requests sent for discovery (see Section 6.3).

CoAP group communication in NoSec mode SHOULD NOT be deployed for sensitive and mission-critical applications (e.g., health monitoring systems and alarm monitoring systems).

CoAP group communication without application-layer security SHOULD be deployed only in applications that are non-critical and that do not involve or may have an impact on sensitive data and personal sphere. These include, e.g., read-only temperature sensors deployed in non-sensitive environments, where the client reads out the values but does not use the data to control actuators or to base an important decision on.

6.2. Group OSCORE

Group OSCORE provides end-to-end application-level security. This has many desirable properties, including maintaining security assurances while forwarding traffic through intermediaries (proxies). Application-level security also tends to more cleanly separate security from the dynamics of group membership (e.g., the problem of distributing security keys across large groups with many members that come and go).

For sensitive and mission-critical applications, CoAP group communication MUST be protected by using Group OSCORE as specified in [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]. The same security considerations from Section 11 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] hold for this specification.
6.2.1. Group Key Management

A key management scheme for secure revocation and renewal of group security material, namely group rekeying, is required to be adopted in OSCORE groups. The key management scheme has to preserve forward security in the OSCORE group, as well as backward security if this is required by the application (see Section 5.2). In particular, the key management scheme MUST comply with the functional steps defined in Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

Group policies should also take into account the time that the key management scheme requires to rekey the group, on one hand, and the expected frequency of group membership changes, i.e., nodes' joining and leaving, on the other hand.

That is, it may be desirable to not rekey the group upon every single membership change, in case members' joining and leaving are frequent, and at the same time a single group rekeying instance takes a non-negligible time to complete.

In such a case, the Group Manager may cautiously consider to rekey the group, e.g., after a minimum number of nodes has joined or left the group within a pre-defined time interval, or according to communication patterns with predictable time intervals of network inactivity. This would prevent paralyzing communications in the group, when a slow rekeying scheme is used and frequently invoked.

At the same, the security implications of delaying the rekeying process have to be carefully considered and understood, before enforcing such group policies.

In fact, this comes at the cost of not continuously preserving backward and forward security, since group rekeying might not occur upon every single group membership change. That is, most recently joined nodes would have access to the security material used prior to their joining, and thus be able to access past group communications protected with that security material. Similarly, until the group is rekeyed, most recently left nodes would preserve access to group communications protected with the retained security material.

6.2.2. Source Authentication

Both the group mode and the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE ensure source authentication of messages exchanged by CoAP endpoints through CoAP group communication.
To this end, outgoing messages are either countersigned by the message sender endpoint with its own private key (group mode), or protected with a symmetric key, which is in turn derived using the asymmetric keys of the message sender and recipient (pairwise mode).

Thus, both modes allow a recipient CoAP endpoint to verify that a message has actually been originated by a specific and identified member of the OSCORE group.

6.2.3. Countering Attacks

As discussed below, Group OSCORE addresses a number of security attacks mentioned in Section 11 of [RFC7252], with particular reference to their execution over IP multicast.

* Since Group OSCORE provides end-to-end confidentiality and integrity of request/response messages, proxies capable of group communication cannot break message protection, and thus cannot act as man-in-the-middle beyond their legitimate duties (see Section 11.2 of [RFC7252]). In fact, intermediaries such as proxies are not assumed to have access to the OSCORE Security Context used by group members. Also, with the notable addition of signatures for the group mode, Group OSCORE protects messages using the same procedure as OSCORE (see Sections 8 and 9 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]), and especially processes CoAP options according to the same classification in U/I/E classes.

* Group OSCORE limits the feasibility and impact of amplification attacks, see Section 6.3 of this document and Section 11.3 of [RFC7252].

In fact, upon receiving a group request protected with Group OSCORE in group mode, a server is able to verify whether the request is not a replay and originates from the alleged sender in the OSCORE group, by verifying the signature included in the request using the public key of that sender (see Section 8.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]). Furthermore, as also discussed in Section 8 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], it is recommended that servers failing to decrypt and verify an incoming message do not send back any error message.

This limits an adversary to leveraging an intercepted group request protected with Group OSCORE, and then altering the source address to be the one of the intended amplification victim.

Furthermore, the adversary needs to consider a group request that specifically targets a resource for which the CoAP servers are configured to respond. While this can be often correctly assumed
or inferable from the application context, it is not explicit from the group request itself, since Group OSCORE protects the Uri-Path and Uri-Query CoAP Options conveying the respective components of the target URI.

As a further mitigation against amplification attacks, a server can also rely on the Echo Option for CoAP defined in [RFC9175] and include it in a response to a group request. By doing so, the server can assert that the alleged sender of the group request (i.e., the CoAP client associated with a certain authentication credential including the corresponding public key) is indeed reachable at the claimed source address, especially if this differs from the one used in previous group requests from the same CoAP client. Although responses including the Echo Option do still result in amplification, this is limited in volume compared to when all servers reply with a full-fledged response.

* Group OSCORE limits the impact of attacks based on IP spoofing also over IP multicast (see Section 11.4 of [RFC7252]). In fact, requests and corresponding responses sent in the OSCORE group can be correctly generated only by legitimate group members.

Within an OSCORE group, the shared symmetric-key security material strictly provides only group-level authentication. However, source authentication of messages is also ensured, both in the group mode by means of signatures (see Sections 8.1 and 8.3 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]), and in the pairwise mode by using additionally derived pairwise keys (see Sections 9.3 and 9.5 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]). Thus, recipient endpoints can verify a message to be originated by the alleged, identifiable sender in the OSCORE group.

As noted above, the server may additionally rely on the Echo Option for CoAP defined in [RFC9175], in order to verify the aliveness and reachability of the client sending a request from a particular IP address.

* Group OSCORE does not require group members to be equipped with a good source of entropy for generating security material (see Section 11.6 of [RFC7252]), and thus does not contribute to create an entropy-related attack vector against such (constrained) CoAP endpoints. In particular, the symmetric keys used for message encryption and decryption are derived through the same HMAC-based HKDF scheme used for OSCORE (see Section 3.2 of [RFC8613]). Besides, the OSCORE Master Secret used in such derivation is securely generated by the Group Manager responsible for the OSCORE group, and securely provided to the CoAP endpoints when they join the group.
Group OSCORE prevents to make any single group member a target for subverting security in the whole OSCORE group (see Section 11.6 of [RFC7252]), even though all group members share (and can derive) the same symmetric-key security material used in the OSCORE group. In fact, source authentication is always ensured for exchanged CoAP messages, as verifiable to be originated by the alleged, identifiable sender in the OSCORE group. This relies on including a signature computed with a node’s individual private key (in the group mode), or on protecting messages with a pairwise symmetric key, which is in turn derived from the asymmetric keys of the sender and recipient CoAP endpoints (in the pairwise mode).

6.3. Risk of Amplification

Section 11.3 of [RFC7252] highlights that CoAP group requests may be used for accidentally or deliberately performing Denial of Service attacks, especially in the form of a high-volume amplification attack, by using all the servers in the CoAP group as attack vectors.

That is, following a group request sent to a CoAP group, each of the servers in the group may reply with a response which is likely larger in size than the group request. Thus, an attacker sending a single group request may achieve a high amplification factor, i.e., a high ratio between the size of the group request and the total size of the corresponding responses intended to the attack victim.

Thus, consistently with Section 11.3 of [RFC7252], a server in a CoAP group:

* SHOULD limit the support for CoAP group requests only to the group resources of the application group(s) using that CoAP group;
* SHOULD NOT accept group requests that can not be authenticated in some way;
* SHOULD NOT provide large amplification factors through its responses to a non-authenticated group request, and can possibly rely on CoAP block-wise transfers [RFC7959] to reduce the amount of amplification.

Amplifications attacks using CoAP are further discussed in [I-D.mattsson-t2trg-amplification-attacks], which also highlights how the amplification factor would become even higher when CoAP group communication is combined with resource observation [RFC7641]. That is, a single group request may result in multiple notification responses from each of the responding servers, throughout the observation lifetime.
Thus, consistently with Section 7 of [RFC7641], a server in a CoAP group MUST strictly limit the number of notifications it sends between receiving acknowledgments that confirm the actual interest of the client in continuing the observation.

Moreover, it is especially easy to perform an amplification attack when the NoSec mode is used. Therefore, even in case of non-sensitive and non-critical applications, it is generally NOT RECOMMENDED to use CoAP group communication in NoSec mode, in order to prevent an easy proliferation of high-volume amplification attacks.

Exceptions should be carefully limited to use cases and accesses to a group resource that have a specific, narrow and well understood scope, and where only a few CoAP servers (or, ideally, only one) would possibly respond to a group request.

A relevant exceptional example is a CoAP client performing the discovery of hosts such as a group manager or a Resource Directory [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory], by probing for them through a group request sent to the CoAP group. This early, unprotected step is relevant for a CoAP client that does not know the address of such hosts in advance, and that does not have yet configured a mutual security relation with them. In this kind of deployments, such a discovery procedure does not result in a considerable and harmful amplification, since only the few CoAP servers object of discovery are going to respond to the group request targeting that specific resource. In particular, those hosts can be the only CoAP servers in that specific CoAP group (hence listening for group requests sent to that group), and/or the only CoAP servers explicitly configured to respond to group requests targeting specific group resources.

With the exception of such particular use cases, group communications MUST be secured using Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], see Section 5. As discussed in Section 6.2.3, this limits the feasibility and impact of amplification attacks.

6.4. Replay of Non-Confirmable Messages

Since all requests sent over IP multicast are Non-confirmable, a client might not be able to know if an adversary has actually captured one of its transmitted requests and later re-injected it in the group as a replay to the server nodes. In fact, even if the servers sent back responses to the replayed request, the client would typically not have a valid matching request active anymore so this attack would not accomplish anything in the client.
If Group OSCORE is used, such a replay attack on the servers is prevented, since a client protects every different request with a different Sequence Number value, which is in turn included as Partial IV in the protected message and takes part in the construction of the AEAD cipher nonce. Thus, a server would be able to detect the replayed request, by checking the conveyed Partial IV against its own replay window in the OSCORE Recipient Context associated with the client.

This requires a server to have a synchronized, up to date view of the sequence number used by the client. If such synchronization is lost, e.g., due to a reboot, or suspected so, the server should use the challenge-response synchronization method described in Appendix E of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] and based on the Echo Option for CoAP defined in [RFC9175], in order to (re-)synchronize with the client’s sequence number.

6.5. Use of CoAP No-Response Option

When CoAP group communication is used in CoAP NoSec (No Security) mode (see Section 4), the CoAP No-Response Option [RFC7967] could be misused by a malicious client to evoke as much responses from servers to a group request as possible, by using the value '0' - Interested in all responses. This even overrides the default behavior of a CoAP server to suppress the response in case there is nothing of interest to respond with. Therefore, this option can be used to perform an amplification attack (see Section 6.3).

A proposed mitigation is to only allow this option to relax the standard suppression rules for a resource in case the option is sent by an authenticated client. If sent by an unauthenticated client, the option can be used to expand the classes of responses suppressed compared to the default rules but not to reduce the classes of responses suppressed.

6.6. 6LoWPAN and MPL

In a 6LoWPAN network, a multicast IPv6 packet may be fragmented prior to transmission. A 6LoWPAN Router that forwards a fragmented packet may have a relatively high impact on the occupation of the wireless channel and may locally experience high memory load due to packet buffering. For example, the MPL [RFC7731] protocol requires an MPL Forwarder to store the packet for a longer duration, to allow multiple forwarding transmissions to neighboring Forwarders. If one or more of the fragments are not received correctly by an MPL Forwarder during its packet reassembly time window, the Forwarder discards all received fragments and at a future point in time it needs to receive again all the packet fragments (this time, possibly
from another neighboring MPL Forwarder).

For these reasons, a fragmented IPv6 multicast packet is a possible attack vector in a Denial of Service (DoS) amplification attack. See Section 6.3 of this document and Section 11.3 of [RFC7252] for more details on amplification. To mitigate the risk, applications sending multicast IPv6 requests to 6LoWPAN hosted CoAP servers SHOULD limit the size of the request to avoid 6LoWPAN fragmentation of the request packet. A 6LoWPAN Router or (MPL) multicast forwarder SHOULD deprioritize forwarding for multi-fragment 6LoWPAN multicast packets. 6LoWPAN Border Routers are typical ingress points where multicast traffic enters into a 6LoWPAN network. Specific MPL Forwarders (whether located on a 6LBR or not) may also be configured as ingress points. Any such ingress point SHOULD implement multicast packet filtering to prevent unwanted multicast traffic from entering a 6LoWPAN network from the outside. For example, it could filter out all multicast packets for which there is no known multicast listener on the 6LoWPAN network. See Section 3.10 for protocols that allow multicast listeners to signal which groups they would like to listen to. As part of multicast packet filtering, the ingress point SHOULD implement a filtering criterion based on the size of the multicast packet. Ingress multicast packets above a defined size may then be dropped or deprioritized.

6.7. Wi-Fi

In a home automation scenario using Wi-Fi, Wi-Fi security should be enabled to prevent rogue nodes from joining. The Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) that enables access to the Internet should also have its IP multicast filters set so that it enforces multicast scope boundaries to isolate local multicast groups from the rest of the Internet (e.g., as per [RFC6092]). In addition, the scope of IP multicast transmissions and listeners should be site-local (5) or smaller. For site-local scope, the CPE will be an appropriate multicast scope boundary point.

6.8. Monitoring

6.8.1. General Monitoring

CoAP group communication can be used to control a set of related devices: for example, simultaneously turn on all the lights in a room. This intrinsically exposes the group to some unique monitoring risks that devices not in a group are not as vulnerable to. For example, assume an attacker is able to physically see a set of lights turn on in a room. Then the attacker can correlate an observed CoAP group communication message to the observed coordinated group action -- even if the CoAP message is (partly) encrypted.
This will give the attacker side-channel information to plan further attacks (e.g., by determining the members of the group some network topology information may be deduced).

6.8.2. Pervasive Monitoring

A key additional threat consideration for group communication is pervasive monitoring [RFC7258]. CoAP group communication solutions that are built on top of IP multicast need to pay particular heed to these dangers. This is because IP multicast is easier to intercept compared to IP unicast. Also, CoAP traffic is typically used for the Internet of Things. This means that CoAP (multicast) group communication may be used for the control and monitoring of critical infrastructure (e.g., lights, alarms, HVAC, electrical grid, etc.) that may be prime targets for attack.

For example, an attacker may attempt to record all the CoAP traffic going over a smart grid (i.e., networked electrical utility) and try to determine critical nodes for further attacks. For example, the source node (controller) sends out CoAP group communication messages which easily identifies it as a controller. CoAP multicast traffic is inherently more vulnerable compared to unicast, as the same packet may be replicated over many more links, leading to a higher probability of packet capture by a pervasive monitoring system.

One mitigation is to restrict the scope of IP multicast to the minimal scope that fulfills the application need. See the congestion control recommendations in the last bullet of Section 3.6 to minimize the scope. Thus, for example, realm-local IP multicast scope is always preferred over site-local scope IP multicast if this fulfills the application needs.

Even if all CoAP multicast traffic is encrypted/protected, an attacker may still attempt to capture this traffic and perform an off-line attack in the future.

7. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

8. References

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[I-D.tiloca-core-oscore-discovery]


Appendix A. Use Cases

To illustrate where and how CoAP-based group communication can be used, this section summarizes the most common use cases. These use cases include both secured and non-secured CoAP usage. Each subsection below covers one particular category of use cases for CoRE. Within each category, a use case may cover multiple application areas such as home IoT, commercial building IoT (sensing and control), industrial IoT/control, or environmental sensing.

A.1. Discovery

Discovery of physical devices in a network, or discovery of information entities hosted on network devices, are operations that are usually required in a system during the phases of setup or (re)configuration. When a discovery use case involves devices that need to interact without having been configured previously with a common security context, unsecured CoAP communication is typically used. Discovery may involve a request to a directory server, which provides services to aid clients in the discovery process. One particular type of directory server is the CoRE Resource Directory [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]; and there may be other types of directories that can be used with CoAP.

A.1.1. Distributed Device Discovery

Device discovery is the discovery and identification of networked devices -- optionally only devices of a particular class, type, model, or brand. Group communication is used for distributed device discovery, if a central directory server is not used. Typically in distributed device discovery, a multicast request is sent to a particular address (or address range) and multicast scope of interest, and any devices configured to be discoverable will respond back. For the alternative solution of centralized device discovery a central directory server is accessed through unicast, in which case group communication is not needed. This requires that the address of the central directory is either preconfigured in each device or configured during operation using a protocol.

In CoAP, device discovery can be implemented by CoAP resource discovery requesting (GET) a particular resource that the sought device class, type, model or brand is known to respond to. It can also be implemented using CoAP resource discovery (Section 7 of [RFC7252]) and the CoAP query interface defined in Section 4 of [RFC6690] to find these particular resources. Also, a multicast GET request to /.well-known/core can be used to discover all CoAP devices.
A.1.2. Distributed Service Discovery

Service discovery is the discovery and identification of particular services hosted on network devices. Services can be identified by one or more parameters such as ID, name, protocol, version and/or type. Distributed service discovery involves group communication to reach individual devices hosting a particular service; with a central directory server not being used.

In CoAP, services are represented as resources and service discovery is implemented using resource discovery (Section 7 of [RFC7252]) and the CoAP query interface defined in Section 4 of [RFC6690].

A.1.3. Directory Discovery

This use case is a specific sub-case of Distributed Service Discovery (Appendix A.1.2), in which a device needs to identify the location of a Directory on the network to which it can e.g., register its own offered services, or to which it can perform queries to identify and locate other devices/services it needs to access on the network. Section 3.3 of [RFC7390] showed an example of discovering a CoRE Resource Directory using CoAP group communication. As defined in [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory], a resource directory is a web entity that stores information about web resources and implements REST interfaces for registration and lookup of those resources. For example, a device can register itself to a resource directory to let it be found by other devices and/or applications.

A.2. Operational Phase

Operational phase use cases describe those operations that occur most frequently in a networked system, during its operational lifetime and regular operation. Regular usage is when the applications on networked devices perform the tasks they were designed for and exchange of application-related data using group communication occurs. Processes like system reconfiguration, group changes, system/device setup, extra group security changes, etc. are not part of regular operation.

A.2.1. Actuator Group Control

Group communication can be beneficial to control actuators that need to act in synchrony, as a group, with strict timing (latency) requirements. Examples are office lighting, stage lighting, street lighting, or audio alert/Public Address systems. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 of [RFC7390] showed examples of lighting control of a group of 6LoWPAN-connected lights.
A.2.2. Device Group Status Request

To properly monitor the status of systems, there may be a need for ad-hoc, unplanned status updates. Group communication can be used to quickly send out a request to a (potentially large) number of devices for specific information. Each device then responds back with the requested data. Those devices that did not respond to the request can optionally be polled again via reliable unicast communication to complete the dataset. The device group may be defined e.g., as "all temperature sensors on floor 3", or "all lights in wing B". For example, it could be a status request for device temperature, most recent sensor event detected, firmware version, network load, and/or battery level.

A.2.3. Network-wide Query

In some cases a whole network or subnet of multiple IP devices needs to be queried for status or other information. This is similar to the previous use case except that the device group is not defined in terms of its function/type but in terms of its network location. Technically this is also similar to distributed service discovery (Appendix A.1.2) where a query is processed by all devices on a network - except that the query is not about services offered by the device, but rather specific operational data is requested.

A.2.4. Network-wide / Group Notification

In some cases a whole network, or subnet of multiple IP devices, or a specific target group needs to be notified of a status change or other information. This is similar to the previous two use cases except that the recipients are not expected to respond with some information. Unreliable notification can be acceptable in some use cases, in which a recipient does not respond with a confirmation of having received the notification. In such a case, the receiving CoAP server does not have to create a CoAP response. If the sender needs confirmation of reception, the CoAP servers can be configured for that resource to respond with a 2.xx success status after processing a notification request successfully.

A.3. Software Update

Group communication can be useful to efficiently distribute new software (firmware, image, application, etc.) to a group of multiple devices. In this case, the group is defined in terms of device type: all devices in the target group are known to be capable of installing and running the new software. The software is distributed as a series of smaller blocks that are collected by all devices and stored in memory. All devices in the target group are usually responsible
for integrity verification of the received software; which can be
done per-block or for the entire software image once all blocks have
been received. Due to the inherent unreliability of CoAP multicast,
there needs to be a backup mechanism (e.g., implemented using CoAP
unicast) by which a device can individually request missing blocks of
a whole software image/entity. Prior to a multicast software update,
the group of recipients can be separately notified that there is new
software available and coming, using the above network-wide or group
notification.

Appendix B. Examples of Message Exchanges

This section provides examples of different message exchanges when
CoAP is used with group communication. The examples consider:

* A client with address ADDR_CLIENT and port number PORT_CLIENT.

* A CoAP group associated with the IP multicast address ADDR_GRP and
  port number PORT_GRP.

* An application group "gp1" associated with the CoAP group above.

* Three servers A, B and C, all of which are members of the CoAP
group above and of the application group "gp1". Each server X
(with X equal to A, B or C): listens to its own address ADDR_X and
port number PORT_X; and listens to the address ADDR_GRP and port
number PORT_GRP. For each server its PORT_X may be different from
PORT_GRP or may be equal to it, in general.

In Figure 16, the client sends a Non-confirmable GET request to the
CoAP group, targeting the resource "temperature" in the application
group "gp1". All servers reply with a 2.05 Content response,
although the response from server B is lost. As source port number
of their response, servers A and B use the destination port number of
the request, i.e, PORT_GRP. Instead, server C uses its own port
number PORT_C.
Figure 16: Example of Non-confirmable group request, followed by Non-confirmable Responses

In Figure 17, the client sends a Non-confirmable GET request to the CoAP group, targeting and requesting to observe the resource "temperature" in the application group "gp1". All servers reply with a 2.05 Content notification response. As source port number of their response, servers A and B use the destination port number of the request, i.e., PORT_GRP. Instead, server C uses its own port number PORT_C. Some time later, all servers send a 2.05 Content notification response, with payload the new representation of the "temperature" resource.
Client A B C

GET Source: ADDR_CLIENT:PORT_CLIENT
\ Destination: ADDR_GRP:PORT_GRP
  Header: GET (T=NON, Code=0.01, MID=0x7d41)
  Token: 0x86
  Observe: 0 (register)
  Uri-Path: "gp"
  Uri-Path: "gp1"
  Uri-Path: "temperature"

2.05 Source: ADDR_A:PORT_GRP
  Destination: ADDR_CLIENT:PORT_CLIENT
  Header: 2.05 (T=NON, Code=2.05, MID=0x60b1)
  Token: 0x86
  Observe: 3
  Payload: "22.3 C"

2.05 Source: ADDR_B:PORT_GRP
  Destination: ADDR_CLIENT:PORT_CLIENT
  Header: 2.05 (T=NON, Code=2.05, MID=0x01a0)
  Token: 0x86
  Observe: 13
  Payload: "20.9 C"

2.05 Source: ADDR_C:PORT_C
  Destination: ADDR_CLIENT:PORT_CLIENT
  Header: 2.05 (T=NON, Code=2.05, MID=0x952a)
  Token: 0x86
  Observe: 23
  Payload: "21.0 C"

// The temperature changes ...

2.05 Source: ADDR_A:PORT_GRP
  Destination: ADDR_CLIENT:PORT_CLIENT
  Header: 2.05 (T=NON, Code=2.05, MID=0x60b2)
  Token: 0x86
  Observe: 7
  Payload: "32.3 C"

2.05 Source: ADDR_B:PORT_GRP
  Destination: ADDR_CLIENT:PORT_CLIENT
  Header: 2.05 (T=NON, Code=2.05, MID=0x01a1)
  Token: 0x86
Figure 17: Example of Non-confirmable Observe group request, followed by Non-confirmable Responses as Observe notifications.

In Figure 18, the client sends a Non-confirmable GET request to the CoAP group, targeting the resource "log" in the application group "gp1", and requesting a blockwise transfer. All servers reply with a 2.05 Content response including the first block. As source port number of its response, each server uses its own port number. After obtaining the first block, the client requests the following blocks separately from each server, by means of unicast exchanges.
Source: ADDR_B:PORT_B
Destination: ADDR_CLIENT:PORT_CLIENT
Header: 2.05 (T=ACK, Code=2.05, MID=0x7d44)
Token: 0xb6
Block2: 1/1/64
Payload: 0x0b01 ...

Source: ADDR_CLIENT:PORT_CLIENT
Destination: ADDR_C:PORT_B
Header: GET (T=CON, Code=0.01, MID=0x7d45)
Token: 0xb7
Uri-Path: "gp"
Uri-Path: "gp1"
Uri-Path: "log"
Block2: 2/0/64

Source: ADDR_B:PORT_B
Destination: ADDR_CLIENT:PORT_CLIENT
Header: 2.05 (T=ACK, Code=2.05, MID=0x7d45)
Token: 0xb7
Block2: 2/0/64
Payload: 0x0b02 ...

Source: ADDR_CLIENT:PORT_CLIENT
Destination: ADDR_C:PORT_C
Header: GET (T=CON, Code=0.01, MID=0x7d46)
Token: 0xc6
Uri-Path: "gp"
Uri-Path: "gp1"
Uri-Path: "log"
Block2: 1/0/64

Source: ADDR_C:PORT_C
Destination: ADDR_CLIENT:PORT_CLIENT
Header: 2.05 (T=ACK, Code=2.05, MID=0x7d46)
Token: 0xc6
Block2: 1/1/64
Payload: 0x0c01 ...

Source: ADDR_CLIENT:PORT_CLIENT
Destination: ADDR_C:PORT_C
Header: GET (T=CON, Code=0.01, MID=0x7d47)
Figure 18: Example of Non-confirmable group request starting a blockwise transfer, followed by Non-confirmable Responses with the first block. The transfer continues over confirmable unicast exchanges.

Appendix C. Document Updates

RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION.

C.1. Version -05 to -06

* Harmonized use of "group URI".
* Clarifications about different group types.
* Revised methods to perform group naming.
* Revised methods to discover application groups and CoAP groups.
* Explicit difference between "authentication credential" and "public key".
* Added examples of application group naming.
* Added examples of application/CoAP group discovery.
* Added examples of message exchanges.
* Reference to draft-mattsson-core-coap-attacks replaced with reference to draft-mattsson-t2trg-amplification-attacks.
* Editorial improvements.
C.2. Version -04 to -05

* Clarified changes to other documents.
* Clarified relation between different group types.
* Clarified discovery of application groups.
* Discussed methods to express application group names in requests.
* Revised and extended text on the NoSec mode and amplification attacks.
* Rephrased backward/forward security as properties.
* Removed appendix on Multi-ETag Option for response revalidation.
* Editorial improvements.

C.3. Version -03 to -04

* Multi-ETag Option for response revalidation moved to appendix.
* ETag Option usage added.
* Q-Block Options added in the block-wise transfer section.
* Caching at proxies moved to draft-tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy.
* Client-Proxy response revalidation with the Group-ETag Option moved to draft-tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy.
* Security considerations on amplification attacks.
* Generalized transport protocols to include others than UDP/IP multicast; and security protocols other than Group OSCORE.
* Overview of security cases with proxies.
* Editorial improvements.

C.4. Version -02 to -03

* Multiple responses from same server handled at the application.
* Clarifications about issues with forward-proxies.
* Operations for reverse-proxies.
* Caching of responses at proxies.
* Client-Server response revalidation, with Multi-ETag Option.
* Client-Proxy response revalidation, with the Group-ETag Option.

C.5. Version -01 to -02

* Clarified relation between security groups and application groups.
* Considered also FETCH for requests over IP multicast.
* More details on Observe re-registration.
* More details on Proxy intermediaries.
* More details on servers changing port number in the response.
* Usage of the Uri-Host Option to indicate an application group.
* Response suppression based on classes of error codes.

C.6. Version -00 to -01

* Clarifications on group memberships for the different group types.
* Simplified description of Token reusage, compared to the unicast case.
* More details on the rationale for response suppression.
* Clarifications of creation and management of security groups.
* Clients more knowledgeable than proxies about stopping receiving responses.
* Cancellation of group observations.
* Clarification on multicast scope to use.
* Both the group mode and pairwise mode of Group OSCORE are considered.
* Updated security considerations.
* Editorial improvements.
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Constrained Resource Identifiers
draft-ietf-core-href-10

Abstract

The Constrained Resource Identifier (CRI) is a complement to the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) that serializes the URI components in Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) instead of a sequence of characters. This simplifies parsing, comparison and reference resolution in environments with severe limitations on processing power, code size, and memory size.

The present revision -10 of this draft contains an experimental addition that allows representing user information (https://alice@chains.example) in the URI authority component. This feature lacks test vectors and implementation experience at the time of writing and requires discussion.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-core-href/.

Discussion of this document takes place on the Constrained RESTful Environments Working Group mailing list (mailto:core@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/core/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/core-wg/href.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Table of Contents

1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
  1.1.  Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
2.  Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
  2.1.  Constraints not expressed by the data model . . . . . . .   6
3.  Creation and Normalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
4.  Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
5.  CRI References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
  5.1.  CBOR Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
    5.1.1.  The discard Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
    5.1.2.  Visualization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
    5.1.3.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
    5.1.4.  Specific Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
  5.2.  Ingesting and encoding a CRI Reference . . . . . . . . .  12
  5.3.  Reference Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
6.  Relationship between CRIs, URIs and IRIs . . . . . . . . . .  14
  6.1.  Converting CRIs to URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
7.  Extended CRI: Accommodating Percent Encoding (PET) . . . . .  17
8.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
  11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
  11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
Appendix A.  The Small Print . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
Appendix B.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
1. Introduction

The Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) [RFC3986] and its most common usage, the URI reference, are the Internet standard for linking to resources in hypertext formats such as HTML [W3C.REC-html52-20171214] or the HTTP "Link" header field [RFC8288].

A URI reference is a sequence of characters chosen from the repertoire of US-ASCII characters. The individual components of a URI reference are delimited by a number of reserved characters, which necessitates the use of a character escape mechanism called "percent-encoding" when these reserved characters are used in a non-delimiting function. The resolution of URI references involves parsing a character sequence into its components, combining those components with the components of a base URI, merging path components, removing dot-segments, and recomposing the result back into a character sequence.

Overall, the proper handling of URI references is quite intricate. This can be a problem especially in constrained environments [RFC7228], where nodes often have severe code size and memory size limitations. As a result, many implementations in such environments support only an ad-hoc, informally-specified, bug-ridden, non-interoperable subset of half of RFC 3986.

This document defines the _Constrained Resource Identifier (CRI)_ by constraining URIs to a simplified subset and serializing their components in Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC8949] instead of a sequence of characters. This allows typical operations on URI references such as parsing, comparison and reference resolution (including all corner cases) to be implemented in a comparatively small amount of code.

As a result of simplification, however, CRIs are not capable of expressing all URIs permitted by the generic syntax of RFC 3986 (hence the "constrained" in "Constrained Resource Identifier"). The supported subset includes all URIs of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252], most URIs of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [RFC7230], Uniform Resource Names (URNs) [RFC8141], and other similar URIs. The exact constraints are defined in Section 2.
1.1. Notational Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

In this specification, the term "byte" is used in its now customary sense as a synonym for "octet".

Terms defined in this document appear in _cursive_ where they are introduced (rendered in plain text as the new term surrounded by underscores).

2. Constraints

A Constrained Resource Identifier consists of the same five components as a URI: scheme, authority, path, query, and fragment. The components are subject to the following constraints:

C1. The scheme name can be any Unicode string (see Definition D80 in [Unicode]) that matches the syntax of a URI scheme (see Section 3.1 of [RFC3986], which constrains schemes to ASCII) and is lowercase (see Definition D139 in [Unicode]). The scheme is always present.

C2. An authority is always a host identified by an IP address or registered name, along with optional port information, and optionally preceded by user information.

Alternatively, the authority can be absent; the two cases for this defined in Section 3.3 of [RFC3986] are modeled by two different values used in place of an absent authority:

* the path can begin with a root ("/", as when the authority is present), or

* the path can be rootless.

(Note that in Figure 1, no-authority is marked as a feature, as not all CRI implementations will support authority-less URIs.)
C3. A userinfo is a text string built out of unreserved characters (Section 2.3 of [RFC3986]) or "sub-delims" (Section 2.2 of [RFC3986]); any other character needs to be percent-encoded (Section 7). Note that this excludes the ":" character, which is commonly deprecated as a way to delimit a cleartext password in a userinfo.

C4. An IP address can be either an IPv4 address or an IPv6 address, optionally with a zone identifier [RFC6874]. Future versions of IP are not supported (it is likely that a binary mapping would be strongly desirable, and that cannot be designed ahead of time, so these versions need to be added as a future extension if needed).

C5. A registered name is a sequence of one or more _labels_, which, when joined with dots (".") in between them, result in a Unicode string that is lowercase and in Unicode Normalization Form C (NFC) (see Definition D120 in [Unicode]). (The syntax may be further restricted by the scheme. As per Section 3.2.2 of [RFC3986], a registered name can be empty, for which case a scheme can define a default for the host.)

C6. A port is always an integer in the range from 0 to 65535. Ports outside this range, empty ports (port subcomponents with no digits, see Section 3.2.3 of [RFC3986]), or ports with redundant leading zeros, are not supported.

C7. The port is omitted if and only if the port would be the same as the scheme's default port (provided the scheme is defining such a default port) or the scheme is not using ports.

C8. A path consists of zero or more path segments. Note that a path of just a single zero-length path segment is allowed -- this is considered equivalent to a path of zero path segments by HTTP and CoAP, but this equivalence does not hold for CRIs in general as they only perform normalization on the Syntax-Based Normalization level (Section 6.2.2 of [RFC3986], not on the scheme-specific Scheme-Based Normalization level (Section 6.2.3 of [RFC3986]).

(A CRI implementation may want to offer scheme-cognizant interfaces, performing this scheme-specific normalization for schemes it knows. The interface could assert which schemes the implementation knows and provide pre-normalized CRIs. This can also relieve the application from removing a lone zero-length path segment before putting path segments into CoAP Options, i.e., from performing the check and jump in item 8 of Section 6.4 of [RFC7252]. See also SP1 in Appendix A.)
C9. A path segment can be any Unicode string that is in NFC, with the exception of the special "." and ".." complete path segments. Note that this includes the zero-length string.

If no authority is present in a CRI, the leading path segment cannot be empty. (See also SP1 in Appendix A.)

C10. A query always consists of one or more query parameters. A query parameter can be any Unicode string that is in NFC. It is often in the form of a "key=value" pair. When converting a CRI to a URI, query parameters are separated by an ampersand ("&") character. (This matches the structure and encoding of the target URI in CoAP requests.) Queries are optional; there is a difference between an absent query and a single query parameter that is the empty string.

C11. A fragment identifier can be any Unicode string that is in NFC. Fragment identifiers are optional; there is a difference between an absent fragment identifier and a fragment identifier that is the empty string.

C12. The syntax of registered names, path segments, query parameters, and fragment identifiers may be further restricted and sub-structured by the scheme. There is no support, however, for escaping sub-delimiters that are not intended to be used in a delimiting function.

C13. When converting a CRI to a URI, any character that is outside the allowed character range or is a delimiter in the URI syntax is percent-encoded. For CRIs, percent-encoding always uses the UTF-8 encoding form (see Definition D92 in [Unicode]) to convert the character to a sequence of bytes (that is then converted to a sequence of %HH triplets).

Examples for URIs at or beyond the boundaries of these constraints are in SP2 in Appendix A.

2.1. Constraints not expressed by the data model

There are syntactically valid CRIs and CRI references that cannot be converted into a URI or URI reference, respectively.

For CRI references, this is acceptable -- they can be resolved still and result in a valid CRI that can be converted back. (An example of this is [0, ["p"] which appends a slash and the path segment "p" to its base).
Constrained Resource Identifiers

(Full) CRIs that do not correspond to a valid URI are not valid on their own, and cannot be used. Normatively they are characterized by the Section 6.1 process producing a valid and syntax-normalized URI. For easier understanding, they are listed here:

* CRIs (and CRI references) containing a path component "." or "..".

These would be removed by the remove_dot_segments algorithm of [RFC3986], and thus never produce a normalized URI after resolution.

(In CRI references, the discard value is used to afford segment removal, and with "." being an unreserved character, expressing them as ":%2e" and ":%2e%2e" is not even viable, let alone practical).

* CRIs without authority whose path starts with two or more empty segments.

When converted to URIs, these would violate the requirement that in absence of an authority, a URI’s path cannot begin with two slash characters, and they would be indistinguishable from a URI with a shorter path and a present but empty authority component.

3. Creation and Normalization

In general, resource identifiers are created on the initial creation of a resource with a certain resource identifier, or the initial exposition of a resource under a particular resource identifier.

A Constrained Resource Identifier SHOULD be created by the naming authority that governs the namespace of the resource identifier (see also [RFC8820]). For example, for the resources of an HTTP origin server, that server is responsible for creating the CRIs for those resources.

The naming authority MUST ensure that any CRI created satisfies the constraints defined in Section 2. The creation of a CRI fails if the CRI cannot be validated to satisfy all of the constraints.

If a naming authority creates a CRI from user input, it MAY apply the following (and only the following) normalizations to get the CRI more likely to validate:

* map the scheme name to lowercase (C1);

* map the registered name to NFC (C5) and split it on embedded dots;
* elide the port if it is the default port for the scheme (C7);
* map path segments, query parameters and the fragment identifier to NFC form (C9, C10, C11).

Once a CRI has been created, it can be used and transferred without further normalization. All operations that operate on a CRI SHOULD rely on the assumption that the CRI is appropriately pre-normalized. (This does not contradict the requirement that when CRIs are transferred, recipients must operate on as-good-as untrusted input and fail gracefully in the face of malicious inputs.)

4. Comparison

One of the most common operations on CRIs is comparison: determining whether two CRIs are equivalent, without dereferencing the CRIs (using them to access their respective resource(s)).

Determination of equivalence or difference of CRIs is based on simple component-wise comparison. If two CRIs are identical component-by-component (using code-point-by-code-point comparison for components that are Unicode strings) then it is safe to conclude that they are equivalent.

This comparison mechanism is designed to minimize false negatives while strictly avoiding false positives. The constraints defined in Section 2 imply the most common forms of syntax- and scheme-based normalizations in URIs, but do not comprise protocol-based normalizations that require accessing the resources or detailed knowledge of the scheme’s dereference algorithm. False negatives can be caused, for example, by CRIs that are not appropriately pre-normalized and by resource aliases.

When CRIs are compared to select (or avoid) a network action, such as retrieval of a representation, fragment components (if any) should be excluded from the comparison.

5. CRI References

The most common usage of a Constrained Resource Identifier is to embed it in resource representations, e.g., to express a hyperlink between the represented resource and the resource identified by the CRI.
This section defines the serialization of CRIs in Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC8949]. To reduce representation size, CRIs are not serialized directly. Instead, CRIs are indirectly referenced through _CRI references_. These take advantage of hierarchical locality and provide a very compact encoding. The CBOR serialization of CRI references is specified in Section 5.1.

The only operation defined on a CRI reference is _reference resolution_: the act of transforming a CRI reference into a CRI. An application MUST implement this operation by applying the algorithm specified in Section 5.3 (or any algorithm that is functionally equivalent to it).

The reverse operation of transforming a CRI into a CRI reference is unspecified; implementations are free to use any algorithm as long as reference resolution of the resulting CRI reference yields the original CRI. Notably, a CRI reference is not required to satisfy all of the constraints of a CRI; the only requirement on a CRI reference is that reference resolution MUST yield the original CRI.

When testing for equivalence or difference, applications SHOULD NOT directly compare CRI references; the references should be resolved to their respective CRI before comparison.

5.1. CBOR Serialization

A CRI or CRI reference is encoded as a CBOR array [RFC8949], with the structure as described in the Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) [RFC8610] as follows:

```cddl
 RFC-XXXX-Definitions = [CRI, CRI-Reference]

CRI = [    scheme,    authority / no-authority,    local-part ]

CRI-Reference = [    ((scheme / null, authority / no-authority)    // discard), ; relative reference    local-part ]
```

Bormann & Birkholz Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 9]
local-part = (path / null, query / null, fragment / null)
scheme = scheme-name / scheme-id
scheme-name = text .regexp "[a-z][a-z0-9\+.-]*"
scheme-id = (COAP / COAPS / HTTP / HTTPS / URN / DID /
other-scheme)

COAP = -1 COAPS = -2 HTTP = -3 HTTPS = -4 URN = -5 DID = -6
other-scheme = nint .feature "scheme-id-extension"

no-authority = NOAUTH-NOSLASH / NOAUTH-LEADINGSLASH
NOAUTH-LEADINGSLASH = null .feature "no-authority"
NOAUTH-NOSLASH = true .feature "no-authority"

authority = [?userinfo, host, ?port]
userinfo = (false, text .feature "userinfo")
host = (host-ip // host-name)
host-name = (*text) ; lowercase, NFC labels
host-ip = (bytes .size 4 //
(bytes .size 16, ?zone-id))
zone-id = text
port = 0..65535
discard = DISCARD-ALL / 0..127
DISCARD-ALL = true
path = [*text]
query = [*text]
fragment = text

Figure 1: CDDL for CRI CBOR serialization

This CDDL specification is simplified for exposition and needs to be augmented by the following rule for interchange of CRIs and CRI references: Trailing null values MUST be removed, and two leading null values (scheme and authority both not given) are represented by using the discard alternative instead.

The rules scheme, authority, path, query, fragment correspond to the (sub-)components of a CRI, as described in Section 2, with the addition of the discard section.
5.1.1. The discard Section

The discard section can be used in a CRI reference when neither a scheme nor an authority is present. It then expresses the operations performed on a base CRI by CRI references that are equivalent to URI references with relative paths and path prefixes such as "/", "./", ".../", ".../../", etc. "." and ".." are not available in CRIs and are therefore expressed using discard after a normalization step, as is the presence or absence of a leading "/".

E.g., a simple URI reference "foo" specifies to remove one leading segment from the base URI's path, which is represented in the equivalent CRI reference discard section as the value 1; similarly ".../foo" removes two leading segments, represented as 2; and "/foo" removes all segments, represented in the discard section as the value true. The exact semantics of the section values are defined by Section 5.3.

Most URI references that Section 4.2 of [RFC3986] calls "relative references" (i.e., references that need to undergo a resolution process to obtain a URI) correspond to the CRI form that starts with discard. The exception are relative references with an authority (called a "network-path reference" in Section 4.2 of [RFC3986]), which discard the entire path of the base CRI. These CRI references never carry a discard section: the value of discard defaults to true.

5.1.2. Visualization

The structure of a CRI reference is visualized using the somewhat limited means of a railroad diagram:

```
cri-reference:
   >
       >
           >
               >
                   scheme   authority   path   query   fragment
                   discard
```

This visualization does not go into the details of the elements.

5.1.3. Examples
5.1.4. Specific Terminology

A CRI reference is considered _well-formed_ if it matches the structure as expressed in Figure 1 in CDDL, with the additional requirement that trailing null values are removed from the array.

A CRI reference is considered _absolute_ if it is well-formed and the sequence of sections starts with a non-null scheme.

A CRI reference is considered _relative_ if it is well-formed and the sequence of sections is empty or starts with a section other than those that would constitute a scheme.

5.2. Ingesting and encoding a CRI Reference

From an abstract point of view, a CRI Reference is a data structure with six sections:

- scheme
- authority
- discard
- path
- query
- fragment

Each of these sections can be unset ("null"), except for discard, which is always an unsigned number or true. If scheme and/or authority are non-null, discard must be true.

When ingesting a CRI Reference that is in the transfer form, those sections are filled in from the transfer form (unset sections are filled with null), and the following steps are performed:

* If the array is entirely empty, replace it with [0].
* If discard is present in the transfer form (i.e., the outer array starts with true or an unsigned number), set scheme and authority to null.

* If scheme and/or authority are present in the transfer form (i.e., the outer array starts with null, a text string, or a negative integer), set discard to true.

Upon encoding the abstract form into the transfer form, the inverse processing is performed: If scheme and/or authority are not null, the discard value is not transferred (it must be true in this case). If they are both null, they are both left out and only discard is transferred. Trailing null values are removed from the array. As a special case, an empty array is sent in place for a remaining [0] (URI "")

5.3. Reference Resolution

The term "relative" implies that a "base CRI" exists against which the relative reference is applied. Aside from fragment-only references, relative references are only usable when a base CRI is known.

The following steps define the process of resolving any well-formed CRI reference against a base CRI so that the result is a CRI in the form of an absolute CRI reference:

1. Establish the base CRI of the CRI reference and express it in the form of an abstract absolute CRI reference.

2. Initialize a buffer with the sections from the base CRI.

3. If the value of discard is true in the CRI reference (which is implicitly the case when scheme and/or authority are present in the reference), replace the path in the buffer with the empty array, unset query and fragment, and set a true authority to null. If the value of discard is an unsigned number, remove as many elements from the end of the path array; if it is non-zero, unset query and fragment.

   Set discard to true in the buffer.

4. If the path section is set in the CRI reference, append all elements from the path array to the array in the path section in the buffer; unset query and fragment.
5. Apart from the path and discard, copy all non-null sections from the CRI reference to the buffer in sequence; unset fragment in the buffer if query is non-null in the CRI reference (and therefore has been copied to the buffer).

6. Return the sections in the buffer as the resolved CRI.

6. Relationship between CRIs, URIs and IRIs

CRIs are meant to replace both Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) [RFC3986] and Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs) [RFC3987] in constrained environments [RFC7228]. Applications in these environments may never need to use URIs and IRIs directly, especially when the resource identifier is used simply for identification purposes or when the CRI can be directly converted into a CoAP request.

However, it may be necessary in other environments to determine the associated URI or IRI of a CRI, and vice versa. Applications can perform these conversions as follows:

CRI to URI
A CRI is converted to a URI as specified in Section 6.1.

URI to CRI
The method of converting a URI to a CRI is unspecified; implementations are free to use any algorithm as long as converting the resulting CRI back to a URI yields an equivalent URI.

CRI to IRI
A CRI can be converted to an IRI by first converting it to a URI as specified in Section 6.1, and then converting the URI to an IRI as described in Section 3.2 of [RFC3987].

IRI to CRI
An IRI can be converted to a CRI by first converting it to a URI as described in Section 3.1 of [RFC3987], and then converting the URI to a CRI as described above.

Everything in this section also applies to CRI references, URI references and IRI references.
6.1. Converting CRIs to URIs

Applications MUST convert a CRI reference to a URI reference by determining the components of the URI reference according to the following steps and then recomposing the components to a URI reference string as specified in Section 5.3 of [RFC3986].

scheme
If the CRI reference contains a scheme section, the scheme component of the URI reference consists of the value of that section. Otherwise, the scheme component is unset.

authority
If the CRI reference contains a host-name or host-ip item, the authority component of the URI reference consists of a host subcomponent, optionally followed by a colon (":") character and a port subcomponent, optionally preceded by a userinfo subcomponent. Otherwise, the authority component is unset.

The host subcomponent consists of the value of the host-name or host-ip item.

The userinfo subcomponent, if present, is turned into a single string by appending a "@". Otherwise, both the subcomponent and the "@" sign are omitted. Any character in the value of the userinfo elements that is not in the set of unreserved characters (Section 2.3 of [RFC3986]) or "sub-delims" (Section 2.2 of [RFC3986]) MUST be percent-encoded.

The host-name is turned into a single string by joining the elements separated by dots ("."). Any character in the elements of a host-name item that is a dot ("."), or not in the set of unreserved characters (Section 2.3 of [RFC3986]) or "sub-delims" (Section 2.2 of [RFC3986]) MUST be percent-encoded.

The value of a host-ip item MUST be represented as a string that matches the "IPv4address" or "IP-literal" rule (Section 3.2.2 of [RFC3986]). Any zone-id is appended to the string, separated by "%25" as defined in Section 2 of [RFC6874], or as specified in a superseding zone-id specification document [I-D.carpenter-6man-rfc6874bis]; this also leads to a modified "IP-literal" rule as specified in these documents.

If the CRI reference contains a port item, the port subcomponent consists of the value of that item in decimal notation. Otherwise, the colon (":") character and the port subcomponent are both omitted.
If the CRI reference contains a discard item of value true, the path component is considered _rooted_. If it contains a discard item of value 0 and the path item is present, the conversion fails. If it contains a positive discard item, the path component is considered _unrooted_ and prefixed by as many ".../" components as the discard value minus one indicates.

If the discard item is not present and the CRI reference contains an authority that is true, the path component of the URI reference is considered unrooted. Otherwise, the path component is considered rooted.

If the CRI reference contains one or more path items, the path component is constructed by concatenating the sequence of representations of these items. These representations generally contain a leading slash "/" character and the value of each item, processed as discussed below. The leading slash character is omitted for the first path item only if the path component is considered "unrooted".

Any character in the value of a path item that is not in the set of unreserved characters or "sub-delims" or a colon (":") or commercial at ("@") character MUST be percent-encoded.

If the authority component is present (not null or true) and the path component does not match the "path-abempty" rule (Section 3.3 of [RFC3986]), the conversion fails.

If the authority component is not present, but the scheme component is, and the path component does not match the "path-absolute", "path-rootless" (authority == true) or "path-empty" rule (Section 3.3 of [RFC3986]), the conversion fails.

If neither the authority component nor the scheme component are present, and the path component does not match the "path-absolute", "path-noscheme" or "path-empty" rule (Section 3.3 of [RFC3986]), the conversion fails.

query
If the CRI reference contains one or more query items, the query component of the URI reference consists of the value of each item, separated by an ampersand ("&") character. Otherwise, the query component is unset.
Any character in the value of a query item that is not in the set of unreserved characters or "sub-delims" or a colon (":")
commercial at ("@"), slash ("/") or question mark ("?"), character
MUST be percent-encoded. Additionally, any ampersand character
("&") in the item value MUST be percent-encoded.

If the CRI reference contains a fragment item, the fragment
component of the URI reference consists of the value of that item.
Otherwise, the fragment component is unset.

Any character in the value of a fragment item that is not in the
set of unreserved characters or "sub-delims" or a colon (":")
commercial at ("@"), slash ("/") or question mark ("?"), character
MUST be percent-encoded.

7. Extended CRI: Accommodating Percent Encoding (PET)

CRIs have been designed to relieve implementations operating on CRIs
from string scanning, which both helps constrained implementations
and implementations that need to achieve high throughput.

Basic CRI does not support URI components that _require_ percent-
encoding (Section 2.1 of [RFC3986]) to represent them in the URI
syntax, except where that percent-encoding is used to escape the main
delimiter in use.

E.g., the URI

https://alice/3%2f4-inch

is represented by the basic CRI

[-4, ["alice"], ["3/4-inch"]]

However, percent-encoding that is used at the application level is
not supported by basic CRIs:

did:web:alice:7%3A1-balun

This section presents a method to represent percent-encoded segments
of userinfo, hostnames, paths, and queries, as well as fragments.

The four CDDL rules
userinfo = (false, text .feature "userinfo")
host-name = (*text)
path = [*text]
query = [*text]
fragment = text

are replaced with

userinfo = (false, text-or-pet .feature "userinfo")
host-name = (*text-or-pet)
path = [*text-or-pet]
query = [*text-or-pet]
fragment = text-or-pet

text-or-pet = text /
   text-pet-sequence .feature "extended-cri"

; text1 and pet1 alternating, at least one pet1:
text-pet-sequence = [%text1, ((+(pet1, text1), ?pet1) // pet1)]
; pet is percent-encoded bytes
pet1 = bytes .ne ''
text1 = text .ne ''

That is, for each of the host-name, path, and query segments, and for
the userinfo and fragment components, an alternate representation is
provided besides a simple text string: a non-empty array of
alternating non-blank text and byte strings, the text strings of
which stand for non-percent-encoded text, while the byte strings
retain the special semantics of percent-encoded text without actually
being percent-encoded.

The above DID URI can now be represented as:

[-6, true, [%"web:alice:7", ':', "1-balun"]]

8. Implementation Status

With the exception of the authority=true fix, host-names split into
labels, and Section 7, CRIs are implemented in
https://gitlab.com/chrysn/micrurus. A golang implementation of
version -10 of this document is found at: https://github.com/thomas-fossati/href
9. Security Considerations

Parsers of CRI references must operate on input that is assumed to be untrusted. This means that parsers MUST fail gracefully in the face of malicious inputs. Additionally, parsers MUST be prepared to deal with resource exhaustion (e.g., resulting from the allocation of big data items) or exhaustion of the call stack (stack overflow). See Section 10 of [RFC8949] for additional security considerations relating to CBOR.

The security considerations discussed in Section 7 of [RFC3986] and Section 8 of [RFC3987] for URIs and IRIs also apply to CRIs.

10. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

11. References

11.1. Normative References

[I-D.carpenter-6man-rfc6874bis]


11.2. Informative References


Appendix A.  The Small Print

This appendix lists a few corner cases of URI semantics that implementers of CRIs need to be aware of, but that are not representative of the normal operation of CRIs.

SP1.  Initial (Lone/Leading) Empty Path Segments:

* _Lone empty path segments:_ As per [RFC3986], s://x is distinct from s://x/ -- i.e., a URI with an empty path is different from one with a lone empty path segment.  However, in HTTP, CoAP, they are implicitly aliased (for CoAP, in item 8 of Section 6.4 of [RFC7252]).  As per item 7 of Section 6.5 of [RFC7252], recomposition of a URI without Uri-Path Options from the other URI-related CoAP Options produces s://x/, not s://x -- CoAP prefers the lone empty path segment form.
// TBD: add similar text for HTTP, if that can be made.
Section 6.2.3 of [RFC3986] even states:

| In general, a URI that uses the generic syntax for authority with an empty path should be normalized to a path of "/".

* _Leading empty path segments without authority:_ Somewhat related, note also that URIs and URI references that do not carry an authority cannot represent initial empty path segments (i.e., that are followed by further path segments): s://x/foo works, but in a s://foo URI or an (absolute-path) URI reference of the form //foo the double slash would be mis-parsed as leading in to an authority.

SP2.  Constraints (Section 2) of CRIs/basic CRIs

While most URIs in everyday use can be converted to CRIs and back to URIs matching the input after syntax-based normalization of the URI, these URIs illustrate the constraints by example:

* https://host%ffname, https://example.com/x?data=%ff

All URI components must, after percent decoding, be valid UTF-8 encoded text.  Bytes that are not valid UTF-8 show up, for example, in BitTorrent web seeds.
* https://example.com/component%3bone;component%3btwo,
  http://example.com/component%3dequals

While delimiters can be used in an escaped and unescaped form in URIs with generally distinct meanings, basic CRIs (i.e., without percent-encoded text Section 7) only support one escapable delimiter character per component, which is the delimiter by which the component is split up in the CRI.

Note that the separators . (for authority parts), / (for paths), & (for query parameters) are special in that they are syntactic delimiters of their respective components in CRIs. Thus, the following examples _are_ convertible to basic CRIs:

https://interior%2edot/

https://example.com/path%2fcomponent/second-component

https://example.com/x?ampersand=%26&questionmark=?

* https://alice@example.com/

The user information can be expressed in CRIs if the "userinfo" feature is present. The URI https://@example.com is represented as [-4, [false, "", "example", "com"]); the false serves as a marker that the next element is the userinfo.

The rules do not cater for unencoded ":" in userinfo, which is commonly considered a deprecated inclusion of a literal password.

Appendix B. Change Log

This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Changes from -08 to -09

* Identify more esoteric features with a CDDL ".feature".
* Clarify that well-formedness requires removing trailing nulls.
* Fragments can contain PET.
* Percent-encoded text in PET is treated as byte strings.
* URIs with an authority but a completely empty path (e.g., http://example.com): CRIs with an authority component no longer always produce at least a slash in the path component.

For generic schemes, the conversion of scheme://example.com to a CRI is now possible because CRI produces a URI with an authority not followed by a slash following the updated rules of Section 6.1. Schemes like http and coap do not distinguish between the empty path and the path containing a single slash when an authority is set (as recommended in [RFC3986]). For these schemes, that equivalence allows implementations to convert the just-a-slash URI to a CRI with a zero length path array (which, however, when converted back, does not produce a slash after the authority).

(Add an appendix "the small print" for more detailed discussion of pesky corner cases like this.)

Changes from -07 to -08

* Fix the encoding of NOAUTH-NOSLASH / NOAUTH-LEADINGSLASH
* Add URN and DID schemes, add example.
* Add PET
* Remove hopeless attempt to encode "remote trailing nulls" rule in CDDL (which is not a transformation language).

Changes from -06 to -07

* More explicitly discuss constraints (Section 2), add examples (Appendix A, Paragraph 6, Item 1).
* Make CDDL more explicit about special simple values.
* Lots of gratuitous changes from XML2RFC redefinition of <tt> semantics.

Changes from -05 to -06

* rework authority:
  - split reg-names at dots;
  - add optional zone identifiers [RFC6874] to IP addresses

Changes from -04 to -05
* Simplify CBOR structure.
* Add implementation status section.

Changes from -03 to -04:
* Minor editorial improvements.
* Renamed path.type/path-type to discard.
* Renamed option to section, substructured into items.
* Simplified the table "resolution-variables".
* Use the CBOR structure inspired by Jim Schaad’s proposals.

Changes from -02 to -03:
* Expanded the set of supported schemes (#3).
* Specified creation, normalization and comparison (#9).
* Clarified the default value of the path.type option (#33).
* Removed the append-relation path.type option (#41).
* Renumbered the remaining path.types.
* Renumbered the option numbers.
* Restructured the document.
* Minor editorial improvements.

Changes from -01 to -02:
* Changed the syntax of schemes to exclude upper case characters (#13).
* Minor editorial improvements (#34 #37).

Changes from -00 to -01:
* None.
Acknowledgements

CRIs were developed by Klaus Hartke for use in the Constrained RESTful Application Language (CoRAL). The current author team is completing this work with a view to achieve good integration with the potential use cases, both inside and outside of CoRAL.

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Abstract

This document defines Group Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE), providing end-to-end security of CoAP messages exchanged between members of a group, e.g., sent over IP multicast. In particular, the described approach defines how OSCORE is used in a group communication setting to provide source authentication for CoAP group requests, sent by a client to multiple servers, and for protection of the corresponding CoAP responses. Group OSCORE also defines a pairwise mode where each member of the group can efficiently derive a symmetric pairwise key with any other member of the group for pairwise OSCORE communication.
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Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................. 4
   1.1. Terminology .............................................. 6
2. Security Context ................................................ 8
   2.1. Common Context ........................................... 11
       2.1.1. AEAD Algorithm ..................................... 11
       2.1.2. ID Context ........................................ 11
       2.1.3. Group Manager Authentication Credential ............. 12
       2.1.4. Signature Encryption Algorithm ....................... 12
       2.1.5. Signature Algorithm ................................ 12
       2.1.6. Group Encryption Key ................................ 12
       2.1.7. Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm ..................... 13
   2.2. Sender Context and Recipient Context ...................... 13
   2.3. Authentication Credentials ................................ 14
   2.4. Pairwise Keys ............................................. 16
       2.4.1. Derivation of Pairwise Keys ......................... 16
       2.4.2. ECDH with Montgomery Coordinates .................... 18
       2.4.3. Usage of Sequence Numbers ........................... 19
       2.4.4. Security Context for Pairwise Mode .................. 20
   2.5. Update of Security Context ................................ 20
       2.5.1. Loss of Mutable Security Context .................... 21
       2.5.2. Exhaustion of Sender Sequence Number ................. 22
       2.5.3. Retrieving New Security Context Parameters .......... 23
3. The Group Manager ............................................... 25
   3.1. Support for Additional Entities .......................... 26
   3.2. Management of Group Keying Material ...................... 27
       3.2.1. Recycling of Identifiers ............................ 30
   3.3. Responsibilities of the Group Manager .................... 32
4. The COSE Object ................................................. 34
   4.1. Countersignature ......................................... 34
       4.1.1. Keystream Derivation ................................ 35
       4.1.2. Clarifications on Using a Countersignature .......... 36
   4.2. The ‘kid’ and ‘kid context’ parameters .................. 36
       4.3. external_aad ........................................... 36
5. OSCORE Header Compression ..................................... 39
   5.1. Examples of Compressed COSE Objects ...................... 40
       5.1.1. Examples in Group Mode ............................... 40
       5.1.2. Examples in Pairwise Mode ............................ 41
1. Introduction

The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] is a web transfer protocol specifically designed for constrained devices and networks [RFC7228]. Group communication for CoAP [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis] addresses use cases where deployed devices benefit from a group communication model, for example to reduce latencies, improve performance, and reduce bandwidth utilization. Use cases include lighting control, integrated building control, software and firmware updates, parameter and configuration updates, commissioning of constrained networks, and emergency multicast (see Appendix B). Group communication for CoAP [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis] mainly uses UDP/IP multicast as the underlying data transport.

Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) [RFC8613] describes a security protocol based on the exchange of protected CoAP messages. OSCORE builds on CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct][I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs] and
provides end-to-end encryption, integrity, replay protection and binding of response to request between a sender and a recipient, independent of the transport layer also in the presence of intermediaries. To this end, a CoAP message is protected by including its payload (if any), certain options, and header fields in a COSE object, which replaces the authenticated and encrypted fields in the protected message.

This document defines Group OSCORE, a security protocol for Group communication for CoAP [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis], providing the same end-to-end security properties as OSCORE in the case where CoAP requests have multiple recipients. In particular, the described approach defines how OSCORE is used in a group communication setting to provide source authentication for CoAP group requests, sent by a client to multiple servers, and for protection of the corresponding CoAP responses. Group OSCORE also defines a pairwise mode where each member of the group can efficiently derive a symmetric pairwise key with any other member of the group for pairwise OSCORE communication. Just like OSCORE, Group OSCORE is independent of the transport layer and works wherever CoAP does.

As with OSCORE, it is possible to combine Group OSCORE with communication security on other layers. One example is the use of transport layer security, such as DTLS [RFC6347][I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13], between one client and one proxy (and vice versa), or between one proxy and one server (and vice versa). This prevents observers from accessing addressing information conveyed in CoAP options that would not be protected by Group OSCORE, but would be protected by DTLS. These options include Uri-Host, Uri-Port and Proxy-Uri. Note that DTLS does not define how to secure messages sent over IP multicast.

Group OSCORE defines two modes of operation, that can be used independently or together:

* In the group mode, Group OSCORE requests and responses are digitally signed with the private key of the sender and the signature is embedded in the protected CoAP message. The group mode supports all COSE signature algorithms as well as signature verification by intermediaries. This mode is defined in Section 8.
* In the pairwise mode, two group members exchange OSCORE requests and responses (typically) over unicast, and the messages are protected with symmetric keys. These symmetric keys are derived from Diffie-Hellman shared secrets, calculated with the asymmetric keys of the sender and recipient, allowing for shorter integrity tags and therefore lower message overhead. This mode is defined in Section 9.

Both modes provide source authentication of CoAP messages. The application decides what mode to use, potentially on a per-message basis. Such decisions can be based, for instance, on pre-configured policies or dynamic assessing of the target recipient and/or resource, among other things. One important case is when requests are protected with the group mode, and responses with the pairwise mode. Since such responses convey shorter integrity tags instead of bigger, full-fledged signatures, this significantly reduces the message overhead in case of many responses to one request.

A special deployment of Group OSCORE is to use pairwise mode only. For example, consider the case of a constrained-node network [RFC7228] with a large number of CoAP endpoints and the objective to establish secure communication between any pair of endpoints with a small provisioning effort and message overhead. Since the total number of security associations that needs to be established grows with the square of the number of endpoints, it is desirable to restrict the amount of secret keying material provided to each endpoint. Moreover, a key establishment protocol would need to be executed for each security association. One solution to this is to deploy Group OSCORE, with the endpoints being part of a group, and use the pairwise mode. This solution assumes a trusted third party called Group Manager (see Section 3). However, it has the benefit of providing a single shared secret, while distributing only the public keys of group members or a subset of those. After that, a CoAP endpoint can locally derive the OSCORE Security Context for the other endpoint in the group, and protect CoAP communications with very low overhead [I-D.ietf-lwig-security-protocol-comparison].

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts described in CoAP [RFC7252] including "endpoint", "client", "server", "sender" and "recipient"; group communication for CoAP
Readers are also expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts for protection and processing of CoAP messages through OSCORE, such as "Security Context" and "Master Secret", defined in [RFC8613].

Terminology for constrained environments, such as "constrained device" and "constrained-node network", is defined in [RFC7228].

This document refers also to the following terminology.

* Keying material: data that is necessary to establish and maintain secure communication among endpoints. This includes, for instance, keys and IVs [RFC4949].

* Authentication credential: set of information associated with an entity, including that entity's public key and parameters associated with the public key. Examples of authentication credentials are CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) and CWT Claims Sets (CCSs) [RFC8392], X.509 certificates [RFC7925] and C509 certificates [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]. Further details about authentication credentials are provided in Section 2.3.

* Group: a set of endpoints that share group keying material and security parameters (Common Context, see Section 2). That is, unless otherwise specified, the term group used in this document refers to a "security group" (see Section 2.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis]), not to be confused with "CoAP group" or "application group".

* Group Manager: entity responsible for a group. Each endpoint in a group communicates securely with the respective Group Manager, which is neither required to be an actual group member nor to take part in the group communication. The full list of responsibilities of the Group Manager is provided in Section 3.3.
* Silent server: member of a group that never sends protected responses in reply to requests. For CoAP group communications, requests are normally sent without necessarily expecting a response. A silent server may send unprotected responses, as error responses reporting an OSCORE error. Note that an endpoint can implement both a silent server and a client, i.e., the two roles are independent. An endpoint acting only as a silent server performs only Group OSCORE processing on incoming requests. Silent servers maintain less keying material and in particular do not have a Sender Context for the group. Since silent servers do not have a Sender ID, they cannot support the pairwise mode.

* Group Identifier (Gid): identifier assigned to the group, unique within the set of groups of a given Group Manager.

* Birth Gid: with respect to a group member, the Gid obtained by that group member upon (re-)joining the group.

* Group request: CoAP request message sent by a client in the group to all servers in that group.

* Key Generation Number: an integer value identifying the current version of the keying material used in a group.

* Source authentication: evidence that a received message in the group originated from a specific identified group member. This also provides assurance that the message was not tampered with by anyone, be it a different legitimate group member or an endpoint which is not a group member.

2. Security Context

As per the terminology in Section 1.1, this document refers to a group as a set of endpoints sharing keying material and security parameters for executing the Group OSCORE protocol. Each endpoint of a group is aware of whether the group uses the group mode, or the pairwise mode, or both. Then, an endpoint can use any mode it supports if also used in the group.

All members of a group maintain a Security Context as defined in Section 3 of [RFC8613] and extended as defined in this section. How the Security Context is established by the group members is out of scope for this document, but if there is more than one Security Context applicable to a message, then the endpoints MUST be able to tell which Security Context was latest established.
The default setting for how to manage information about the group, including the Security Context, is described in terms of a Group Manager (see Section 3). In particular, the Group Manager indicates whether the group uses the group mode, the pairwise mode, or both of them, as part of the group data provided to candidate group members when joining the group.

The remainder of this section provides further details about the Security Context of Group OSCORE. In particular, each endpoint which is member of a group maintains a Security Context as defined in Section 3 of [RFC8613], extended as follows (see Figure 1).

* One Common Context, shared by all the endpoints in the group. Several new parameters are included in the Common Context.

  If a Group Manager is used for maintaining the group, the Common Context is extended with the authentication credential of the Group Manager, including the Group Manager’s public key. When processing messages, the authentication credential of the Group Manager is included in the external additional authenticated data (see Section 4.3).

  If the group uses the group mode, the Common context is extended with the following new parameters.

  - Signature Encryption Algorithm and Signature Algorithm. These relate to the encryption/decryption operations and to the computation/verification of countersignatures, respectively, when a message is protected with the group mode (see Section 8).

  - Group Encryption Key, used to perform encryption/decryption of countersignatures, when a message is protected with the group mode (see Section 8).

  If the group uses the pairwise mode, the Common Context is extended with a Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm used for agreement on a static-static Diffie-Hellman shared secret, from which pairwise keys are derived (see Section 2.4.1) to protect messages with the pairwise mode (see Section 9).

* One Sender Context, extended with the endpoint’s private key and authentication credential including the endpoint’s public key.
The private key is used to sign messages protected with the group mode, or for deriving pairwise keys in pairwise mode (see Section 2.4). The authentication credential is used for deriving pairwise keys in pairwise mode, and is included in the external additional authenticated data when processing outgoing messages (see Section 9).

If the endpoint supports the pairwise mode, the Sender Context is also extended with the Pairwise Sender Keys associated with the other endpoints (see Section 2.4).

The Sender Context is omitted if the endpoint is configured exclusively as silent server.

* One Recipient Context for each other endpoint from which messages are received. It is not necessary to maintain Recipient Contexts associated with endpoints from which messages are not (expected to be) received. The Recipient Context is extended with the authentication credential of the other endpoint, including that endpoint’s public key.

The public key is used to verify the signature of messages protected with the group mode from the other endpoint and for deriving the pairwise keys in pairwise mode (see Section 2.4). The authentication credential is used for deriving pairwise keys in pairwise mode, and is included in the external additional authenticated data when processing incoming messages from the other endpoint (see Section 9).

If the endpoint supports the pairwise mode, then the Recipient Context is also extended with the Pairwise Recipient Key associated with the other endpoint (see Section 2.4).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context Component</th>
<th>New Information Elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common Context</td>
<td>Group Manager Authentication Credential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Signature Encryption Algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Signature Algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Group Encryption Key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>^ Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sender Context</td>
<td>Endpoint’s own private key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Endpoint’s own authentication credential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>^ Pairwise Sender Keys for the other endpoints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each Recipient Context</td>
<td>Other endpoint’s authentication credential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>^ Pairwise Recipient Key for the other endpoint</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Additions to the OSCORE Security Context. The optional elements labeled with * (with ^) are present only if the group uses the group mode (the pairwise mode).

2.1. Common Context

The Common Context may be acquired from the Group Manager (see Section 3). The following sections define how the Common Context is extended, compared to [RFC8613].

2.1.1. AEAD Algorithm

AEAD Algorithm identifies the COSE AEAD algorithm to use for encryption, when messages are protected using the pairwise mode (see Section 9). This algorithm MUST provide integrity protection. This parameter is immutable once the Common Context is established, and it is not relevant if the group uses only the group mode.

2.1.2. ID Context

The ID Context parameter (see Sections 3.1 and 3.3 of [RFC8613]) in the Common Context SHALL contain the Group Identifier (Gid) of the group. The choice of the Gid format is application specific. An example of specific formatting of the Gid is given in Appendix C. The application needs to specify how to handle potential collisions between Gids (see Section 12.6).
2.1.3. Group Manager Authentication Credential

Group Manager Authentication Credential specifies the authentication credential of the Group Manager, including the Group Manager’s public key. This is included in the external additional authenticated data when processing messages (see Section 4.3).

Each group member MUST obtain the authentication credential of the Group Manager with a valid proof-of-possession of the corresponding private key, for instance from the Group Manager itself when joining the group. Further details on the provisioning of the Group Manager’s authentication credential to the group members are out of the scope of this document.

2.1.4. Signature Encryption Algorithm

Signature Encryption Algorithm identifies the algorithm to use for encryption, when messages are protected using the group mode (see Section 8). This algorithm MAY provide integrity protection. This parameter is immutable once the Common Context is established.

This algorithm is not used to encrypt the countersignature in messages protected using the group mode, for which the method defined in Section 4.1 is used.

2.1.5. Signature Algorithm

Signature Algorithm identifies the digital signature algorithm used to compute a countersignature on the COSE object (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of [I-D.ietf-cose-countersign]), when messages are protected using the group mode (see Section 8). This parameter is immutable once the Common Context is established.

2.1.6. Group Encryption Key

Group Encryption Key specifies the encryption key for deriving a keystream to encrypt/decrypt a countersignature, when a message is protected with the group mode (see Section 8).

The Group Encryption Key is derived as defined for Sender/Recipient Keys in Section 3.2.1 of [RFC8613], with the following differences.

* The ’id’ element of the ’info’ array is the empty byte string.

* The ’alg_aead’ element of the ’info’ array takes the value of Signature Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.5).
* The 'type' element of the 'info' array is "Group Encryption Key". The label is an ASCII string and does not include a trailing NUL byte.

* L and the 'L' element of the 'info' array are the size of the key for the Signature Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.5), in bytes.

2.1.7. Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm

Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm identifies the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm used to derive a static-static Diffie-Hellman shared secret, from which pairwise keys are derived (see Section 2.4.1) to protect messages with the pairwise mode (see Section 9). This parameter is immutable once the Common Context is established.

2.2. Sender Context and Recipient Context

OSCORE specifies the derivation of Sender Context and Recipient Context, specifically of Sender/Recipient Keys and Common IV, from a set of input parameters (see Section 3.2 of [RFC8613]).

The derivation of Sender/Recipient Keys and Common IV defined in OSCORE applies also to Group OSCORE, with the following extensions compared to Section 3.2.1 of [RFC8613].

* If the group uses (also) the group mode, the 'alg_aead' element of the 'info' array takes the value of Signature Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.5).

* If the group uses only the pairwise mode, the 'alg_aead' element of the 'info' array takes the value of AEAD Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.1).

The Sender ID SHALL be unique for each endpoint in a group with a certain tuple (Master Secret, Master Salt, Group Identifier), see Section 3.3 of [RFC8613].

For Group OSCORE, the Sender Context and Recipient Context additionally contain asymmetric keys, as described previously in Section 2. The private key of the sender and the authentication credential including the corresponding public key can, for example, be generated by the endpoint or provisioned during manufacturing.

With the exception of the authentication credential of the sender endpoint and the possibly associated pairwise keys, a receiver endpoint can derive a complete Security Context from a received Group
OSCORE message and the Common Context. The authentication
credentials in the Recipient Contexts can be retrieved from the Group
Manager (see Section 3) upon joining the group. An authentication
credential can alternatively be acquired from the Group Manager at a
later time, for example the first time a message is received from a
particular endpoint in the group (see Section 8.2 and Section 8.4).

For severely constrained devices, it may be not feasible to
simultaneously handle the ongoing processing of a recently received
message in parallel with the retrieval of the sender endpoint’s
authentication credential. Such devices can be configured to drop a
received message for which there is no (complete) Recipient Context,
and retrieve the sender endpoint’s authentication credential in order
to have it available to verify subsequent messages from that
endpoint.

An endpoint admits a maximum amount of Recipient Contexts for a same
Security Context, e.g., due to memory limitations. After reaching
that limit, the creation of a new Recipient Context results in an
overflow. When this happens, the endpoint has to delete a current
Recipient Context to install the new one. It is up to the
application to define policies for selecting the current Recipient
Context to delete. If the new Recipient Context has been installed
after the endpoint has experienced the overflow above, then the
Recipient Context is initialized with an invalid Replay Window, and
accordingly requires the endpoint to take appropriate actions (see
Section 2.5.1.2).

2.3. Authentication Credentials

In a group, the following MUST hold for the authentication credential
of each endpoint as well as for the authentication credential of the
Group Manager.

* All authentication credentials MUST be encoded according to the
  same format used in the group. The used format MUST provide the
  public key as well as the comprehensive set of information related
  to the public key algorithm, including, e.g., the used elliptic
curve (when applicable).

* All authentication credentials and the public key specified
  therein MUST be for the public key algorithm used in the group and
  aligned with the possible associated parameters used in the group,
  e.g., the used elliptic curve (when applicable).
If the group uses (also) the group mode, the public key algorithm is the Signature Algorithm used in the group. If the group uses only the pairwise mode, the public key algorithm is the Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm used in the group.

If the authentication credentials are X.509 certificates [RFC7925] or C509 certificates [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert], the public key algorithm is fully described by the "algorithm" field of the "SubjectPublicKeyInfo" structure, and by the "subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm" element, respectively.

If authentication credentials are CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) or CWT Claims Sets (CCSs) [RFC8392], the public key algorithm is fully described by a COSE key type and its "kty" and "crv" parameters.

Authentication credentials are used to derive pairwise keys (see Section 2.4.1) and are included in the external additional authenticated data when processing messages (see Section 4.3). In both these cases, an endpoint in a group MUST treat authentication credentials as opaque data, i.e., by considering the same binary representation made available to other endpoints in the group, possibly through a designated trusted source (e.g., the Group Manager).

For example, an X.509 certificate is provided as its direct binary serialization. If C509 certificates or CWTs are used as authentication credentials, each is provided as the binary serialization of a (possibly tagged) CBOR array. If CCSs are used as authentication credentials, each is provided as the binary serialization of a CBOR map.

If authentication credentials are CWTs, then the untagged CWT associated with an entity is stored in the Security Context and used as authentication credential for that entity.

If authentication credentials are X.509 / C509 certificates or CWTs and the authentication credential associated with an entity is provided within a chain or a bag, then only the end-entity certificate or end-entity untagged CWT is stored in the Security Context and used as authentication credential for that entity.

Storing whole authentication credentials rather than only a subset of those may result in a non-negligible storage overhead. On the other hand, it also ensures that authentication credentials are correctly used in a simple, flexible and non-error-prone way, also taking into account future credential formats as entirely new or extending existing ones. In particular, it is ensured that:
* When used to derive pairwise keys and when included in the external additional authenticated data, authentication credentials can also specify possible metadata and parameters related to the included public key. Besides the public key algorithm, these comprise other relevant pieces of information such as key usage, expiration time, issuer and subject.

* All endpoints using another endpoint’s authentication credential use exactly the same binary serialization, as obtained and distributed by the credential provider (e.g., the Group Manager) and as originally crafted by the credential issuer. In turn, this does not require to define and maintain canonical subsets of authentication credentials and their corresponding encoding, and spares endpoints from error-prone re-encoding operations.

Depending on the particular deployment and the intended group size, limiting the storage overhead of endpoints in a group can be an incentive for system/network administrators to prefer using a compact format of authentication credentials in the first place.

2.4. Pairwise Keys

Certain signature schemes, such as EdDSA and ECDSA, support a secure combined signature and encryption scheme. This section specifies the derivation of "pairwise keys", for use in the pairwise mode defined in Section 9.

Group OSCORE keys used for both signature and encryption MUST be used only for purposes related to Group OSCORE. These include the processing of messages with Group OSCORE, as well as performing proof-of-possession of private keys, e.g., upon joining a group through the Group Manager (see Section 3).

2.4.1. Derivation of Pairwise Keys

Using the Group OSCORE Security Context (see Section 2), a group member can derive AEAD keys, to protect point-to-point communication between itself and any other endpoint X in the group by means of the AEAD Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.1). The key derivation of these so-called pairwise keys follows the same construction as in Section 3.2.1 of [RFC8613]:

Pairwise Sender Key = HKDF(Sender Key, IKM-Sender, info, L)
Pairwise Recipient Key = HKDF(Recipient Key, IKM-Recipient, info, L)

with

IKM-Sender = Sender Auth Cred | Recipient Auth Cred | Shared Secret
IKM-Recipient = Recipient Auth Cred | Sender Auth Cred | Shared Secret

where:

* The Pairwise Sender Key is the AEAD key for processing outgoing messages addressed to endpoint X.
* The Pairwise Recipient Key is the AEAD key for processing incoming messages from endpoint X.
* HKDF is the OSCORE HKDF algorithm [RFC8613] from the Common Context.
* The Sender Key from the Sender Context is used as salt in the HKDF, when deriving the Pairwise Sender Key.
* The Recipient Key from the Recipient Context associated with endpoint X is used as salt in the HKDF, when deriving the Pairwise Recipient Key.
* Sender Auth Cred is the endpoint’s own authentication credential from the Sender Context.
* Recipient Auth Cred is the endpoint X’s authentication credential from the Recipient Context associated with the endpoint X.
* The Shared Secret is computed as a cofactor Diffie-Hellman shared secret, see Section 5.7.1.2 of [NIST-800-56A], using the Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm. The endpoint uses its private key from the Sender Context and the other endpoint’s public key included in Recipient Auth Cred. Note the requirement of validation of public keys in Section 12.15. For X25519 and X448, the procedure is described in Section 5 of [RFC7748] using public keys mapped to Montgomery coordinates, see Section 2.4.2.
* IKM-Sender is the Input Keying Material (IKM) used in the HKDF for the derivation of the Pairwise Sender Key. IKM-Sender is the byte string concatenation of Sender Auth Cred, Recipient Auth Cred and the Shared Secret. The authentication credentials Sender Auth Cred and Recipient Auth Cred are binary encoded as defined in Section 2.3.
* IKM-Recipient is the Input Keying Material (IKM) used in the HKDF for the derivation of the Pairwise Recipient Key. IKM-Recipient is the byte string concatenation of Recipient Auth Cred, Sender Auth Cred and the Shared Secret. The authentication credentials Recipient Auth Cred and Sender Auth Cred are binary encoded as defined in Section 2.3.

* info and L are as defined in Section 3.2.1 of [RFC8613]. That is:
  - The ‘alg_aead’ element of the ‘info’ array takes the value of AEAD Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.1).
  - L and the ‘L’ element of the ‘info’ array are the size of the key for the AEAD Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.1), in bytes.

If EdDSA asymmetric keys are used, the Edward coordinates are mapped to Montgomery coordinates using the maps defined in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of [RFC7748], before using the X25519 and X448 functions defined in Section 5 of [RFC7748]. For further details, see Section 2.4.2. ECC asymmetric keys in Montgomery or Weirstrass form are used directly in the key agreement algorithm without coordinate mapping.

After establishing a partially or completely new Security Context (see Section 2.5 and Section 3.2), the old pairwise keys MUST be deleted. Since new Sender/Recipient Keys are derived from the new group keying material (see Section 2.2), every group member MUST use the new Sender/Recipient Keys when deriving new pairwise keys.

As long as any two group members preserve the same asymmetric keys, their Diffie-Hellman shared secret does not change across updates of the group keying material.

2.4.2. ECDH with Montgomery Coordinates

2.4.2.1. Curve25519

The y-coordinate of the other endpoint’s Ed25519 public key is decoded as specified in Section 5.1.3 of [RFC8032]. The Curve25519 u-coordinate is recovered as \( u = (1 + y) / (1 - y) \) (mod p) following the map in Section 4.1 of [RFC7748]. Note that the mapping is not defined for \( y = 1 \), and that \( y = -1 \) maps to \( u = 0 \) which corresponds to the neutral group element and thus will result in a degenerate shared secret. Therefore implementations MUST abort if the y-coordinate of the other endpoint’s Ed25519 public key is 1 or -1 (mod p).
The private signing key byte strings (= the lower 32 bytes used for generating the public key, see step 1 of Section 5.1.5 of [RFC8032]) are decoded the same way for signing in Ed25519 and scalar multiplication in X25519. Hence, to compute the shared secret the endpoint applies the X25519 function to the Ed25519 private signing key byte string and the encoded u-coordinate byte string as specified in Section 5 of [RFC7748].

2.4.2.2. Curve448

The y-coordinate of the other endpoint’s Ed448 public key is decoded as specified in Section 5.2.3. of [RFC8032]. The Curve448 u-coordinate is recovered as \( u = y^2 \times (d \times y^2 - 1) / (y^2 - 1) \mod p \) following the map from "edwards448" in Section 4.2 of [RFC7748], and also using the relation \( x^2 = (y^2 - 1) / (d \times y^2 - 1) \) from the curve equation. Note that the mapping is not defined for \( y = 1 \) or \(-1\). Therefore implementations MUST abort if the y-coordinate of the peer endpoint’s Ed448 public key is 1 or -1 (mod p).

The private signing key byte strings (= the lower 57 bytes used for generating the public key, see step 1 of Section 5.2.5 of [RFC8032]) are decoded the same way for signing in Ed448 and scalar multiplication in X448. Hence, to compute the shared secret the endpoint applies the X448 function to the Ed448 private signing key byte string and the encoded u-coordinate byte string as specified in Section 5 of [RFC7748].

2.4.3. Usage of Sequence Numbers

When using any of its Pairwise Sender Keys, a sender endpoint including the ‘Partial IV’ parameter in the protected message MUST use the current fresh value of the Sender Sequence Number from its Sender Context (see Section 2.2). That is, the same Sender Sequence Number space is used for all outgoing messages protected with Group OSCORE, thus limiting both storage and complexity.

On the other hand, when combining group and pairwise communication modes, this may result in the Partial IV values moving forward more often. This can happen when a client engages in frequent or long sequences of one-to-one exchanges with servers in the group, by sending requests over unicast. In turn, this contributes to a sooner exhaustion of the Sender Sequence Number space of the client, which would then require to take actions for deriving a new Sender Context before resuming communications in the group (see Section 2.5.2).
2.4.4. Security Context for Pairwise Mode

If the pairwise mode is supported, the Security Context additionally includes Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm and the pairwise keys, as described at the beginning of Section 2.

The pairwise keys as well as the shared secrets used in their derivation (see Section 2.4.1) may be stored in memory or recomputed every time they are needed. The shared secret changes only when a public/private key pair used for its derivation changes, which results in the pairwise keys also changing. Additionally, the pairwise keys change if the Sender ID changes or if a new Security Context is established for the group (see Section 2.5.3). In order to optimize protocol performance, an endpoint may store the derived pairwise keys for easy retrieval.

In the pairwise mode, the Sender Context includes the Pairwise Sender Keys to use with the other endpoints (see Figure 1). In order to identify the right key to use, the Pairwise Sender Key for endpoint X may be associated with the Recipient ID of endpoint X, as defined in the Recipient Context (i.e., the Sender ID from the point of view of endpoint X). In this way, the Recipient ID can be used to lookup for the right Pairwise Sender Key. This association may be implemented in different ways, e.g., by storing the pair (Recipient ID, Pairwise Sender Key) or linking a Pairwise Sender Key to a Recipient Context.

2.5. Update of Security Context

It is RECOMMENDED that the immutable part of the Security Context is stored in non-volatile memory, or that it can otherwise be reliably accessed throughout the operation of the group, e.g., after a device reboots. However, also immutable parts of the Security Context may need to be updated, for example due to scheduled key renewal, new or re-joining members in the group, or the fact that the endpoint changes Sender ID (see Section 2.5.3).

On the other hand, the mutable parts of the Security Context are updated by the endpoint when executing the security protocol, but may nevertheless become outdated, e.g., due to loss of the mutable Security Context (see Section 2.5.1) or exhaustion of Sender Sequence Numbers (see Section 2.5.2).

If it is not feasible or practically possible to store and maintain up-to-date the mutable part in non-volatile memory (e.g., due to limited number of write operations), the endpoint MUST be able to detect a loss of the mutable Security Context and MUST accordingly take the actions defined in Section 2.5.1.
2.5.1. Loss of Mutable Security Context

An endpoint may lose its mutable Security Context, e.g., due to a reboot (see Section 2.5.1.1) or to an overflow of Recipient Contexts (see Section 2.5.1.2).

In such a case, the endpoint needs to prevent the re-use of a nonce with the same AEAD key, and to handle incoming replayed messages.

2.5.1.1. Reboot and Total Loss

In case a loss of the Sender Context and/or of the Recipient Contexts is detected (e.g., following a reboot), the endpoint MUST NOT protect further messages using this Security Context to avoid reusing an AEAD nonce with the same AEAD key.

In particular, before resuming its operations in the group, the endpoint MUST retrieve new Security Context parameters from the Group Manager (see Section 2.5.3) and use them to derive a new Sender Context (see Section 2.2). Since this includes a newly derived Sender Key, a server will not reuse the same pair (key, nonce), even when using the Partial IV of (old re-injected) requests to build the AEAD nonce for protecting the corresponding responses.

From then on, the endpoint MUST use the latest installed Sender Context to protect outgoing messages. Also, newly created Recipient Contexts will have a Replay Window which is initialized as valid.

If not able to establish an updated Sender Context, e.g., because of lack of connectivity with the Group Manager, the endpoint MUST NOT protect further messages using the current Security Context and MUST NOT accept incoming messages from other group members, as currently unable to detect possible replays.

An adversary may leverage the above to perform a Denial of Service attack and prevent some group members from communicating altogether. That is, the adversary can first block the communication path between the Group Manager and some individual group members. This can be achieved, for instance, by injecting fake responses to DNS queries for the Group Manager hostname, or by removing a network link used for routing traffic towards the Group Manager. Then, the adversary can induce a reboot for some endpoints in the group, e.g., by triggering a short power outage. After that, such endpoints that have lost their Sender Context and/or Recipient Contexts following the reboot would not be able to obtain new Security Context parameters from the Group Manager, as specified above. Thus, they would not be able to further communicate in the group until connectivity with the Group Manager is restored.
2.5.1.2. Overflow of Recipient Contexts

After reaching the maximum amount of Recipient Contexts, an endpoint will experience an overflow when installing a new Recipient Context, as it requires to first delete an existing one (see Section 2.2).

Every time this happens, the Replay Window of the new Recipient Context is initialized as not valid. Therefore, the endpoint MUST take the following actions, before accepting request messages from the client associated with the new Recipient Context.

If it is not configured as silent server, the endpoint MUST either:

* Retrieve new Security Context parameters from the Group Manager and derive a new Sender Context, as defined in Section 2.5.1.1; or

* When receiving a first request to process with the new Recipient Context, use the approach specified in Section 10 and based on the Echo Option for CoAP [RFC9175], if supported. In particular, the endpoint MUST use its Partial IV when generating the AEAD nonce and MUST include the Partial IV in the response message conveying the Echo Option. If the endpoint supports the CoAP Echo Option, it is RECOMMENDED to take this approach.

If it is configured exclusively as silent server, the endpoint MUST wait for the next group rekeying to occur, in order to derive a new Security Context and re-initialize the Replay Window of each Recipient Contexts as valid.

2.5.2. Exhaustion of Sender Sequence Number

An endpoint can eventually exhaust the Sender Sequence Number, which is incremented for each new outgoing message including a Partial IV. This is the case for group requests, Observe notifications [RFC7641] and, optionally, any other response.

Implementations MUST be able to detect an exhaustion of Sender Sequence Number, after the endpoint has consumed the largest usable value. If an implementation’s integers support wrapping addition, the implementation MUST treat Sender Sequence Number as exhausted when a wrap-around is detected.

Upon exhausting the Sender Sequence Numbers, the endpoint MUST NOT use this Security Context to protect further messages including a Partial IV.
The endpoint SHOULD inform the Group Manager, retrieve new Security Context parameters from the Group Manager (see Section 2.5.3), and use them to derive a new Sender Context (see Section 2.2).

From then on, the endpoint MUST use its latest installed Sender Context to protect outgoing messages.

2.5.3. Retrieving New Security Context Parameters

The Group Manager can assist an endpoint with an incomplete Sender Context to retrieve missing data of the Security Context and thereby become fully operational in the group again. The two main options for the Group Manager are described in this section: i) assignment of a new Sender ID to the endpoint (see Section 2.5.3.1); and ii) establishment of a new Security Context for the group (see Section 2.5.3.2). The update of the Replay Window in each of the Recipient Contexts is discussed in Section 6.2.

As group membership changes, or as group members get new Sender IDs (see Section 2.5.3.1) so do the relevant Recipient IDs that the other endpoints need to keep track of. As a consequence, group members may end up retaining stale Recipient Contexts, that are no longer useful to verify incoming secure messages.

The Recipient ID (‘kid’) SHOULD NOT be considered as a persistent and reliable identifier of a group member. Such an indication can be achieved only by using that member’s public key, when verifying countersignatures of received messages (in group mode), or when verifying messages integrity-protected with pairwise keying material derived from authentication credentials and associated asymmetric keys (in pairwise mode).

Furthermore, applications MAY define policies to: i) delete (long-)unused Recipient Contexts and reduce the impact on storage space; as well as ii) check with the Group Manager that an authentication credential with the public key included therein is currently the one associated with a ‘kid’ value, after a number of consecutive failed verifications.

2.5.3.1. New Sender ID for the Endpoint

The Group Manager may assign a new Sender ID to an endpoint, while leaving the Gid, Master Secret and Master Salt unchanged in the group. In this case, the Group Manager MUST assign a Sender ID that has not been used in the group since the latest time when the current Gid value was assigned to the group (see Section 3.2).
Having retrieved the new Sender ID, and potentially other missing data of the immutable Security Context, the endpoint can derive a new Sender Context (see Section 2.2). When doing so, the endpoint resets the Sender Sequence Number in its Sender Context to 0, and derives a new Sender Key. This is in turn used to possibly derive new Pairwise Sender Keys.

From then on, the endpoint MUST use its latest installed Sender Context to protect outgoing messages.

The assignment of a new Sender ID may be the result of different processes. The endpoint may request a new Sender ID, e.g., because of exhaustion of Sender Sequence Numbers (see Section 2.5.2). An endpoint may request to re-join the group, e.g., because of losing its mutable Security Context (see Section 2.5.1), and is provided with a new Sender ID together with the latest immutable Security Context.

For the other group members, the Recipient Context corresponding to the old Sender ID becomes stale (see Section 3.2).

2.5.3.2. New Security Context for the Group

The Group Manager may establish a new Security Context for the group (see Section 3.2). The Group Manager does not necessarily establish a new Security Context for the group if one member has an outdated Security Context (see Section 2.5.3.1), unless that was already planned or required for other reasons.

All the group members need to acquire new Security Context parameters from the Group Manager. Once having acquired new Security Context parameters, each group member performs the following actions.

* From then on, it MUST NOT use the current Security Context to start processing new messages for the considered group.

* It completes any ongoing message processing for the considered group.

* It derives and install a new Security Context. In particular:
  
  - It re-derives the keying material stored in its Sender Context and Recipient Contexts (see Section 2.2). The Master Salt used for the re-derivations is the updated Master Salt parameter if provided by the Group Manager, or the empty byte string otherwise.
- It resets its Sender Sequence Number in its Sender Context to 0.

- It re-initializes the Replay Window of each Recipient Context.

- For each ongoing observation where it is an observer client and that it wants to keep active, it resets to 0 the Notification Number of each associated server (see Section 6.1).

From then on, it can resume processing new messages for the considered group. In particular:

* It MUST use its latest installed Sender Context to protect outgoing messages.

* It SHOULD use its latest installed Recipient Contexts to process incoming messages, unless application policies admit to temporarily retain and use the old, recent, Security Context (see Section 12.5.1).

The distribution of a new Gid and Master Secret may result in temporarily misaligned Security Contexts among group members. In particular, this may result in a group member not being able to process messages received right after a new Gid and Master Secret have been distributed. A discussion on practical consequences and possible ways to address them, as well as on how to handle the old Security Context, is provided in Section 12.5.

3. The Group Manager

As with OSCORE, endpoints communicating with Group OSCORE need to establish the relevant Security Context. Group OSCORE endpoints need to acquire OSCORE input parameters, information about the group(s) and about other endpoints in the group(s). This document is based on the existence of an entity called Group Manager and responsible for the group, but it does not mandate how the Group Manager interacts with the group members. The list of responsibilities of the Group Manager is compiled in Section 3.3.

A possible Group Manager to use is specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore], where the join process is based on the ACE framework for authentication and authorization in constrained environments [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

The Group Manager assigns an integer Key Generation Number to each of its groups, identifying the current version of the keying material used in that group. The first Key Generation Number assigned to every group MUST be 0. Separately for each group, the value of the
Key Generation Number increases strictly monotonically, each time the Group Manager distributes new keying material to that group (see Section 3.2). That is, if the current Key Generation Number for a group is X, then X+1 will denote the keying material distributed and used in that group immediately after the current one.

The Group Manager assigns unique Group Identifiers (Gids) to the groups under its control. Also, for each group, the Group Manager assigns unique Sender IDs (and thus Recipient IDs) to the respective group members. According to a hierarchical approach, the Gid value assigned to a group is associated with a dedicated space for the values of Sender ID and Recipient ID of the members of that group. When an endpoint (re-)joins a group, it is provided also with the current Gid to use in the group.

The Group Manager maintains records of the authentication credentials of endpoints in a group, and provides information about the group and its members to other group members and to external entities with selected roles (see Section 3.1). Upon endpoints’ joining, the Group Manager collects such authentication credentials and MUST verify proof-of-possession of the respective private key.

An endpoint acquires group data such as the Gid and OSCORE input parameters including its own Sender ID from the Group Manager, and provides information about its authentication credential to the Group Manager, for example upon joining the group.

Furthermore, when joining the group or later on as a group member, an endpoint can retrieve from the Group Manager the authentication credential of the Group Manager as well as the authentication credential and other information associated with other members of the group, with which it can derive the corresponding Recipient Context. Together with the requested authentication credentials, the Group Manager MUST provide the Sender ID of the associated group members and the current Key Generation Number in the group. An application can configure a group member to asynchronously retrieve information about Recipient Contexts, e.g., by Observing [RFC7641] a resource at the Group Manager to get updates on the group membership.

3.1. Support for Additional Entities

The Group Manager MAY serve additional entities acting as signature checkers, e.g., intermediary gateways. These entities do not join a group as members, but can retrieve authentication credentials of group members and other selected group data from the Group Manager, in order to solely verify countersignatures of messages protected in group mode (see Section 8.5).
In order to verify countersignatures of messages in a group, a signature checker needs to retrieve the following information about that group from the Group Manager.

* The current ID Context (Gid) used in the group.

* The authentication credentials of the group members and the authentication credential of the Group Manager.

If the signature checker is provided with a CWT for a given entity, then the authentication credential associated with that entity that the signature checker stores and uses is the untagged CWT.

If the signature checker is provided with a chain or a bag of X.509 / C509 certificates or of CWTs for a given entity, then the authentication credential associated with that entity that the signature checker stores and uses is just the end-entity certificate or end-entity untagged CWT.

* The current Group Encryption Key (see Section 2.1.6).

* The identifiers of the algorithms used in the group (see Section 2), i.e.: i) Signature Encryption Algorithm and Signature Algorithm; and ii) AEAD Algorithm and Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm, if the group uses also the pairwise mode.

A signature checker MUST be authorized before it can retrieve such information. To this end, the same method mentioned above based on the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] can be used.

3.2. Management of Group Keying Material

In order to establish a new Security Context for a group, the Group Manager MUST generate and assign to the group a new Group Identifier (Gid) and a new value for the Master Secret parameter. When doing so, a new value for the Master Salt parameter MAY also be generated and assigned to the group. When establishing the new Security Context, the Group Manager should preserve the current value of the Sender ID of each group member.

The specific group key management scheme used to distribute new keying material is out of the scope of this document. A simple group key management scheme is defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]. When possible, the delivery of rekeying messages should use a reliable transport, in order to reduce chances of group members missing a rekeying instance.
The set of group members should not be assumed as fixed, i.e., the group membership is subject to changes, possibly on a frequent basis.

The Group Manager MUST rekey the group when one or more endpoints leave the group. An endpoint may leave the group on its own initiative, or may be evicted from the group by the Group Manager, e.g., in case an endpoint is compromised, or is suspected to be compromised. In either case, rekeying the group excludes such endpoints from future communications in the group, and thus preserves forward security. If a network node is compromised or suspected to be compromised, the Group Manager MUST evict from the group all the endpoints hosted by that node that are members of the group and rekey the group accordingly.

If required by the application, the Group Manager MUST rekey the group also before one or more new joining endpoints are added to the group, thus preserving backward security.

The establishment of the new Security Context for the group takes the following steps.

1. The Group Manager MUST increment the Key Generation Number for the group by 1.

2. The Group Manager MUST build a set of stale Sender IDs including:
   * The Sender IDs that, during the current Gid, were both assigned to an endpoint and subsequently relinquished (see Section 2.5.3.1).
   * The current Sender IDs of the group members that the upcoming group rekeying aims to exclude from future group communications, if any.

3. The Group Manager rekeys the group, by distributing:
   * The new keying material, i.e., the new Master Secret, the new Gid and (optionally) the new Master Salt.
   * The new Key Generation Number from step 1.
   * The set of stale Sender IDs from step 2.

   Further information may be distributed, depending on the specific group key management scheme used in the group.

When receiving the new group keying material, a group member considers the received stale Sender IDs and performs the following actions.
* The group member MUST remove every authentication credential associated with a stale Sender ID from its list of group members’ authentication credentials used in the group.

* The group member MUST delete each of its Recipient Contexts used in the group whose corresponding Recipient ID is a stale Sender ID.

After that, the group member installs the new keying material and derives the corresponding new Security Context.

A group member might miss one group rekeying or more consecutive instances. As a result, the group member will retain old group keying material with Key Generation Number GEN_OLD. Eventually, the group member can notice the discrepancy, e.g., by repeatedly failing to verify incoming messages, or by explicitly querying the Group Manager for the current Key Generation Number. Once the group member gains knowledge of having missed a group rekeying, it MUST delete the old keying material it stores.

Then, the group member proceeds according to the following steps.

1. The group member retrieves from the Group Manager the current group keying material, together with the current Key Generation Number GEN_NEW. The group member MUST NOT install the obtained group keying material yet.

2. The group member asks the Group Manager for the set of stale Sender IDs.

3. If no exact indication can be obtained from the Group Manager, the group member MUST remove all the authentication credentials from its list of group members’ authentication credentials used in the group and MUST delete all its Recipient Contexts used in the group.

   Otherwise, the group member MUST remove every authentication credential associated with a stale Sender ID from its list of group members’ authentication credentials used in the group, and MUST delete each of its Recipient Contexts used in the group whose corresponding Recipient ID is a stale Sender ID.

4. The group member installs the current group keying material, and derives the corresponding new Security Context.

   Alternatively, the group member can re-join the group. In such a case, the group member MUST take one of the following two actions.
* The group member performs steps 2 and 3 above. Then, the group member re-joins the group.

* The group member re-joins the group with the same roles it currently has in the group, and, during the re-joining process, it asks the Group Manager for the authentication credentials of all the current group members.

Then, given Z the set of authentication credentials received from the Group Manager, the group member removes every authentication credential which is not in Z from its list of group members’ authentication credentials used in the group, and deletes each of its Recipient Contexts used in the group that does not include any of the authentication credentials in Z.

By removing authentication credentials and deleting Recipient Contexts associated with stale Sender IDs, it is ensured that a recipient endpoint storing the latest group keying material does not store the authentication credentials of sender endpoints that are not current group members. This in turn allows group members to rely on stored authentication credentials to confidently assert the group membership of sender endpoints, when receiving incoming messages protected in group mode (see Section 8).

3.2.1. Recycling of Identifiers

This section specifies how the Group Manager handles and possibly reassigns Gid values and Sender ID values in a group.

3.2.1.1. Recycling of Group Identifiers

Since the Gid value changes every time a group is rekeyed, it can happen that, after several rekeying instances, the whole space of Gid values has been used for the group in question. When this happens, the Group Manager has no available Gid values to use that have never been assigned to the group during the group’s lifetime.

The occurrence of such an event and how long it would take to occur depend on the format and encoding of Gid values used in the group (see, e.g., Appendix C), as well as on the frequency of rekeying instances yielding a change of Gid value. Independently for each group under its control, the Group Manager can take one of the two following approaches.

* The Group Manager does not reassign Gid values. That is, once the whole space of Gid values has been used for a group, the Group Manager terminates the group and may re-establish a new group.
* While the Gid value changes every time a group is rekeyed, the Group Manager can reassign Gid values previously used during a group’s lifetime. By doing so, the group can continue to exist even once the whole space of Gid values has been used.

The Group Manager MAY support and use this approach. In such a case, the Group Manager MUST take additional actions when handling Gid values and rekeying the group, as specified below.

When a node (re-)joins the group and it is provided with the current Gid to use in the group, the Group Manager considers such a Gid as the Birth Gid of that endpoint for that group. For each group member, the Group Manager MUST store the latest corresponding Birth Gid until that member leaves the group. In case the endpoint has in fact re-joined the group, the newly determined Birth Gid overwrites the one currently stored.

When establishing a new Security Context for the group, the Group Manager takes the additional following step between steps 1 and 2 of Section 3.2.

A. The Group Manager MUST check if the new Gid to be distributed is equal to the Birth Gid of any of the current group members. If any of such "elder members" is found in the group, then:

- The Group Manager MUST evict the elder members from the group. That is, the Group Manager MUST terminate their membership and MUST rekey the group in such a way that the new keying material is not provided to those evicted elder members.

This ensures that an Observe notification [RFC7641] can never successfully match against the Observe requests of two different observations. In fact, the excluded elder members would eventually re-join the group, thus terminating any of their ongoing (long-lasting) observations (see Section 6.1). Therefore, it is ensured by construction that no observer client can have two different ongoing observations such that the two respective Observe requests were protected using the same Partial IV, Gid and Sender ID.

- Until a further following group rekeying, the Group Manager MUST store the list of those latest-evicted elder members. If any of those endpoints re-joins the group before a further following group rekeying occurs, the Group Manager MUST NOT rekey the group upon their re-joining. When one of those endpoints re-joins the group, the Group Manager can rely, e.g., on the ongoing secure communication association to recognize the endpoint as included in the stored list.
3.2.1.2. Recycling of Sender IDs

From the moment when a Gid is assigned to a group until the moment a new Gid is assigned to that same group, the Group Manager MUST NOT reassign a Sender ID within the group. This prevents to reuse a Sender ID (‘kid’) with the same Gid, Master Secret and Master Salt. Within this restriction, the Group Manager can assign a Sender ID used under an old Gid value (including under a same, recycled Gid value), thus avoiding Sender ID values to irrecoverably grow in size.

Even when an endpoint joining a group is recognized as a current member of that group, e.g., through the ongoing secure communication association, the Group Manager MUST assign a new Sender ID different than the one currently used by the endpoint in the group, unless the group is rekeyed first and a new Gid value is established.

3.2.1.3. Relation between Identifiers and Keying Material

Figure 2 overviews the different identifiers and keying material components, considering their relation and possible reuse across group rekeying.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components changed in lockstep upon a group rekeying</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Master Secret &lt;--o ID &lt;-- Master ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Salt (optional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Key Generation Number is incremented by 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Changing a kid does not need changing the Group ID
* A kid is not reassigned under the ongoing usage of the current Group ID
* Upon changing the Group ID, every current kid should be preserved for efficient key rollover
* After changing Group ID, an unused kid can be assigned, even if it was used before the Group ID change

Figure 2: Relations among keying material components.

3.3. Responsibilities of the Group Manager

The Group Manager is responsible for performing the following tasks:
1. Creating and managing OSCORE groups. This includes the assignment of a Gid to every newly created group, ensuring uniqueness of Gids within the set of its OSCORE groups and, optionally, the secure recycling of Gids.

2. Defining policies for authorizing the joining of its OSCORE groups.

3. Handling the join process to add new endpoints as group members.

4. Establishing the Common Context part of the Security Context, and providing it to authorized group members during the join process, together with the corresponding Sender Context.

5. Updating the Key Generation Number and the Gid of its OSCORE groups, upon renewing the respective Security Context.

6. Generating and managing Sender IDs within its OSCORE groups, as well as assigning and providing them to new endpoints during the join process, or to current group members upon request of renewal or re-joining. This includes ensuring that:
   * Each Sender ID is unique within each of the OSCORE groups;
   * Each Sender ID is not reassigned within the same group since the latest time when the current Gid value was assigned to the group. That is, the Sender ID is not reassigned even to a current group member re-joining the same group, without a rekeying happening first.

7. Defining communication policies for each of its OSCORE groups, and signaling them to new endpoints during the join process.

8. Renewing the Security Context of an OSCORE group upon membership change, by revoking and renewing common security parameters and keying material (rekeying).

9. Providing the management keying material that a new endpoint requires to participate in the rekeying process, consistently with the key management scheme used in the group joined by the new endpoint.

10. Assisting a group member that has missed a group rekeying instance to understand which authentication credentials and Recipient Contexts to delete, as associated with former group members.
11. Acting as key repository, in order to handle the authentication credentials of the members of its OSCORE groups, and providing such authentication credentials to other members of the same group upon request. The actual storage of authentication credentials may be entrusted to a separate secure storage device or service.

12. Validating that the format and parameters of authentication credentials of group members are consistent with the public key algorithm and related parameters used in the respective OSCORE group.

The Group Manager specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore] provides these functionalities.

4. The COSE Object

Building on Section 5 of [RFC8613], this section defines how to use COSE [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct] to wrap and protect data in the original message. OSCORE uses the untagged COSE_Encrypt0 structure with an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm. Unless otherwise specified, the following modifications apply for both the group mode and the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE.

4.1. Countersignature

When protecting a message in group mode, the ‘unprotected’ field MUST additionally include the following parameter:

* COSE_Countersignature0: its value is set to the encrypted countersignature of the COSE object, namely ENC_SIGNATURE. That is:

  - The countersignature of the COSE object, namely SIGNATURE, is computed by the sender as described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of [I-D.ietf-cose-countersign], by using its private key and according to the Signature Algorithm in the Security Context.

    In particular, the Countersign_structure contains the context text string "CounterSignature0", the external_aad as defined in Section 4.3 of this document, and the ciphertext of the COSE object as payload.

  - The encrypted countersignature, namely ENC_SIGNATURE, is computed as

    ENC_SIGNATURE = SIGNATURE XOR KEYSSTREAM

Tiloca, et al. Expires 8 September 2022
where KEYPSTREAM is derived as per Section 4.1.1.

4.1.1. Keystream Derivation

The following defines how an endpoint derives the keystream KEYPSTREAM, used to encrypt/decrypt the countersignature of an outgoing/incoming message $M$ protected in group mode.

The keystream SHALL be derived as follows, by using the HKDF Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 3.2 of [RFC8613]), which consists of composing the HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand steps [RFC5869].

$\text{KEYSTREAM} = \text{HKDF}(\text{salt, IKM, info, L})$

The input parameters of HKDF are as follows.

* salt takes as value the Partial IV (PIV) used to protect $M$. Note that, if $M$ is a response, salt takes as value either: i) the fresh Partial IV generated by the server and included in the response; or ii) the same Partial IV of the request generated by the client and not included in the response.

* IKM is the Group Encryption Key from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.6).

* info is the serialization of a CBOR array consisting of (the notation follows [RFC8610]):

$$\text{info} = \{$$
$$\text{id} : \text{bstr},$$
$$\text{id\_context} : \text{bstr},$$
$$\text{type} : \text{bool},$$
$$L : \text{uint}$$
$$\}$$

where:

* id is the Sender ID of the endpoint that generated PIV.

* id_context is the ID Context (Gid) used when protecting $M$.

Note that, in case of group rekeying, a server might use a different Gid when protecting a response, compared to the Gid that it used to verify (that the client used to protect) the request, see Section 8.3.
* type is the CBOR simple value "true" (0xf5) if M is a request, or the CBOR simple value "false" (0xf4) otherwise.

* L is the size of the countersignature, as per Signature Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.5), in bytes.

4.1.2. Clarifications on Using a Countersignature

Note that the literature commonly refers to a countersignature as a signature computed by an entity A over a document already protected by a different entity B.

However, the COSE_Countersignature0 structure belongs to the set of abbreviated countersignatures defined in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of [I-D.ietf-cose-countersign], which were designed primarily to deal with the problem of encrypted group messaging, but where it is required to know who originated the message.

Since the parameters for computing or verifying the abbreviated countersignature generated by A are provided by the same context used to describe the security processing performed by B and to be countersigned, these structures are applicable also when the two entities A and B are actually the same one, like the sender of a Group OSCORE message protected in group mode.

4.2. The ‘kid’ and ‘kid context’ parameters

The value of the ‘kid’ parameter in the ‘unprotected’ field of response messages MUST be set to the Sender ID of the endpoint transmitting the message, if the request was protected in group mode. That is, unlike in [RFC8613], the ‘kid’ parameter is always present in responses to a request that was protected in group mode.

The value of the ‘kid context’ parameter in the ‘unprotected’ field of requests messages MUST be set to the ID Context, i.e., the Group Identifier value (Gid) of the group. That is, unlike in [RFC8613], the ‘kid context’ parameter is always present in requests.

4.3. external_aad

The external_aad of the Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) is different compared to OSCORE [RFC8613], and is defined in this section.
The same external_aad structure is used in group mode and pairwise mode for authenticated encryption/decryption (see Section 5.3 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct]), as well as in group mode for computing and verifying the countertsignature (see Section 4.4 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct]).

In particular, the external_aad includes also the Signature Algorithm, the Signature Encryption Algorithm, the Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm, the value of the 'kid context' in the COSE object of the request, the OSCORE option of the protected message, the sender's authentication credential, and the Group Manager's authentication credential.

The external_aad SHALL be a CBOR array wrapped in a bstr object as defined below, following the notation of [RFC8610]:

```
external_aad = bstr .cbor aad_array

aad_array = [
  oscore_version : uint,
  algorithms : [alg_aead : int / tstr / null,
                alg_signature_enc : int / tstr / null,
                alg_signature : int / tstr / null,
                alg_pairwise_key_agreement : int / tstr / null],
  request_kid : bstr,
  request_piv : bstr,
  options : bstr,
  request_kid_context : bstr,
  OSCORE_option : bstr,
  sender_creds : bstr,
  gm_cred : bstr / null
]
```

Figure 3: external_aad

Compared with Section 5.4 of [RFC8613], the aad_array has the following differences.

* The 'algorithms' array is extended as follows.

The parameter 'alg_aead' MUST be set to the CBOR simple value "null" (0xf6) if the group does not use the pairwise mode, regardless whether the endpoint supports the pairwise mode or not. Otherwise, this parameter MUST encode the value of AEAD Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.1), as per Section 5.4 of [RFC8613].

Furthermore, the 'algorithms' array additionally includes:
- 'alg_signature_enc', which specifies Signature Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.5). This parameter MUST be set to the CBOR simple value "null" (0xf6) if the group does not use the group mode, regardless whether the endpoint supports the group mode or not. Otherwise, this parameter MUST encode the value of Signature Encryption Algorithm as a CBOR integer or text string, consistently with the "Value" field in the "COSE Algorithms" Registry for this AEAD algorithm.

- 'alg_signature', which specifies Signature Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.5). This parameter MUST be set to the CBOR simple value "null" (0xf6) if the group does not use the group mode, regardless whether the endpoint supports the group mode or not. Otherwise, this parameter MUST encode the value of Signature Algorithm as a CBOR integer or text string, consistently with the "Value" field in the "COSE Algorithms" Registry for this signature algorithm.

- 'alg_pairwise_key_agreement', which specifies Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.5). This parameter MUST be set to the CBOR simple value "null" (0xf6) if the group does not use the pairwise mode, regardless whether the endpoint supports the pairwise mode or not. Otherwise, this parameter MUST encode the value of Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm as a CBOR integer or text string, consistently with the "Value" field in the "COSE Algorithms" Registry for this HKDF algorithm.

* The new element 'request_kid_context' contains the value of the 'kid context' in the COSE object of the request (see Section 4.2).

In case Observe [RFC7641] is used, this enables endpoints to safely keep an observation active beyond a possible change of Gid (i.e., of ID Context), following a group rekeying (see Section 3.2). In fact, it ensures that every notification cryptographically matches with only one observation request, rather than with multiple ones that were protected with different keying material but share the same 'request_kid' and 'request_piv' values.

* The new element 'OSCORE_option', containing the value of the OSCORE Option present in the protected message, encoded as a binary string. This prevents the attack described in Section 12.7 when using the group mode, as further explained in Section 12.7.2.
Note for implementation: this construction requires the OSCORE option of the message to be generated and finalized before computing the ciphertext of the COSE_Encrypt0 object (when using the group mode or the pairwise mode) and before calculating the countersignature (when using the group mode). Also, the aad_array needs to be large enough to contain the largest possible OSCORE option.

* The new element ‘sender_cred’, containing the sender’s authentication credential. This parameter MUST be set to a CBOR byte string, which encodes the sender’s authentication credential in its original binary representation made available to other endpoints in the group (see Section 2.3).

* The new element ‘gm_cred’, containing the Group Manager’s authentication credential. If no Group Manager maintains the group, this parameter MUST encode the CBOR simple value "null" (0xf6). Otherwise, this parameter MUST be set to a CBOR byte string, which encodes the Group Manager’s authentication credential in its original binary representation made available to other endpoints in the group (see Section 2.3). This prevents the attack described in Section 12.8.

5. OSCORE Header Compression

The OSCORE header compression defined in Section 6 of [RFC8613] is used, with the following differences.

* The payload of the OSCORE message SHALL encode the ciphertext of the COSE_Encrypt0 object. In the group mode, the ciphertext above is concatenated with the value of the COSE.CounterSignature0 of the COSE object, computed as described in Section 4.1.

* This document defines the usage of the sixth least significant bit, called "Group Flag", in the first byte of the OSCORE option containing the OSCORE flag bits. This flag bit is specified in Section 13.1.

* The Group Flag MUST be set to 1 if the OSCORE message is protected using the group mode (see Section 8).

* The Group Flag MUST be set to 0 if the OSCORE message is protected using the pairwise mode (see Section 9). The Group Flag MUST also be set to 0 for ordinary OSCORE messages processed according to [RFC8613].
5.1. Examples of Compressed COSE Objects

This section covers a list of OSCORE Header Compression examples of Group OSCORE used in group mode (see Section 5.1.1) or in pairwise mode (see Section 5.1.2).

The examples assume that the COSE_Encrypt0 object is set (which means the CoAP message and cryptographic material is known). Note that the examples do not include the full CoAP unprotected message or the full Security Context, but only the input necessary to the compression mechanism, i.e., the COSE_Encrypt0 object. The output is the compressed COSE object as defined in Section 5 and divided into two parts, since the object is transported in two CoAP fields: OSCORE option and payload.

The examples assume that the plaintext (see Section 5.3 of [RFC8613]) is 6 bytes long, and that the AEAD tag is 8 bytes long, hence resulting in a ciphertext which is 14 bytes long. When using the group mode, the COSE.CounterSignature0 byte string as described in Section 4 is assumed to be 64 bytes long.

5.1.1. Examples in Group Mode

* Request with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9, kid = 0x25, Partial IV = 5 and kid context = 0x44616c.

* Before compression (96 bytes):

```
[ 
  h'`,
  { 4:h'25', 6:h'05', 10:h'44616c', 11:h'de9e ... f1' },
  h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9```

* After compression (85 bytes):

  Flag byte: 0b00111001 = 0x39 (1 byte)

  Option Value: 0x39 05 03 44 61 6c 25 (7 bytes)

  Payload: 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9 de9e ... f1
          (14 bytes + size of the encrypted countsignature)

* Response with ciphertext = 0x60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b, kid = 0x52 and no Partial IV.
* Before compression (88 bytes):

```json
[  h'',
   { 4:h'52', 11:h'ca1e ... b3' },
   h'60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b'
 ]
```

* After compression (80 bytes):

Flag byte: 0b00101000 = 0x28 (1 byte)
Option Value: 0x28 52 (2 bytes)
Payload: 0x60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b (14 bytes + size of the encrypted countersignature)

5.1.2. Examples in Pairwise Mode

* Request with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9, kid = 0x25, Partial IV = 5 and kid context = 0x44616c.

* Before compression (29 bytes):

```json
[  h'',
   { 4:h'25', 6:h'05', 10:h'44616c' },
   h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'
 ]
```

* After compression (21 bytes):

Flag byte: 0b00011001 = 0x19 (1 byte)
Option Value: 0x19 05 03 44 61 6c 25 (7 bytes)
Payload: 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9 (14 bytes)

* Response with ciphertext = 0x60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b and no Partial IV.

* Before compression (18 bytes):

```json
[  h'',
   {},
   h'60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b'
 ]
```
* After compression (14 bytes):

Flag byte: 0b00000000 = 0x00 (1 byte)

Option Value: 0x (0 bytes)

Payload: 0x60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b (14 bytes)

6. Message Binding, Sequence Numbers, Freshness and Replay Protection

The requirements and properties described in Section 7 of [RFC8613] also apply to Group OSCORE. In particular, Group OSCORE provides message binding of responses to requests, which enables absolute freshness of responses that are not notifications, relative freshness of requests and notification responses, and replay protection of requests. In addition, the following holds for Group OSCORE.

6.1. Supporting Observe

When Observe [RFC7641] is used, a client maintains for each ongoing observation one Notification Number for each different server. Then, separately for each server, the client uses the associated Notification Number to perform ordering and replay protection of notifications received from that server (see Section 8.4.1).

Group OSCORE allows to preserve an observation active indefinitely, even in case the group is rekeyed, with consequent change of ID Context, or in case the observer client obtains a new Sender ID.

As defined in Section 8 when discussing support for Observe, this is achieved by the client and server(s) storing the ‘kid’ and ‘kid context’ used in the original Observe request, throughout the whole duration of the observation.

Upon leaving the group or before re-joining the group, a group member MUST terminate all the ongoing observations that it has started in the group as observer client.

6.2. Update of Replay Window

Sender Sequence Numbers seen by a server as Partial IV values in request messages can spontaneously increase at a fast pace, for example when a client exchanges unicast messages with other servers using the Group OSCORE Security Context. As in OSCORE [RFC8613], a server always needs to accept such increases and accordingly updates the Replay Window in each of its Recipient Contexts.
As discussed in Section 2.5.1, a newly created Recipient Context would have an invalid Replay Window, if its installation has required to delete another Recipient Context. Hence, the server is not able to verify if a request from the client associated with the new Recipient Context is a replay. When this happens, the server MUST validate the Replay Window of the new Recipient Context, before accepting messages from the associated client (see Section 2.5.1).

Furthermore, when the Group Manager establishes a new Security Context for the group (see Section 2.5.3.2), every server re-initializes the Replay Window in each of its Recipient Contexts.

6.3. Message Freshness

When receiving a request from a client for the first time, the server is not synchronized with the client’s Sender Sequence Number, i.e., it is not able to verify if that request is fresh. This applies to a server that has just joined the group, with respect to already present clients, and recurs as new clients are added as group members.

During its operations in the group, the server may also lose synchronization with a client’s Sender Sequence Number. This can happen, for instance, if the server has rebooted or has deleted its previously synchronized version of the Recipient Context for that client (see Section 2.5.1).

If the application requires message freshness, e.g., according to time- or event-based policies, the server has to (re-)synchronize with a client’s Sender Sequence Number before delivering request messages from that client to the application. To this end, the server can use the approach in Section 10 based on the Echo Option for CoAP [RFC9175], as a variant of the approach defined in Appendix B.1.2 of [RFC8613] applicable to Group OSCORE.

7. Message Reception

Upon receiving a protected message, a recipient endpoint retrieves a Security Context as in [RFC8613]. An endpoint MUST be able to distinguish between a Security Context to process OSCORE messages as in [RFC8613] and a Group OSCORE Security Context to process Group OSCORE messages as defined in this document.
To this end, an endpoint can take into account the different structure of the Security Context defined in Section 2, for example based on the presence of Signature Algorithm and/or Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm in the Common Context. Alternatively implementations can use an additional parameter in the Security Context, to explicitly signal that it is intended for processing Group OSCORE messages.

If either of the following conditions holds, a recipient endpoint MUST discard the incoming protected message:

* The Group Flag is set to 0, and the recipient endpoint retrieves a Security Context which is both valid to process the message and also associated with an OSCORE group, but the endpoint does not support the pairwise mode.

* The Group Flag is set to 1, and the recipient endpoint retrieves a Security Context which is both valid to process the message and also associated with an OSCORE group, but the endpoint does not support the group mode.

* The Group Flag is set to 1, and the recipient endpoint can not retrieve a Security Context which is both valid to process the message and also associated with an OSCORE group.

As per Section 6.1 of [RFC8613], this holds also when retrieving a Security Context which is valid but not associated with an OSCORE group. Future specifications may define how to process incoming messages protected with a Security Contexts as in [RFC8613], when the Group Flag bit is set to 1.

Otherwise, if a Security Context associated with an OSCORE group and valid to process the message is retrieved, the recipient endpoint processes the message with Group OSCORE, using the group mode (see Section 8) if the Group Flag is set to 1, or the pairwise mode (see Section 9) if the Group Flag is set to 0.

Note that, if the Group Flag is set to 0, and the recipient endpoint retrieves a Security Context which is valid to process the message but is not associated with an OSCORE group, then the message is processed according to [RFC8613].

8. Message Processing in Group Mode

When using the group mode, messages are protected and processed as specified in [RFC8613], with the modifications described in this section. The security objectives of the group mode are discussed in Appendix A.2.
The Group Manager indicates that the group uses (also) the group mode, as part of the group data provided to candidate group members when joining the group.

During all the steps of the message processing, an endpoint MUST use the same Security Context for the considered group. That is, an endpoint MUST NOT install a new Security Context for that group (see Section 2.5.3.2) until the message processing is completed.

The group mode MUST be used to protect group requests intended for multiple recipients or for the whole group. This includes both requests directly addressed to multiple recipients, e.g., sent by the client over multicast, as well as requests sent by the client over unicast to a proxy, that forwards them to the intended recipients over multicast [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis]. For encryption and decryption operations, the Signature Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context is used.

As per [RFC7252][I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis], group requests sent over multicast MUST be Non-confirmable, and thus are not retransmitted by the CoAP messaging layer. Instead, applications should store such outgoing messages for a predefined, sufficient amount of time, in order to correctly perform potential retransmissions at the application layer. According to Section 5.2.3 of [RFC7252], responses to Non-confirmable group requests SHOULD also be Non-confirmable, but endpoints MUST be prepared to receive Confirmable responses in reply to a Non-confirmable group request. Confirmable group requests are acknowledged when sent over non-multicast transports, as specified in [RFC7252].

Furthermore, endpoints in the group locally perform error handling and processing of invalid messages according to the same principles adopted in [RFC8613]. However, a recipient MUST stop processing and reject any message which is malformed and does not follow the format specified in Section 4 of this document, or which is not cryptographically validated in a successful way.

In either case, it is RECOMMENDED that a server does not send back any error message in reply to a received request, if any of the two following conditions holds:

* The server is not able to identify the received request as a group request, i.e., as sent to all servers in the group.

* The server identifies the received request as a group request.
This prevents servers from replying with multiple error messages to a client sending a group request, so avoiding the risk of flooding and possibly congesting the network.

8.1. Protecting the Request

A client transmits a secure group request as described in Section 8.1 of [RFC8613], with the following modifications.

* In step 2, the Additional Authenticated Data is modified as described in Section 4 of this document.

* In step 4, the encryption of the COSE object is modified as described in Section 4 of this document. The encoding of the compressed COSE object is modified as described in Section 5 of this document. In particular, the Group Flag MUST be set to 1. The Signature Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context MUST be used.

* In step 5, the countersignature is computed and the format of the OSCORE message is modified as described in Section 4 and Section 5 of this document. In particular the payload of the OSCORE message includes also the encrypted countersignature (see Section 4.1).

8.1.1. Supporting Observe

If Observe [RFC7641] is supported, the following holds for each newly started observation.

* If the client intends to keep the observation active beyond a possible change of Sender ID, the client MUST store the value of the ‘kid’ parameter from the original Observe request, and retain it for the whole duration of the observation. Even in case the client is individually rekeyed and receives a new Sender ID from the Group Manager (see Section 2.5.3.1), the client MUST NOT update the stored value associated with a particular Observe request.

* If the client intends to keep the observation active beyond a possible change of ID Context following a group rekeying (see Section 3.2), then the following applies.

  - The client MUST store the value of the ‘kid context’ parameter from the original Observe request, and retain it for the whole duration of the observation. Upon establishing a new Security Context with a new Gid as ID Context (see Section 2.5.3.2), the client MUST NOT update the stored value associated with a particular Observe request.
- The client MUST store an invariant identifier of the group, which is immutable even in case the Security Context of the group is re-established. For example, this invariant identifier can be the "group name" in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore], where it is used for joining the group and retrieving the current group keying material from the Group Manager.

After a group rekeying, such an invariant information makes it simpler for the observer client to retrieve the current group keying material from the Group Manager, in case the client has missed both the rekeying messages and the first observe notification protected with the new Security Context (see Section 8.3.1).

8.2. Verifying the Request

Upon receiving a secure group request with the Group Flag set to 1, following the procedure in Section 7, a server proceeds as described in Section 8.2 of [RFC8613], with the following modifications.

* In step 2, the decoding of the compressed COSE object follows Section 5 of this document. In particular:

    - If the server discards the request due to not retrieving a Security Context associated with the OSCORE group, the server MAY respond with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message. When doing so, the server MAY set an Outer Max-Age option with value zero, and MAY include a descriptive string as diagnostic payload.

    - If the received 'kid context' matches an existing ID Context (Gid) but the received 'kid' does not match any Recipient ID in this Security Context, then the server MAY create a new Recipient Context for this Recipient ID and initialize it according to Section 3 of [RFC8613], and also retrieve the authentication credential associated with the Recipient ID to be stored in the new Recipient Context. Such a configuration is application specific. If the application does not specify dynamic derivation of new Recipient Contexts, then the server SHALL stop processing the request.

* In step 4, the Additional Authenticated Data is modified as described in Section 4 of this document.

* In step 6, the server also verifies the countersignature, by using the public key from the client’s authentication credential stored in the associated Recipient Context. In particular:
- If the server does not have the public key of the client yet, the server MUST stop processing the request and MAY respond with a 5.03 (Service Unavailable) response. The response MAY include a Max-Age Option, indicating to the client the number of seconds after which to retry. If the Max-Age Option is not present, a retry time of 60 seconds will be assumed by the client, as default value defined in Section 5.10.5 of [RFC7252].

- The server MUST perform signature verification before decrypting the COSE object, as defined below. Implementations that cannot perform the two steps in this order MUST ensure that no access to the plaintext is possible before a successful signature verification and MUST prevent any possible leak of time-related information that can yield side-channel attacks.

- The server retrieves the encrypted countersignature ENC_SIGNATURE from the message payload, and computes the original countersignature SIGNATURE as

\[
\text{SIGNATURE} = \text{ENC\_SIGNATURE} \oplus \text{KEYSTREAM}
\]

where KEYSTREAM is derived as per Section 4.1.1.

The server verifies the original countersignature SIGNATURE.

- If the signature verification fails, the server SHALL stop processing the request, SHALL NOT update the Replay Window, and MAY respond with a 4.00 (Bad Request) response. The server MAY set an Outer Max-Age option with value zero. The diagnostic payload MAY contain a string, which, if present, MUST be "Decryption failed" as if the decryption had failed.

- When decrypting the COSE object using the Recipient Key, the Signature Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context MUST be used.

* Additionally, if the used Recipient Context was created upon receiving this group request and the message is not verified successfully, the server MAY delete that Recipient Context. Such a configuration, which is specified by the application, mitigates attacks that aim at overloading the server's storage.

A server SHOULD NOT process a request if the received Recipient ID (‘kid’) is equal to its own Sender ID in its own Sender Context. For an example where this is not fulfilled, see Section 7.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-observe-multicast-notifications].
8.2.1. Supporting Observe

If Observe [RFC7641] is supported, the following holds for each newly started observation.

* The server MUST store the value of the 'kid' parameter from the original Observe request, and retain it for the whole duration of the observation. The server MUST NOT update the stored value of a 'kid' parameter associated with a particular Observe request, even in case the observer client is individually rekeyed and starts using a new Sender ID received from the Group Manager (see Section 2.5.3.1).

* The server MUST store the value of the 'kid context' parameter from the original Observe request, and retain it for the whole duration of the observation, beyond a possible change of ID Context following a group rekeying (see Section 3.2). That is, upon establishing a new Security Context with a new Gid as ID Context (see Section 2.5.3.2), the server MUST NOT update the stored value associated with the ongoing observation.

8.3. Protecting the Response

If a server generates a CoAP message in response to a Group OSCORE request, then the server SHALL follow the description in Section 8.3 of [RFC8613], with the modifications described in this section.

Note that the server always protects a response with the Sender Context from its latest Security Context, and that establishing a new Security Context resets the Sender Sequence Number to 0 (see Section 3.2).

* In step 2, the Additional Authenticated Data is modified as described in Section 4 of this document.

* In step 3, if the server is using a different Security Context for the response compared to what was used to verify the request (see Section 3.2), then the server MUST include its Sender Sequence Number as Partial IV in the response and use it to build the AEAD nonce to protect the response. This prevents the AEAD nonce from being reused.

* In step 4, the encryption of the COSE object is modified as described in Section 4 of this document. The encoding of the compressed COSE object is modified as described in Section 5 of this document. In particular, the Group Flag MUST be set to 1. The Signature Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context MUST be used.
If the server is using a different ID Context (Gid) for the response compared to what was used to verify the request (see Section 3.2), then the new ID Context MUST be included in the ‘kid context’ parameter of the response.

The server can obtain a new Sender ID from the Group Manager, when individually rekeyed (see Section 2.5.3.1) or when re-joining the group. In such a case, the server can help the client to synchronize, by including the ‘kid’ parameter in a response protected in group mode, even when the request was protected in pairwise mode (see Section 9.3).

That is, when responding to a request protected in pairwise mode, the server SHOULD include the ‘kid’ parameter in a response protected in group mode, if it is replying to that client for the first time since the assignment of its new Sender ID.

* In step 5, the countersignature is computed and the format of the OSCORE message is modified as described in Section 4 and Section 5 of this document. In particular the payload of the OSCORE message includes also the encrypted countersignature (see Section 4.1).

8.3.1. Supporting Observe

If Observe [RFC7641] is supported, the following holds when protecting notifications for an ongoing observation.

* The server MUST use the stored value of the ‘kid’ parameter from the original Observe request (see Section 8.2.1), as value for the ‘request_kid’ parameter in the external_aad structure (see Section 4.3).

* The server MUST use the stored value of the ‘kid context’ parameter from the original Observe request (see Section 8.2.1), as value for the ‘request_kid_context’ parameter in the external_aad structure (see Section 4.3).

Furthermore, the server may have ongoing observations started by Observe requests protected with an old Security Context. After completing the establishment of a new Security Context, the server MUST protect the following notifications with the Sender Context of the new Security Context.

For each ongoing observation, the server can help the client to synchronize, by including also the ‘kid context’ parameter in notifications following a group rekeying, with value set to the ID Context (Gid) of the new Security Context.
If there is a known upper limit to the duration of a group rekeying, the server SHOULD include the 'kid context' parameter during that time. Otherwise, the server SHOULD include it until the Max-Age has expired for the last notification sent before the installation of the new Security Context.

8.4. Verifying the Response

Upon receiving a secure response message with the Group Flag set to 1, following the procedure in Section 7, the client proceeds as described in Section 8.4 of [RFC8613], with the following modifications.

Note that a client may receive a response protected with a Security Context different from the one used to protect the corresponding request, and that, upon the establishment of a new Security Context, the client re-initializes its Replay Windows in its Recipient Contexts (see Section 3.2).

* In step 2, the decoding of the compressed COSE object is modified as described in Section 5 of this document. In particular, a 'kid' may not be present, if the response is a reply to a request protected in pairwise mode. In such a case, the client assumes the response 'kid' to be the Recipient ID for the server to which the request protected in pairwise mode was intended for.

If the response 'kid context' matches an existing ID Context (Gid) but the received/assumed 'kid' does not match any Recipient ID in this Security Context, then the client MAY create a new Recipient ID for this Recipient Context for this Recipient ID and initialize it according to Section 3 of [RFC8613], and also retrieve the authentication credential associated with the Recipient ID to be stored in the new Recipient Context. If the application does not specify dynamic derivation of new Recipient Contexts, then the client SHALL stop processing the response.

* In step 3, the Additional Authenticated Data is modified as described in Section 4 of this document.

* In step 5, the client also verifies the countersignature, by using the public key from the server’s authentication credential stored in the associated Recipient Context. In particular:
- The client MUST perform signature verification before decrypting the COSE object, as defined below. Implementations that cannot perform the two steps in this order MUST ensure that no access to the plaintext is possible before a successful signature verification and MUST prevent any possible leak of time-related information that can yield side-channel attacks.

- The client retrieves the encrypted countersignature ENC_SIGNEDATURE from the message payload, and computes the original countersignature SIGNATURE as

\[
\text{SIGNATURE} = \text{ENC_SIGNEDATURE} \oplus \text{KEYSTREAM}
\]

where KEYSTREAM is derived as per Section 4.1.1.

The client verifies the original countersignature SIGNATURE.

- If the verification of the countersignature fails, the server SHALL stop processing the response, and SHALL NOT update the Notification Number associated with the server if the response is an Observe notification [RFC7641].

- After a successful verification of the countersignature, the client performs also the following actions if the response is not an Observe notification.

  o In case the request was protected in pairwise mode and the 'kid' parameter is present in the response, the client checks whether this received 'kid' is equal to the expected 'kid', i.e., the known Recipient ID for the server to which the request was intended for.

  o In case the request was protected in pairwise mode and the 'kid' parameter is not present in the response, the client checks whether the server that has sent the response is the same one to which the request was intended for. This can be done by checking that the public key used to verify the countersignature of the response is equal to the public key included in the authentication credential Recipient Auth Cred, which was taken as input to derive the Pairwise Sender Key used for protecting the request (see Section 2.4.1).

In either case, if the client determines that the response has come from a different server than the expected one, then the client SHALL discard the response and SHALL NOT deliver it to the application. Otherwise, the client hereafter considers the received 'kid' as the current Recipient ID for the server.
When decrypting the COSE object using the Recipient Key, the Signature Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context MUST be used.

* Additionally, if the used Recipient Context was created upon receiving this response and the message is not verified successfully, the client MAY delete that Recipient Context. Such a configuration, which is specified by the application, mitigates attacks that aim at overloading the client’s storage.

8.4.1. Supporting Observe

If Observe [RFC7641] is supported, the following holds when verifying notifications for an ongoing observation.

* The client MUST use the stored value of the ‘kid’ parameter from the original Observe request (see Section 8.1.1), as value for the ‘request_kid’ parameter in the external_aad structure (see Section 4.3).

* The client MUST use the stored value of the ‘kid context’ parameter from the original Observe request (see Section 8.1.1), as value for the ‘request_kid_context’ parameter in the external_aad structure (see Section 4.3).

This ensures that the client can correctly verify notifications, even in case it is individually rekeyed and starts using a new Sender ID received from the Group Manager (see Section 2.5.3.1), as well as when it installs a new Security Context with a new ID Context (Gid) following a group rekeying (see Section 3.2).

* The ordering and the replay protection of notifications received from a server are performed as per Sections 4.1.3.5.2 and 7.4.1 of [RFC8613], by using the Notification Number associated with that server for the observation in question. In addition, the client performs the following actions for each ongoing observation.

  - When receiving the first valid notification from a server, the client MUST store the current kid "kid1" of that server for the observation in question. If the ‘kid’ field is included in the OSCORE option of the notification, its value specifies "kid1". If the Observe request was protected in pairwise mode (see Section 9.3), the ‘kid’ field may not be present in the OSCORE option of the notification (see Section 4.2). In this case, the client assumes "kid1" to be the Recipient ID for the server to which the Observe request was intended for.
When receiving another valid notification from the same server - which can be identified and recognized through the same public key used to verify the countersignature and included in the server's authentication credential - the client determines the current kid "kid2" of the server as above for "kid1", and MUST check whether "kid2" is equal to the stored "kid1". If "kid1" and "kid2" are different, the client MUST cancel or re-register the observation in question.

Note that, if "kid2" is different from "kid1" and the 'kid' field is omitted from the notification - which is possible if the Observe request was protected in pairwise mode - then the client will compute a wrong keystream to decrypt the countersignature (i.e., by using "kid1" rather than "kid2" in the 'id' field of the 'info' array in Section 4.1.1), thus subsequently failing to verify the countersignature and discarding the notification.

This ensures that the client remains able to correctly perform the ordering and replay protection of notifications, even in case a server legitimately starts using a new Sender ID, as received from the Group Manager when individually rekeyed (see Section 2.5.3.1) or when re-joining the group.

8.5. External Signature Checkers

When receiving a message protected in group mode, a signature checker (see Section 3.1) proceeds as follows.

* The signature checker retrieves the encrypted countersignature ENC_SIGNATURE from the message payload, and computes the original countersignature SIGNATURE as

\[
\text{SIGNATURE} = \text{ENC\_SIGNATURE} \oplus \text{KEYSTREAM}
\]

where KEYSSTREAM is derived as per Section 4.1.1.

* The signature checker verifies the original countersignature SIGNATURE, by using the public key of the sender endpoint as included in that endpoint's authentication credential. The signature checker determines the right authentication credential based on the ID Context (Gid) and the Sender ID of the sender endpoint.

Note that the following applies when attempting to verify the countersignature of a response message.
* The response may not include a Partial IV and/or an ID Context. In such a case, the signature checker considers the same values from the corresponding request, i.e., the request matching with the response by CoAP Token value.

* The response may not include a Sender ID. This can happen when the response protected in group mode matches a request protected in pairwise mode (see Section 9.1), with a case in point provided by [I-D.amsuess-core-cachable-oscore]. In such a case, the signature checker needs to use other means (e.g., source addressing information of the server endpoint) to identify the correct authentication credential including the public key to use for verifying the countersignature of the response.

The particular actions following a successful or unsuccessful verification of the countersignature are application specific and out of the scope of this document.

9. Message Processing in Pairwise Mode

When using the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE, messages are protected and processed as in [RFC8613], with the modifications described in this section. The security objectives of the pairwise mode are discussed in Appendix A.2.

The pairwise mode takes advantage of an existing Security Context for the group mode to establish a Security Context shared exclusively with any other member. In order to use the pairwise mode in a group that uses also the group mode, the signature scheme of the group mode MUST support a combined signature and encryption scheme. This can be, for example, signature using ECDSA, and encryption using AES-CCM with a key derived with ECDH. For encryption and decryption operations, the AEAD Algorithm from the Common Context is used (see Section 2.1.1).

The pairwise mode does not support the use of additional entities acting as verifiers of source authentication and integrity of group messages, such as intermediary gateways (see Section 3).

An endpoint implementing only a silent server does not support the pairwise mode.

If the signature algorithm used in the group supports ECDH (e.g., ECDSA, EdDSA), the pairwise mode MUST be supported by endpoints that use the CoAP Echo Option [RFC9175] and/or block-wise transfers [RFC7959], for instance for responses after the first block-wise request, which possibly targets all servers in the group and includes the CoAP Block2 option (see Section 3.8 of...
Senders cannot use the pairwise mode to protect a message intended for multiple recipients. In fact, the pairwise mode is defined only between two endpoints and the keying material is thus only available to one recipient.

However, a sender can use the pairwise mode to protect a message sent to (but not intended for) multiple recipients, if interested in a response from only one of them. For instance, this is useful to support the address discovery service defined in Section 9.1, when a single ‘kid’ value is indicated in the payload of a request sent to multiple recipients, e.g., over multicast.

The Group Manager indicates that the group uses (also) the pairwise mode, as part of the group data provided to candidate group members when joining the group.

9.1.  Pre-Conditions

In order to protect an outgoing message in pairwise mode, the sender needs to know the authentication credential and the Recipient ID for the recipient endpoint, as stored in the Recipient Context associated with that endpoint (see Section 2.4.4).

Furthermore, the sender needs to know the individual address of the recipient endpoint. This information may not be known at any given point in time. For instance, right after having joined the group, a client may know the authentication credential and Recipient ID for a given server, but not the addressing information required to reach it with an individual, one-to-one request.

To make addressing information of individual endpoints available, servers in the group MAY expose a resource to which a client can send a group request targeting a set of servers, identified by their ‘kid’ values specified in the request payload. The specified set may be empty, hence identifying all the servers in the group. Further details of such an interface are out of scope for this document.

9.2.  Main Differences from OSCORE

The pairwise mode protects messages between two members of a group, essentially following [RFC8613], but with the following notable differences.
* The ‘kid’ and ‘kid context’ parameters of the COSE object are used as defined in Section 4.2 of this document.

* The external_aad defined in Section 4.3 of this document is used for the encryption process.

* The Pairwise Sender/Recipient Keys used as Sender/Recipient keys are derived as defined in Section 2.4 of this document.

9.3. Protecting the Request

When using the pairwise mode, the request is protected as defined in Section 8.1 of [RFC8613], with the differences summarized in Section 9.2 of this document. The following difference also applies.

* If Observe [RFC7641] is supported, what is defined in Section 8.1.1 of this document holds.

9.4. Verifying the Request

Upon receiving a request with the Group Flag set to 0, following the procedure in Section 7, the server MUST process it as defined in Section 8.2 of [RFC8613], with the differences summarized in Section 9.2 of this document. The following differences also apply.

* If the server discards the request due to not retrieving a Security Context associated with the OSCORE group or to not supporting the pairwise mode, the server MAY respond with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message or a 4.02 (Bad Option) error message, respectively. When doing so, the server MAY set an Outer Max-Age option with value zero, and MAY include a descriptive string as diagnostic payload.

* If a new Recipient Context is created for this Recipient ID, new Pairwise Sender/Recipient Keys are also derived (see Section 2.4.1). The new Pairwise Sender/Recipient Keys are deleted if the Recipient Context is deleted as a result of the message not being successfully verified.

* If Observe [RFC7641] is supported, what is defined in Section 8.2.1 of this document holds.

9.5. Protecting the Response

When using the pairwise mode, a response is protected as defined in Section 8.3 of [RFC8613], with the differences summarized in Section 9.2 of this document. The following differences also apply.
* If the server is using a different Security Context for the response compared to what was used to verify the request (see Section 3.2), then the server MUST include its Sender Sequence Number as Partial IV in the response and use it to build the AEAD nonce to protect the response. This prevents the AEAD nonce from being reused.

* If the server is using a different ID Context (Gid) for the response compared to what was used to verify the request (see Section 3.2), then the new ID Context MUST be included in the ‘kid context’ parameter of the response.

* The server can obtain a new Sender ID from the Group Manager, when individually rekeyed (see Section 2.5.3.1) or when re-joining the group. In such a case, the server can help the client to synchronize, by including the ‘kid’ parameter in a response protected in pairwise mode, even when the request was also protected in pairwise mode.

That is, when responding to a request protected in pairwise mode, the server SHOULD include the ‘kid’ parameter in a response protected in pairwise mode, if it is replying to that client for the first time since the assignment of its new Sender ID.

* If Observe [RFC7641] is supported, what is defined in Section 8.3.1 of this document holds.

9.6. Verifying the Response

Upon receiving a response with the Group Flag set to 0, following the procedure in Section 7, the client MUST process it as defined in Section 8.4 of [RFC8613], with the differences summarized in Section 9.2 of this document. The following differences also apply.

* The client may receive a response protected with a Security Context different from the one used to protect the corresponding request. Also, upon the establishment of a new Security Context, the client re-initializes its Replay Windows in its Recipient Contexts (see Section 2.2).

* The same as described in Section 8.4 holds with respect to handling the ‘kid’ parameter of the response, when received as a reply to a request protected in pairwise mode. The client can also in this case check whether the replying server is the expected one, by relying on the server’s public key. However, since the response is protected in pairwise mode, the public key is not used for verifying a countersignature as in Section 8.4. Instead, the expected server’s authentication credential – namely
Recipient Auth Cred and including the server’s public key - was taken as input to derive the Pairwise Recipient Key used to decrypt and verify the response (see Section 2.4.1).

* If a new Recipient Context is created for this Recipient ID, new Pairwise Sender/Recipient Keys are also derived (see Section 2.4.1). The new Pairwise Sender/Recipient Keys are deleted if the Recipient Context is deleted as a result of the message not being successfully verified.

* If Observe [RFC7641] is supported, what is defined in Section 8.4.1 of this document holds. The client can also in this case identify a server to be the same one across a change of Sender ID, by relying on the server’s public key. As to the expected server’s authentication credential, the same holds as specified above for non-notification responses.

10. Challenge-Response Synchronization

This section describes how a server endpoint can synchronize with Sender Sequence Numbers of client endpoints in the group. Similarly to what is defined in Appendix B.1.2 of [RFC8613], the server performs a challenge-response exchange with a client, by using the Echo Option for CoAP specified in Section 2 of [RFC9175].

Upon receiving a request from a particular client for the first time, the server processes the message as described in this document, but, even if valid, does not deliver it to the application. Instead, the server replies to the client with an OSCORE protected 4.01 (Unauthorized) response message, including only the Echo Option and no diagnostic payload. The Echo option value SHOULD NOT be reused; when it is reused, it MUST be highly unlikely to have been recently used with this client. Since this response is protected with the Security Context used in the group, the client will consider the response valid upon successfully decrypting and verifying it.

The server stores the Echo Option value included in the response together with the pair (gid,kid), where ‘gid’ is the Group Identifier of the OSCORE group and ‘kid’ is the Sender ID of the client in the group. These are specified in the 'kid context' and 'kid' fields of the OSCORE Option of the request, respectively. After a group rekeying has been completed and a new Security Context has been established in the group, which results also in a new Group Identifier (see Section 3.2), the server MUST delete all the stored Echo values associated with members of the group.
Upon receiving a 4.01 (Unauthorized) response that includes an Echo Option and originates from a verified group member, the client sends a request as a unicast message addressed to the same server, echoing the Echo Option value. The client MUST NOT send the request including the Echo Option over multicast.

If the group uses also the group mode and the used Signature Algorithm supports ECDH (e.g., ECDSA, EdDSA), the client MUST use the pairwise mode to protect the request, as per Section 9.3. Note that, as defined in Section 9, endpoints that are members of such a group and that use the Echo Option MUST support the pairwise mode.

The client does not necessarily resend the same group request, but can instead send a more recent one, if the application permits it. This allows the client to not retain previously sent group requests for full retransmission, unless the application explicitly requires otherwise. In either case, the client uses a fresh Sender Sequence Number value from its own Sender Context. If the client stores group requests for possible retransmission with the Echo Option, it should not store a given request for longer than a preconfigured time interval. Note that the unicast request echoing the Echo Option is correctly treated and processed, since the 'kid context' field including the Group Identifier of the OSCORE group is still present in the OSCORE Option as part of the COSE object (see Section 4).

Upon receiving the unicast request including the Echo Option, the server performs the following verifications.

* If the server does not store an Echo Option value for the pair \( (gid, kid) \), it considers: i) the time \( t_1 \) when it has established the Security Context used to protect the received request; and ii) the time \( t_2 \) when the request has been received. Since a valid request cannot be older than the Security Context used to protect it, the server verifies that \( (t_2 - t_1) \) is less than the largest amount of time acceptable to consider the request fresh.

* If the server stores an Echo Option value for the pair \( (gid, kid) \) associated with that same client in the same group, the server verifies that the option value equals that same stored value previously sent to that client.

If the verifications above fail, the server MUST NOT process the request further and MAY send a 4.01 (Unauthorized) response including an Echo Option, hence performing a new challenge-response exchange.

If the verifications above are successful, the server proceeds as follows. In case the Replay Window in the Recipient Context associated with the client has not been set yet, the server updates
the Replay Window to mark the current Sender Sequence Number from the latest received request as seen (but all newer ones as new), and delivers the message as fresh to the application. Otherwise, the server discards the verification result and treats the message as fresh or as a replay, according to the existing Replay Window.

A server should not deliver requests from a given client to the application until one valid request from that same client has been verified as fresh, as conveying an echoed Echo Option. A server may perform the challenge-response described above at any time, if synchronization with Sender Sequence Numbers of clients is lost, e.g., after a device reboot. A client has to be ready to perform the challenge-response based on the Echo Option if a server starts it.

It is the role of the server application to define under what circumstances Sender Sequence Numbers lose synchronization. This can include experiencing a "large enough" gap \( D = (SN2 - SN1) \), between the Sender Sequence Number \( SN1 \) of the latest accepted group request from a client and the Sender Sequence Number \( SN2 \) of a group request just received from that client. However, a client may send several unicast requests to different group members as protected with the pairwise mode, which may result in the server experiencing the gap \( D \) in a relatively short time. This would induce the server to perform more challenge-response exchanges than actually needed.

In order to ameliorate this, the server may rely on a trade-off between the Sender Sequence Number gap \( D \) and a time gap \( T = (t2 - t1) \), where \( t1 \) is the time when the latest group request from a client was accepted and \( t2 \) is the time when the latest group request from that client has been received, respectively. Then, the server can start a challenge-response when experiencing a time gap \( T \) larger than a given, preconfigured threshold. Also, the server can start a challenge-response when experiencing a Sender Sequence Number gap \( D \) greater than a different threshold, computed as a monotonically increasing function of the currently experienced time gap \( T \).

The challenge-response approach described in this section provides an assurance of absolute message freshness. However, it can result in an impact on performance which is undesirable or unbearable, especially in large groups where many endpoints at the same time might join as new members or lose synchronization.

Endpoints configured as silent servers are not able to perform the challenge-response described above, as they do not store a Sender Context to secure the 4.01 (Unauthorized) response to the client. Thus, silent servers should adopt alternative approaches to achieve and maintain synchronization with Sender Sequence Numbers of clients.
Since requests including the Echo Option are sent over unicast, a server can be victim of the attack discussed in Section 12.9, in case such requests are protected with the group mode. Instead, protecting those requests with the pairwise mode prevents the attack above. In fact, only the exact server involved in the challenge-response exchange is able to derive the pairwise key used by the client to protect the request including the Echo Option.

In either case, an internal on-path adversary would not be able to mix up the Echo Option value of two different unicast requests, sent by a same client to any two different servers in the group. In fact, even if the group mode was used, this would require the adversary to forge the countersignature of both requests. As a consequence, each of the two servers remains able to selectively accept a request with the Echo Option only if it is waiting for that exact integrity-protected Echo Option value, and is thus the intended recipient.

11. Implementation Compliance

Like in [RFC8613], HKDF SHA-256 is the mandatory to implement HKDF.

An endpoint may support only the group mode, or only the pairwise mode, or both.

For endpoints that support the group mode, the following applies.

* For endpoints that use authenticated encryption, the AEAD algorithm AES-CCM-16-64-128 defined in Section 4.2 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs] is mandatory to implement as Signature Encryption Algorithm (see Section 2.1.4).

* For many constrained IoT devices it is problematic to support more than one signature algorithm. Existing devices can be expected to support either EdDSA or ECDSA. In order to enable as much interoperability as we can reasonably achieve, the following applies with respect to the Signature Algorithm (see Section 2.1.5).

Less constrained endpoints SHOULD implement both: the EdDSA signature algorithm together with the elliptic curve Ed25519 [RFC8032]; and the ECDSA signature algorithm together with the elliptic curve P-256.

Constrained endpoints SHOULD implement: the EdDSA signature algorithm together with the elliptic curve Ed25519 [RFC8032]; or the ECDSA signature algorithm together with the elliptic curve P-256.
Endpoints that implement the ECDSA signature algorithm MAY use "deterministic ECDSA" as specified in [RFC6979]. Pure deterministic elliptic-curve signature algorithms such as deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA have the advantage of not requiring access to a source of high-quality randomness. However, these signature algorithms have been shown vulnerable to some side-channel and fault injection attacks due to their determinism, which can result in extracting a device’s private key. As suggested in Section 2.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs], this can be addressed by combining both randomness and determinism [I-D.mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise].

For endpoints that support the pairwise mode, the following applies.

* The AEAD algorithm AES-CCM-16-64-128 defined in Section 4.2 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs] is mandatory to implement as AEAD Algorithm (see Section 2.1.1).

* The ECDH-SS + HKDF-256 algorithm specified in Section 6.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs] is mandatory to implement as Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm (see Section 2.1.7).

* In order to enable as much interoperability as we can reasonably achieve in the presence of constrained devices (see above), the following applies.

  Less constrained endpoints SHOULD implement both the X25519 curve [RFC7748] and the P-256 curve as ECDH curves.

  Constrained endpoints SHOULD implement the X25519 curve [RFC7748] or the P-256 curve as ECDH curve.

Constrained IoT devices may alternatively represent Montgomery curves and (twisted) Edwards curves [RFC7748] in the short-Weierstrass form Wei25519, with which the algorithms ECDSA25519 and ECDH25519 can be used for signature operations and Diffie-Hellman secret calculation, respectively [I-D.ietf-lwig-curve-representations].

12. Security Considerations

The same threat model discussed for OSCORE in Appendix D.1 of [RFC8613] holds for Group OSCORE. In addition, when using the group mode, source authentication of messages is explicitly ensured by means of countersignatures, as discussed in Section 12.1.

Note that, even if an endpoint is authorized to be a group member and to take part in group communications, there is a risk that it behaves inappropriately. For instance, it can forward the content of
messages in the group to unauthorized entities. However, in many use cases, the devices in the group belong to a common authority and are configured by a commissioner (see Appendix B), which results in a practically limited risk and enables a prompt detection/reaction in case of misbehaving.

The same considerations on supporting Proxy operations discussed for OSCORE in Appendix D.2 of [RFC8613] hold for Group OSCORE.

The same considerations on protected message fields for OSCORE discussed in Appendix D.3 of [RFC8613] hold for Group OSCORE.

The same considerations on uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs for OSCORE discussed in Appendix D.4 of [RFC8613] hold for Group OSCORE. This is further discussed in Section 12.3 of this document.

The same considerations on unprotected message fields for OSCORE discussed in Appendix D.5 of [RFC8613] hold for Group OSCORE, with the following differences. First, the ‘kid context’ of request messages is part of the Additional Authenticated Data, thus safely enabling to keep observations active beyond a possible change of ID Context (Gid), following a group rekeying (see Section 4.3). Second, the countersignature included in a Group OSCORE message protected in group mode is computed also over the value of the OSCORE option, which is also part of the Additional Authenticated Data used in the signing process. This is further discussed in Section 12.7 of this document.

As discussed in Section 6.2.3 of [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis], Group OSCORE addresses security attacks against CoAP listed in Sections 11.2-11.6 of [RFC7252], especially when run over IP multicast.

The rest of this section first discusses security aspects to be taken into account when using Group OSCORE. Then it goes through aspects covered in the security considerations of OSCORE (see Section 12 of [RFC8613]), and discusses how they hold when Group OSCORE is used.

12.1. Security of the Group Mode

The group mode defined in Section 8 relies on commonly shared group keying material to protect communication within a group. Using the group mode has the implications discussed below. The following refers to group members as the endpoints in the group storing the latest version of the group keying material.
* Messages are encrypted at a group level (group-level data confidentiality), i.e., they can be decrypted by any member of the group, but not by an external adversary or other external entities.

* If the used encryption algorithm provides integrity protection, then it also ensures group authentication and proof of group membership, but not source authentication. That is, it ensures that a message sent to a group has been sent by a member of that group, but not necessarily by the alleged sender. In fact, any group member is able to derive the Sender Key used by the actual sender endpoint, and thus can compute a valid authentication tag. Therefore, the message content could originate from any of the current group members.

Furthermore, if the used encryption algorithm does not provide integrity protection, then it does not ensure any level of message authentication or proof of group membership.

On the other hand, proof of group membership is always ensured by construction through the strict management of the group keying material (see Section 3.2). That is, the group is rekeyed in case of members’ leaving, and the current group members are informed of former group members. Thus, a current group member storing the latest group keying material does not store the authentication credential of any former group member.

This allows a recipient endpoint to rely on the stored authentication credentials and public keys included therein, in order to always confidently assert the group membership of a sender endpoint when processing an incoming message, i.e., to assert that the sender endpoint was a group member when it signed the message. In turn, this prevents a former group member to possibly re-sign and inject in the group a stored message that was protected with old keying material.

* Source authentication of messages sent to a group is ensured through a countersignature, which is computed by the sender using its own private key and then appended to the message payload. Also, the countersignature is encrypted by using a keystream derived from the group keying material (see Section 4.1). This ensures group privacy, i.e., an attacker cannot track an endpoint over two groups by linking messages between the two groups, unless being also a member of those groups.

The security properties of the group mode are summarized below.

1. Asymmetric source authentication, by means of a countersignature.
2. Symmetric group authentication, by means of an authentication tag (only for encryption algorithms providing integrity protection).


4. Proof of group membership, by strictly managing the group keying material, as well as by means of integrity tags when using an encryption algorithm that provides also integrity protection.

5. Group privacy, by encrypting the countersignature.

The group mode fulfills the security properties above while also displaying the following benefits. First, the use of an encryption algorithm that does not provide integrity protection results in a minimal communication overhead, by limiting the message payload to the ciphertext and the encrypted countersignature. Second, it is possible to deploy semi-trusted entities such as signature checkers (see Section 3.1), which can break property 5, but cannot break properties 1, 2 and 3.

12.2. Security of the Pairwise Mode

The pairwise mode defined in Section 9 protects messages by using pairwise symmetric keys, derived from the static-static Diffie-Hellman shared secret computed from the asymmetric keys of the sender and recipient endpoint (see Section 2.4).

The used encryption algorithm MUST provide integrity protection. Therefore, the pairwise mode ensures both pairwise data-confidentiality and source authentication of messages, without using countersignatures. Furthermore, the recipient endpoint achieves proof of group membership for the sender endpoint, since only current group members have the required keying material to derive a valid Pairwise Sender/Recipient Key.

The long-term storing of the Diffie-Hellman shared secret is a potential security issue. In fact, if the shared secret of two group members is leaked, a third group member can exploit it to impersonate any of those two group members, by deriving and using their pairwise key. The possibility of such leakage should be contemplated, as more likely to happen than the leakage of a private key, which could be rather protected at a significantly higher level than generic memory, e.g., by using a Trusted Platform Module. Therefore, there is a trade-off between the maximum amount of time a same shared secret is stored and the frequency of its re-computing.
12.3. Uniqueness of (key, nonce)

The proof for uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs in Appendix D.4 of [RFC8613] is also valid in group communication scenarios. That is, given an OSCORE group:

* Uniqueness of Sender IDs within the group is enforced by the Group Manager. In fact, from the moment when a Gid is assigned to a group until the moment a new Gid is assigned to that same group, the Group Manager does not reassign a Sender ID within the group (see Section 3.2).

* The case A in Appendix D.4 of [RFC8613] concerns all group requests and responses including a Partial IV (e.g., Observe notifications). In this case, same considerations from [RFC8613] apply here as well.

* The case B in Appendix D.4 of [RFC8613] concerns responses not including a Partial IV (e.g., single response to a group request). In this case, same considerations from [RFC8613] apply here as well.

As a consequence, each message encrypted/decrypted with the same Sender Key is processed by using a different (ID_PIV, PIV) pair. This means that nonces used by any fixed encrypting endpoint are unique. Thus, each message is processed with a different (key, nonce) pair.

12.4. Management of Group Keying Material

The approach described in this document should take into account the risk of compromise of group members. In particular, this document specifies that a key management scheme for secure revocation and renewal of Security Contexts and group keying material MUST be adopted.

[I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore] specifies a simple rekeying scheme for renewing the Security Context in a group.

Alternative rekeying schemes which are more scalable with the group size may be needed in dynamic, large groups where endpoints can join and leave at any time, in order to limit the impact on performance due to the Security Context and keying material update.
12.5. Update of Security Context and Key Rotation

A group member can receive a message shortly after the group has been rekeyed, and new security parameters and keying material have been distributed by the Group Manager.

This may result in a client using an old Security Context to protect a request, and a server using a different new Security Context to protect a corresponding response. As a consequence, clients may receive a response protected with a Security Context different from the one used to protect the corresponding request.

In particular, a server may first get a request protected with the old Security Context, then install the new Security Context, and only after that produce a response to send back to the client. In such a case, as specified in Section 8.3, the server MUST protect the potential response using the new Security Context. Specifically, the server MUST include its Sender Sequence Number as Partial IV in the response and use it to build the AEAD nonce to protect the response. This prevents the AEAD nonce from the request from being reused with the new Security Context.

The client will process that response using the new Security Context, provided that it has installed the new security parameters and keying material before the message processing.

In case block-wise transfer [RFC7959] is used, the same considerations from Section 10.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm] hold.

Furthermore, as described below, a group rekeying may temporarily result in misaligned Security Contexts between the sender and recipient of a same message.

12.5.1. Late Update on the Sender

In this case, the sender protects a message using the old Security Context, i.e., before having installed the new Security Context. However, the recipient receives the message after having installed the new Security Context, and is thus unable to correctly process it.

A possible way to ameliorate this issue is to preserve the old, recent, Security Context for a maximum amount of time defined by the application. By doing so, the recipient can still try to process the received message using the old retained Security Context as a second attempt. This makes particular sense when the recipient is a client, that would hence be able to process incoming responses protected with the old, recent, Security Context used to protect the associated
group request. Instead, a recipient server would better and more simply discard an incoming group request which is not successfully processed with the new Security Context.

This tolerance preserves the processing of secure messages throughout a long-lasting key rotation, as group rekeying processes may likely take a long time to complete, especially in large groups. On the other hand, a former (compromised) group member can abusively take advantage of this, and send messages protected with the old retained Security Context. Therefore, a conservative application policy should not admit the retention of old Security Contexts.

12.5.2. Late Update on the Recipient

In this case, the sender protects a message using the new Security Context, but the recipient receives that message before having installed the new Security Context. Therefore, the recipient would not be able to correctly process the message and hence discards it.

If the recipient installs the new Security Context shortly after that and the sender endpoint retransmits the message, the former will still be able to receive and correctly process the message.

In any case, the recipient should actively ask the Group Manager for an updated Security Context according to an application-defined policy, for instance after a given number of unsuccessfully decrypted incoming messages.

12.6. Collision of Group Identifiers

In case endpoints are deployed in multiple groups managed by different non-synchronized Group Managers, it is possible for Group Identifiers of different groups to coincide.

This does not impair the security of the AEAD algorithm. In fact, as long as the Master Secret is different for different groups and this condition holds over time, AEAD keys are different among different groups.

In case multiple groups use the same IP multicast address, the entity assigning that address may help limiting the chances to experience such collisions of Group Identifiers. In particular, it may allow the Group Managers of those groups using the same IP multicast address to share their respective list of assigned Group Identifiers currently in use.
12.7. Cross-group Message Injection

A same endpoint is allowed to and would likely use the same pair (private key, authentication credential) in multiple OSCORE groups, possibly administered by different Group Managers.

When a sender endpoint sends a message protected in pairwise mode to a recipient endpoint in an OSCORE group, a malicious group member may attempt to inject the message to a different OSCORE group also including the same endpoints (see Section 12.7.1).

This practically relies on altering the content of the OSCORE option, and having the same MAC in the ciphertext still correctly validating, which has a success probability depending on the size of the MAC.

As discussed in Section 12.7.2, the attack is practically infeasible if the message is protected in group mode, thanks to the countersignature also bound to the OSCORE option through the Additional Authenticated Data used in the signing process (see Section 4.3).

12.7.1. Attack Description

Let us consider:

* Two OSCORE groups G1 and G2, with ID Context (Group ID) Gid1 and Gid2, respectively. Both G1 and G2 use the AEAD cipher AES-CCM-16-64-128, i.e., the MAC of the ciphertext is 8 bytes in size.

* A sender endpoint X which is member of both G1 and G2, and uses the same pair (private key, authentication credential) in both groups. The endpoint X has Sender ID Sid1 in G1 and Sender ID Sid2 in G2. The pairs (Sid1, Gid1) and (Sid2, Gid2) identify the same authentication credential of X in G1 and G2, respectively.

* A recipient endpoint Y which is member of both G1 and G2, and uses the same pair (private key, authentication credential) in both groups. The endpoint Y has Sender ID Sid3 in G1 and Sender ID Sid4 in G2. The pairs (Sid3, Gid1) and (Sid4, Gid2) identify the same authentication credential of Y in G1 and G2, respectively.

* A malicious endpoint Z is also member of both G1 and G2. Hence, Z is able to derive the Sender Keys used by X in G1 and G2.

When X sends a message M1 addressed to Y in G1 and protected in pairwise mode, Z can intercept M1, and attempt to forge a valid message M2 to be injected in G2, making it appear as still sent by X to Y and valid to be accepted.
More in detail, Z intercepts and stops message $M_1$, and forges a message $M_2$ by changing the value of the OSCORE option from $M_1$ as follows: the 'kid context' is set to $G_2$ (rather than $G_1$); and the 'kid' is set to $Sid_2$ (rather than $Sid_1$). Then, Z injects message $M_2$ as addressed to $Y$ in $G_2$.

Upon receiving $M_2$, there is a probability equal to $2^{-64}$ that $Y$ successfully verifies the same unchanged MAC by using the Pairwise Recipient Key associated with $X$ in $G_2$.

Note that $Z$ does not know the pairwise keys of $X$ and $Y$, since it does not know and is not able to compute their shared Diffie-Hellman secret. Therefore, $Z$ is not able to check offline if a performed forgery is actually valid, before sending the forged message to $G_2$.

12.7.2. Attack Prevention in Group Mode

When a Group OSCORE message is protected with the group mode, the countersignature is computed also over the value of the OSCORE option, which is part of the Additional Authenticated Data used in the signing process (see Section 4.3).

That is, other than over the ciphertext, the countersignature is computed over: the ID Context ($Gid$) and the Partial IV, which are always present in group requests; as well as the Sender ID of the message originator, which is always present in group requests as well as in responses to requests protected in group mode.

Since the signing process takes as input also the ciphertext of the COSE_Encrypt0 object, the countersignature is bound not only to the intended OSCORE group, hence to the triplet (Master Secret, Master Salt, ID Context), but also to a specific Sender ID in that group and to its specific symmetric key used for AEAD encryption, hence to the quartet (Master Secret, Master Salt, ID Context, Sender ID).

This makes it practically infeasible to perform the attack described in Section 12.7.1, since it would require the adversary to additionally forge a valid countersignature that replaces the original one in the forged message $M_2$.

If, hypothetically, the countersignature did not cover the OSCORE option:

* The attack described in Section 12.7.1 would still be possible against response messages protected in group mode, since the same unchanged countersignature from message $M_1$ would be also valid in message $M_2$. 
* A simplification would also be possible in performing the attack, since Z is able to derive the Sender/Recipient Keys of X and Y in G1 and G2. That is, Z can also set a convenient Partial IV in the response, until the same unchanged MAC is successfully verified by using G2 as 'request_kid_context', Sid2 as 'request_kid', and the symmetric key associated with X in G2.

Since the Partial IV is 5 bytes in size, this requires \(2^{40}\) operations to test all the Partial IVs, which can be done in real-time. The probability that a single given message M1 can be used to forge a response M2 for a given request would be equal to \(2^{-24}\), since there are more MAC values (8 bytes in size) than Partial IV values (5 bytes in size).

Note that, by changing the Partial IV as discussed above, any member of G1 would also be able to forge a valid signed response message M2 to be injected in the same group G1.


Both when using the group mode and the pairwise mode, the message protection covers also the Group Manager’s authentication credential. This is included in the Additional Authenticated Data used in the signing process and/or in the integrity-protected encryption process (see Section 4.3).

By doing so, an endpoint X member of a group G1 cannot perform the following attack.

1. X sets up a group G2 where it acts as Group Manager.
2. X makes G2 a "clone" of G1, i.e., G1 and G2 use the same algorithms and have the same Master Secret, Master Salt and ID Context.
3. X collects a message M sent to G1 and injects it in G2.
4. Members of G2 accept M and believe it to be originated in G2.

The attack above is effectively prevented, since message M is protected by including the authentication credential of G1’s Group Manager in the Additional Authenticated Data. Therefore, members of G2 do not successfully verify and decrypt M, since they correctly use the authentication credential of X as Group Manager of G2 when attempting to.
12.9. Group OSCORE for Unicast Requests

If a request is intended to be sent over unicast as addressed to a single group member, it is NOT RECOMMENDED for the client to protect the request by using the group mode as defined in Section 8.1.

This does not include the case where the client sends a request over unicast to a proxy, to be forwarded to multiple intended recipients over multicast [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis]. In this case, the client MUST protect the request with the group mode, even though it is sent to the proxy over unicast (see Section 8).

If the client uses the group mode with its own Sender Key to protect a unicast request to a group member, an on-path adversary can, right then or later on, redirect that request to one/many different group member(s) over unicast, or to the whole OSCORE group over multicast. By doing so, the adversary can induce the target group member(s) to perform actions intended for one group member only. Note that the adversary can be external, i.e., (s)he does not need to also be a member of the OSCORE group.

This is due to the fact that the client is not able to indicate the single intended recipient in a way which is secure and possible to process for Group OSCORE on the server side. In particular, Group OSCORE does not protect network addressing information such as the IP address of the intended recipient server. It follows that the server(s) receiving the redirected request cannot assert whether that was the original intention of the client, and would thus simply assume so.

The impact of such an attack depends especially on the REST method of the request, i.e., the Inner CoAP Code of the OSCORE request message. In particular, safe methods such as GET and FETCH would trigger (several) unintended responses from the targeted server(s), while not resulting in destructive behavior. On the other hand, non safe methods such as PUT, POST and PATCH/iPATCH would result in the target server(s) taking active actions on their resources and possible cyber-physical environment, with the risk of destructive consequences and possible implications for safety.
A client can instead use the pairwise mode as defined in Section 9.3, in order to protect a request sent to a single group member by using pairwise keying material (see Section 2.4). This prevents the attack discussed above by construction, as only the intended server is able to derive the pairwise keying material used by the client to protect the request. A client supporting the pairwise mode SHOULD use it to protect requests sent to a single group member over unicast, instead of using the group mode. For an example where this is not fulfilled, see Section 7.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-observe-multicast-notifications].

With particular reference to block-wise transfers [RFC7959], Section 3.8 of [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis] points out that, while an initial request including the CoAP Block2 option can be sent over multicast, any other request in a transfer has to occur over unicast, individually addressing the servers in the group.

Additional considerations are discussed in Section 10, with respect to requests including a CoAP Echo Option [RFC9175] that have to be sent over unicast, as a challenge-response method for servers to achieve synchronization of clients’ Sender Sequence Number.

12.10. End-to-end Protection

The same considerations from Section 12.1 of [RFC8613] hold for Group OSCORE.

Additionally, (D)TLS and Group OSCORE can be combined for protecting message exchanges occurring over unicast. However, it is not possible to combine (D)TLS and Group OSCORE for protecting message exchanges where messages are (also) sent over multicast.

12.11. Master Secret

Group OSCORE derives the Security Context using the same construction as OSCORE, and by using the Group Identifier of a group as the related ID Context. Hence, the same required properties of the Security Context parameters discussed in Section 3.3 of [RFC8613] hold for this document.

With particular reference to the OSCORE Master Secret, it has to be kept secret among the members of the respective OSCORE group and the Group Manager responsible for that group. Also, the Master Secret must have a good amount of randomness, and the Group Manager can generate it offline using a good random number generator. This includes the case where the Group Manager rekeys the group by generating and distributing a new Master Secret. Randomness requirements for security are described in [RFC4086].
12.12.  Replay Protection

As in OSCORE [RFC8613], also Group OSCORE relies on Sender Sequence Numbers included in the COSE message field ‘Partial IV’ and used to build AEAD nonces.

Note that the Partial IV of an endpoint does not necessarily grow monotonically. For instance, upon exhaustion of the endpoint Sender Sequence Number, the Partial IV also gets exhausted. As discussed in Section 2.5.3, this results either in the endpoint being individually rekeyed and getting a new Sender ID, or in the establishment of a new Security Context in the group. Therefore, uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs (see Section 12.3) is preserved also when a new Security Context is established.

Since one-to-many communication such as multicast usually involves unreliable transports, the simplification of the Replay Window to a size of 1 suggested in Section 7.4 of [RFC8613] is not viable with Group OSCORE, unless exchanges in the group rely only on unicast messages.

As discussed in Section 6.2, a Replay Window may be initialized as not valid, following the loss of mutable Security Context Section 2.5.1. In particular, Section 2.5.1.1 and Section 2.5.1.2 define measures that endpoints need to take in such a situation, before resuming to accept incoming messages from other group members.

12.13.  Message Freshness

As discussed in Section 6.3, a server may not be able to assert whether an incoming request is fresh, in case it does not have or has lost synchronization with the client’s Sender Sequence Number.

If freshness is relevant for the application, the server may (re-)synchronize with the client’s Sender Sequence Number at any time, by using the approach described in Section 10 and based on the CoAP Echo Option [RFC9175], as a variant of the approach defined in Appendix B.1.2 of [RFC8613] applicable to Group OSCORE.


Building on Section 12.5 of [RFC8613], a server may use the CoAP Echo Option [RFC9175] to verify the aliveness of the client that originated a received request, by using the approach described in Section 10 of this document.
12.15. Cryptographic Considerations

The same considerations from Section 12.6 of [RFC8613] about the maximum Sender Sequence Number hold for Group OSCORE.

As discussed in Section 2.5.2, an endpoint that experiences an exhaustion of its own Sender Sequence Numbers MUST NOT protect further messages including a Partial IV, until it has derived a new Sender Context. This prevents the endpoint to reuse the same AEAD nonces with the same Sender Key.

In order to renew its own Sender Context, the endpoint SHOULD inform the Group Manager, which can either renew the whole Security Context by means of group rekeying, or provide only that endpoint with a new Sender ID value. In either case, the endpoint derives a new Sender Context, and in particular a new Sender Key.

Additionally, the same considerations from Section 12.6 of [RFC8613] hold for Group OSCORE, about building the AEAD nonce and the secrecy of the Security Context parameters.

The group mode uses the "encrypt-then-sign" construction, i.e., the countersignature is computed over the COSE_Encrypt0 object (see Section 4.1). This is motivated by enabling additional entities acting as signature checkers (see Section 3.1), which do not join a group as members but are allowed to verify countersignatures of messages protected in group mode without being able to decrypt them (see Section 8.5).

If the encryption algorithm used in group mode provides integrity protection, countersignatures of COSE_Encrypt0 with short authentication tags do not provide the security properties associated with the same algorithm used in COSE_Sign (see Section 6 of [I-D.ietf-cose-countersign]). To provide 128-bit security against collision attacks, the tag length MUST be at least 256-bits. A countersignature of a COSE_Encrypt0 with AES-CCM-16-64-128 provides at most 32 bits of integrity protection.

The derivation of pairwise keys defined in Section 2.4.1 is compatible with ECDSA and EdDSA asymmetric keys, but is not compatible with RSA asymmetric keys.

For the public key translation from Ed25519 (Ed448) to X25519 (X448) specified in Section 2.4.1, variable time methods can be used since the translation operates on public information. Any byte string of appropriate length is accepted as a public key for X25519 (X448) in [RFC7748]. It is therefore not necessary for security to validate the translated public key (assuming the translation was successful).
The security of using the same key pair for Diffie-Hellman and for signing (by considering the ECDH procedure in Section 2.4 as a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM)) is demonstrated in [Degabriele] and [Thormarker].

Applications using ECDH (except X25519 and X448) based KEM in Section 2.4 are assumed to verify that a peer endpoint’s public key is on the expected curve and that the shared secret is not the point at infinity. The KEM in [Degabriele] checks that the shared secret is different from the point at infinity, as does the procedure in Section 5.7.1.2 of [NIST-800-56A] which is referenced in Section 2.4.

Extending Theorem 2 of [Degabriele], [Thormarker] shows that the same key pair can be used with X25519 and Ed25519 (X448 and Ed448) for the KEM specified in Section 2.4. By symmetry in the KEM used in this document, both endpoints can consider themselves to have the recipient role in the KEM – as discussed in Section 7 of [Thormarker] – and rely on the mentioned proofs for the security of their key pairs.

Theorem 3 in [Degabriele] shows that the same key pair can be used for an ECDH based KEM and ECDSA. The KEM uses a different KDF than in Section 2.4, but the proof only depends on that the KDF has certain required properties, which are the typical assumptions about HKDF, e.g., that output keys are pseudorandom. In order to comply with the assumptions of Theorem 3, received public keys MUST be successfully validated, see Section 5.6.2.3.4 of [NIST-800-56A]. The validation MAY be performed by a trusted Group Manager. For [Degabriele] to apply as it is written, public keys need to be in the expected subgroup. For this we rely on cofactor DH, Section 5.7.1.2 of [NIST-800-56A] which is referenced in Section 2.4.

HashEdDSA variants of Ed25519 and Ed448 are not used by COSE, see Section 2.2 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs], and are not covered by the analysis in [Thormarker]. Hence, they MUST NOT be used with the public keys used to derive pairwise keys as specified in this document.

12.16. Message Segmentation

The same considerations from Section 12.7 of [RFC8613] hold for Group OSCORE.
12.17. Privacy Considerations

Group OSCORE ensures end-to-end integrity protection and encryption of the message payload and all options that are not used for proxy operations. In particular, options are processed according to the same class U/I/E that they have for OSCORE. Therefore, the same privacy considerations from Section 12.8 of [RFC8613] hold for Group OSCORE, with the following addition.

* When protecting a message in group mode, the countersignature is encrypted by using a keystream derived from the group keying material (see Section 4.1 and Section 4.1.1). This ensures group privacy. That is, an attacker cannot track an endpoint over two groups by linking messages between the two groups, unless being also a member of those groups.

Furthermore, the following privacy considerations hold about the OSCORE option, which may reveal information on the communicating endpoints.

* The 'kid' parameter, which is intended to help a recipient endpoint to find the right Recipient Context, may reveal information about the Sender Endpoint. When both a request and the corresponding responses include the 'kid' parameter, this may reveal information about both a client sending a request and all the possibly replying servers sending their own individual response.

* The 'kid context' parameter, which is intended to help a recipient endpoint to find the right Security Context, reveals information about the sender endpoint. In particular, it reveals that the sender endpoint is a member of a particular OSCORE group, whose current Group ID is indicated in the 'kid context' parameter.

When receiving a group request, each of the recipient endpoints can reply with a response that includes its Sender ID as 'kid' parameter. All these responses will be matchable with the request through the Token. Thus, even if these responses do not include a 'kid context' parameter, it becomes possible to understand that the responder endpoints are in the same group of the requester endpoint.

Furthermore, using the approach described in Section 10 to achieve Sender Sequence Number synchronization with a client may reveal when a server device goes through a reboot. This can be mitigated by the server device storing the precise state of the Replay Window of each known client on a clean shutdown.
Finally, the approach described in Section 12.6 to prevent collisions of Group Identifiers from different Group Managers may reveal information about events in the respective OSCORE groups. In particular, a Group Identifier changes when the corresponding group is rekeyed. Thus, Group Managers might use the shared list of Group Identifiers to infer the rate and patterns of group membership changes triggering a group rekeying, e.g., due to newly joined members or evicted (compromised) members. In order to alleviate this privacy concern, it should be hidden from the Group Managers which exact Group Manager has currently assigned which Group Identifiers in its OSCORE groups.

13. IANA Considerations

Note to RFC Editor: Please replace "[This Document]" with the RFC number of this document and delete this paragraph.

This document has the following actions for IANA.

13.1. OSCORE Flag Bits Registry

IANA is asked to add the following value entry to the "OSCORE Flag Bits" registry within the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters" registry group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Group Flag</td>
<td>For using a Group OSCORE Security Context, set to 1 if the message is protected with the group mode</td>
<td>[This Document]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. References

14.1. Normative References

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[NIST-800-56A]


14.2. Informative References

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Tiloca, et al. Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 81]
[I-D.amsuess-core-cachable-oscore]

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Appendix A. Assumptions and Security Objectives

This section presents a set of assumptions and security objectives for the approach described in this document. The rest of this section refers to three types of groups:

* Application group, i.e., a set of CoAP endpoints that share a common pool of resources.

* Security group, as defined in Section 1.1 of this document. There can be a one-to-one or a one-to-many relation between security groups and application groups, and vice versa.

* CoAP group, i.e., a set of CoAP endpoints where each endpoint is configured to receive one-to-many CoAP requests, e.g., sent to the group’s associated IP multicast address and UDP port as defined in [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis]. An endpoint may be a member of multiple CoAP groups. There can be a one-to-one or a one-to-many relation between application groups and CoAP groups. Note that a
device sending a CoAP request to a CoAP group is not necessarily itself a member of that group: it is a member only if it also has a CoAP server endpoint listening to requests for this CoAP group, sent to the associated IP multicast address and port. In order to provide secure group communication, all members of a CoAP group as well as all further endpoints configured only as clients sending CoAP (multicast) requests to the CoAP group have to be member of a security group. There can be a one-to-one or a one-to-many relation between security groups and CoAP groups, and vice versa.

A.1. Assumptions

The following points are assumed to be already addressed and are out of the scope of this document.

* Multicast communication topology: this document considers both 1-to-N (one sender and multiple recipients) and M-to-N (multiple senders and multiple recipients) communication topologies. The 1-to-N communication topology is the simplest group communication scenario that would serve the needs of a typical Low-power and Lossy Network (LLN). Examples of use cases that benefit from secure group communication are provided in Appendix B.

In a 1-to-N communication model, only a single client transmits data to the CoAP group, in the form of request messages; in an M-to-N communication model (where M and N do not necessarily have the same value), M clients transmit data to the CoAP group. According to [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis], any possible proxy entity is supposed to know about the clients. Also, every client expects and is able to handle multiple response messages associated with a same request sent to the CoAP group.

* Group size: security solutions for group communication should be able to adequately support different and possibly large security groups. The group size is the current number of members in a security group. In the use cases mentioned in this document, the number of clients (normally the controlling devices) is expected to be much smaller than the number of servers (i.e., the controlled devices). A security solution for group communication that supports 1 to 50 clients would be able to properly cover the group sizes required for most use cases that are relevant for this document. The maximum group size is expected to be in the range of 2 to 100 devices. Security groups larger than that should be divided into smaller independent groups. One should not assume that the set of members of a security group remains fixed. That is, the group membership is subject to changes, possibly on a frequent basis.
* Communication with the Group Manager: an endpoint must use a secure dedicated channel when communicating with the Group Manager, also when not registered as a member of the security group.

* Provisioning and management of Security Contexts: a Security Context must be established among the members of the security group. A secure mechanism must be used to generate, revoke and (re-)distribute keying material, communication policies and security parameters in the security group. The actual provisioning and management of the Security Context is out of the scope of this document.

* Multicast data security ciphersuite: all members of a security group must use the same ciphersuite to provide authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of messages in the group. The ciphersuite is specified as part of the Security Context.

* Backward security: a new device joining the security group should not have access to any old Security Contexts used before its joining. This ensures that a new member of the security group is not able to decrypt confidential data sent before it has joined the security group. The adopted key management scheme should ensure that the Security Context is updated to ensure backward confidentiality. The actual mechanism to update the Security Context and renew the group keying material in the security group upon a new member’s joining has to be defined as part of the group key management scheme.

* Forward security: entities that leave the security group should not have access to any future Security Contexts or message exchanged within the security group after their leaving. This ensures that a former member of the security group is not able to decrypt confidential data sent within the security group anymore. Also, it ensures that a former member is not able to send protected messages to the security group anymore. The actual mechanism to update the Security Context and renew the group keying material in the security group upon a member’s leaving has to be defined as part of the group key management scheme.

A.2. Security Objectives

The approach described in this document aims at fulfilling the following security objectives:

* Data replay protection: group request messages or response messages replayed within the security group must be detected.
* Data confidentiality: messages sent within the security group shall be encrypted.

* Group-level data confidentiality: the group mode provides group-level data confidentiality since messages are encrypted at a group level, i.e., in such a way that they can be decrypted by any member of the security group, but not by an external adversary or other external entities.

* Pairwise data confidentiality: the pairwise mode especially provides pairwise data confidentiality, since messages are encrypted using pairwise keying material shared between any two group members, hence they can be decrypted only by the intended single recipient.

* Source message authentication: messages sent within the security group shall be authenticated. That is, it is essential to ensure that a message is originated by a member of the security group in the first place, and in particular by a specific, identifiable member of the security group.

* Message integrity: messages sent within the security group shall be integrity protected. That is, it is essential to ensure that a message has not been tampered with, either by a group member, or by an external adversary or other external entities which are not members of the security group.

* Message ordering: it must be possible to determine the ordering of messages coming from a single sender. In accordance with OSCORE [RFC8613], this results in providing absolute freshness of responses that are not notifications, as well as relative freshness of group requests and notification responses. It is not required to determine ordering of messages from different senders.

**Appendix B. List of Use Cases**

Group Communication for CoAP [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis] provides the necessary background for multicast-based CoAP communication, with particular reference to low-power and lossy networks (LLNs) and resource constrained environments. The interested reader is encouraged to first read [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis] to understand the non-security related details. This section discusses a number of use cases that benefit from secure group communication, and refers to the three types of groups from Appendix A. Specific security requirements for these use cases are discussed in Appendix A.
* Lighting control: consider a building equipped with IP-connected lighting devices, switches, and border routers. The lighting devices acting as servers are organized into application groups and CoAP groups, according to their physical location in the building. For instance, lighting devices in a room or corridor can be configured as members of a single application group and corresponding CoAP group. Those lighting devices together with the switches acting as clients in the same room or corridor can be configured as members of the corresponding security group. Switches are then used to control the lighting devices by sending on/off/dimming commands to all lighting devices in the CoAP group, while border routers connected to an IP network backbone (which is also multicast-enabled) can be used to interconnect routers in the building. Consequently, this would also enable logical groups to be formed even if devices with a role in the lighting application may be physically in different subnets (e.g., on wired and wireless networks). Connectivity between lighting devices may be realized, for instance, by means of IPv6 and (border) routers supporting 6LoWPAN [RFC4944][RFC6282]. Group communication enables synchronous operation of a set of connected lights, ensuring that the light preset (e.g., dimming level or color) of a large set of luminaires are changed at the same perceived time. This is especially useful for providing a visual synchronicity of light effects to the user. As a practical guideline, events within a 200 ms interval are perceived as simultaneous by humans, which is necessary to ensure in many setups. Devices may reply back to the switches that issue on/off/dimming commands, in order to report about the execution of the requested operation (e.g., OK, failure, error) and their current operational status. In a typical lighting control scenario, a single switch is the only entity responsible for sending commands to a set of lighting devices. In more advanced lighting control use cases, a M-to-N communication topology would be required, for instance in case multiple sensors (presence or day-light) are responsible to trigger events to a set of lighting devices. Especially in professional lighting scenarios, the roles of client and server are configured by the lighting commissioner, and devices strictly follow those roles.

* Integrated building control: enabling Building Automation and Control Systems (BACSs) to control multiple heating, ventilation and air-conditioning units to predefined presets. Controlled units can be organized into application groups and CoAP groups in order to reflect their physical position in the building, e.g., devices in the same room can be configured as members of a single application group and corresponding CoAP group. As a practical guideline, events within intervals of seconds are typically acceptable. Controlled units are expected to possibly reply back
to the BACS issuing control commands, in order to report about the execution of the requested operation (e.g., OK, failure, error) and their current operational status.

* Software and firmware updates: software and firmware updates often comprise quite a large amount of data. This can overload a Low-power and Lossy Network (LLN) that is otherwise typically used to deal with only small amounts of data, on an infrequent base. Rather than sending software and firmware updates as unicast messages to each individual device, multicasting such updated data to a larger set of devices at once displays a number of benefits. For instance, it can significantly reduce the network load and decrease the overall time latency for propagating this data to all devices. Even if the complete whole update process itself is secured, securing the individual messages is important, in case updates consist of relatively large amounts of data. In fact, checking individual received data piecemeal for tampering avoids that devices store large amounts of partially corrupted data and that they detect tampering hereof only after all data has been received. Devices receiving software and firmware updates are expected to possibly reply back, in order to provide a feedback about the execution of the update operation (e.g., OK, failure, error) and their current operational status.

* Parameter and configuration update: by means of multicast communication, it is possible to update the settings of a set of similar devices, both simultaneously and efficiently. Possible parameters are related, for instance, to network load management or network access controls. Devices receiving parameter and configuration updates are expected to possibly reply back, to provide a feedback about the execution of the update operation (e.g., OK, failure, error) and their current operational status.

* Commissioning of Low-power and Lossy Network (LLN) systems: a commissioning device is responsible for querying all devices in the local network or a selected subset of them, in order to discover their presence, and be aware of their capabilities, default configuration, and operating conditions. Queried devices displaying similarities in their capabilities and features, or sharing a common physical location can be configured as members of a single application group and corresponding CoAP group. Queried devices are expected to reply back to the commissioning device, in order to notify their presence, and provide the requested information and their current operational status.

* Emergency multicast: a particular emergency related information (e.g., natural disaster) is generated and multicast by an emergency notifier, and relayed to multiple devices. The latter
may reply back to the emergency notifier, in order to provide their feedback and local information related to the ongoing emergency. This kind of setups should additionally rely on a fault-tolerant multicast algorithm, such as Multicast Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (MPL).

Appendix C. Example of Group Identifier Format

This section provides an example of how the Group Identifier (Gid) can be specifically formatted. That is, the Gid can be composed of two parts, namely a Group Prefix and a Group Epoch.

For each group, the Group Prefix is constant over time and is uniquely defined in the set of all the groups associated with the same Group Manager. The choice of the Group Prefix for a given group’s Security Context is application specific. The size of the Group Prefix directly impact on the maximum number of distinct groups under the same Group Manager.

The Group Epoch is set to 0 upon the group’s initialization, and is incremented by 1 each time new keying material, together with a new Gid, is distributed to the group in order to establish a new Security Context (see Section 3.2).

As an example, a 3-byte Gid can be composed of: i) a 1-byte Group Prefix ‘0xb1’ interpreted as a raw byte string; and ii) a 2-byte Group Epoch interpreted as an unsigned integer ranging from 0 to 65535. Then, after having established the Common Context 61532 times in the group, its Gid will assume value ‘0xb1f05c’.

Using an immutable Group Prefix for a group assumes that enough time elapses before all possible Group Epoch values are used, i.e., before the Group Manager terminates the group or starts reassigning Gid values to the group (see Section 3.2). Thus, the expected highest rate for addition/removal of group members and consequent group rekeying should be taken into account for a proper dimensioning of the Group Epoch size.

As discussed in Section 12.6, if endpoints are deployed in multiple groups managed by different non-synchronized Group Managers, it is possible that Group Identifiers of different groups coincide at some point in time. In this case, a recipient has to handle coinciding Group Identifiers, and has to try using different Security Contexts to process an incoming message, until the right one is found and the message is correctly verified. Therefore, it is favorable that Group Identifiers from different Group Managers have a size that result in a small probability of collision. How small this probability should be is up to system designers.
Appendix D. Set-up of New Endpoints

An endpoint joins a group by explicitly interacting with the responsible Group Manager. When becoming members of a group, endpoints are not required to know how many and what endpoints are in the same group.

Communications between a joining endpoint and the Group Manager rely on the CoAP protocol and must be secured. Specific details on how to secure communications between joining endpoints and a Group Manager are out of the scope of this document.

The Group Manager must verify that the joining endpoint is authorized to join the group. To this end, the Group Manager can directly authorize the joining endpoint, or expect it to provide authorization evidence previously obtained from a trusted entity. Further details about the authorization of joining endpoints are out of scope.

In case of successful authorization check, the Group Manager generates a Sender ID assigned to the joining endpoint, before proceeding with the rest of the join process. That is, the Group Manager provides the joining endpoint with the keying material and parameters to initialize the Security Context, including its own authentication credential (see Section 2). The actual provisioning of keying material and parameters to the joining endpoint is out of the scope of this document.

As mentioned in Section 3, the Group Manager and the join process can be as specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore].

Appendix E. Document Updates

RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION.

E.1. Version -13 to -14

* Replaced "node" with "endpoint" where appropriate.
* Replaced "owning" with "storing" (of keying material).
* Distinction between "authentication credential" and "public key".
* Considerations on storing whole authentication credentials.
* Considerations on Denial of Service.
* Recycling of Group IDs by tracking the "Birth Gid" of each group member is now optional to support and use for the Group Manager.
* Fine-grained suppression of error responses.

* Changed section title "Mandatory-to-Implement Compliance Requirements" to "Implementation Compliance".

* "Challenge-Response Synchronization" moved to the document body.

* RFC 7641 and draft-ietf-core-echo-request-tag as normative references.

* Clarifications and editorial improvements.

E.2. Version -12 to -13

* Fixes in the derivation of the Group Encryption Key.

* Added Mandatory-to-Implement compliance requirements.

* Changed UCCS to CCS.

E.3. Version -11 to -12

* No mode of operation is mandatory to support.

* Revised parameters of the Security Context, COSE object and external_aad.

* Revised management of keying material for the Group Manager.

* Informing of former members when rekeying the group.

* Admit encryption-only algorithms in group mode.

* Encrypted countersignature through a keystream.

* Added public key of the Group Manager as key material and protected data.

* Clarifications about message processing, especially notifications.

* Guidance for message processing of external signature checkers.

* Updated derivation of pairwise keys, with more security considerations.

* Termination of ongoing observations as client, upon leaving or before re-joining the group.
* Recycling Group IDs by tracking the "Birth Gid" of each group member.

* Expanded security and privacy considerations about the group mode.

* Removed appendices on skipping signature verification and on COSE capabilities.

* Fixes and editorial improvements.

E.4. Version -10 to -11

* Loss of Recipient Contexts due to their overflow.

* Added diagram on keying material components and their relation.

* Distinction between anti-replay and freshness.

* Preservation of Sender IDs over rekeying.

* Clearer cause-effect about reset of SSN.

* The GM provides public keys of group members with associated Sender IDs.

* Removed ‘par_countersign_key’ from the external_aad.

* One single format for the external_aad, both for encryption and signing.

* Presence of ‘kid’ in responses to requests protected with the pairwise mode.

* Inclusion of ‘kid_context’ in notifications following a group rekeying.

* Pairwise mode presented with OSCORE as baseline.

* Revised examples with signature values.

* Decoupled growth of clients’ Sender Sequence Numbers and loss of synchronization for server.

* Sender IDs not recycled in the group under the same Gid.

* Processing and description of the Group Flag bit in the OSCORE option.
* Usage of the pairwise mode for multicast requests.
* Clarifications on synchronization using the Echo option.
* General format of context parameters and external_aad elements, supporting future registered COSE algorithms (new Appendix).
* Fixes and editorial improvements.

E.5. Version -09 to -10

* Removed 'Counter Signature Key Parameters' from the Common Context.
* New parameters in the Common Context covering the DH secret derivation.
* New countersignature header parameter from draft-ietf-cose-countersign.
* Stronger policies non non-recycling of Sender IDs and Gid.
* The Sender Sequence Number is reset when establishing a new Security Context.
* Added 'request_kid_context' in the aad_array.
* The server can respond with 5.03 if the client’s public key is not available.
* The observer client stores an invariant identifier of the group.
* Relaxed storing of original 'kid' for observer clients.
* Both client and server store the 'kid_context' of the original observation request.
* The server uses a fresh PIV if protecting the response with a Security Context different from the one used to protect the request.
* Clarifications on MTI algorithms and curves.
* Removed optimized requests.
* Overall clarifications and editorial revision.
E.6. Version -08 to -09

* Pairwise keys are discarded after group rekeying.
* Signature mode renamed to group mode.
* The parameters for countersignatures use the updated COSE registries. Newly defined IANA registries have been removed.
* Pairwise Flag bit renamed as Group Flag bit, set to 1 in group mode and set to 0 in pairwise mode.
* Dedicated section on updating the Security Context.
* By default, sender sequence numbers and replay windows are not reset upon group rekeying.
* An endpoint implementing only a silent server does not support the pairwise mode.
* Separate section on general message reception.
* Pairwise mode moved to the document body.
* Considerations on using the pairwise mode in non-multicast settings.
* Optimized requests are moved as an appendix.
* Normative support for the signature and pairwise mode.
* Revised methods for synchronization with clients’ sender sequence number.
* Appendix with example values of parameters for countersignatures.
* Clarifications and editorial improvements.

E.7. Version -07 to -08

* Clarified relation between pairwise mode and group communication (Section 1).
* Improved definition of "silent server" (Section 1.1).
* Clarified when a Recipient Context is needed (Section 2).
* Signature checkers as entities supported by the Group Manager (Section 2.3).

* Clarified that the Group Manager is under exclusive control of Gid and Sender ID values in a group, with Sender ID values under each Gid value (Section 2.3).

* Mitigation policies in case of recycled 'kid' values (Section 2.4).

* More generic exhaustion (not necessarily wrap-around) of sender sequence numbers (Sections 2.5 and 10.11).

* Pairwise key considerations, as to group rekeying and Sender Sequence Numbers (Section 3).

* Added reference to static-static Diffie-Hellman shared secret (Section 3).

* Note for implementation about the external_aad for signing (Section 4.3.2).

* Retransmission by the application for group requests over multicast as Non-confirmable (Section 7).

* A server MUST use its own Partial IV in a response, if protecting it with a different context than the one used for the request (Section 7.3).

* Security considerations: encryption of pairwise mode as alternative to group-level security (Section 10.1).

* Security considerations: added approach to reduce the chance of global collisions of Gid values from different Group Managers (Section 10.5).

* Security considerations: added implications for block-wise transfers when using the signature mode for requests over unicast (Section 10.7).

* Security considerations: (multiple) supported signature algorithms (Section 10.13).

* Security considerations: added privacy considerations on the approach for reducing global collisions of Gid values (Section 10.15).
* Updates to the methods for synchronizing with clients’ sequence number (Appendix E).

* Simplified text on discovery services supporting the pairwise mode (Appendix G.1).

* Editorial improvements.

E.8. Version -06 to -07

* Updated abstract and introduction.

* Clarifications of what pertains a group rekeying.

* Derivation of pairwise keying material.

* Content re-organization for COSE Object and OSCORE header compression.

* Defined the Pairwise Flag bit for the OSCORE option.

* Supporting CoAP Observe for group requests and responses.

* Considerations on message protection across switching to new keying material.

* New optimized mode based on pairwise keying material.

* More considerations on replay protection and Security Contexts upon key renewal.

* Security considerations on Group OSCORE for unicast requests, also as affecting the usage of the Echo option.

* Clarification on different types of groups considered (application/security/CoAP).

* New pairwise mode, using pairwise keying material for both requests and responses.

E.9. Version -05 to -06

* Group IDs mandated to be unique under the same Group Manager.

* Clarifications on parameter update upon group rekeying.

* Updated external_aad structures.
* Dynamic derivation of Recipient Contexts made optional and application specific.

* Optional 4.00 response for failed signature verification on the server.

* Removed client handling of duplicated responses to multicast requests.

* Additional considerations on public key retrieval and group rekeying.

* Added Group Manager responsibility on validating public keys.

* Updates IANA registries.

* Reference to RFC 8613.

* Editorial improvements.

E.10. Version -04 to -05

* Added references to draft-dijk-core-groupcomm-bis.

* New parameter Counter Signature Key Parameters (Section 2).

* Clarification about Recipient Contexts (Section 2).

* Two different external_aad for encrypting and signing (Section 3.1).

* Updated response verification to handle Observe notifications (Section 6.4).

* Extended Security Considerations (Section 8).

* New "Counter Signature Key Parameters" IANA Registry (Section 9.2).

E.11. Version -03 to -04

* Added the new "Counter Signature Parameters" in the Common Context (see Section 2).

* Added recommendation on using "deterministic ECDSA" if ECDSA is used as countersignature algorithm (see Section 2).
* Clarified possible asynchronous retrieval of keying material from the Group Manager, in order to process incoming messages (see Section 2).

* Structured Section 3 into subsections.

* Added the new 'par_countersign' to the aad_array of the external_aad (see Section 3.1).

* Clarified non reliability of 'kid' as identity identifier for a group member (see Section 2.1).

* Described possible provisioning of new Sender ID in case of Partial IV wrap-around (see Section 2.2).

* The former signature bit in the Flag Byte of the OSCORE option value is reverted to reserved (see Section 4.1).

* Updated examples of compressed COSE object, now with the sixth less significant bit in the Flag Byte of the OSCORE option value set to 0 (see Section 4.3).

* Relaxed statements on sending error messages (see Section 6).

* Added explicit step on computing the countersignature for outgoing messages (see Sections 6.1 and 6.3).

* Handling of just created Recipient Contexts in case of unsuccessful message verification (see Sections 6.2 and 6.4).

* Handling of replied/repeated responses on the client (see Section 6.4).

* New IANA Registry "Counter Signature Parameters" (see Section 9.1).

E.12. Version -02 to -03

* Revised structure and phrasing for improved readability and better alignment with draft-ietf-core-object-security.

* Added discussion on wrap-Around of Partial IVs (see Section 2.2).

* Separate sections for the COSE Object (Section 3) and the OSCORE Header Compression (Section 4).
* The countersignature is now appended to the encrypted payload of the OSCORE message, rather than included in the OSCORE Option (see Section 4).

* Extended scope of Section 5, now titled "Message Binding, Sequence Numbers, Freshness and Replay Protection".

* Clarifications about Non-confirmable messages in Section 5.1 "Synchronization of Sender Sequence Numbers".

* Clarifications about error handling in Section 6 "Message Processing".

* Compacted list of responsibilities of the Group Manager in Section 7.

* Revised and extended security considerations in Section 8.

* Added IANA considerations for the OSCORE Flag Bits Registry in Section 9.

* Revised Appendix D, now giving a short high-level description of a new endpoint set-up.

E.13. Version -01 to -02

* Terminology has been made more aligned with RFC7252 and draft-ietf-core-object-security: i) "client" and "server" replace the old "multicaster" and "listener", respectively; ii) "silent server" replaces the old "pure listener".

* Section 2 has been updated to have the Group Identifier stored in the 'ID Context' parameter defined in draft-ietf-core-object-security.

* Section 3 has been updated with the new format of the Additional Authenticated Data.

* Major rewriting of Section 4 to better highlight the differences with the message processing in draft-ietf-core-object-security.

* Added Sections 7.2 and 7.3 discussing security considerations about uniqueness of (key, nonce) and collision of group identifiers, respectively.

* Minor updates to Appendix A.1 about assumptions on multicast communication topology and group size.
* Updated Appendix C on format of group identifiers, with practical implications of possible collisions of group identifiers.

* Updated Appendix D.2, adding a pointer to draft-palombini-ace-key-groupcomm about retrieval of nodes’ public keys through the Group Manager.

* Minor updates to Appendix E.3 about Challenge-Response synchronization of sequence numbers based on the Echo option from draft-ietf-core-echo-request-tag.

E.14. Version -00 to -01

* Section 1.1 has been updated with the definition of group as "security group".

* Section 2 has been updated with:
  - Clarifications on establishment/derivation of Security Contexts.
  - A table summarizing the additional context elements compared to OSCORE.

* Section 3 has been updated with:
  - Examples of request and response messages.
  - Use of CounterSignature0 rather than CounterSignature.
  - Additional Authenticated Data including also the signature algorithm, while not including the Group Identifier any longer.

* Added Section 6, listing the responsibilities of the Group Manager.

* Added Appendix A (former section), including assumptions and security objectives.

* Appendix B has been updated with more details on the use cases.

* Added Appendix C, providing an example of Group Identifier format.

* Appendix D has been updated to be aligned with draft-palombini-ace-key-groupcomm.
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Abstract

Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) uses AEAD algorithms to ensure confidentiality and integrity of exchanged messages. Due to known issues allowing forgery attacks against AEAD algorithms, limits should be followed on the number of times a specific key is used for encryption or decryption. This document defines how two OSCORE peers must follow these limits and what steps they must take to preserve the security of their communications. Therefore, this document updates RFC8613. Furthermore, this document specifies Key Update for OSCORE (KUDOS), a lightweight procedure that two peers can use to update their keying material and establish a new OSCORE Security Context.

Discussion Venues

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Discussion of this document takes place on the Constrained RESTful Environments Working Group mailing list (core@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/core/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/core-wg/oscore-key-update.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction .................................................. 3
  1.1. Terminology ................................................ 4
2. AEAD Key Usage Limits in OSCORE ............................. 4
  2.1. Problem Overview .......................................... 4
      2.1.1. Limits for 'q' and 'v' ............................... 5
  2.2. Additional Information in the Security Context ...... 6
      2.2.1. Common Context ..................................... 6
      2.2.2. Sender Context ...................................... 7
      2.2.3. Recipient Context ................................... 7
  2.3. OSCORE Messages Processing .............................. 8
      2.3.1. Protecting a Request or a Response ............... 8
      2.3.2. Verifying a Request or a Response .................. 8
3. Current methods for Rekeying OSCORE ....................... 8
4. Key Update for OSCORE (KUDOS) ............................... 11
  4.1. Extensions to the OSCORE Option ....................... 11
  4.2. Function for Security Context Update .................. 12
  4.3. Establishment of the New OSCORE Security Context ... 14
      4.3.1. Client-Initiated Key Update ....................... 16
      4.3.2. Server-Initiated Key Update ....................... 18
  4.4. Retention Policies ...................................... 22
  4.5. Discussion ............................................... 22
5. Security Considerations ..................................... 23
6. IANA Considerations ......................................... 23
  6.1. CoAP Option Numbers Registry ............................ 23
  6.2. OSCORE Flag Bits Registry .............................. 23
1. Introduction

Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) [RFC8613] provides end-to-end protection of CoAP [RFC7252] messages at the application-layer, ensuring message confidentiality and integrity, replay protection, as well as binding of response to request between a sender and a recipient.

In particular, OSCORE uses AEAD algorithms to provide confidentiality and integrity of messages exchanged between two peers. Due to known issues allowing forgery attacks against AEAD algorithms, limits should be followed on the number of times a specific key is used to perform encryption or decryption [I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits].

Should these limits be exceeded, an adversary may break the security properties of the AEAD algorithm, such as message confidentiality and integrity, e.g. by performing a message forgery attack. The original OSCORE specification [RFC8613] does not consider such limits.

This document updates [RFC8613] as follows.
It defines when a peer must stop using an OSCORE Security Context shared with another peer, due to the reached key usage limits. When this happens, the two peers have to establish a new Security Context with new keying material, in order to continue their secure communication with OSCORE.

It specifies KUDOS, a lightweight key update procedure that the two peers can use in order to update their current keying material and establish a new OSCORE Security Context. This deprecates and replaces the procedure specified in Appendix B.2 of [RFC8613].

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts related to the CoAP [RFC7252] and OSCORE [RFC8613] protocols.

2. AEAD Key Usage Limits in OSCORE

The following sections details how key usage limits for AEAD algorithms must be considered when using OSCORE. It covers specific limits for common AEAD algorithms used with OSCORE; necessary additions to the OSCORE Security Context, updates to the OSCORE message processing, and existing methods for rekeying OSCORE.

2.1. Problem Overview

The OSCORE security protocol [RFC8613] uses AEAD algorithms to provide integrity and confidentiality of messages, as exchanged between two peers sharing an OSCORE Security Context.

When processing messages with OSCORE, each peer should follow specific limits as to the number of times it uses a specific key. This applies separately to the Sender Key used to encrypt outgoing messages, and to the Recipient Key used to decrypt and verify incoming protected messages.

Exceeding these limits may allow an adversary to break the security properties of the AEAD algorithm, such as message confidentiality and integrity, e.g. by performing a message forgery attack.

The following refers to the two parameters ‘q’ and ‘v’ introduced in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits], to use when deploying an AEAD algorithm.
* 'q': this parameter has as value the number of messages protected with a specific key, i.e. the number of times the AEAD algorithm has been invoked to encrypt data with that key.

* 'v': this parameter has as value the number of alleged forgery attempts that have been made against a specific key, i.e. the amount of failed decryptions that has been done with the AEAD algorithm for that key.

When a peer uses OSCORE:

* The key used to protect outgoing messages is its Sender Key, in its Sender Context.

* The key used to decrypt and verify incoming messages is its Recipient Key, in its Recipient Context.

Both keys are derived as part of the establishment of the OSCORE Security Context, as defined in Section 3.2 of [RFC8613].

As mentioned above, exceeding specific limits for the 'q' or 'v' value can weaken the security properties of the AEAD algorithm used, thus compromising secure communication requirements.

Therefore, in order to preserve the security of the used AEAD algorithm, OSCORE has to observe limits for the 'q' and 'v' values, throughout the lifetime of the used AEAD keys.

2.1.1. Limits for 'q' and 'v'

Formulas for calculating the security levels as Integrity Advantage (IA) and Confidentiality Advantage (CA) probabilities, are presented in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits]. These formulas take as input specific values for 'q' and 'v' (see section Section 2.1) and for 'l', i.e., the maximum length of each message (in cipher blocks).

For the algorithms that can be used as AEAD Algorithm for OSCORE shows in Figure 1, the key property to achieve is having IA and CA values which are no larger than $p = 2^{-64}$, which will ensure a safe security level for the AEAD Algorithm. This can be entailed by using the values $q = 2^{20}$, $v = 2^{20}$, and $l = 2^{10}$, that this document recommends to use for these algorithms.

Figure 1 shows the resulting IA and CA probabilities enjoyed by the considered algorithms, when taking the value of 'q', 'v' and 'l' above as input to the formulas defined in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits].
### Algorithm name | IA probability | CA probability
---|---|---
AEAD_AES_128_CCM | $2^{-64}$ | $2^{-66}$
AEAD_AES_128_GCM | $2^{-97}$ | $2^{-89}$
AEAD_AES_256_GCM | $2^{-97}$ | $2^{-89}$
AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 | $2^{-73}$ | -

| Algorithm name | l=2^6 in bytes | l=2^8 in bytes | l=2^10 in bytes |
---|---|---|---|
AEAD_AES_128_CCM | 1024 | 4096 | 16384 |
AEAD_AES_128_GCM | 1024 | 4096 | 16384 |
AEAD_AES_256_GCM | 1024 | 4096 | 16384 |
AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 | 1024 | 4096 | 16384 |
AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 | 4096 | 16384 | 65536 |

Figure 1: Probabilities for algorithms based on chosen q, v and l values.

When AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 is used as AEAD Algorithm for OSCORE, the triplet (q, v, l) considered above yields larger values of IA and CA. Hence, specifically for AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8, this document recommends using the triplet (q, v, l) = (2^{20}, 2^{14}, 2^8). This is appropriate since the resulting CA and IA values are not greater than the threshold value of $2^{-50}$ defined in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits], and thus yields an acceptable security level. Achieving smaller values of CA and IA would require to inconveniently reduce ‘q’, ‘v’ or ‘l’, with no corresponding increase in terms of security. This is further elaborated in Appendix A.

Figure 2: Maximum length of each message (in bytes)

### 2.2. Additional Information in the Security Context

In addition to what defined in Section 3.1 of [RFC8613], the OSCORE Security Context MUST also include the following information.

#### 2.2.1. Common Context

The Common Context is extended to include the following parameter.

* ‘exp’: with value the expiration time of the OSCORE Security Context, as a non-negative integer. The parameter contains a numeric value representing the number of seconds from
1970-01-01T00:00:00Z UTC until the specified UTC date/time, ignoring leap seconds, analogous to what specified for NumericDate in Section 2 of [RFC7519].

At the time indicated in this field, a peer MUST stop using this Security Context to process any incoming or outgoing message, and is required to establish a new Security Context to continue OSCORE-protected communications with the other peer.

2.2.2. Sender Context

The Sender Context is extended to include the following parameters.

* 'count_q': a non-negative integer counter, keeping track of the current 'q' value for the Sender Key. At any time, 'count_q' has as value the number of messages that have been encrypted using the Sender Key. The value of 'count_q' is set to 0 when establishing the Sender Context.

* 'limit_q': a non-negative integer, which specifies the highest value that 'count_q' is allowed to reach, before stopping using the Sender Key to process outgoing messages.

The value of 'limit_q' depends on the AEAD algorithm specified in the Common Context, considering the properties of that algorithm. The value of 'limit_q' is determined according to Section 2.1.1.

Note for implementation: it is possible to avoid storing and maintaining the counter 'count_q'. Rather, an estimated value to be compared against 'limit_q' can be computed, by leveraging the Sender Sequence Number of the peer and (an estimate of) the other peer’s. A possible method to achieve this is described in Appendix B. While this relieves peers from storing and maintaining the precise 'count_q' value, it results in overestimating the number of encryptions performed with a Sender Key. This in turn results in approaching 'limit_q' sooner and performing a key update procedure more frequently.

2.2.3. Recipient Context

The Recipient Context is extended to include the following parameters.

* 'count_v': a non-negative integer counter, keeping track of the current 'v' value for the Recipient Key. At any time, 'count_v' has as value the number of failed decryptions occurred on incoming messages using the Recipient Key. The value of 'count_v' is set to 0 when establishing the Recipient Context.
* 'limit_v': a non-negative integer, which specifies the highest value that 'count_v' is allowed to reach, before stopping using the Recipient Key to process incoming messages.

The value of 'limit_v' depends on the AEAD algorithm specified in the Common Context, considering the properties of that algorithm. The value of 'limit_v' is determined according to Section 2.1.1.

2.3. OSCORE Messages Processing

In order to keep track of the 'q' and 'v' values and ensure that AEAD keys are not used beyond reaching their limits, the processing of OSCORE messages is extended as defined in this section. A limitation that is introduced is that, in order not to exceed the selected value for 'l', the total size of the COSE plaintext, authentication Tag, and possible cipher padding for a message may not exceed the block size for the selected algorithm multiplied with 'l'.

In particular, the processing of OSCORE messages follows the steps outlined in Section 8 of [RFC8613], with the additions defined below.

2.3.1. Protecting a Request or a Response

Before encrypting the COSE object using the Sender Key, the 'count_q' counter MUST be incremented.

If 'count_q' exceeds the 'limit_q' limit, the message processing MUST be aborted. From then on, the Sender Key MUST NOT be used to encrypt further messages.

2.3.2. Verifying a Request or a Response

If an incoming message is detected to be a replay (see Section 7.4 of [RFC8613]), the 'count_v' counter MUST NOT be incremented.

If the decryption and verification of the COSE object using the Recipient Key fails, the 'count_v' counter MUST be incremented.

After 'count_v' has exceeded the 'limit_v' limit, incoming messages MUST NOT be decrypted and verified using the Recipient Key, and their processing MUST be aborted.

3. Current methods for Rekeying OSCORE

Before the limit of 'q' or 'v' defined in Section 2.1.1 has been reached for an OSCORE Security Context, the two peers have to establish a new OSCORE Security Context, in order to continue using OSCORE for secure communication.
In practice, the two peers have to establish new Sender and Recipient Keys, as the keys actually used by the AEAD algorithm. When this happens, both peers reset their 'count_q' and 'count_v' values to 0 (see Section 2.2).

Other specifications define a number of ways to accomplish this, as summarized below.

* The two peers can run the procedure defined in Appendix B.2 of [RFC8613]. That is, the two peers exchange three or four messages, protected with temporary Security Contexts adding randomness to the ID Context.

As a result, the two peers establish a new OSCORE Security Context with new ID Context, Sender Key and Recipient Key, while keeping the same OSCORE Master Secret and OSCORE Master Salt from the old OSCORE Security Context.

This procedure does not require any additional components to what OSCORE already provides, and it does not provide forward secrecy.

The procedure defined in Appendix B.2 of [RFC8613] is used in 6TiSCH networks [RFC7554][RFC8180] when handling failure events. That is, a node acting as Join Registrar/Coordinator (JRC) assists new devices, namely "pledges", to securely join the network as per the Constrained Join Protocol [RFC9031]. In particular, a pledge exchanges OSCORE-protected messages with the JRC, from which it obtains a short identifier, link-layer keying material and other configuration parameters. As per Section 8.3.3 of [RFC9031], a JRC that experiences a failure event may likely lose information about joined nodes, including their assigned identifiers. Then, the reinitialized JRC can establish a new OSCORE Security Context with each pledge, through the procedure defined in Appendix B.2 of [RFC8613].

* The two peers can run the OSCORE profile [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile] of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) Framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

When a CoAP client uploads an Access Token to a CoAP server as an access credential, the two peers also exchange two nonces. Then, the two peers use the two nonces together with information provided by the ACE Authorization Server that issued the Access Token, in order to derive an OSCORE Security Context.

This procedure does not provide forward secrecy.
The two peers can run the EDHOC key exchange protocol based on Diffie-Hellman and defined in [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc], in order to establish a pseudo-random key in a mutually authenticated way.

Then, the two peers can use the established pseudo-random key to derive external application keys. This allows the two peers to securely derive especially an OSCORE Master Secret and an OSCORE Master Salt, from which an OSCORE Security Context can be established.

This procedure additionally provides forward secrecy.

If one peer is acting as LwM2M Client and the other peer as LwM2M Server, according to the OMA Lightweight Machine to Machine Core specification [LwM2M], then the LwM2M Client peer may take the initiative to bootstrap again with the LwM2M Bootstrap Server, and receive again an OSCORE Security Context. Alternatively, the LwM2M Server can instruct the LwM2M Client to initiate this procedure.

If the OSCORE Security Context information on the LwM2M Bootstrap Server has been updated, the LwM2M Client will thus receive a fresh OSCORE Security Context to use with the LwM2M Server.

In addition to that, the LwM2M Client, the LwM2M Server as well as the LwM2M Bootstrap server are required to use the procedure defined in Appendix B.2 of [RFC8613] and overviewed above, when they use a certain OSCORE Security Context for the first time [LwM2M-Transport].

Manually updating the OSCORE Security Context at the two peers should be a last resort option, and it might often be not practical or feasible.

Even when any of the alternatives mentioned above is available, it is RECOMMENDED that two OSCORE peers update their Security Context by using the KUDOS procedure as defined in Section 4 of this document.

It is RECOMMENDED that the peer initiating the key update procedure starts it before reaching the 'q' or 'v' limits. Otherwise, the AEAD keys possibly to be used during the key update procedure itself may already be or become invalid before the rekeying is completed, which may prevent a successful establishment of the new OSCORE Security Context altogether.
4. Key Update for OSCORE (KUDOS)

This section defines KUDOS, a lightweight procedure that two OSCORE peers can use to update their keying material and establish a new OSCORE Security Context.

KUDOS relies on the support function updateCtx() defined in Section 4.2 and the message exchange defined in Section 4.3. The following properties are fulfilled.

* KUDOS can be initiated by either peer. In particular, the client or the server may start KUDOS by sending the first rekeying message.

* The new OSCORE Security Context enjoys forward secrecy.

* The same ID Context value used in the old OSCORE Security Context is preserved in the new Security Context. Furthermore, the ID Context value never changes throughout the KUDOS execution.

* KUDOS is robust against a peer rebooting, and it especially avoids the reuse of AEAD (nonce, key) pairs.

* KUDOS completes in one round trip. The two peers achieve mutual proof-of-possession in the following exchange, which is protected with the newly established OSCORE Security Context.

4.1. Extensions to the OSCORE Option

In order to support the message exchange for establishing a new OSCORE Security Context as defined in Section 4.3, this document extends the use of the OSCORE option originally defined in [RFC8613] as follows.

* This document defines the usage of the seventh least significant bit, called "Extension-1 Flag", in the first byte of the OSCORE option containing the OSCORE flag bits. This flag bit is specified in Section 6.2.

When the Extension-1 Flag is set to 1, the second byte of the OSCORE option MUST include the set of OSCORE flag bits 8-15.

* This document defines the usage of the first least significant bit "ID Detail Flag", 'd', in the second byte of the OSCORE option containing the OSCORE flag bits. This flag bit is specified in Section 6.2.
When it is set to 1, the compressed COSE object contains an 'id detail', to be used for the steps defined in Section 4.3. In particular, the 1 byte following 'kid context' (if any) encodes the length x of 'id detail', and the following x bytes encode 'id detail'.

Hereafter, this document refers to a message where the 'd' flag is set to 0 as "non KUDOS (request/response) message", and to a message where the 'd' flag is set to 1 as "KUDOS (request/response) message".

* The second-to-eighth least significant bits in the second byte of the OSCORE option containing the OSCORE flag bits are reserved for future use. These bits SHALL be set to zero when not in use. According to this specification, if any of these bits are set to 1, the message is considered to be malformed and decompression fails as specified in item 2 of Section 8.2 of [RFC8613].

Figure 3 shows the OSCORE option value including also 'id detail'.

```
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 <----- n bytes ------>
|0|1|0|h|k|  n  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | d | Partial IV (if any) |
+-----------------------------+----------------------------------------+
<- 1 byte -> <----- s bytes -------> <- 1 byte -> <----- x bytes ----->
+-----------------------------+----------------------------------------+
|  s (if any) | kid context (if any) |  x (if any) | id detail (if any) |
+-----------------------------+----------------------------------------+

| kid (if any) ... |
+-----------------------------+
```

Figure 3: The OSCORE option value, including 'id detail'

4.2. Function for Security Context Update

The updateCtx() function shown in Figure 4 takes as input a nonce N as well as an OSCORE Security Context CTX_IN, and returns as output a new OSCORE Security Context CTX_OUT.

As a first step, the updateCtx() function derives the new values of the Master Secret and Master Salt for CTX_OUT, according to one of the two following methods. The used method depends on how the two peers established their original Security Context, i.e., the Security Context that they shared before performing KUDOS with one another for the first time.
* If the original Security Context was established by running the EDHOC protocol [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc], the following applies.

First, the EDHOC key PRK_4x3m shared by the two peers is updated using the EDHOC-KeyUpdate() function defined in Section 4.4 of [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc], which takes the nonce N as input.

After that, the EDHOC-Exporter() function defined in Section 4.3 of [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc] is used to derive the new values for the Master Secret and Master Salt, consistently with what is defined in Appendix A.2 of [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc]. In particular, the context parameter provided as second argument to the EDHOC-Exporter() function is the empty CBOR byte string (0x40) [RFC8949], which is denoted as h’’.

Note that, compared to the compliance requirements in Section 7 of [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc], a peer MUST support the EDHOC-KeyUpdate() function, in case it establishes an original Security Context through the EDHOC protocol and intends to perform KUDOS.

* If the original Security Context was established through other means than the EDHOC protocol, the new Master Secret is derived through an HKDF-Expand() step, which takes as input N as well as the Master Secret value from the Security Context CTX_IN. Instead, the new Master Salt takes N as value.

In either case, the derivation of new values follows the same approach used in TLS 1.3, which is also based on HKDF-Expand (see Section 7.1 of [RFC8446]) and used for computing new keying material in case of key update (see Section 4.6.3 of [RFC8446]).

After that, the new Master Secret and Master Salt parameters are used to derive a new Security Context CTX_OUT as per Section 3.2 of [RFC8613]. Any other parameter required for the derivation takes the same value as in the Security Context CTX_IN. Finally, the function returns the newly derived Security Context CTX_OUT.

```plaintext
updateCtx(N, CTX_IN) { 

CTX_OUT       // The new Security Context
MSECRET_NEW   // The new Master Secret
MSALT_NEW     // The new Master Salt

if <the original Security Context was established through EDHOC> { 

EDHOC-KeyUpdate(N)
// This results in updating the key PRK_4x3m of the
// EDHOC session, i.e., PRK_4x3m = Extract(N, PRK_4x3m)

```
MSECRET_NEW = EDHOC-Exporter("OSCORE_Master_Secret", h'', key_length)
    = EDHOC-KDF(PRK_4x3m, TH_4, "OSCORE_Master_Secret", h'', key_length)

MSALT_NEW = EDHOC-Exporter("OSCORE_Master_Salt", h'', salt_length)
    = EDHOC-KDF(PRK_4x3m, TH_4, "OSCORE_MASTER_Salt", h'', salt_length)
}
else {
    Master Secret Length = < Size of CTX_IN.MasterSecret in bytes >

    MSECRET_NEW = HKDF-Expand-Label(CTX_IN.MasterSecret, Label, N, Master Secret Length)
    = HKDF-Expand(CTX_IN.MasterSecret, HkdfLabel, Master Secret Length)

    MSALT_NEW = N;
}

< Derive CTX_OUT using MSECRET_NEW and MSALT_NEW, together with other parameters from CTX_IN >

Return CTX_OUT;

Where HkdfLabel is defined as

struct {
    uint16 length = Length;
    opaque label<7..255> = "oscore " + Label;
    opaque context<0..255> = Context;
} HkdfLabel;

Figure 4: Function for deriving a new OSCORE Security Context

4.3. Establishment of the New OSCORE Security Context

This section defines the actual KUDOS procedure performed by two peers to update their OSCORE keying material. Before starting KUDOS, the two peers share the OSCORE Security Context CTX_OLD. Once completed the KUDOS execution, the two peers agree on a newly established OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW.
In particular, each peer contributes by generating a fresh value R1 or R2, and providing it to the other peer. The byte string concatenation of the two values, hereafter denoted as R1 | R2, is used as input N by the updateCtx() function, in order to derive the new OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW. As for any new OSCORE Security Context, the Sender Sequence Number and the replay window are re-initialized accordingly (see Section 3.2.2 of [RFC8613]).

Once a peer has successfully derived the new OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW, that peer MUST use CTX_NEW to protect outgoing non KUDOS messages.

Also, that peer MUST terminate all the ongoing observations [RFC7641] that it has with the other peer as protected with the old Security Context CTX_OLD, unless the two peers have explicitly agreed otherwise as defined in Appendix C.

Once a peer has successfully decrypted and verified an incoming message protected with CTX_NEW, that peer MUST discard the old Security Context CTX_OLD.

KUDOS can be started by the client or the server, as defined in Section 4.3.1 and Section 4.3.2, respectively. The following properties hold for both the client- and server-initiated version of KUDOS:

* The initiator always offers the fresh value R1.
* The responder always offers the fresh value R2.
* The responder is always the first one deriving the new OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW.
* The initiator is always the first one achieving key confirmation, hence able to safely discard the old OSCORE Security Context CTX_OLD.
* Both the initiator and the responder use the same respective OSCORE Sender ID and Recipient ID. Also, they both preserve and use the same OSCORE ID Context from CTX_OLD.

The length of the nonces R1 and R2 is application specific. The application needs to set the length of each nonce such that the probability of its value being repeated is negligible. To this end, each nonce is typically at least 8 bytes long.
Once a peer acting as initiator (responder) has sent (received) the first KUDOS message, that peer MUST NOT send a non KUDOS message to the other peer, until having completed the key update process on its side. The initiator completes the key update process when receiving the second KUDOS message and successfully verifying it with the new OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW. The responder completes the key update process when sending the second KUDOS message, as protected with the new OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW.

### 4.3.1. Client-Initiated Key Update

Figure 5 shows the KUDOS workflow with the client acting as initiator.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client (initiator)</th>
<th>Server (responder)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generate R1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTX_1 =</td>
<td>Request #1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>updateCtx(R1,</td>
<td>OSCORE Option:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTX_OLD)</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect with CTX_1</td>
<td>d flag: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ID Detail: R1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Verify with CTX_1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Generate R2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTX_NEW =</td>
<td>CTX_NEW =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>updateCtx(R1</td>
<td>R2,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTX_OLD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Höglund & Tiloca Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 16]
// The actual key update process ends here.
// The two peers can use the new Security Context CTX_NEW.

Request #2
------------------>
Protect with CTX_NEW

Verify with CTX_NEW
Discard CTX_OLD

Response #2

Verify with CTX_NEW

Protect with CTX_NEW

// The actual key update process ends here.
// The two peers can use the new Security Context CTX_NEW.

First, the client generates a random value R1, and uses the nonce N = R1 together with the old Security Context CTX_OLD, in order to derive a temporary Security Context CTX_1. Then, the client sends an OSCORE request to the server, protected with the Security Context CTX_1. In particular, the request has the 'd' flag bit set to 1 and specifies R1 as 'id detail' (see Section 4.1).

Upon receiving the OSCORE request, the server retrieves the value R1 from the 'id detail' of the request, and uses the nonce N = R1 together with the old Security Context CTX_OLD, in order to derive the temporary Security Context CTX_1. Then, the server verifies the request by using the Security Context CTX_1.

After that, the server generates a random value R2, and uses the nonce N = R1 | R2 together with the old Security Context CTX_OLD, in order to derive the new Security Context CTX_NEW. Then, the server sends an OSCORE response to the client, protected with the new Security Context CTX_NEW. In particular, the response has the 'd' flag bit set to 1 and specifies R2 as 'id detail'.

Upon receiving the OSCORE response, the client retrieves the value R2 from the 'id detail' of the response. Since the client has received a response to an OSCORE request it made with the 'd' flag bit set to 1, the client uses the nonce N = R1 | R2 together with the old Security Context CTX_OLD, in order to derive the new Security Context CTX_NEW. Finally, the client verifies the response by using the Security Context CTX_NEW and deletes the old Security Context CTX_OLD.
After that, the client can send a new OSCORE request protected with the new Security Context CTX_NEW. When successfully verifying the request using the Security Context CTX_NEW, the server deletes the old Security Context CTX_OLD and can reply with an OSCORE response protected with the new Security Context CTX_NEW.

From then on, the two peers can protect their message exchanges by using the new Security Context CTX_NEW.

Note that the server achieves key confirmation only when receiving a message from the client as protected with the new Security Context CTX_NEW. If the server sends a non KUDOS request to the client protected with CTX_NEW before then, and the server receives a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error response as reply, the server SHOULD delete the new Security Context CTX_NEW and start a new client-initiated key update process, by taking the role of initiator as per Figure 5.

Also note that, if both peers reboot simultaneously, they will run the client-initiated version of KUDOS defined in this section. That is, one of the two peers implementing a CoAP client will send KUDOS Request #1 in Figure 5.

### 4.3.1.1. Avoiding In-Transit Requests During a Key Update

Before sending the KUDOS message Request #1 in Figure 5, the client MUST ensure that it has no outstanding interactions with the server (see Section 4.7 of [RFC7252]), with the exception of ongoing observations [RFC7641] with that server.

If there are any, the client MUST NOT initiate the KUDOS execution, before either: i) having all those outstanding interactions cleared; or ii) freeing up the Token values used with those outstanding interactions, with the exception of ongoing observations with the server.

Later on, this prevents a non KUDOS response protected with the new Security Context CTX_NEW to cryptographically match with both the corresponding request also protected with CTX_NEW and with an older request protected with CTX_OLD, in case the two requests were protected using the same OSCORE Partial IV.

### 4.3.2. Server-Initiated Key Update

Figure 6 shows the KUDOS workflow with the server acting as initiator.
The actual key update process ends here. The two peers can use the new Security Context CTX_NEW.
First, the client sends a normal OSCORE request to the server, protected with the old Security Context CTX_OLD and with the ‘d’ flag bit set to 0.

Upon receiving the OSCORE request and after having verified it with the old Security Context CTX_OLD as usual, the server generates a random value R1 and uses the nonce N = R1 together with the old Security Context CTX_OLD, in order to derive a temporary Security Context CTX_1. Then, the server sends an OSCORE response to the client, protected with the Security Context CTX_1. In particular, the response has the ‘d’ flag bit set to 1 and specifies R1 as ‘id detail’ (see Section 4.1).

Upon receiving the OSCORE response, the client retrieves the value R1 from the ‘id detail’ of the response, and uses the nonce N = R1 together with the old Security Context CTX_OLD, in order to derive the temporary Security Context CTX_1. Then, the client verifies the response by using the Security Context CTX_1.

After that, the client generates a random value R2, and uses the nonce N = R1 | R2 together with the old Security Context CTX_OLD, in order to derive the new Security Context CTX_NEW. Then, the client sends an OSCORE request to the server, protected with the new Security Context CTX_NEW. In particular, the request has the ‘d’ flag bit set to 1 and specifies R1 | R2 as ‘id detail’.

Upon receiving the OSCORE request, the server retrieves the value R1 | R2 from the request. Then, the server verifies that: i) the value R1 is identical to the value R1 specified in a previous OSCORE response with the ‘d’ flag bit set to 1; and ii) the value R1 | R2 has not been received before in an OSCORE request with the ‘d’ flag bit set to 1. If the verification succeeds, the server uses the nonce N = R1 | R2 together with the old Security Context CTX_OLD, in order to derive the new Security Context CTX_NEW. Finally, the server verifies the request by using the Security Context CTX_NEW and deletes the old Security Context CTX_OLD.

After that, the server can send an OSCORE response protected with the new Security Context CTX_NEW. When successfully verifying the response using the Security Context CTX_NEW, the client deletes the old Security Context CTX_OLD.

From then on, the two peers can protect their message exchanges by using the new Security Context CTX_NEW.
Note that the client achieves key confirmation only when receiving a message from the server as protected with the new Security Context CTX_NEW. If the client sends a non KUDOS request to the server protected with CTX_NEW before then, and the client receives a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error response as reply, the client SHOULD delete the new Security Context CTX_NEW and start a new client-initiated key update process, by taking the role of initiator as per Figure 5 in Section 4.3.1.

4.3.2.1. Avoiding In-Transit Requests During a Key Update

Before sending the KUDOS message Request #2 in Figure 6, the client MUST ensure that it has no outstanding interactions with the server (see Section 4.7 of [RFC7252]), with the exception of ongoing observations [RFC7641] with that server.

If there are any, the client MUST NOT initiate the KUDOS execution, before either: i) having all those outstanding interactions cleared; or ii) freeing up the Token values used with those outstanding interactions, with the exception of ongoing observations with the server.

Later on, this prevents a non KUDOS response protected with the new Security Context CTX_NEW to cryptographically match with both the corresponding request also protected with CTX_NEW and with an older request protected with CTX_OLD, in case the two requests were protected using the same OSCORE Partial IV.

4.3.2.2. Preventing Deadlock Situations

When the server-initiated version of KUDOS is used, the two peers risk to run into a deadlock, if all the following conditions hold.

* The client is a client-only device, i.e., it is not capable to act as CoAP server and thus does not listen for incoming requests.

* The server needs to execute KUDOS, which, due to the previous point, can only be performed in its server-initiated version as per Figure 6. That is, the server has to wait for an incoming non KUDOS request, in order to initiate KUDOS by replying with the first KUDOS message as a response.

* The client sends only Non-confirmable CoAP requests to the server and does not expect responses sent back as reply, hence freeing up a request’s Token value once the request is sent.
In such a case, in order to avoid experiencing a deadlock situation where the server needs to execute KUDOS but cannot practically initiate it, a client-only device that supports KUDOS SHOULD intersperse Non-confirmable requests it sends to that server with confirmable requests.

4.4. Retention Policies

Applications MAY define policies that allows a peer to also temporarily keep the old Security Context CTX_OLD, rather than simply overwriting it to become CTX_NEW. This allows the peer to decrypt late, still on-the-fly incoming messages protected with CTX_OLD.

When enforcing such policies, the following applies.

* Outgoing non KUDOS messages MUST be protected by using only CTX_NEW.

* Incoming non KUDOS messages MUST first be attempted to decrypt by using CTX_NEW. If decryption fails, a second attempt can use CTX_OLD.

* When an amount of time defined by the policy has elapsed since the establishment of CTX_NEW, the peer deletes CTX_OLD.

4.5. Discussion

KUDOS is intended to deprecate and replace the procedure defined in Appendix B.2 of [RFC8613], as fundamentally achieving the same goal, while displaying a number of improvements and advantages.

In particular, it is especially convenient for the handling of failure events concerning the JRC node in 6TiSCH networks (see Section 3). That is, among its intrinsic advantages compared to the procedure defined in Appendix B.2 of [RFC8613], KUDOS preserves the same ID Context value, when establishing a new OSCORE Security Context.

Since the JRC uses ID Context values as identifiers of network nodes, namely "pledge identifiers", the above implies that the JRC does not have anymore to perform a mapping between a new, different ID Context value and a certain pledge identifier (see Section 8.3.3 of [RFC9031]). It follows that pledge identifiers can remain constant once assigned, and thus ID Context values used as pledge identifiers can be employed in the long-term as originally intended.
5. Security Considerations

This document mainly covers security considerations about using AEAD keys in OSCORE and their usage limits, in addition to the security considerations of [RFC8613].

Depending on the specific key update procedure used to establish a new OSCORE Security Context, the related security considerations also apply.

[TODO: Add more considerations.]

6. IANA Considerations

RFC Editor: Please replace "[this document]" with the RFC number of this document and delete this paragraph.

This document has the following actions for IANA.

6.1. CoAP Option Numbers Registry

IANA is asked to enter the following option number to the "CoAP Option Numbers" registry within the "CoRE Parameters" registry group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Recipient-ID</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number suggested to IANA for the Recipient-ID option is 24.

6.2. OSCORE Flag Bits Registry

IANA is asked to add the following entries to the "OSCORE Flag Bits" registry within the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters" registry group.
### Bit Position | Name | Description | Reference
--- | --- | --- | ---
1 | Extension-1 Flag | Set to 1 if the OSCORE Option specifies a second byte of OSCORE flag bits | [this document] |
15 | ID Detail Flag | Set to 1 if the compressed COSE object contains 'id detail' | [this document] |

7. References

7.1. Normative References

- [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc]


7.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]

[I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]

[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits]

[LwM2M]

[LwM2M-Transport]
Appendix A. Detailed considerations for AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8

For the AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 algorithm when used as AEAD Algorithm for OSCORE, larger IA and CA values are achieved, depending on the value of ‘q’, ‘v’ and ‘l’. Figure 7 shows the resulting IA and CA probabilities enjoyed by AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8, when taking different values of ‘q’, ‘v’ and ‘l’ as input to the formulas defined in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits].

As shown in Figure 7, it is especially possible to achieve the lowest IA = 2^-50 and a good CA = 2^-70 by considering the largest possible value of the (q, v, l) triplet equal to (2^20, 2^10, 2^8), while still keeping a good security level. Note that the value of ‘l’ does not impact on IA, while CA displays good values for every considered value of ‘l’.
Appendix B.  Estimation of 'count_q'

This section defines a method to compute an estimate of the counter 'count_q' (see Section 2.2.2), hence not requiring a peer to store it in its own Sender Context.

This method relies on the fact that, at any point in time, a peer has performed _at most_ ENC = (SSN + SSN*) encryptions using its own Sender Key, where:

* SSN is the current value of this peer’s Sender Sequence Number.

* SSN* is the current value of other peer’s Sender Sequence Number. That is, SSN* is an overestimation of the responses without Partial IV that this peer has sent.

Figure 7: Probabilities for AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 based on chosen q, v and l values.
Thus, when protecting an outgoing message (see Section 2.3.1), the peer aborts the message processing if the estimated \(\text{est}_q > \text{limit}_q\), where \(\text{est}_q = (\text{SSN} + X)\) and \(X\) is determined as follows.

* If the outgoing message is a response, \(X\) is the Partial IV specified in the corresponding request that this peer is responding to. Note that \(X < \text{SSN}^*\) always holds.

* If the outgoing message is a request, \(X\) is the highest Partial IV value marked as received in this peer’s Replay Window plus 1, or 0 if it has not accepted any protected message from the other peer yet. That is, \(X\) is the highest Partial IV specified in message received from the other peer, i.e., the highest seen Sender Sequence Number of the other peer. Note that, also in this case, \(X < \text{SSN}^*\) always holds.

Appendix C. Preserving Observations across Key Updates

As defined in Section 4.3, once a peer has completed the KUDOS execution and successfully derived the new OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW, that peer normally terminates all the ongoing observations it has with the other peer [RFC7641], as protected with the old Security Context CTX_OLD.

This section describes a method that the two peers can use to safely preserve the ongoing observations that they have with one another, after having completed a KUDOS execution. In particular, this method ensures that an Observe notification can never successfully cryptographically match against the Observe requests of two different observations, i.e., an Observe request protected with CTX_OLD and an Observe request protected with CTX_NEW.

The actual preservation of ongoing observations has to be agreed by the two peers at each execution of KUDOS that they run with one another, as defined in Appendix C.2. If, at the end of a KUDOS execution, the two peers have not agreed on that, they MUST terminate the ongoing observations that they have with one another, as defined in Section 4.3.

If a peer supporting KUDOS is generally interested in preserving ongoing observations across a key update, the peer maintains a counter EPOCH for each ongoing observation it participates in. At any point in time, \((\text{EPOCH} + 1)\) is the number of KUDOS executions performed by the peer since the successful registration of the associated observation. That is, EPOCH indicates the lifetime of an observation measured in keying material epochs, and is bounded by the configuration parameter MAX_EPOCH.
[ NOTE:

MAX_EPOCH really has to be the same for any two peers. As a start, it can be assumed that a TBD default value applies, unless a different one is provided. It is possible to enable an actual negotiation between two peers running KUDOS, see Appendix C.2.
]

The following sections specify the different actions taken by the peer depending on whether it acts as client or server in an ongoing observation, as well as the signaling method used in KUDOS to agree on preserving the ongoing observations beyond the current KUDOS execution.

[ NOTE:

This method may be of more general applicability, i.e., also in case an update of the OSCORE keying material is performed through a different means than KUDOS.
]

C.1. Management of Observations

As per Section 3.1 of [RFC7641], a client can register its interest in observing a resource at a server, by sending a registration request including the Observe option with value 0.

If the server sends back a successful response also including the Observe option, hence confirming that the observation has been registered, then the server initializes to 0 the counter EPOCH associated with the just confirmed observation.

If the client receives back the successful response from the server, then the client initializes to 0 the counter EPOCH associated with the just confirmed observation.

If, later on, the client is not interested in the observation anymore, it MUST NOT simply forget about it. Rather, the client MUST send an explicit cancellation request to the server, i.e., a request including the Observe option with value 1 (see Section 3.6 of [RFC7641]). After sending this cancellation request, if the client does not receive back a response confirming that the observation has been terminated, the client MUST NOT consider the observation terminated. The client MAY try again to terminate the observation by sending a new cancellation request.
In case a peer A performs a KUDOS execution with another peer B, and A has ongoing observations with B that it is interested to preserve across the key update, then A explicitly indicates it by using the signaling approach embedded in KUDOS and defined in Appendix C.2.

After having successfully completed the KUDOS execution (i.e., after having successfully derived the new OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW), if the other peer B has confirmed its interest in preserving those ongoing observations also by using the signaling approach defined in Appendix C.2, then the peer A performs the following actions.

1. For each ongoing observation X that A has with B and for which following notifications are going to be protected with CTX_NEW:
   a. The peer A increments the counter EPOCH associated with X.
   b. If the updated value of EPOCH associated with X has reached MAX_EPOCH, then the peer A MUST terminate the observation.

2. For each still ongoing observation X that A has with B after the previous step, such that A acts as client in X and for which following notifications are going to be protected with CTX_NEW:
   a. The peer A MUST attempt again to cancel X, if A previously tried to do that but had not received a response from the other peer B as confirmation. As specified above, such an observation cancellation MUST be performed by sending a cancellation request.
   b. The peer A considers all the OSCORE Partial IV values used in the Observe registration request associated with any of the still ongoing observations with the other peer B. Then, the peer A determines the value PIV* as the highest OSCORE Partial IV among those considered at the previous step.
   c. In the Sender Context within CTX_NEW, the peer A sets its own Sender Sequence Number to (PIV* + 1), rather than to 0.

C.2. Signaling to Preserve Observations

When performing KUDOS, a peer can indicate to the other peer its interest in preserving the ongoing observations that they have with one another and are bound to the OSCORE Security Context to renew. To this end, the extended OSCORE option shown in Figure 3 and included in a KUDOS message is further extended as follows.

[ NOTE:

This is an early proposal with many details to be refined.]
An additional bit "Preserve Observations", 'b', is set to 1 by the sender peer to indicate that it wishes to preserve ongoing observations with the other peer.

While 'b' can be a bit in the second byte of the OSCORE option containing the OSCORE flag bits, 'b' can rather be one bit in the 1 byte 'x' following 'kid context' (if any) and originally encoding the size of 'id detail'. Since, the recommended size of 'id detail' is 8 bytes, the number of bits left available in the 'x' byte is amply sufficient to still indicate the size of 'id detail'.

It is fundamental to integrity-protect the value of the bit 'b' set in the two KUDOS messages. This can be achieved by taking also the whole byte 'x' including the bit 'b' as input in the derivation of the new OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW.

That is, the updateCtx() function defined in Figure 4 would be invoked as follows:

* CTX_1 = updateCtx(X1|R1, CTX_OLD), when deriving CTX_1 for processing the first KUDOS message in the KUDOS execution.

* CTX_NEW = updateCtx(X1|X2|R1|R2, CTX_OLD), when deriving CTX_NEW for processing the second KUDOS message in the KUDOS execution.

where X1 and X2 are the values of the 'x' byte specified in the OSCORE option of the first and second KUDOS message in the KUDOS execution, respectively.

[ NOTE:

The single bit 'b' can actually be replaced by three bits 'b1', 'b2' and 'b3' still within the byte 'x'. These can be used by the two peers performing KUDOS to negotiate the value of MAX_EPOCH (see Appendix C. Then, the two peers agree to use as MAX_EPOCH the smallest of the two values exchanged during the execution of KUDOS.

The final encoding of the 'x' byte specified in Section 4.1 will be affected. In particular, a smarter encoding would be convenient for the bits left to use to indicate the size in bytes of 'id detail'.
]
Appendix D. Update of OSCORE Sender/Recipient IDs

This section defines an optional procedure that two peers can execute to update the OSCORE Sender/Recipient IDs that they use in their shared OSCORE Security Context.

This procedure can be initiated by either peer. In particular, the client or the server may start it by sending the first OSCORE ID update message. When sending an OSCORE ID update message, a peer provides its new intended OSCORE Recipient ID to the other peer.

Furthermore, this procedure can be executed stand-alone, or rather seamlessly integrated in an execution of KUDOS (see Section 4).

* In the former stand-alone case, updating the OSCORE Sender/Recipient IDs effectively results in updating part of the current OSCORE Security Context.

That is, a new Sender Key, Recipient Key and Common IV are derived as defined in Section 3.2 of [RFC8613]. Also, the Sender Sequence Number and the replay window are re-initialized accordingly, as defined in Section 3.2.2 of [RFC8613]. Since the same Master Secret is preserved, forward secrecy is not achieved.

Finally, as defined in Appendix D.1.3, the two peers must take additional actions to ensure a safe execution of the OSCORE IDs update procedure.

* In the latter integrated case, the KUDOS initiator (responder) also acts as initiator (responder) for the ID update procedure.

[TODO: think about the possibility of safely preserving ongoing observations following an update of OSCORE IDs alone.]

D.1. The Recipient-ID Option

The Recipient ID Option defined in this section has the properties summarized in Figure 8, which extends Table 4 of [RFC7252]. That is, the option is elective, safe to forward, part of the cache key and non repeatable.
### Recipient-ID Option

This document particularly defines how this option is used in messages protected with OSCORE. That is, when the option is included in an outgoing message, the option value specifies the new OSCORE Recipient ID that the sender endpoint intends to use with the other endpoint sharing the OSCORE Security Context.

The Recipient-ID Option is of class E in terms of OSCORE processing (see Section 4.1 of [RFC8613]).

**D.1.1. Client-Initiated OSCORE IDs Update**

Figure 9 shows the stand-alone OSCORE IDs update workflow, with the client acting as initiator.

On each peer, SID and RID denote the OSCORE Sender ID and Recipient ID of that peer, respectively.

**Client (initiator)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CTX_A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SID = 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RID = 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Server (responder)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CTX_A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SID = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RID = 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Request #1

Protect with CTX_A

OSCORE Option: ..., kid:1

Encrypted_Payload {

...  

RecipientID: 42 

...

Application Payload 

}

// When embedded in KUDOS, CTX_1 is CTX_A,
// and there cannot be application payload.

Response #1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verify</th>
<th>OSCORE Option: ...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>with CTX_A</td>
<td>Encrypted_Payload {</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recipient-ID: 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Application Payload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with CTX_A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

// When embedded in KUDOS, this message
// is protected using CTX_NEW, and there
// there cannot be application payload.
//
// Then, CTX_B builds on CTX_NEW by updating
// the new Sender/Recipient IDs

CTX_B {
    SID = 78
    RID = 42
}

Request #2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protect</th>
<th>OSCORE Option: ..., kid:78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>with CTX_B</td>
<td>Encrypted_Payload {</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Application Payload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with CTX_B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Response #2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verify</th>
<th>OSCORE Option: ...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>with CTX_B</td>
<td>Encrypted_Payload {</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Application Payload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with CTX_B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discard

CTX_A

Request #3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protect</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Höglund & Tiloca  Expires 8 September 2022  [Page 34]
with CTX_B | OSCORE Option: ..., kid:78 | Verify
Encrypted_Payload {
... 
    Application Payload
}
| with CTX_B |
| Discard |
| CTX_A |

Figure 9: Client-Initiated OSCORE IDs Update Workflow

[TODO: discuss the example]

D.1.2. Server-Initiated OSCORE IDs Update

Figure 10 shows the stand-alone OSCORE IDs update workflow, with the server acting as initiator.

On each peer, SID and RID denote the OSCORE Sender ID and Recipient ID of that peer, respectively.

Client (responder)          Server (initiator)
CTX_A {
    SID = 1
    RID = 0
}

Request #1
Protect with CTX_A
OSCORE Option: ..., kid:1
Encrypted_Payload {
... 
    Application Payload
}

// When (to be) embedded in KUDOS,
// CTX_OLD is CTX_A

Response #1
Verify with CTX_A

Höglund & Tiloca          Expires 8 September 2022  [Page 35]
Application Payload

// When embedded in KUDOS, this message is
// protected with CTX_1 instead, and
// there cannot be application payload.

CTX_A {
    SID = 1
    RID = 0
}

Protect with CTX_A
OSCORE Option: ..., kid:1
Encrypted_Payload {
    ...
    Recipient-ID: 42
    Application Payload
}

// When embedded in KUDOS, this message is
// protected with CTX_NEW instead, and
// there cannot be application payload.

Response #2
Verify with CTX_A
OSCORE Option: ...
Encrypted_Payload {
    ...
    Application Payload
}

// When embedded in KUDOS, this message is
// protected with CTX_NEW instead, and
// there cannot be application payload.

CTX_B {
    SID = 78
    RID = 42
}

Request #3
Figure 10: Server-Initiated OSCORE IDs Update Workflow

[TODO: discuss the example]
D.1.3. Additional Actions for Stand-Alone Execution

After having experienced a loss of state, a peer MUST NOT participate in a stand-alone OSCORE IDs update procedure with another peer, until having performed a full-fledged establishment/renewal of an OSCORE Security Context with the other peer (e.g., through KUDOS or EDHOC [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc]).

More precisely, a peer has experienced a loss of state if it cannot access the latest snapshot of the latest OSCORE Security Context CTX_OLD or the whole set of OSCORE Sender/Recipient IDs that have been used with the triplet (Master Secret, Master Salt ID Context) of CTX_OLD. This can happen, for instance, following a device reboot.

Furthermore, when participating in a stand-alone OSCORE IDs update procedure, a peer perform the following additional steps.

* When sending an OSCORE ID update message, the peer MUST specify its new intended OSCORE Recipient ID as value of the Recipient-ID option only if such a Recipient ID is not only available (see Section 3.3 of [RFC8613], but it has also never been used as Recipient ID with the current triplet (Master Secret, Master Salt ID Context).

* When receiving an OSCORE ID update message, the peer MUST abort the procedure if it has already used the identifier specified in the Recipient-ID Option as its own Sender ID with current triplet (Master Secret, Master Salt ID Context).

In order to fulfill the conditions above, a peer has to keep track of the OSCORE Sender/Recipient IDs that it has used with the current triplet (Master Secret, Master Salt ID Context), since the latest update of OSCORE Master Secret (e.g., performed through KUDOS).

Appendix E. Key Update without Forward Secrecy

The main version of the KUDOS procedure defined in Section 4 ensures forward secrecy of the OSCORE keying material. However, it requires peers executing KUDOS to preserve their state (e.g., across a device reboot), by writing information such as data from the newly derived OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW in non-volatile memory.
However, this can be problematic for devices that cannot dynamically write information to non-volatile memory. For example, some devices may support only a single writing in persistent memory when initial keying material is provided (e.g., at manufacturing or commissioning time), but not more after that. Therefore, these devices cannot perform a stateful key update procedure, which prevents running the main version of KUDOS and ensuring forward secrecy.

In order to address these limitations, this section defines an alternative, stateless version of the KUDOS procedure. This allows two peers to achieve the same results as when running the main version of KUDOS defined in Section 4, with the difference that no forward secrecy is achieved and no state information is required to be dynamically written in non-volatile memory.

Hereafter, "FS mode" and "non-FS mode" refer to the main version of KUDOS defined in Section 4 and the alternative version of KUDOS defined in this section, respectively. From a practical point of view, the two modes differ as to what exact OSCORE Master Secret and Master Salt are used as part of the OSCORE Security Context CTX_OLD provided as input to the updateCtx() function (see Section 4).

In order to run KUDOS in FS mode, both peers have to be able to write in non-volatile memory the OSCORE Master Secret and OSCORE Master Salt from the newly derived Security Context CTX_NEW. If this is not the case, the two peers have to run KUDOS in non-FS mode.

E.1. Handling and use of Keying Material

In the following, a device is denoted as "CAPABLE" if it is able to store information in non-volatile memory (e.g., on disk), beyond a one-time-only writing occurring at manufacturing or (re-)commissioning time.

The following terms are used to refer to OSCORE keying material.

* Bootstrap Master Secret and Bootstrap Master Salt. If pre-provisioned during manufacturing or (re-)commissioning, these OSCORE Master Secret and Master Salt are initially stored on disk and are never going to be overwritten by the device.

* Latest Master Secret and Latest Master Salt. These OSCORE Master Secret and Master Salt can be dynamically updated by the device. In case of reboot, they are lost unless they have been stored on disk.

Note that:
* A peer running KUDOS can have none of the pairs above associated with another peer, only one or both.

* A peer that has neither of the pairs above associated with another peer, cannot run KUDOS in any mode with that other peer.

* A peer that has only one of the pairs above associated with another peer can attempt to run KUDOS with that other peer, but the procedure might fail depending on the other peer’s capabilities. In particular:

  - In order to run KUDOS in FS mode, a peer must be a CAPABLE device. It follows that two peers have to both be CAPABLE devices in order to be able to run KUDOS in FS mode with one another.

  - In order to run KUDOS in no-FS mode, a peer must have Bootstrap Master Secret and Bootstrap Master Salt available as stored on disk.

As a general rule, once successfully generated a new OSCORE Security Context CTX (e.g., CTX is the CTX_NEW resulting from a KUDOS execution, or it has been established through EDHOC [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc]), a peer considers the Master Secret and Master Salt of CTX as Latest Master Secret and Latest Master Salt. After that:

* If the peer is a CAPABLE device, it SHOULD store Latest Master Secret and Latest Master Salt on disk.

  As an exception, this does not apply to possible temporary OSCORE Security Contexts used during a key update procedure, such as CTX_1 used during the KUDOS execution. That is, the OSCORE Master Secret and Master Salt from such temporary Security Contexts MUST NOT be stored on disk.

* The peer MUST store Latest Master Secret and Latest Master Salt in volatile memory, thus making them available to OSCORE message processing and possible key update procedures.

E.1.1. Actions after Device Reboot

Building on the above, after having experienced a reboot, a peer A checks whether it has a pair P1 = (Latest Master Secret, Latest Master Salt) associated with any another peer B stored on disk.

* If a pair P1 is found, the peer A performs the following actions.
The peer A loads the Latest Master Secret and Latest Master Salt to volatile memory, and uses them to derive an OSCORE Security Context CTX_OLD.

The peer A runs KUDOS with the other peer B, acting as initiator. If the peer A is a CAPABLE device, it stores on disk the Master Secret and Master Salt from the newly established OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW, as Latest Master Secret and Latest Master Salt, respectively.

* If a pair P1 is not found, the peer A checks whether it has a pair P2 = (Bootstrap Master Secret, Bootstrap Master Salt) associated with the other peer B stored on disk.

- If a pair P2 is found, the peer A performs the following actions.
  - The peer A loads the Bootstrap Master Secret and Bootstrap Master Salt to volatile memory, and uses them to derive an OSCORE Security Context CTX_OLD.
  - If the peer A is a CAPABLE device, it stores on disk Bootstrap Master Secret and Bootstrap Master Salt as Latest Master Secret and Latest Master Salt, respectively. This supports the situation where A is a CAPABLE device and has never run KUDOS with the other peer B before.
  - The peer A runs KUDOS with the other peer B, acting as initiator. If the peer A is a CAPABLE device, it stores on disk the Master Secret and Master Salt from the newly established OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW, as Latest Master Secret and Latest Master Salt, respectively.

- If a pair P2 is not found, the peer A has to use alternative ways to establish a first OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW with the other peer B, e.g., by running EDHOC. After that, if A is a CAPABLE device, it stores on disk the Master Secret and Master Salt from the newly established OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW, as Latest Master Secret and Latest Master Salt, respectively.

E.2. Signaling of FS Mode or Non-FS Mode

This section defines the signaling method that two peers use to agree on whether to run KUDOS in FS or non-FS mode. To this end, the extended OSCORE option shown in Figure 3 and included in a KUDOS message is further extended as follows.
An additional bit "No Forward Secrecy", ‘p’, is set to 1 by the
sender peer to indicate that it wishes to run KUDOS in no-FS mode, or
to 0 if it wishes to run KUDOS in FS mode.

While ‘p’ can be a bit in the second byte of the OSCORE option
containing the OSCORE flag bits, ‘p’ can rather be one bit in the 1
byte ‘x’ following ‘kid context’ (if any) and originally encoding the
size of ‘id detail’. Since, the recommended size of ‘id detail’ is 8
bytes, the number of bits left available in the ‘x’ byte is amply
sufficient to still indicate the size of ‘id detail’.

[ NOTE:

The design currently in Appendix C.2 considers also the ‘x’ byte as
input to the updateCtx() function. Preserving this approach would
integrity-protect the bit ‘p’ as well, in addition to the protection
it already enjoys as a by-product from key confirmation.

]

If the second byte of the OSCORE option containing flag bits is
present and the ‘d’ flag is set to 0 (i.e., the message is not a
KUDOS message), the bit ‘p’ MUST be set to 0.

In a KUDOS message (i.e., the ‘d’ bit is set to 1), the ‘p’ bit
practically determines what OSCORE Security Context to use as CTX_OLD
during the KUDOS execution, consistently with the indicated mode.

* If the ‘p’ bit is set to 0, the updateCtx() function used to
derive CTX_1 or CTX_NEW considers as input CTX_OLD the current
OSCORE Security Context shared with the other peer as is. In
particular, CTX_OLD includes Latest Master Secret as Master Secret
and Latest Master Salt as Master Salt.

* If the ‘p’ bit is set to 1, the updateCtx() function used to
derive CTX_1 or CTX_NEW considers as input CTX_OLD the current
OSCORE Security Context shared with the other peer, with the
following difference: Bootstrap Master Secret is used as Master
Secret and Bootstrap Master Salt is used as Master Salt. That is,
every execution of KUDOS in no-FS mode between these two peers
considers the same pair (Master Secret, Master Salt) in the OSCORE
Security Context CTX_OLD provided as input to the updateCtx()
function, hence the impossibility to achieve forward secrecy.

E.3. Selection and Negotiation of KUDOS Mode

This section defines how a peer determines to run KUDOS either in FS
or no-FS mode with another peer.
* If a peer A is not a CAPABLE device, it MUST run KUDOS only in no-FS mode. That is, when sending a KUDOS message, it MUST set the 'p' bit to 1 in the OSCORE option (see Appendix E.2).

* If a peer A is a CAPABLE device, it SHOULD run KUDOS only in FS mode and SHOULD NOT run KUDOS as initiator in no-FS mode. That is, when sending a KUDOS message, it SHOULD set the 'p' bit to 0 in the OSCORE option (see Appendix E.2). An exception applies in the following cases.

- The peer A is running KUDOS with another peer B, which A has learned to not be a CAPABLE device (and hence not able to run KUDOS in FS mode).

  Note that, if the peer A is a CAPABLE device, it is able to store such information about the other peer B on disk and it MUST do so. From then on, the peer A will perform every execution of KUDOS with the peer B in no-FS mode, including after a possible reboot.

- The peer A is acting as responder and running KUDOS with another peer B without knowing its capabilities, and A receives a KUDOS message with the 'p' bit set to 1.

* If the peer A is a CAPABLE device and has learned that another peer B is also a CAPABLE device (and hence able to run KUDOS in FS mode), then the peer A MUST NOT run KUDOS with the peer B in no-FS mode. This also means that, if the peer A acts as responder when running KUDOS with the peer B, the peer A MUST terminate the KUDOS execution if it receives a KUDOS message from the peer B with the 'p' bit set to 1.

  Note that, if the peer A is a CAPABLE device, it is able to store such information about the other peer B on disk and it MUST do so. This ensures that the peer A will perform every execution of KUDOS with the peer B in FS mode. In turn, this prevents a possible downgrading attack, aimed at making A believe that B is not a CAPABLE device, and thus to run KUDOS in no-FS mode although the FS mode is actually supported by both peers.

Within the limitations above, two peers running KUDOS generate the new OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW according to the mode indicated per the bit 'p' set by the responder in the second KUDOS message.

If, after having received the first KUDOS message, the responder can continue performing KUDOS, the bit 'p' in the reply message has the same value as in the bit 'p' set by the initiator, unless the value is 0 and the responder is not a CAPABLE device. More specifically:
If both peers are CAPABLE devices, they will run KUDOS in FS mode. That is, both initiator and responder sets the ‘p’ bit to 0 in the respective sent KUDOS message.

If both peers are not CAPABLE devices or only the peer acting as initiator is not a CAPABLE device, they will run KUDOS in no-FS mode. That is, both initiator and responder sets the ‘p’ bit to 1 in the respective sent KUDOS message.

If only the peer acting as initiator is a CAPABLE device and it has knowledge of the other peer being a not CAPABLE device, they will run KUDOS in no-FS mode. That is, both initiator and responder sets the ‘p’ bit to 1 in the respective sent KUDOS message.

If only the peer acting as initiator is a CAPABLE device and it has no knowledge of the other peer being a not CAPABLE device, they will not run KUDOS in FS mode and will rather set to ground for possibly retrying in no-FS mode. In particular, the initiator sets the ‘p’ bit of its sent KUDOS message to 0. Then:

- If the responder is a server, it MUST reply with a 5.03 (Service Unavailable) error response. The response is protected with the newly derived OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW. The diagnostic payload MAY provide additional information. The ‘p’ bit in the error response MUST be set to 1.

  When receiving the error response, the initiator learns that the responder is not a CAPABLE device (and hence not able to run KUDOS in FS mode). The initiator MAY try running KUDOS again, by setting the ‘p’ bit to 1 when sending a new request as first KUDOS message.

- If the responder is a client, it sends to the initiator the second KUDOS message protected with the newly derived OSCORE Security Context CTX_NEW. The ‘p’ bit in the request MUST be set to 1.

  When receiving the request above (i.e., with the ‘p’ bit set to 1 as a follow-up to the previous KUDOS response having the ‘p’ bit set to 0), the initiator learns that the responder is not a CAPABLE device (and hence not able to run KUDOS in FS mode).

In either case, both KUDOS peers delete the OSCORE Security Contexts CTX_1 and CTX_NEW.
Appendix F. Document Updates

RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION.

F.1. Version -00 to -01

* Recommendation on limits for CCM_8. Details in Appendix.
* Improved message processing, also covering corner cases.
* Example of method to estimate and not store ‘count_q’.
* Added procedure to update OSCORE Sender/Recipient IDs.
* Added method for preserving observations across key updates.
* Added key update without forward secrecy.

Acknowledgments

The authors sincerely thank Christian Amsuess, John Mattsson and Goeran Selander for their feedback and comments.

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DNS Queries over CoAP (DoC)
draft-lenders-dns-over-coap-03

Abstract

This document defines a protocol for sending DNS messages over the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP). These CoAP messages are protected by DTLS-Secured CoAP (CoAPS) or Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) to provide encrypted DNS message exchange for constrained devices in the Internet of Things (IoT).

Discussion Venues

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Discussion of this document takes place on TODO

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/anr-bmbf-pivot/draft-dns-over-coap.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

This document defines DNS over CoAP (DoC), a protocol to send DNS [RFC1035] queries and get DNS responses over the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252]. Each DNS query-response pair is mapped into a CoAP message exchange. Each CoAP message is secured by DTLS [RFC6347] or Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) [RFC8613] to ensure message integrity and confidentiality.

The application use case of DoC is inspired by DNS over HTTPS [RFC8484] (DoH). DoC, however, aims for the deployment in the constrained Internet of Things (IoT), which usually conflicts with the requirements introduced by HTTPS.

To prevent TCP and HTTPS resource requirements, constrained IoT devices could use DNS over DTLS [RFC8094]. In contrast to DNS over DTLS, DoC utilizes CoAP features to mitigate drawbacks of datagram-based communication. These features include: block-wise transfer, which solves the Path MTU problem of DNS over DTLS (see [RFC8094], section 5); CoAP proxies, which provide an additional level of caching; re-use of data structures for application traffic and DNS information, which saves memory on constrained devices.

To prevent resource requirements of DTLS or TLS on top of UDP (e.g., introduced by DNS over QUIC [I-D.ietf-dprive-dnsoquic]), DoC allows for lightweight end-to-end payload encryption based on OSCORE.

- FETCH coaps://[2001:db8::1]/

![Figure 1: Basic DoC architecture](image-url)
The most important components of DoC can be seen in Figure 1: A DoC client tries to resolve DNS information by sending DNS queries carried within CoAP requests to a DoC server. That DoC server may or may not resolve that DNS information itself by using other DNS transports with an upstream DNS server. The DoC server then replies to the DNS queries with DNS responses carried within CoAP responses.

TBD: additional feature sets of CoAP/CoRE

* resource directory for DoC service discovery,
* ...

2. Terminology

A server that provides the service specified in this document is called a "DoC server" to differentiate it from a classic "DNS server". Correspondingly, a client using this protocol to retrieve the DNS information is called a "DoC client".

The term "constrained nodes" is used as defined in [RFC7228].

The terms "CoAP payload" and "CoAP body" are used as defined in [RFC7959].

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Selection of a DoC Server

In this document, it is assumed that the DoC client knows the DoC server and the DNS resource at the DoC server. Possible options could be manual configuration of a URI [RFC3986] or CRI [I-D.ietf-core-href], or automatic configuration, e.g., using a CoRE resource directory [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory], DHCP or Router Advertisement options [I-D.ietf-add-dnr]. Automatic configuration SHOULD only be done from a trusted source.

When discovering the DNS resource through a link mechanism that allows describing a resource type (e.g., the Resource Type Attribute in [RFC6690]), the resource type "core.dns" can be used to identify a generic DNS resolver that is available to the client.

4. Basic Message Exchange
4.1. The "application/dns-message" Content-Format

This document defines the Internet media type "application/dns-message" for the CoAP Content-Format. This media type is defined as in [RFC8484] Section 6, i.e., a single DNS message encoded in the DNS on-the-wire format [RFC1035].

4.2. DNS Queries in CoAP Requests

A DoC client encodes a single DNS query in one or more CoAP request messages the CoAP FETCH [RFC8132] method. Requests SHOULD include an Accept option to indicate the type of content that can be parsed in the response.

To enable reliable message exchange, the CoAP request SHOULD be carried in a Confirmable (CON) message.

4.2.1. Request Format

When sending a CoAP request, a DoC client MUST include the DNS query in the body (i.e. the payload, or the concatenated payloads) of the CoAP request. As specified in [RFC8132] Section 2.3.1, the type of content of the body MUST be indicated using the Content-Format option. This document specifies the usage of Content-Format "application/dns-message" (details see Section 4.1).

If block-wise transfer [RFC7959] is supported by the client, more than one CoAP request message MAY be used. If more than one CoAP request message is used to encode the DNS query, it must be chained together using the Block1 option in those CoAP requests.

The FETCH request is sent to the URI specified in Section 3.

A DoC server MUST be able to parse requests of Content-Format "application/dns-message".

4.2.2. Support of CoAP Caching

The DoC client SHOULD set the ID field of the DNS header always to 0 to enable a CoAP cache (e.g., a CoAP proxy en-route) to respond to the same DNS queries with a cache entry. This ensures that the CoAP Cache-Key (see [RFC8132] Section 2) does not change when multiple DNS queries for the same DNS data, carried in CoAP requests, are issued.
4.2.3. Examples

The following example illustrates the usage of a CoAP message to resolve "example.org. IN AAAA" based on the URI "coaps://[2001:db8::1]/". The CoAP body is encoded in "application/dns-message" Content Format.

```
FETCH coaps://[2001:db8::1]/
Content-Format: application/dns-message
Accept: application/dns-message
Payload: 00 00 01 20 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 07 65 78 61 [binary]
         6d 70 6c 65 03 6f 72 67 00 00 1c 00 01 c0 0c 00 [binary]
         01 00 01 [binary]
```

4.3. DNS Responses in CoAP Responses

Each DNS query-response pair is mapped to a CoAP REST request-response operation, which may consist of several CoAP request-response pairs if block-wise transfer is involved. DNS responses are provided in the body (i.e. the payload, or the concatenated payloads) of the CoAP response. A DoC server MUST indicate the type of content of the body using the Content-Format option, and MUST be able to produce responses in the "application/dns-message" Content-Format (details see Section 4.1) when requested. A DoC client MUST understand responses in "application/dns-message" format when it does not send an Accept option.

If supported, a DoC server MAY transfer the DNS response in more than one CoAP responses using the Block2 option [RFC7959].

4.3.1. Response Codes and Handling DNS and CoAP errors

A DNS response indicates either success or failure in the Response code of the DNS header (see [RFC1035] Section 4.1.1). It is RECOMMENDED that CoAP responses that carry any valid DNS response use a "2.05 Content" response code.

CoAP responses use non-successful response codes MUST NOT contain any payload and may only be used on errors in the CoAP layer or when a request does not fulfill the requirements of the DoC protocol.

Communication errors with a DNS server (e.g., timeouts) SHOULD be indicated by including a SERVFAIL DNS response in a successful CoAP response.
A DoC client might try to repeat a non-successful exchange unless otherwise prohibited. The DoC client might also decide to repeat a non-successful exchange with a different URI, for instance, when the response indicates an unsupported Content-Format.

4.3.2. Support of CoAP Caching

It is RECOMMENDED to set the Max-Age option of a response to the minimum TTL in the Answer section of a DNS response. This prevents expired records unintentionally being served from a CoAP cache.

It is RECOMMENDED that DoC servers set an ETag option on large responses (TBD: more concrete guidance) that have a short Max-Age relative to the expected clients’ caching time. Thus, clients that need to revalidate a response can do so using the established ETag mechanism. With responses large enough to be fragmented, it’s best practice for servers to set an ETag anyway. As specified in [RFC7252] and [RFC8132], if the response associated with the ETag is still valid, the response uses the "2.03 Valid" code and consequently carries no payload.

4.3.3. Examples

The following examples illustrate the replies to the query "example.org. IN AAAA record", recursion turned on. Successful responses carry one answer record including address 2001:db8:1::1:2:3:4 and TTL 58719.

A successful response:

2.05 Content
Content-Format: application/dns-message
Max-Age: 58719
Payload: 00 00 81 a0 00 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 07 65 78 61 [binary]
6d 70 6c 65 03 6f 72 67 00 1c 00 01 c0 0c 00 [binary]
1c 00 01 00 01 37 49 00 10 20 01 0d b8 00 01 00 [binary]
00 00 01 00 02 00 03 00 04 [binary]

When a DNS error (SERVFAIL in this case) is noted in the DNS response, the CoAP response still indicates success:

2.05 Content
Content-Format: application/dns-message
Payload: 00 00 81 a2 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 65 78 61 [binary]
6d 70 6c 65 03 6f 72 67 00 1c 00 01 c0 0c 00 [binary]
1c 00 01 00 01 37 49 00 10 20 01 0d b8 00 01 00 [binary]
00 00 01 00 02 00 03 00 04 [binary]
When an error occurs on the CoAP layer, the DoC server SHOULD respond with an appropriate CoAP error, for instance "4.15 Unsupported Content-Format" if the Content-Format option in the request was not set to "application/dns-message" and the Content-Format is not otherwise supported by the server.

5. CoAP/CoRE Integration

5.1. DoC server considerations

In the case of CNAME records in a DNS response, a DoC server SHOULD follow common DNS resolver behavior [RFC1034] by resolving a CNAME until the originally requested resource record type is reached. This reduces the number of message exchanges within an LLN.

The DoC server SHOULD send compact answers, i.e., additional or authority sections in the DNS response should only be sent if needed or if it is anticipated that they help the DoC client to reduce additional queries.

5.2. Proxies and caching

TBD:

* TTL vs. Max-Age (https://github.com/anr-bmbf-pivot/draft-dns-over-coap/issues/5)

* Responses that are not globally valid

* General CoAP proxy problem, but what to do when DoC server is a DNS proxy, response came not yet in but retransmission by DoC client was received (see Figure 2)

  - send empty ACK (maybe move to best practices appendix (https://github.com/anr-bmbf-pivot/draft-dns-over-coap/issues/6#issuecomment-895880206))

```
DoC client   DoC proxy   DNS server
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CoAP req [rt 1]</th>
<th>DNS query [rt 1]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CoAP req [rt 2]</td>
<td>DNS resp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoAP resp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Figure 2: CoAP retransmission (rt) is received before DNS query could have been fulfilled.

5.3. OBSERVE (modifications)?

* TBD

* DoH has considerations on Server Push to deliver additional, potentially outstanding requests + response to the DoC client for caching

* OBSERVE does not include the request it would have been generated from => cannot be cached without corresponding request having been send over the wire.

* If use case exists: extend OBSERVE with option that contains "promised" request (see [RFC7540], section 8.2)?

* Other caveat: clients can’t cache, only proxys so value needs to be evaluated

* Potential use case: [RFC8490] Section 4.1.2

5.4. OSCORE

* TBD

* With OSCORE DTLS might not be required

6. Considerations for Unencrypted Use

While not recommended, DoC can be used without any encryption (e.g., in very constrained environments where encryption is not possible or necessary). It can also be used when lower layers provide secure communication between client and server. In both cases, potential benefits of unencrypted DoC usage over classic DNS are e.g. block-wise transfer or alternative CoAP Content-Formats to overcome link-layer constraints.

7. Security Considerations

TODO Security

8. IANA Considerations
8.1. New "application/dns-message" Content-Format

IANA is requested to assign CoAP Content-Format ID for the DNS message media type in the "CoAP Content-Formats" sub-registry, within the "CoRE Parameters" registry [RFC7252], corresponding the "application/dns-message" media type from the "Media Types" registry:

Media-Type: application/dns-message
Encoding: -
Id: TBD
Reference: [TBD-this-spec]

8.2. New "core.dns" Resource Type

IANA is requested to assign a new Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute, "core.dns" in the "Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values" sub-registry, within the "CoRE Parameters" register [RFC6690].

Attribute Value: core.dns
Description: DNS over CoAP resource.
Reference: [TBD-this-spec] Section 3

9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-add-dnr]

[I-D.ietf-core-href]

[I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]
[I-D.ietf-dprive-dnsoquic]


Appendix A. Change Log
TBD:
* Request text duplication (https://github.com/anr-bmbf-pivot/draft-dns-over-coap/issues/4)


* Clarify server selection to be out-of-band and define "core.dns" resource type in Section 3 and Section 8.2

* Add message manipulation considerations for DoC servers in Section 5.1

* Update Considerations for Unencrypted Use in Section 6


* Remove GET and POST methods

* Add note on ETag and response codes

* Provide requirement conflict for DNS over QUIC

* Clarify Content-Format / Accept handling


* Soften Content-Format requirements in Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.3

* Clarify "CoAP payload"/"CoAP body" terminology

* Fix nits and typos


* Clarification in abstract that both DTLS and OSCORE can be used as secure transport

* Restructuring of Section 4:
  - Add dedicated Section 4.1 on Content-Format

Lenders, et al. Expires 8 September 2022
- Add overview table about usable and required features for request method types to Section 4.2
- Add dedicated Section 4.2.2 and Section 4.3.2 on caching requirements for CoAP requests and responses

* Fix nits and typos

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