JSON Proof Algorithms (JPA) specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Proof (JWP) and JSON Web Key (JWK) specifications. It defines several IANA registries for these identifiers.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 January 2023.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents

1. Introduction ......................................................... 3
2. Conventions and Definitions ...................................... 3
3. Terminology .......................................................... 3
4. Background ............................................................ 4
5. Algorithm Basics .................................................... 4
   5.1. Issue ............................................................. 4
   5.2. Confirm .......................................................... 4
   5.3. Present .......................................................... 5
   5.4. Verify ............................................................ 5
6. Algorithm Specifications ............................................. 6
   6.1. Single Use ........................................................ 6
      6.1.1. JWS Algorithm .............................................. 6
      6.1.2. Holder Setup .............................................. 6
      6.1.3. Issuer Setup ............................................... 7
      6.1.4. Using JWS .................................................. 7
      6.1.5. Issuer Protected Header .................................. 7
      6.1.6. Payloads .................................................... 7
      6.1.7. Presentation Protected Header ............................ 8
      6.1.8. Presentation ............................................... 8
      6.1.9. Verification ............................................... 9
      6.1.10. JPA Registration ......................................... 9
      6.1.11. Example ................................................... 9
   6.2. BBS ............................................................... 9
      6.2.1. BLS Curve .................................................. 10
      6.2.2. Messages ................................................... 10
      6.2.3. Issuer Protected Header .................................. 10
      6.2.4. Payloads .................................................... 10
      6.2.5. Issuance .................................................... 11
      6.2.6. Presentation ............................................... 11
      6.2.7. Verification ............................................... 11
      6.2.8. JPA Registration ......................................... 12
      6.2.9. Example ................................................... 12
   6.3. Message Authentication Code ................................... 16
      6.3.1. Holder Setup ............................................... 17
      6.3.2. Issuer Setup ............................................... 17
      6.3.3. Issuer Protected Header .................................. 18
      6.3.4. Payloads .................................................... 18
      6.3.5. Issuer Proof ............................................... 18
      6.3.6. Presentation Protected Header ............................ 19
      6.3.7. Presentation ............................................... 19
      6.3.8. Verifier Setup ............................................. 19
      6.3.9. JPA Registration ......................................... 21
      6.3.10. Example .................................................. 21
   6.4. ZKSnark .......................................................... 27
7. Security Considerations ............................................ 27
8. IANA Considerations ............................................... 27
1. Introduction

The JSON Web Proof (JWP) (https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-jmiller-jose-json-web-proof-00.html) draft establishes a new secure container format that supports selective disclosure and unlinkability using Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) or other cryptographic algorithms.

Editors Note: This draft is still early and incomplete, there will be significant changes to the algorithms as currently defined here. Please do not use any of these definitions or examples for anything except personal experimentation and learning. Contributions and feedback are welcome at https://github.com/json-web-proofs/json-web-proofs (https://github.com/json-web-proofs/json-web-proofs).

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The roles of "issuer", "holder", and "verifier", are used as defined by the Verifiable Credentials Data Model v1.1 (https://www.w3.org/TR/2021/REC-vc-data-model-20211109/). The term "presentation" is also used as defined by this source, but the term "credential" is avoided in this specification in order to minimize confusion with other definitions.

3. Terminology

The terms "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", "Base64url Encoding", "Header Parameter", "JOSE Header", "JWS Payload", "JWS Signature", and "JWS Protected Header" are defined by [RFC7515].

The terms "JSON Web Proof (JWP)", "JWP Payload", "JWP Proof", and "JWP Protected Header" are defined by the JWP draft.

These terms are defined by this specification:
Stable Key An asymmetric key-pair used by an issuer that is also shared via an out-of-band mechanism to a verifier in order to validate the signature.

Ephemeral Key An asymmetric key-pair that is generated for one-time use by an issuer and never stored or used again outside of the creation of a single JWP.

Presentation Key An asymmetric key-pair that is generated by a holder and used to ensure a presentation is not able to be replayed by any other party.

4. Background

JWP defines a container binding together a protected header, one or more payloads, and a cryptographic proof. It does not define any details about the interactions between an application and the cryptographic libraries that implement proof-supporting algorithms.

Due to the nature of ZKPs, this specification also documents the subtle but important differences in proof algorithms versus those defined by the JSON Web Algorithms [RFC7518]. These differences help support more advanced capabilities such as blinded signatures and predicate proofs.

5. Algorithm Basics

The four principal interactions that every proof algorithm MUST support are [issue](#issue), [confirm](#confirm), [present](#present), and [verify](#verify).

5.1. Issue

The JWP is first created as the output of a JPA’s issue operation.

Every algorithm MUST support a JSON issuer protected header along with one or more octet string payloads. The algorithm MAY support using additional items provided by the holder for issuance such as blinded payloads, keys for replay prevention, etc.

All algorithms MUST provide integrity protection for the issuer header and all payloads, and MUST specify all digest and/or hash2curve methods used.

5.2. Confirm

Performed by the holder to validate the issued JWP is correctly formed and protected.
Each algorithm MAY support using additional input items options such as those sent to the issuer for issuance. After confirmation an algorithm MAY return a modified JWP for serialized storage without the local state (such as with blinded payloads now un-blinded).

The algorithm MUST fully verify the issued proof value against the issuer protected header and all payloads. If given a presented JWP instead of an issued one the confirm process and MUST return an error.

5.3. Present

Used to apply any selective disclosure choices and perform any unlinkability transformations.

An algorithm MAY support additional input options from the requesting party such as for predicate proofs and verifiable computation requests.

Every algorithm MUST support the ability to hide any or all payloads. It MUST always include the issuer protected header unmodified in the presentation.

The algorithm MUST replace the issued proof value and generate a new presented proof value. It also MUST include a new presentation protected header that provides replay protection.

5.4. Verify

Performed by the verifier to verify the protected headers along with any disclosed payloads and/or assertions about them from the proving party, while also verifying they are the same payloads and ordering as witnessed by the issuer.

The algorithm MUST verify the integrity of all disclosed payloads and MUST also verify the integrity of both the issuer and presentation protected headers.

If the presented proof contains any assertions about the hidden payloads, the algorithm MUST also verify all of those assertions. It MAY support additional options such as those sent to the holder to generate the presentation.

If given an issued JWP for verification, the algorithm MUST return an error.
6. Algorithm Specifications

This section defines how to use specific algorithms for JWP.

6.1. Single Use

Editors Note: This algorithm is going to be renamed and slightly refactored, new name is still TBD.

The Single Use (SU) algorithm is based on composing multiple traditional JWS values into a single JWP proof value. It enables a very simple form of selective disclosure without requiring any advanced cryptographic techniques.

It does not supportunlinkability if the same JWP is presented multiple times, therefore when privacy is required the holder will need to interact with the issuer again to receive new single-use JWP's (dynamically or in batches).

6.1.1. JWS Algorithm

The Single Use algorithm is based on using multiple JWS values, all of which are generated with the same JSON Web Algorithm (JWA) for signing. This JWA identifier is included as part of the Single Use identifier for JWP.

The chosen JWA MUST be an asymmetric signing algorithm so that each signature can be verified without sharing any private values between the parties. This ensures that the verifier cannot brute-force any non-disclosed payloads based only on their disclosed individual signatures.

6.1.2. Holder Setup

In order to support the protection of a presentation by a holder to a verifier, the holder MUST use a Presentation Key during the issuance and the presentation of every Single Use JWP. This Presentation Key MUST be generated and used for only one JWP.

The issuer MUST verify that the holder has possession of this key. The holder-issuer communication to exchange this information is out of scope of this specification, but can be easily accomplished by the holder using this key to generate a JWS that signs a value the issuer can verify as unique.
6.1.3. Issuer Setup

To create a Single Use JWP the issuer first generates a unique Ephemeral Key using the selected JWS algorithm. This key-pair will be used to sign each of the payloads of a single JWP and then discarded.

6.1.4. Using JWS

JSON Web Signatures are used to create all of the signature values used by the SU algorithm. This allows an implementation to use an existing JWS library directly for all necessary cryptographic operations without requiring any additional primitives.

Each individual JWS uses a fixed protected header containing only the minimum required alg value. Since this JWS protected header itself is the same for every JWS, it SHOULD be a static value in the form of "alg:"***" where *** is the JWA asymmetric signing key algorithm identifier being used. This value is re-created by a verifier using the correct JWA algorithm value included in the SU algorithm identifier.

If an implementation uses an alternative JWS protected header than this fixed value, a base64url encoded serialized form of the alternate fixed header MUST be included using the jws_header claim in the issuer protected header.

6.1.5. Issuer Protected Header

The JWK of the issuer’s Ephemeral Key MUST be included in the issuer protected header with the property name of proof_jwk and contain only the REQUIRED values to represent the public key.

The holder’s Presentation Key JWK MUST be included in issuer protected header using the presentation_jwk claim.

The final issuer protected header is then used directly as the body of a JWS and signed using the issuer’s Stable Key. The resulting JWS signature value unencoded octet string is the first value in the JWP proof.

6.1.6. Payloads

Each JWP payload is processed in order and signed as a JWS body using the issuer’s Ephemeral Key. The resulting JWS signature value unencoded octet string is appended to the JWP proof.
The proof value as an octet string will have a total length that is the sum of the fixed length of the issuer protected header signature plus the fixed length of each of the payload Ephemeral Key signatures. For example, the signature for the ES256 algorithm is 64 octets and for a JWP with five payloads the total proof value length would be 64 * (1 + 5) = 384 octets).

6.1.7. Presentation Protected Header

In order to generate a new presentation, the holder first creates a presentation protected header that is specific to the verifier being presented to. This header MUST contain a claim that both the holder and verifier trust as being unique and non-replay-able.

This specification registers a nonce claim for the presentation protected header that contains a string value either generated by the verifier or derived from values provided by the verifier. When present, the verifier MUST ensure the nonce value matches during verification.

The presentation protected header MAY contain other claims that are either provided by the verifier or by the holder. These presentation claims SHOULD NOT contain values that are common across multiple presentations and SHOULD be unique to a single presentation and verifier.

6.1.8. Presentation

| Editors Note: The current definition here is incomplete, the holder’s signature needs to also incorporate the presented proof. |

The holder derives a new proof value when presenting it to a verifier. The presented proof value will always contain the issuer’s Stable Key signature for the issuer protected header as the first element.

The second element of the presented proof value is always the holder’s Presentation Key signature of the presentation protected header, constructed identically to the issuer protected header by using the serialized JSON value octet string as the JWS body. Signing only the presentation header with the Presentation Key is sufficient to protect the entire presentation since that key is private to the holder and only the contents of the presentation header are used for replay prevention.

The two header signatures are then followed by only the issuer’s Ephemeral Key signatures for each payload that is disclosed. The order of the payload signatures is preserved and MUST be in the same
order as the included disclosed payloads in the presented JWP. Non-
disclosed payloads will NOT have a signature value included. For
example, if the second and fifth payloads are hidden then the
holder’s derived proof value would be of the length 64 * (1 + 1 + the
1st, 2nd, and 4th payload signatures) = 320 octets.

Since the individual signatures in the proof value are unique and
remain unchanged across multiple presentations, a Single Use JWP
SHOULD only be presented a single time to each verifier in order for
the holder to remain unlinkable across multiple presentations.

6.1.9. Verification

The verifier MUST verify the issuer protected header against the
first matching JWS signature part in the proof value using the
issuer’s Stable Key. It MUST also verify the presentation protected
header against the second JWS signature part in the proof value using
the holder’s Presentation Key as provided in the presentation_jwk
claim in the issuer protected header.

With the headers verified, the issuer’s Ephemeral Key as given in the
issuer protected header proof_jwk claim can then be used to verify
each of the disclosed payload signatures.

6.1.10. JPA Registration

Proposed JWP alg value is of the format "SU-" appended with the
relevant JWS alg value for the chosen public and ephemeral key-pair
algorithm, for example "SU-ES256".

6.1.11. Example

See the example in the appendix of the JSON Web Proof draft.

6.2. BBS

The BBS Signature Scheme under active standards development as a work
item (https://github.com/decentralized-identity/bbs-signature) within
the DIF Applied Cryptography Working Group
(https://identity.foundation/working-groups/crypto.html). Prior to
this effort, a V1 implementation of BBS
(https://github.com/mattrglobal/bbs-signatures) has been released and
maintained by a community of individuals with notable adoption in
multiple early stage decentralized identity projects.
This JSON Proof Algorithm definition for BBS is based on the already released implementation and relies on the provided software API. A future definition with a different alg value will be created to succeed this version as the BBS standardization effort progresses.

This algorithm supports both selective disclosure and ununlinkability, enabling the holder to generate multiple presentations from one issued JWP without any verifier being able to correlate those presentations together.

6.2.1. BLS Curve

The pairing friendly elliptic curve used for the BBS software implementation is part of the BLS family with an embedding degree of 12 over a 381-bit prime field. For this JPA, only the group G2 is used.

In the implementation the method used to generate the key pairs is generateBls12381G2KeyPair().

6.2.2. Messages

BBS is a multi-message scheme and operates on an array of individual messages for signing and proof generation. Each message is a single binary octet string. The BBS implementation uses a hash-to-curve method to map each message to a point.

6.2.3. Issuer Protected Header

The UTF-8 octet string of the issuer protected header is the first message in the input array at index 0.

6.2.4. Payloads

The octet strings of each payload are placed into the BBS message array following the issuer protected header message. For example, first payload is at index 1 of the array and the last payload is always the last message in the array.

In future versions of this algorithm, there will be additional methods defined for transforming a payload into a point such that additional Zero-Knowledge Proof types can be supported by the holder such as range and membership predicates.
6.2.5. Issuance

The issuer’s BLS12-381 G2 Stable Key is used to sign the completed message array input containing the octet strings of the issuer protected header and every payload. The result is a signature octet string that is used as the initial JWP proof value.

In the implementation, the method used to perform the signing is `blsSign(keyPair, [header, payload1, payload2, ...])` and returns a binary signature value.

6.2.6. Presentation

The holder must decode the issuer protected header and payload values in order to generate the identical message array that the issuer used.

To generate a presented JWP for a verifier, the holder must use a cryptographic nonce that is provided by that verifier as input. This nonce MUST be a 32 byte octet string that the verifier generated by a secure RNG. How this nonce value is communicated to the holder is out of scope of this presentation. The nonce claim in the presentation protected header is used to store the verifier’s given nonce value.

The holder also applies selective disclosure preferences by creating an array of indices of which messages in the input array are to be revealed to the verifier. The revealed indices MUST include the value 0 so that the issuer protected header message is always revealed to the verifier.

The result of creating a proof is an octet string that is used as the presented JWP proof value.

In the implementation, the method used to generate the proof is `blsCreateProof(signedProof, publicKey, [issuer_header, payload1, payload2, ...], presentation_header, [0, 2, ...])`.

6.2.7. Verification

The verifier decodes the JWP issuer protected header and payload values into a messages array, skipping any non-revealed payloads. The current BBS implementation embeds the revealed indices into the output proof value so the verification messages array only needs to include the disclosed messages.
In the implementation, the method used to verify the proof is
blsVerifyProof({verifyProof, publicKey, [issuer_header, payload2,
...], presentation_header}).

6.2.8. JPA Registration

Proposed JWP alg value for BBS based on the software implementation
is "BBS-X".

6.2.9. Example

The following example uses the given BLS12-384 key-pair:

Public:

[179, 209, 122, 60, 230, 37, 188, 86, 19, 19, 4, 36, 240, 230, 79,
178, 230, 147, 9, 60, 239, 41, 233, 167, 190, 252, 154, 35, 39, 201,
238, 73, 77, 228, 20, 47, 109, 174, 15, 168, 187, 145, 126, 85, 83,
151, 48, 30, 13, 237, 92, 179, 124, 181, 211, 204, 187, 222, 229,
234, 182, 94, 60, 157, 19, 148, 162, 48, 185, 134, 177, 168, 68,
115, 167, 48, 92, 181, 168, 53, 52, 246, 201, 112, 103, 23, 159,
138, 225, 13, 165, 171, 251, 112, 163, 96]

Figure 1: bbs-issuer-public-octets

Private:

[72, 125, 227, 97, 150, 148, 186, 145, 110, 46, 135, 232, 104, 204,
128, 242, 73, 151, 72, 162, 0, 54, 139, 146, 221, 137, 34, 74, 1,
42, 140, 206]

Figure 2: bbs-issuer-private-octets

The protected header used is:

{
  "iss": "https://issuer.example",
  "claims": [
    "family_name",
    "given_name",
    "email",
    "age"
  ],
  "typ": "JPT",
  "alg": "BBS-X"
}

Figure 3: bbs-issuer-protected-header
The first payload is the string "Doe" with the octet sequence of [34, 68, 111, 101, 34] and base64url-encoded as IkRvZSI.

The second payload is the string "Jay" with the octet sequence of [34, 74, 97, 121, 34] and base64url-encoded as IkpheSI.

The third payload is the string "jaydoe@example.org" with the octet sequence of [34, 106, 97, 121, 100, 111, 101, 64, 101, 120, 97, 109, 112, 108, 101, 46, 111, 114, 103, 34] and base64url-encoded as ImpheWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI.

The fourth payload is the string 42 with the octet sequence of [52, 50] and base64url-encoded as NDI.

The message array used as an input to the BLS implementation is:

```
```

Figure 4: bbs-issuer-messages

Using the above inputs, the output of the blsSign() call is the octet string:

```
```

Figure 5: bbs-issuer-signature

The resulting signed JWP in JSON serialization is:
{  "protected": "eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2lzc3V1lc15leGtcGx1LiwiY2xhaW1zIjpbImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwiZ2l2ZW5fbmFtZSIiLCJzcnNpZ25hdGljLXVzZXIiLCJwYXlsb2FkIiwiNjIiLCJhY2NldHdvcnkiLCJwaWQieCIsImF1dGhvc2giLCIyIn0,  "payloads": [    "IkRvZSI",    "IkRvZSI",    "ImpheWRvZUBleGtcGx1lm9yZyI",    "NDI"  ],  "proof": "tANC_gnNFFivUloigRQ4VvReBe5n0xJvexzjR9TKyq698TsRhN7UPmS7aww0ME-ZDuafjS1uPpHNGrpGvD71nqFPfFgflPwcIK116DWK9VT0-6_AUGHk-LFGGi3CY3PFWqIoX00A88bNK7N1A2u3A"}

Figure 6: bbs-issued-jwp

The same JWP in compact serialization:

ImV5SnBjM01pT21Kb2RUUndjem92TDJsemMzVmxjatVsZUdGdnHeGxJaxdpWtJ4aGFXMXpJanBiaSwlalHtbH11vUj1iVwCxcbElpd2lamoMwyWlc1ZmJtRnRaU01zSWlWdF1xBHNJaXdpWVdkbEIsMHNJbl11lY0NJKl1rcFFWQ01zSWl1Gc1P5STZJa0pDVXxxWUluMCI.IkRvZSI"IkRvZSI"ImpheWRvZUBleGtcGx1lm9yZyI"NDI.tANC_gnNFFivUloigRQ4VvReBe5n0xJvexzjR9TKyq698TsRhN7UPmS7aww0ME-ZDuafjS1uPpHNGrpGvD71nqFPfFgflPwcIK116DWK9VT0-6_AUGHk-LFGGi3CY3PFWqIoX00A88bNK7N1A2u3A

Figure 7: bbs-issued-compact

For verification a nonce is needed:

[137, 103, 248, 147, 211, 133, 97, 190, 130, 157, 110, 64, 244, 250, 100, 151, 7, 36, 164, 109, 146, 195, 190, 75, 32, 255, 6, 128, 44, 128, 96, 9]

Figure 8: bbs-present-nonce

To generate a proof, the blsCreateProof() method is used with a revealed indexes array argument of [ 0, 2, 4 ] and results in the octet string:
The resulting verifiable JWP in JSON serialization is:
Figure 10: bbs-present-jwp

The same JWP in compact serialization:

```
ImV5SnbJ0l1pT21kb2RIundjeg92TDJsemMzVmxjaTVsZUDgDNHEgJxaXdpWTJ4aGFXMXpJAnBiSW1aAGJXbHNLVj1lVCxbE1pd21aMmwyW1c1zJcTnRaU01zSW1WdFLxbHNJaXdPbWdbkElsMHNJB11YO1NCxrcFFWQ01zSW1Gc1pSSTZA0pDVXxWULuMCI."Ikphesi1" = "NDI.AAUVqOnyMW_gRrCzK7nXgyUydewQQ506276HzUKz41aX9q7qC6-eHGh1GD4Y3ZL91_sA9ibuiK30YbyXY0ym3LEC5LYy2MUNHXd41K9q1P_gE2Y-qzITv
```

Figure 11: bbs-present-compact

6.3. Message Authentication Code

The Message Authentication Code (MAC) JPA uses a MAC to both generate ephemeral keys and compute authentication codes to protect the issuer header and each payload individually.
Like the JWS-based JPA, it also does not support unlinkability if the same JWP is presented multiple times and requires an individually issued JWP for each presentation in order to fully protect privacy. When compared to the JWS approach, using a MAC requires less compute but can result in potentially larger presentation proof values.

The design is intentionally minimal and only involves using a single standardized MAC method instead of a mix of MAC/hash methods or a custom hash-based construct. It is able to use any published cryptographic MAC method such as HMAC (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2104) or KMAC (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-185.pdf). It uses traditional public-key based signatures to verify the authenticity of the issuer and holder.

6.3.1. Holder Setup

Prior to the issuer creating a new JWP it must have presentation binding information provided by the holder. This enables the holder to perform replay prevention while presenting the JWP.

The presentation key used by the holder must be transferred to the issuer and verified, likely through a challenge and self-signing mechanism. If the holder requires unlinkability it must also generate a new key that is verified and bound to each new JWP.

How these holder presentation keys are transferred and verified is out of scope of this specification, protocols such as OpenID Connect can be used to accomplish this. What is required by this definition is that the holder’s presentation key MUST be included in the issuer’s protected header using the pjwk claim with a JWK as the value.

6.3.2. Issuer Setup

To use the MAC algorithm the issuer must have a stable public key pair to perform signing. To start the issuance process a single 32 byte random Shared Secret must first be generated. This value will be shared privately to the holder as part of the issuer’s JWP proof value.

The Shared Secret is used by both the issuer and holder as the MAC method’s key to generate a new set of unique ephemeral keys. These keys are then used as the input to generate a MAC that protects each payload.
6.3.3. Issuer Protected Header

The holder’s presentation key JWK MUST be included in the issuer protected header using the pjwk claim. The issuer MUST validate that the holder has possession of this key through a trusted mechanism such as verifying the signature of a unique nonce value from the holder.

For consistency, the issuer header is also protected by a MAC by using the fixed value "issuer_header" as the input key. The issuer header JSON is serialized using UTF-8 and encoded with base64url into an octet array. The final issuer header MAC is generated from the octet array and the fixed key, and the resulting value becomes the first input into the larger octet array that will be signed by the issuer.

6.3.4. Payloads

A unique key is generated for each payload using the MAC with the Shared Secret as the key and the values "payload_X" where "X" is replaced by the zero-based array index of the payload, for example "payload_0", "payload_1", etc.

Each payload is serialized using UTF-8 and encoded with base64url into an octet array. The generated key for that payload based on its index is used to generate the MAC for the payload’s encoded octet array. The resulting value is appended to the larger octet array that will be signed by the issuer.

6.3.5. Issuer Proof

The issuer proof consists of two items appended together, the issuer’s signature of the appended array of MACs, and the Shared Secret used to generate the set of payload keys.

To generate the signature, the array containing the final MAC of the issuer protected header followed by all of the payload MACs appended in order is used as the input to a new JWS.

\[
jws\_payload = [\text{issuer\_header\_mac}, \text{payload\_mac\_1}, ..., \text{payload\_mac\_n}]\]

The issuer signs the JWS using its stable public key and a fixed header containing the alg associated with MAC algorithm in use.

\[
jws\_header = '\{"alg":"ES256"\}'
\]
The resulting signature is decoded and used as the first item in the issuer proof value. The octet array of the Shared Secret is appended, resulting in the final issuer proof value.

issuer_proof = [jws_signature, shared_secret]

6.3.6. Presentation Protected Header

See the JWS Presentation Protected Header (#presentation-protected-header) section.

6.3.7. Presentation

| Editors Note: The current definition here is incomplete, the holder’s signature needs to also incorporate the presented proof.

The presentation proof is constructed as a large octet array containing multiple appended items similar to the issuer proof value. The first item is the JWS decoded signature value generated when the holder uses the presentation key to sign the presentation header. The second item is the issuer signature from the issuer’s proof value.

These two signatures are then followed by a MAC value for each payload. The MAC values used will depend on if that payload has been disclosed or is hidden. Disclosed payloads will include the MAC key input, and hidden payloads will include only their final MAC value.

presentation_proof = [presentation_signature, issuer_signature, disclosed_key_0, hidden_mac_1, hidden_mac_2, ... disclosed_key_n]

The size of this value will depend on the underlying cryptographic algorithms. For example, MAC-H256 uses the ES256 JWS with a decoded signature of 64 octets, and for a JWP with five payloads using HMAC-SHA256 the total presentation proof value length would be 64 + 64 + (5 * 32) = 288 octets.

6.3.8. Verifier Setup

In order to verify that the presentation was protected from replay attacks, the verifier must be able to validate the presentation protected header. This involves the following steps:

1. JSON parse the presentation header

2. Validate the contained nonce claim
3. JSON parse the issuer header
4. Validate the contained pjwk claim
5. Create a JWS using the correct fixed header with alg value and the presentation header as the body
6. Remove the presentation_signature from the beginning of the presentation_proof octet array
7. Validate the JWS using the JWK from the pjwk claim and the presentation_signature value

Next, the verifier must validate all of the disclosed payloads using the following steps:
1. JSON parse the issuer header
2. Resolve the kid using a trusted mechanism to obtain the correct issuer JWK
3. Remove the issuer_signature from the beginning of the remaining presentation_proof octet array (after the presentation_signature was removed)
4. Perform the MAC on the presented issuer_header value using the "issuer_header" value as the input key
5. Store the resulting value as the first entry in a new jws_payload octet array
6. Iterate on each presented payload (disclosed or hidden)
   1. Extract the next hash value from the remaining presentation_proof octet array
   2. If the payload was disclosed: perform a MAC using the given hash value as the input key and append the result to the jws_payload octet array
   3. If the payload was hidden: append the given hash value to the jws_payload octet array
7. Create a JWS using a header containing the alg parameter along with the generated jws_payload value as the payload
8. Validate the JWS using the resolved issuer JWK and the extracted issuer_signature value
6.3.9. JPA Registration

Proposed JWP alg value is of the format "MAC-" appended with a unique identifier for the set of MAC and signing algorithms used. Below is the initial registrations:

* MAC-H256 uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC and ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 for the signatures
* MAC-H384 uses HMAC SHA-384 as the MAC and ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384 for the signatures
* MAC-H512 uses HMAC SHA-512 as the MAC and ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512 for the signatures
* MAC-K25519 uses KMAC SHAKE128 as the MAC and EdDSA using Curve25519 for the signatures
* MAC-K448 uses KMAC SHAKE256 as the MAC and EdDSA using Curve448 for the signatures
* MAC-H256K uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC and ECDSA using secp256k1 and SHA-256 for the signatures

6.3.10. Example

The following example uses the MAC-H256 algorithm.

This is the Signer’s stable private key in the JWK format:

```
{
  "crv": "P-256",
  "kty": "EC",
  "x": "ONebN43-G5DowZl6jCVPYe0bYd5WbXAG0sL3iDA",
  "y": "b0MHuYFxux3Pj48AyDxAbAc0mPjpw7wEpr3yyrft4",
  "d": "jnE0-9YvxQtlJEKcyUhU6HQ3Y9nSdh0NstYJF7RuI"
}
```

Figure 12: issuer-private-jwk

This is the Signer’s generated Shared Secret:

```
[100, 109, 91, 184, 139, 20, 107, 86, 1, 252, 86, 159, 126, 251, 228, 4, 35, 177, 75, 96, 11, 205, 144, 189, 42, 95, 135, 170, 107, 58, 99, 142]
```

Figure 13: mac-shared-secret
This is the Holder’s presentation private key in the JWK format:

```json
{
  "crv": "P-256",
  "kty": "EC",
  "x": "oB1TPrE_QJIL61fU00K5DpKgd8j2zbZJtgjILDTJX6I",
  "y": "3JqnrkucLobkdRuOq2X0P9MM1bFyenFOLyGlG-FPACM",
  "d": "AvyDP1114xwjrl2iEO16DxM9iPJe_h_VUN5OvoKv9W8"
}
```

**Figure 14: holder-presentation-jwk**

The first MAC is generated using the key issuer_header and the base64url-encoded issuer protected header, resulting in this octet array:

```plaintext
```

**Figure 15: mac-issuer-header-mac**

The issuer generates an array of derived keys with one for each payload by using the shared secret as the key and the index of the payload as the input:

```plaintext
[180, 129, 55, 94, 125, 179, 245, 30, 199, 148, 60, 184, 28, 197, 123, 231, 232, 95, 91, 65, 74, 38, 242, 253, 96, 67, 44, 40, 220, 250, 4],
[143, 172, 182, 156, 184, 138, 228, 172, 215, 26, 175, 137, 137, 25, 159, 141, 213, 12, 214, 29, 231, 200, 13, 94, 116, 22, 41, 115, 72, 214, 57, 98],
[144, 73, 77, 66, 230, 187, 217, 186, 246, 41, 138, 25, 39, 203, 101, 76, 156, 161, 244, 130, 203, 166, 184, 154, 7, 4, 218, 84, 168, 199, 36, 245],
[70, 55, 182, 105, 101, 130, 254, 234, 68, 224, 219, 97, 119, 98, 244, 33, 43, 55, 148, 238, 225, 177, 101, 160, 49, 246, 109, 155, 242, 236, 21, 138]
```

**Figure 16: mac-issuer-keys**

The first payload is the string "Doe" with the octet sequence of [34, 68, 111, 101, 34] and base64url-encoded as IkRvZSI.

The second payload is the string "Jay" with the octet sequence of [34, 74, 97, 121, 34] and base64url-encoded as IkpheSI.
The third payload is the string "jaydoe@example.org" with the octet sequence of [ 34, 106, 97, 121, 100, 111, 101, 64, 101, 120, 97, 109, 112, 108, 101, 46, 111, 114, 103, 34 ] and base64url-encoded as ImpheWRv2UBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI.

The fourth payload is the string 42 with the octet sequence of [ 52, 50 ] and base64url-encoded as NDI.

A MAC is generated for each payload using the generated key for its given index, resulting in an array of MACs:

\[
[156, 53, 90, 125, 139, 226, 60, 168, 100, 220, 79, 255, 8, 87, 28, 220, 237, 112, 161, 91, 39, 68, 137, 203, 92, 243, 16, 116, 64, 129, 61, 172],
[239, 17, 12, 35, 111, 129, 51, 87, 43, 86, 234, 38, 89, 149, 169, 157, 33, 104, 81, 246, 190, 154, 74, 195, 194, 158, 50, 208, 203, 203, 249, 237],
[162, 174, 12, 27, 190, 250, 112, 1, 139, 177, 49, 124, 110, 201, 83, 233, 14, 109, 60, 253, 121, 184, 126, 121, 26, 138, 5, 214, 97, 96, 216, 80],
\]

Figure 17: mac-issuer-macs

Concatenating the issuer protected header MAC with the array of payload MACs produces a single octet array that is signed using the issuer’s stable key, resulting in the following signature:

\[
\]

Figure 18: mac-issuer-signature

The original shared secret octet string is then concatenated to the end of the issuer signature octet string and the result is base64url-encoded as the issuer’s proof value.

The final issued JWP in JSON serialization is:
The same JWP in compact serialization:

```json
eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2lzc3Vlc3lci50bGQ1LCJjbGFpbXMlOls1ZmFtaWx5X25hbWU1LCJnaXZlbiIwZWhuaWwiLCJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiJ9.IkRvZSI:IkpheSI:ImpheWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI:NDI.eKwP5ormlovxxE-GeuvJC_loOscxVyBA7TJWm5k6P3T1gojFpM_o7mqr9mKV_hYBcrvpqHSt09Dq9Uzuj51TymRtW71LFgtWAFxWn3775AQjsUtgC82QvSpfh6prOmOO
```

Figure 20: mac-issued-compact

Next we show the presentation of the JWP with selective disclosure.

We start with this presentation header using a nonce provided by the Verifier:

```json
{  "nonce": "uTEB3711pzWJL7afB0w10HWUNk1Le-bComFLxa8K-s"
}
```

Figure 21: mac-presentation-header

When signed with the holder’s presentation key, the resulting signature octets are:
Then by applying selective disclosure of only the given name and age claims (family name and email hidden, payload array indexes 0 and 2), the holder builds a mixed array of either the payload key (if disclosed) or MAC (if hidden):

```
[156, 53, 90, 125, 139, 226, 60, 168, 100, 220, 79, 255, 8, 87, 28, 220, 237, 112, 161, 91, 39, 68, 137, 203, 92, 243, 16, 116, 64, 129, 61, 172],
[143, 172, 182, 156, 184, 228, 172, 215, 26, 175, 137, 137, 25, 159, 141, 213, 12, 214, 29, 231, 200, 13, 94, 116, 22, 41, 115, 72, 214, 57, 98],
[162, 174, 12, 27, 190, 250, 112, 1, 139, 177, 49, 124, 110, 201, 83, 233, 14, 109, 60, 253, 121, 184, 126, 121, 26, 138, 5, 214, 97, 96, 216, 80],
[70, 55, 182, 105, 101, 130, 254, 234, 68, 224, 219, 97, 119, 98, 244, 33, 43, 55, 148, 238, 225, 177, 101, 160, 49, 246, 109, 155, 242, 236, 21, 138]
```

The final presented proof value is generated by concatenating first the presentation header signature octet string, followed by the issuer signature octet string, then followed by the mixed array of keys and MACs:
The resulting presented JWP in JSON serialization is:

```json
{
    "payloads": [null, "IkpheSI", null, "NDI"],
    "issuer": "eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2lzc3Vlci50bGQiLCJjbGFpbXMiOlsiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUiLCJiYWJlX21lbiI6XCJmdW5jdGlvbi1wcm9jZXRlZC1zb3VyY2UiX3ByZXNlcnQtcG9zaXplZXIiX3ByZXNlcnQtdGltZS10aGUtd2lkdGgubW9kZWwifQ",
    "proof": "foavAqUMZwt0SF7k8I5rw8bu2ss_xmmvAUW2Bczv15VNVwSpbfrNY1QwBp-veEeh2bm8vpWaOAA4yd99hd7nKxl5sD-aKspaI8cRPhnor1Qv9aDrHMVcgQ0YoVpL0U909YKxaTP605q_q-211f4WAXX76ah0rdPQ6vVM7o-dU8qNcvP91-i89G7Ct_8I4Vxz7XChWyde1Ltc8x0Q1E9r1-stpy41uS1xqviYkZn43VDYnyS8gNWXnKXXN1j1ioq4MG776cAGLaTF8bs176Q5tVP15uH5S6ooFimFg2FPBGN7z2YL-6KTg22F3yVqHkKzeU7UxGz2aX9m2b8uwVig",
    "presentation": "eyJub25jZSI6InVURUIzNzFsMXB6V0psN2FmQjB3aTBIV1VOa zFMZSLiQ29tRkx4YThLXMiFQ"
}
```

Figure 25: mac-presentation-jwp
The same JWP in compact serialization:

eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2lzc3Vlci50bGQiLCJjbGFpbXMiOiJsM1siZmFtaWx5X25hbWUi
LCJnaXZlb19uYW1iZWIw2Iiw2IjoiSlBUUmwicGp3ayI6eyJj
cnYiOiJQLTIIiNiIsImtt0eSI6IkJVd1wieCI6Iiw9CMVRQckVfUUpJTDYxL1VPT0s1RHB
Z2Q4ajJ6Y1pKdHFwSUExEVEpYNkkiLCJCJiopM0pxbnJrJrdWNMbm2IjJFJiT3FamWE9OU1N
bgJGWeWVuk9MeUdsRy1GUEFDTD79LCJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiJ9.eyJub25jZSI6
URUIzNzFsMXB6V0psN2FmQjB3aTBIV1VOazFMMZSl1Q29tRkx4YThLLXMiFQ.9IKphei
"NDI.foavAgU0M2zt0SFk815r8Bu2ss_xmmvAUW2czzI5VNVwSpbfNY1QwBP-veEe
h2bm8wpWaoAHidY99hD7nkXiisd-aK5paL8cRPhnoriQv9aDrHMVcQ00yVpuZOj909Y
K1xaTP605qq_2If4WAXK76ah0rdFQ6vVM7o-dU8qcNVp9i-I8qGTcT_8IVxzc7XChWy
dEictc8xBOQIE9ri-stpy4iuS1qyvZKn43VDNYd58gNXnQWkXNI1jlioq4MG776cA
GLsTF8bs1T6Q5tPP15uH55GooF1mFg2FBGN72pZYL-6kTg22F3YvQhKzeU7uGxZaAx9m
2b8uwVig

Figure 26: mac-presentation-compact

6.4. ZKSnark

Editors Note: This is just a placeholder for a future definition that is in the early stages of development as part of the Decentralized Identity Foundation (https://github.com/decentralized-identity/spartan_zkSNARK_signatures).

7. Security Considerations

Editors Note: This will follow once the algorithms defined here have become more stable.

* Data minimization of the proof value

* Unlinkability of the protected header contents

8. IANA Considerations

8.1. JWP Algorithms Registry

This section establishes the IANA JWP Algorithms Registry. It also registers the following algorithms.

TBD

9. Informative References

Appendix A. Acknowledgements

TBD

Authors’ Addresses

Jeremie Miller
Ping Identity
Email: jmiller@pingidentity.com

Michael B. Jones
Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: https://self-issued.info/
Abstract

JSON Proof Token (JPT) is a compact, URL-safe, privacy-preserving representation of claims to be transferred between three parties. The claims in a JPT are encoded as base64url-encoded JSON objects that are used as the payloads of a JSON Web Proof (JWP) (https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-jmiller-jose-json-web-proof-00.html) structure, enabling them to be digitally signed and selectively disclosed. JPTs also support reusability and unlinkability when using Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs).

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 January 2023.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document.
1. Introduction

JSON Proof Token (JPT) is a compact claims representation format intended to be used in the same ways as a JSON Web Token (JWT), but with additional support for selective disclosure and unlinkability. JPTs encode claim values to be transmitted as payloads of a JSON Web Proof (JWP) (https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-jmiller-jose-json-web-proof-00.html). JPTs are always represented using the JWP Compact Serialization. The corresponding claim names are not transmitted in the payloads and are stored in a separate structure that can be externalized and shared across multiple JPTs.

Editors Note: This draft is still early and incomplete, there will be significant changes to the algorithms as currently defined here. Please do not use any of these definitions or examples for anything except personal experimentation and learning. Contributions and feedback are welcome at https://github.com/json-web-proofs/json-web-proofs (https://github.com/json-web-proofs/json-web-proofs).
2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Background

JWP defines a container binding together a protected header, one or more payloads, and a cryptographic proof. It does not define how claims are organized into payloads and what formats they are in. JPTs are intended to be as close to a JWT as possible, while also supporting the selective disclosure and unlinkability of JWP.

4. Design Considerations

The rationale behind the design for JSON Proof Tokens is important when considering how it is structured. These sections detail the underlying reasoning for the approach defined by JPTs.

4.1. Unlinkability

Supporting unlinkability is perhaps the most challenging design constraint for JPTs. Even the smallest oversight can introduce a subtle vector for relying parties to collude and correlate one or more subjects across their usage.

The principal tools to prevent this are data minimization and uniformity. The data included in a JPT SHOULD be minimized to remove potential correlation points. The data SHOULD contain only values that are able to be selectively disclosed with consent or transformed by the proof algorithm when presented.

Any other data that is repeated across multiple JPTs is externalized so that it is uniform across every issuance. This includes preventing the usage of optional headers, dynamic mapping of claims to payloads, changes to how many payloads are included, and the ordering of the payloads.
4.2. Selective Disclosure

While JWPs provide the underlying structure for easily supporting selective disclosure, JPTs must go a step further to ensure that applications can effectively provide choice and consent on exactly what is being disclosed. Software using JWPs must know the mappings from payloads to claims. JPTs do not support disclosing claims that are intended to be private from the issuer to the relying party. All disclosed payloads MUST be mapped to claims and made accessible to the application.

4.3. Familiarity

JPTs are intended to be as close as possible to a JWT in order to provide the simplest transition for any JWT-based system to add support for a JPT.

Although there are some stark differences in the lifecycle of a JPT, from the application’s perspective, the interface to a JPT can be made fairly similar: a JSON object containing a mix of required and optional claims with well-understood values.

The most significant divergence required by JPTs is that of supporting values that may be disclosed or may instead only be a proof about the value. Applications are required to interact with the JPT on a payload-by-payload basis instead of just verifying a JWT and then being able to interact with the JSON body directly.

4.4. Proofs

In order to generate a variety of efficient ZKPs of knowledge, range, membership, or other predicates, it is essential that each individual payload is only a single claim value. This greatly simplifies the task of linking a derived proof of a given claim to the specific payload that was also signed by the issuer. While JPTs support claims that have complex object or array compound values, they also allow for simple claim values such as JSON strings, numbers, and booleans that can be used directly in generating predicate proofs.

5. Claim Names

It is suggested that the claim names used with JPTs come from those in the IANA JSON Web Token Claims Registry, when those fit the application’s needs.
6. Claims

Using a JSON Proof Token requires combining information from two sources: the claim names and the payloads. The simplest solution is to list the claim names in an ordered array that aligns with the included payloads. This claims array can be conveniently included in the JWP Protected Header using the claims key.

When the claims array is stored in the header, any variations of it are disclosed to the verifier and can be used to correlate and link usages. Given the privacy design considerations around linkability it is recommended that the claims are defined external to an individual JPT and either referenced or known by the application context.

In order to facilitate this external definition of the claim names, an additional cid key is defined with a required digest value calculated as defined here. This cid can be used similar to a kid in order to ensure externally resolve and then verify that the correct list of claim names are being used when processing the payloads containing the claim values.

If there is an associated JWK containing the signing key information, the claims key is also registered there as a convenient location for the claim names.

All payloads are claim values and MUST be the base64url encoding of the UTF-8 representation of a JSON value.

The following is an example JWP Protected Header that includes a claims array:

```
{
   "kid": "HjfcpyjuZQ-O8Ye2hQnNbT9RbbnrobptdnExR0DUjU8",
   "alg": "BBS",
   "claims": [
      "iat",
      "exp",
      "family_name",
      "given_name",
      "email"
   ]
}
```

7. Payloads

Editors Note: This section is significantly incomplete, use it only as an indicator of the intended direction.
Application resolves each claim as required when processing the JPT. Resolution can result in one of three things: 1. A disclosed JSON value 2. A custom proof method 3. A null value

7.1. Disclosed

Always an octet string of valid JSON text.

7.2. Proof Methods

* proof methods can be returned instead of a disclosed payload
* these are generated by the algorithm from information in the JWP’s proof value
* a proof method may be custom based on the capabilities of the algorithm
* define common proof method types available?
  - range
  - membership
  - time
  - knowledge
  - linking

8. Example JPT

See the JSON Web Proof draft appendix.

9. Security Considerations

* Protected Header Minimization

10. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

11. Informative References

Appendix A. Acknowledgements

TBD

Authors’ Addresses

Jeremie Miller
Ping Identity
Email: jmiller@pingidentity.com

Michael B. Jones
Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: https://self-issued.info/
Abstract

The JOSE set of standards established JSON-based container formats for Keys (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7517/), Signatures (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7515/), and Encryption (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7516/). They also established IANA registries (https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose/jose.xhtml) to enable the algorithms and representations used for them to be extended. Since those were created, newer cryptographic algorithms that support selective disclosure andunlinkability have matured and started seeing early market adoption.

This document defines a new container format similar in purpose and design to JSON Web Signature (JWS) called a _JSON Web Proof (JWP)_.

Unlike JWS, which integrity-protects only a single payload, JWP can integrity-protect multiple payloads in one message. It also specifies a new presentation form that supports selective disclosure of individual payloads, enables additional proof computation, and adds a protected header to prevent replay and support binding mechanisms.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 January 2023.
1. Introduction

The JOSE specifications are very widely deployed and well supported, enabling use of cryptographic primitives with a JSON representation. JWTs [RFC7519] are one of the most common representations for identity and access claims. For instance, they are used by the OpenID Connect and Secure Telephony Identity Revisited (STIR) standards. Also, JWTs are used by W3C’s Verifiable Credentials and are used in many Decentralized Identity systems.

With these new use cases, there is an increased focus on adopting privacy-protecting cryptographic primitives. While such primitives are still an active area of academic and applied research, the leading candidates introduce new patterns that are not currently supported by JOSE. These new patterns are largely focused on two areas: supporting selective disclosure when presenting information, and minimizing correlation through the use of Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) in addition to traditional signatures.

There are a growing number of these cryptographic primitives that support selective disclosure while protecting privacy across multiple presentations. Examples used in the context of Verifiable Credentials are:

* CL Signatures (https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/562.pdf)
* IDEMIX (http://www.zurich.ibm.com/idemix)
* BBS+ (https://github.com/mattrglobal/bbs-signatures)
* Mercurial Signatures (https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/979)
* PS Signatures (https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/525.pdf)
* U-Prove (https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/u-prove/)
* Spartan (https://github.com/microsoft/Spartan)

All of these follow the same pattern of taking multiple claims (a.k.a., "attributes" or "messages" in the literature) and binding them together into a single issued token. These are then later securely one-way transformed into a presentation that reveals potentially only a subset of the original claims, predicate proofs about the claim values, or proofs of knowledge of the claims.
2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The roles of "issuer", "holder", and "verifier", are used as defined by the Verifiable Credentials Data Model v1.1 (https://www.w3.org/TR/2021/REC-vc-data-model-20211109/). The term "presentation" is also used as defined by this source, but the term "credential" is avoided in this specification in order to minimize confusion with other definitions.

2.1. Abbreviations

* ZKP: Zero-Knowledge Proof
* JWP: JSON Web Proof (this specification)

3. Background

A _JSON Web Proof (JWP)_ is very similar to a JWS [RFC7515], with the addition that it can contain multiple individual secured payloads instead of a singular one. JWP-supporting algorithms are then able to separate and act on the individual payloads contained within.

The intent of JSON Web Proofs is to establish a common container format for multiple payloads that can be integrity-verified against a cryptographic proof value also in the container. It does not create or specify any cryptographic protocols, multi-party protocols, or detail any algorithm-specific capabilities.

In order to fully support the newer privacy primitives, JWP introduces the three roles of issuer, holder, and verifier as defined by the VC Data Model. There are also two forms of a JWP: the issued form created by an issuer for a holder, and the presented form created by a holder for a verifier.
A JWP is initially created by the issuer using the issue interaction with an implementation. A successful result is an issued JWP that has a single issuer-protected header, one or more payloads, and an initial proof value that contains the issuing algorithm output. The holder, upon receiving an issued JWP, then uses confirm to check the integrity protection of the header and all payloads using the given proof value.

After validation, the holder uses present to apply any selective disclosure choices, perform privacy-preserving transformations for unlinkability, and add a presentation-protected header that ensures the resulting presented JWP cannot be replayed. The verifier then uses verify to ensure the integrity protection of the protected headers and any disclosed payloads, along with verifying any additional ZKPs covering non-disclosed payloads.

While issue and confirm only occur when a JWP is initially created by the issuer, the present and verify steps may be safely repeated by a holder on an issued JWP. The unlinkability of the resulting presented JWP is only provided when supported by the underlying algorithm.

Algorithm definitions that support JWP are being done in separate companion specifications—just as the JSON Web Algorithms [RFC7518] specification does for JWS and JWE [RFC7516]. The JSON Proof Algorithms (https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-jmiller-jose-json-proof-algorithms-00.html) specification defines how an initial set of algorithms are used with JWP.

4. JWP Forms

A JWP is always in one of two forms, the issued form and the presented form. The significant difference between the two forms is the number of protected headers. An issued JWP has only one issuer protected header, while a presented JWP will have both the issuer protected header and an additional presentation protected header. Each protected headers is a JSON object that is serialized as a UTF-8 encoded octet string.

All JWP forms have one or more payloads; each payload is an octet string. The payloads are arranged in an array for which the ordering is preserved in all serializations.
The JWP proof value is a single octet string that is only generated from and processed by the underlying JPA. Internally, the proof value may contain one or more cryptographic statements that are used to check the integrity protection of the header(s) and all payloads. Each of these statements may be a ZKP or a traditional cryptographic signature. The algorithm is responsible for how these statements are serialized into a single proof value.

4.1. Issued Form

When a JWP is first created it is always in the issuer form. It will contain the issuer protected header along with all of the payloads.

The issued form can only be confirmed by a holder as being correctly formed and protected, it is NOT to be verified directly or presented as-is to a verifier. The holder SHOULD treat an issued JWP as private and use appropriately protected storage.

4.1.1. Issuer Protected Header

The issuer protected header applies to all of the payloads equally. It is recommended that any payload-specific information not be included in this header and instead be handled outside of the cryptographic envelope. This is to minimize any correlatable signals in the metadata, to reduce a verifier’s ability to group different presentations based on small header variations from the same issuer.

Every issuer protected header MUST have, at minimum, an alg value that identifies a valid JPA.

For example:

```
{
  "alg":"BBS-X"
}
```

4.1.2. Issuer Payloads

Payloads are represented and processed as individual octet strings and arranged in an ordered array when there are multiple payloads. All application context of the placement and encoding of each payload value is out of scope of this specification and SHOULD be well defined and documented by the application or other specifications.

JPAs MAY provide software interfaces that perform the encoding of individual payloads which accept native inputs such as numbers, sets, or elliptic curve points. This enables the algorithm to support advanced features such as blinded values and predicate proofs. These
interfaces would generate the octet string encoded payload value as well as include protection of that payload in the combined proof value.

4.1.3. Issuer Proof

The proof value is a binary octet string that is opaque to applications. Individual proof-supporting algorithms are responsible for the contents and security of the proof value, along with any required internal structures.

The issuer proof is only for the holder to perform validation, checking that the issuer header and all payloads are properly encoded and protected by the given proof.

4.2. Presented Form

When an issued JWP is presented, it undergoes a transformation that adds a presentation protected header. It may also have one or more payloads hidden, disclosing only a subset of the original issued payloads. The proof value will always be updated to add integrity protection of the presentation header along with the necessary cryptographic statements to verify the presented JWP.

When supported by the underling JPA, a single issued JWP can be used to safely generate multiple presented JWPs without becoming correlatable.

A JWP may also be single-use, where an issued JWP can only be used once to generate a presented form, any additional presentations would be inherently correlatable. These are still useful for applications needing only selective disclosure or where new unique issued JWPs can be retrieved easily.

4.2.1. Presentation Protected Header

The presented form of a JWP MUST contain a presentation protected header. It is added by the holder and MUST be integrity protected by the underling JPA.

This header is used to ensure a presented JWP can not be replayed and is cryptographically bound to the verifier it was presented to.

While there isn’t any required values in the presentation header, it MUST contain one or more header values that uniquely identify the presented JWP to both the holder and verifier. For example, header values that would satisfy this requirement include nonce and aud.
4.2.2. Presentation Payloads

Any one or more payloads may be non-disclosed in a presented JWP. When a payload is not disclosed, the position of other payloads does not change; the resulting array will simply be sparse and only contain the disclosed payloads.

The disclosed payloads will always be in the same array positions to preserve any index-based references by the application between the issued and presented forms of the JWP. How the sparse array is represented is specific to the serialization used.

Algorithms MAY support including a proof about a payload in the presentation. Applications then treat that proven payload the same as any other non-disclosed payload and not include it in the presented array of payloads.

4.2.3. Presentation Proof

The proof value of a presented JWP will always be different than the issued proof. At a minimum it MUST be updated to include protection of the added presentation header.

Algorithms SHOULD generate an un-correlatable presentation proof in order to support multiple presentations from a single issued JWP.

Any payload specific proofs are included in the single proof value for the presented JWP, the JPA is responsible for internally encoding multiple proof values into one and cryptographically binding them to a specific payload from the issuer.

5. Serializations

Each disclosed payload MUST be base64url encoded when preparing it to be serialized. The headers and proof are also individually base64url encoded.

Like JWS, JWP supports both a Compact Serialization and a JSON Serialization.

5.1. Compact Serialization

The individually encoded payloads are concatenated with the "" character to form an ordered delimited array. Any non-disclosed payloads are simply left blank, resulting in sequential "" characters such that all payload positions are preserved.
The headers, concatenated payloads, and proof value are then concatenated with a . character to form the final compact serialization. The issued form will only contain one header and always have three . separated parts. The presented form will always have four . separated parts, the issued header, followed by the protected header, then the payloads and the proof.

5.2. JSON Serialization

Non-disclosed payloads in the JSON serialization are represented with a null value in the payloads array.

Example flattened JSON serialization showing the presentation form with both the issuer and presentation headers along with the first and third payloads hidden.

```json
{
    "payloads": [
        null,
        "IkpheSI",
        null,
        "NDI"
    ],
    "issuer": "eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2lzc3V1ci50bGQiLCJjbfGpbXMl0isiZmFtaXV5X25hWU1LCNaxZ1bl9uYWllIiwiZWIhawILCZh2UiXSwidHlwIjoiSBUiIwicHJvb2ZfandrlIj01MjY5MjdiM2liMTI1NTU2MjM4IiwiYWNsXFVpdfU1zMiUkX3VzekVqSjJ0cFR0UK00RVUeXo5MVBIKNKSDJWMCIsInkiOiJjFsfSN5TGosd1dNcHRubUt0TQ2R3PeEjha3ZjcO0TVM5S2dybDHekgzhb1NFIn0sInByZXNlbnRhdGlvb19qd2siOnsiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYiNTIyLCJrHkiOiJFQyIsIngiOiJvQjFUHJFX1FKSUw2MWZVT09LNWU9SS2dkOGyemJaSnRxcE1MRFKWD2J1iwieS6IJNkW5ya3VjTG9ia2R5dU9xWiU1T9EjHtb3cxT9lJQ00ifSwiYWNn1joiU1UtRVMyNTYfQ0",
    "proof": "LJMiN6caEqShMJ5jPNts8oescNq5vKSqfAdSuGJAIlyjyYrfjxpAG0cDJKZoUgomeMuh5fzhrcmzhu2ralRjonnWVsakfxrfm2h7gHxA_8G1wkb09x09Gone2eK9yT41Kw4GP6Rh02PEIAVnhtuiShMnPqVw+WZjyxyJbG86J7Y8MDd2H9fS5hHlwsMlwXy2cbD37mveUEQ2_6whgAYB5ueSQN3BjXEviCA__VX31bhH1Rvc27EYKrHdrgQGwWNtExKz7mwmH8oWipziEtjWJ5Wl1jpee79gQ9HTaQ1Q10bUDvjkkO-jk_zuDJzwh5MhkaQ",
    "presentation": "eyJub25jZSI6InVURUIzNzFsMXB6V0psN2FmQjB3aTBIVVOazFMZ5liQ29tRkx4YThLLXM1FQ"
}
```

Figure 1: jwp-final-presentation

6. Security Considerations

Notes to be expanded:
* Requirements for supporting algorithms, see JPA
* Application interface for verification
* Data minimization of the protected header
* In order to prevent accidentally introducing linkability, when an
  issuer uses the same key with the same grouping of payload types
  they SHOULD also use the same issuer protected header. Each of
  these headers SHOULD have the same base64url-serialized value to
  avoid any non-deterministic JSON serialization.

7. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

8. Informative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May

RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,

[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,

[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, RFC 7519, May 2015,

[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,

Appendix A. Example JWP

The following examples use algorithms defined in JSON Proof
Algorithms and also contain the keys used, so that implementations
can validate these samples.
A.1. Example Single-Use JWP

This example uses the Single-Use Algorithm as defined in JSON Proof Algorithms to create a JSON Proof Token. It demonstrates how to apply selective disclosure using an array of traditional JWS-based signatures. Unlinkability is only achieved by using each JWP one time, as multiple uses are inherently linkable via the traditional ECDSA signature embedded in the proof.

To begin we need two asymmetric keys for Single-Use, one that represents the JPT signers’s stable key, and the other is an ephemeral key generated by the Signer just for this JWP.

This is the Signer’s stable private key used in this example in the JWK format:

```json
{
  "crv": "P-256",
  "kty": "EC",
  "x": "ONebN43-G5DowZX6jCVpEYEe0bYd5WDybXAG0sL3iDA",
  "y": "b0MHuYFsxu3pJ4DAyDXabAc0mPjP1worEpr3yyrft4",
  "d": "jnE0-9YvxQTLJEKcyUHU6HQ3Y9nSDnh0NstYJFn7RuI"
}
```

Figure 2: issuer-private-jwk

This is the ephemeral private key used in this example in the JWK format:

```json
{
  "crv": "P-256",
  "kty": "EC",
  "x": "acbIQiuMs3i18_uszEjJ2tpTtRM4EU3yz91PH6CdH2V0",
  "y": "_KcyLj9VWmptnmKtm46GqDz8wf74I5LKgr12GzH3nSE"
}
```

Figure 3: issuer-ephemeral-jwk

This is the Holder’s presentation private key used in this example in the JWK format:

```json
{
  "crv": "P-256",
  "kty": "EC",
  "x": "oB1TPrE_QJIL61fU00K5DpKgd8j2zbZJtgp1LDTJX6I",
  "y": "3JqnrkucLobkdRuOq2X0P9MM1bFyenFOLyGlG-FPACM"
}
```

Miller, et al. Expires 25 January 2023
The JWP Protected Header declares that the data structure is a JPT and the JWP Proof Input is secured using the Single-Use ECDSA algorithm with the P-256 curve and SHA-256 digest. It also includes the ephemeral public key, the Holder’s presentation public key and list of claims used for this JPT.

```
{
  "iss": "https://issuer.tld",
  "claims": [
    "family_name",
    "given_name",
    "email",
    "age"
  ],
  "typ": "JPT",
  "proof_jwk": {
    "crv": "P-256",
    "kty": "EC",
    "x": "acbIQiuMs3i8_uszEjJ2tpTtRM4EU3yz91PH6CdH2V0",
    "y": "_KcyLj9vWMptnmKtm46GqDz8wf74I5LKr12GzH3nSE"
  },
  "presentation_jwk": {
    "crv": "P-256",
    "kty": "EC",
    "x": "oB1TPrE_QJIL61fU00K5DpKgd8j2zbZJtqpILDTJX6I",
    "y": "3JqnrkucLobkdRuOqZXOP9MMlBfyenFOLyGlG-PPACM"
  },
  "alg": "SU-ES256"
}
```

After removing formatting whitespace, the octets representing UTF8(JWP Protected Header) in this example (using JSON array notation) are:
Encoding this JWP Protected Header as BASE64URL(UFT8(JWP Protected Header)) gives this value:

eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2lzc3Vlicsi5obGQiljbiBFpbumdTaWx5X25hbWUil
CJnaXllblbuYW11I1wiW1haWwiLCJhZ2UiXSwidHlwIjoiSlBUIiwicHJvb2Zf
andri p7ImNydiI6IlAtMjU2Iiwia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJ4IjoiYWNiSVFpdU1zM2k4X3V
ekVgSjJcFR0U00VRvxeoSoMBV1NkS0DJWMClcInkiOiJfS2N5TG5dIdNcHlRubUt0b
TiqR3PE ejh3ZjcStVM5s2ydJHekgzb1NFl0nInByZXNlbmlvdGVhY2E5MjU5NWIw
CoNyNyiLCJrdHkiIo1JFQyIsi1o1JvQjFU0HJFXIFKSUw2MWZVT09LNURVS2dkOGoyem
JaSnRxCElMRKWDZJ1wleS161jNKcWya3VjTG9ia2RSdU9xWIhPUDlNTWxiRnllbkZ
PTH1HbEctR1BBQ00ifSwiYXntjoiUUtRVMnyNTyIyQ

Each payload must also be individually encoded:

The first payload is the string "Doe" with the octet sequence of [34, 68, 111, 101, 34] and base64url-encoded as IkRvZSI.
The second payload is the string "Jay" with the octet sequence of [34, 74, 97, 121, 34] and base64url-encoded as IkpheSI.

The third payload is the string "jaydoe@example.org" with the octet sequence of [34, 106, 97, 121, 100, 111, 101, 64, 101, 120, 97, 109, 112, 108, 101, 46, 111, 114, 103, 34] and base64url-encoded as ImpheWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI.

The fourth payload is the string 42 with the octet sequence of [52, 50] and base64url-encoded as NDI.

The Single Use algorithm utilizes multiple individual JWS Signatures. Each signature value is generated by creating a JWS with a single Protected Header with the associated alg value, in this example the fixed header used for each JWS is the serialized JSON Object ("alg": "ES256"). The JWS payload for each varies and the resulting signature value is used in its unencoded form (the octet string, not the base64url-encoded form).

The first signature is generated by creating a JWS using the fixed header with the payload set to the octet string of the JPT protected header from earlier. The resulting JWS signature using the Signer’s _stable key_ is the octet string of:


Figure 8: jwp-issuer-header-signature

This process is repeated for the JPT payloads, using their octet strings as the payload in the ephemeral JWS in order to generate a signature using the _ephemeral key_ for each:

The first payload signature is:

[171, 17, 93, 97, 129, 118, 193, 36, 150, 14, 229, 113, 60, 60, 114, 243, 240, 152, 229, 218, 124, 218, 120, 150, 103, 43, 110, 177, 204, 182, 28, 156, 72, 243, 36, 140, 160, 218, 241, 207, 27, 106, 88, 133, 72, 43, 12, 143, 224, 43, 119, 76, 96, 216, 245, 111, 233, 39, 131, 244, 158, 53, 210, 69]

Figure 9: jwp-payload-0-signature

The second payload signature is:
Each payload’s individual signature is concatenated in order, resulting in a larger octet string with a length of an individual signature (64 octets for ES256) multiplied by the number of payloads (4 for this example). These payload ephemeral signatures are then appended to the initial protected header stable signature. Using the above examples, the resulting octet string is 320 in length (5 * 64):
Figure 13: jwp-signatures

The final Proof value from the Signer is the concatenated array of the header signature followed by all of the payload signatures, then base64url encoded.

The resulting JSON serialized JPT using the above examples is:
The compact serialization of the same JPT is:

```
eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2lzc3V1ci50bGQICjybGFpbXMl0isiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUICjJnaXZlbi9uYW1lIiwiZW1haWwiLCJhbHdhaWwiLCJhZ2UiXSsidHlwZSI6IjBQIEIsImRldmljZSI6IjBQIEIsImFsaWduXCI6IjBQIEIsInByZXNlbnRhdGlvbl9qd2siOiJyaWVib3Jlci1vdWxkLXNlcnZpY2VsbGllci1hZGJvciIsImlkIjoiZDd3In0.
```

Figure 15: jwp-compact
To present this JPT, we first use the following presentation header with a nonce (provided by the Verifier):

```json
{
  "nonce": "uTEB3711pzWJl7afB0wi0HWUNkLe-bComFLxa8K-s"
}
```

Figure 16: jwp-presentation-header

Which when serialized results in the following octets:

```
```

Figure 17: jwp-presentation-header-octets

And when base64url encoded results in the string:

```
eyJub25jZSI6InVURUIzNzFsMXB6V0psN2FmQjb3aTBIIV1VOazFMZSllQ29tRkx4YThLLXMifQ
```

Figure 18: jwp-presentation-header-base64

When signed with the holder’s presentation key, the resulting signature octets are:

```
```

Figure 19: jwp-presentation-header-signature

Then by applying selective disclosure of only the given name and age claims (family name and email hidden), the proof value including the signature of the presentation header and removing the ephemeral signatures of the family name and email payloads results in the following octet array:
The resulting presented JPT in JSON serialization:

```json
{
  "payloads": [
    null,
    "IkpheSI",
    null,
    "NDI"
  ],
  "issuer": "eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2lzc3Vlci50bGQiLCJjbGFpbXMiOiMzMjQwIiwicHJvb2ZfandrIjp7ImNydiI6IlAtMjU2Iiwia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJ4IjoiYWNiSVFpdU1zM2k4X3VzekVqjJ0cFROUKOU00VRVzeXo5MVBNKMSJWMCISiZkiUJfS2N5TGosd1dNCRubUt0bTQ2RFbeJh32jc0STVMSSdybDJHekgzb1NFln0sInByZXNlbmRhdGlvb19dq3iOIsn1y3J2ioiUCOyNTY1LCJrdHkiOiJFQyIsIngiOiJvQjFUUHJFX1FKSUw2MWZV09iNURwS2dkOGoyemJaSnRxcE1NRFKWDZ2IiwieS16jNkCW5ya3VjTG9ia2RSd0xWihPUDINTWxiRnllbkZPTlHbEcctlBBQ00ifSw1YXwnjoiUIUtRVMYNTY1fQ",
  "proof": "LJMiN6caEqShMJ5jPNts8OesccqNq5vKSqkAdSuGJA1GyJyryfjkkPAG0cDJKZ0UgxmHu5MzyHuS0a0YXVbMB91RjorrWVakfXtmh7gHxJA_8GlwkB09x09k
on2e99gTv4iKw4GF6Rh02PEIAYVnhtuiShMnPqVw1tCBdhweWzjyxJgB6j7Y8MDTzT2H9f5shHIwmsLwxZyCZd37WmvUEQ2_6whgAYB5ugS0N3BjXEv1CA__V31ihBhHRvz7E
YKhrDrgGQwWNtuEkz7GowH8ooWiZplEteJWJ5W1jpeee7gQ9HTa2Q10T9bU0VjYjkkO-
kzubJzW5Mkrcaf",
  "presentation": "eyJub25jZS16InVURU1zNzFsMXB6V0psN2FmQjB3aTBIV1VOaz
FMZSl1Q29tRkx4YThLLXMiFQ"
}
```
And also in compact serialization:

eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2lzc3Vlcz3V1ci50bGQiLCJjbGFpbXMlOSiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUiLCJnaXZlb19uYW11IiwZWhlaWwiLCJhZ2UiXSwidHlwIjoiYWNrSSVfXzAij3Ijpcy5iXWtlcG9pbnFsZXRlc3Rlcl9oZ2ltb3V0X2FueWxlbnQpfQ.

See JPA BBS-X example.

Appendix B.  Acknowledgements

TBD

Appendix C.  Registries

* Issuer Protected Header

* Presentation Protected Header

Authors’ Addresses

Jeremy Miller
Ping Identity
Email: jmiller@pingidentity.com

David Waite
Ping Identity
Email: dwaite+jwp@pingidentity.com