

IKEv2 Count Based SA Extension

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Problem Statement

Hardware accelerated IPsec:

- Are designed for a fix number of SAs
- SAs that cannot be created result in traffic being rejected.

Simultaneous IKEv2 rekeys result in the creation of redundant SAs

- underutilisation of the hardware component

SAs life time can be expressed using a time or a byte count limit.

Time limit:

- makes limit predictable (over time)
 - it is easy to anticipate the expiration time
- Uniformly randomizing time limit distributes the IKEv2 rekey uniformly
 - and works pretty well

byte count limit:

- are hard to predict - as it depends on the traffic.
 - our implementation checks every 2s which SAs needs to be rekeys
- the randomization does not compensate the traffic bursts

As a result, count bases SA results in multiple redundant rekey

Why we want to use byte count limit ?

- a direct expression of the lifetime of the cryptographic key
- binding the SA life time to traffic is appropriated for device that can be in long sleeping mode.

The document describes an IKEv2 extension the prevents redundant rekey:

- no magic: peers agree who is expected to start the rekey

Initiator

Responder

HDR, SAI1, KEi, Ni -->

<-- HDR, SAR1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ]

HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,]

[IDr,] AUTH, SAI2,

TSi, TSr, N(COUNT_BASED_SA_PROPOSED)} -->

<-- HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH,

SAR2, TSi, TSr, N(COUNT_BASED_SA_SELECTED)}

COUNT_BASED_SA_PROPOSED Notification Data contains for each Transform ID:


- Acceptable count base life time
- Rekey Value (random)

```

      1          2          3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|              Transform ID              |              Rekey Value       |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|              Count Based SA Life Time Minimum Value                    |
|                                                                              |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|              Count Based SA Life Time Maximum Value                    |
|                                                                              |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
                                     ...
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|              Transform ID              |              Rekey Value       |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|              Count Based SA Life Time Minimum Value                    |
|                                                                              |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|              Count Based SA Life Time Maximum Value                    |
|                                                                              |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+

```

COUNT_BASED_SA_SELECTED Notification Data



1. Selection of the initiator for the next rekey:

- The peer with the greatest Rekey Value is designated to initiate the next rekey.
- In case of equality, the current initiator remains the initiator.

2. setting the Hard (H) and Soft (S) count base SA lifetime:

- initiator:
 - $S = X_i * LT + \text{rand}(0, 5\% LT)$ with $X_i \leq 80\%$
 - $H = LT$
- responder :
 - $S = X_r LT + \text{rand}(0, 5\% LT)$ with $X_r \geq 95\%$
 - $H = LT$

Thanks!