

# The BBS Signature Scheme

# BBS Signatures

What are BBS Signatures??



With a few words...



A digital signature scheme supporting:

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A digital signature scheme supporting:



- Selective Disclosure (multi-message signing)

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- Proof of possession enabled

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With a few words...




A digital signature scheme supporting:

- Selective Disclosure (multi-message signing)
- Proof of possession enabled
- Unlinkable proofs (via a ZKP protocol)





# The BBS Main Timeline




# BBS Scheme

# Key Information






# BBS Scheme




# BBS Signature - Sign




**Note:** You can generate a signature with either one or both the header and selectively disclosable messages!


# BBS Signature - Verify




# BBS Proof - Generate Proof



# BBS Proof - Verify Proof




# BBS Proof - Verify Proof



- Proves **integrity/authenticity** of the **revealed messages**.
- Proves possession of a **signature**.
- **Un-linkable** Proof.


# Benchmarks

- Benchmarks of all the operations for 0, 1, 10, 100, 1000 and 10000 messages.
- When messages are involved 50% of the messages were disclosed in the generated proofs.
- Benchmarks run on a MacBook Pro 2.4 GHz 8-Core Intel Core i9, 32 Gb RAM



# Use Cases

# Privacy Preserving Anonymous Credentials



## The Prover can:


- Prove only their **name** and **age** to the **Restaurant**
- Prove only their **address** to the **Postal Office**.
- Prove only that they **are a student** to the **Library**.

➤ Only send the information that is relative to each Verifier

➤ The Verifiers cannot conspire to discover more information

(each proof is indistinguishable from random)

# Proof of Possession enabled Security / Access Tokens



## From the signers perspective:

- They can issue a single token that can be used multiple times by the prover.
- Does not require key material supplied by the prover ahead of time to issue.


## From the provers perspective:

- Can prove possession of the security token multiple times to different parties (verifiers).
- Does not require the prover to manage key material.
- Can scope generated proofs via the presentation header (e.g a generated proof is only valid for a particular verifier or has a TTL etc).

## From the verifiers perspective:

- Validates the proof back to the original signer in a way that is inline with existing security tokens (e.g via the signers PK), also provides replay attack detection

# Non-Correlating Security Token Proofs



## During Proof Presentation:

- Each proof **cannot be correlated** to each other, the token or the client.
- Uncorrelatability holds even against **coalition between RPs or RPs and AS**.
- A unique **presentation header** is **NOT required** for un-correlatability to hold.

# Why do this work in the CFRG?

- Fits with numerous existing work items already at the CFRG:
  - Pairing Friendly Curves (including the curve we are using BLS12-381)
  - BLS Signatures
  - Hash to Curve

# Call to Action

- Calling for adoption of draft
- We believe it is sufficiently evolved to describe the scheme, however it is incomplete with several outstanding issues to address such as
  - Broader review of the schemes security properties
  - Cipher Suite definition refinement
  - Clarify the extensibility points

# Conclusion

- BBS Signatures is an efficient multi messages digital signature supporting **selective disclosure** and **zero-knowledge proofs**.
- It has a **long line of research** backing it up, proving its security properties and improving its efficiency
- There are **multiple use cases** in which that BBS Signatures can be applied
- Current ciphersuite is based on BLS12-381 curves and xof hash functions (shake256) however, **any pairing friendly curve** and **any hash function** can be used
- BBS Signatures are **extendable** to: blind signatures, range proofs, bound signatures



**Thank You!!**

# References

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- [2] Au, M. H., Susilo, W., & Mu, Y. (2006, September). Constant-size Dynamic k-TAA. In *International Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks* (pp. 111-125). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
- [3] Camenisch, J., Drijvers, M., & Lehmann, A. (2016, August). Anonymous Attestation Using the Strong Diffie Hellman Assumption Revisited. In *International Conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing* (pp. 1-20). Springer, Cham.
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- [5] Pippenger, N. (1980). On the Evaluation of Powers and Monomials. *SIAM Journal on Computing*, 9(2), 230-250.