

Trustworthy Digital Supply Chain Transparency Services

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on behalf of SCITT contributors (W. Bartholomew, H. Birkholz, S. Clebsch, A. Deligat-Lavaud, Y. Deshpande, C. Fournet, B. Knight, S. Lasker, S. Provine, M. Riechert, A. Stewart, K. Williams, R. Williams, ... see scitt@ietf.org)


<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-birkholz-scitt-architecture-00.html>

<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-birkholz-scitt-receipts-00.html>

HoTRFC @ IETF 113, Sun March 19th, 2022

Countering Software Supply Chains Attacks: Trustworthy Transparency Services

How can I audit
the provenance
of all software
in my TCB?




SCITT Architecture and Receipts

```

SCITT_Receipt = {
; Hash of transparency service key
  "serviceId" => bstr
; Transaction id
  "transactionId" => tstr
; Signature algorithm
  "alg" => int
; Signature over tree root
  "signature" => bstr
; Intermediate hashes (Merkle path)
  "proof" => [+ ProofElement]
}

```



Related Work and Working Groups in the IETF

- Envelopes & Receipts are based on COSE WG output
- Transparency service operations trustworthiness involves RATS WG output
- Transparency services borrow concepts and terms from the concept of Certificate Transparency defined in RFC 6962