MUD (D)TLS profiles for IoT devices

draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-tls-06
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Agenda

- Updates to drafts
- Questions & Comments
Updates to draft

- The middlebox must follow the behavior discussed in TLS 1.3 spec to act as a compliant proxy.
- It is **strongly RECOMMENDED** to not act as a TLS proxy wherever possible
  - Bypass TLS proxy functionality or payload inspection for connections destined to specific well-known services.
  - IoT device could be configured to reject all sessions that involve proxy servers to specific well-known services.
Updates to draft

• Network-designated encrypted resolver (DoH/DoT) required to allow MUD policy enforcement.
Updates to draft (Encrypted Client Hello)

• The middlebox would have to follow the behavior in draft-ietf-tls-esni to disable ECH.
  ➢ It can fake ECH records in the DNS response so that the ClientHelloInner can be decrypted by it.
  ➢ It can strip the ECH record from the DNS response.
    ▪ If the client performs full DNSSEC validation locally, it can detect forged DNS responses.
• Comments and suggestions are welcome
• Ready for WGLC