TLS/DTLS 1.3 Profiles for the Internet of Things draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile-05

Updates

0-RTT signalling for CoAP

- To use 0-RTT, CoAP needs an application profile ullet
- Until -04 we defined the needed signalling extensions (Early-Data Option) and Too Early status code) modelled on RFC8740
- CORE WG <u>did not show interest to use 0-RTT</u> (at least for now)
- Parked the feature in a <u>separate I-D</u> and replaced the section contents with \bullet a "MUST NOT use 0-RTT in CoAP"

Fault Attacks on Deterministic Signature Schemes

- TLS 1.3 "[...] RECOMMENDED that implementations implement "deterministic" ECDSA" as specified in [RFC6979]"
- Fault attacks such as <u>Poddebniak17</u> are challenging the existing recommendation
- Most of these attacks assume physical access to the device ullet
 - Especially relevant to smart cards and IoT deployments with poor or ulletnon-existent physical security

Fault Attacks on Deterministic Signature Schemes (cont.)

- Private key extraction in a safety-critical system is not fun
- Good CSPRNG in constrained / low-end devices is also quite challenging
- Added a recommendation to combine both randomness and determinism, e.g. using <u>draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise</u> if the threat model includes physical / proximity attacks
- o quite challenging ess and determinism

Editorial

MCR's review excerpt:

A long thread at LAMPS two years suggests that the term "Intermediate CA" applies only to cross-certification authority bridges, and the term "Subordinate CA" should be used. That this is consistent with history going back to RFC4949.

=> s/Intermediate CA/Subordinate CA/g

Up Next

1.2 -> 1.3 Feature Disparity Fallout

For example:

- Without renego, we need to come up with sensible recommendations for semi-permanent, mutually authenticated connections that need to rekey and check the associated certificate credentials
 - This is a common use case in industrial IoT

See <u>#8</u>

Waiting on MCR's input

- Client cert validation
- Hiding SNI
- See <u>#22</u> and <u>#21</u>

Timers profiling

- For retransmission during handshake
- For RRC during path probing

See <u>#13</u> and <u>#18</u>