

# OCSP Stapling for EDHOC

Certificate Revocation in Resource Constrained Environments

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
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# Motivation

## PKI

As one more step for authenticating the responder, the Initiator wants to acquire Certificate-revocation information regarding responder's certificate

Initially untrusted Responder might be an adversary leveraging the absence of Certificate-revocation information transport to the constrained nodes




# Motivation

## PKI

-How is this achieved in a constrained environment?

-How can a constrained node acquire certificate-revocation information?




# Motivation

## PKI

-How is this achieved in a constrained environment ? -> Looking into transporting Revocation Information Via a Lightweight Key Exchange Protocol

-How can a constrained node acquire certificate-revocation information ?  
> CRLs[2] ->OCSP[3]




# Motivation

-CRLs[2] --> Too large, Constrained Node has limited RAM and Flash, cannot hold and cross-reference entire CRLs

-OCSP[3]--> Constrained Initiator Queries revocation status of Responder Certificate via an OCSP Request

-What's better ? --> Remove the load on constrained node to perform the request  
-> Instead leverage OCSP Stapling[4]


# OCSP Stapling in EDHOC –



# OCSP Stapling in EDHOC – Staple Request

## PKI

(1) Staple Request :  
initiator appends trusted  
responder list and  
freshness requirement



# OCSP Stapling in EDHOC – Staple Request

## EDHOC\_Message1\_EAD\_1

```
ead = 1* (  
  ead_label : int,  
  ead_value : bstr (staple-req)  
)
```

```
staple-req = (  
  responderID_list : bstr,  
  ? Fresh           : cbor[5] True (unsigned int)  
)
```

ead\_label : Negative label for Critical EAD




# OCSP Stapling in EDHOC – OCSP Request

## PKI

(2) Responder Parses Staple Request found in EAD\_1 to acquire Responder list and freshness

(3) Responder Uses acquired Information to Perform an OCSP Request using  $g_X$  as nonce



# OCSP Request

- An OCSP Request gives a signed Timestamped DER Encoded ASN1 Response -> Size: 1600+ bytes

- No possibility to re-encode at responder side as the initiator needs the response to be signed by one of the OCSP responders in the trusted\_responderList attached in staple request

- A tiny version of the OCSP response needs to be returned by the OCSP responder -> by tiny here we mean C509[6] OCSP Response

- How to signal an OCSP Responder to give a C509 response ?

# OCSP Request

## OCSP Request Data:

Version: 1 (0x0)

Requestor List:

Certificate ID:

Hash Algorithm: sha1

Issuer Name Hash: 90C248EB881AAD4C41E5F8A862CCCD1FC246CA7B

Issuer Key Hash: A176FA3149B9E1C9F640086E4A650E30DC314562

Serial Number: 1001

Request Extensions:

OCSP Nonce: 8af6f430ebe18d3484017a9a11bf511c8dff8f834730b96c1b7c8dbca2fc3b6

PreferredSignatureAlgorithms:

algorithm=rsa-with-sha256-C509


**Preferred signature extension is used  
to specify tiny response**

# OCSP Stapling in EDHOC – Staple Request

## PKI

(4) Responder Receives tinyOCSP response and prepares EAD\_2 staple-response structure

(5) Responder Sends EDHOC Message2 including the stapled tinyOCSP response



# OCSP Stapling in EDHOC – tinyOCSP Response

## EDHOC\_Message2\_EAD\_2

```
ead = 1* (  
  ead_label: int,  
  ead_value: bstr (staple-resp)  
)
```


```
Staple-resp = (  
  ResponseData: tinyOCSP_response  
  SignatureVal : bstr  
  SignatureAlg : unsigned int  
)
```

```
tinyOCSP_response = (  
  response_type: unsigned int  
  responderID:   byteString  
  ProducedAt:   cbor Time  
  nonce:        bytestring  
  certID:       c509 certID  
  cert status:  unsigned int  
  signatureVal: bytestring  
  signatureAlg: cose Label  
)
```

# OCSP Stapling in EDHOC – Staple Request

## PKI

- (6) Initiator receives stapled tinyOCSP response, verifies signature
- (7) verifies producedAt
- (8) verifies certID to correspond to ID\_CRED\_R
- (9) Gets certStatus and decides whether to discontinue EDHOC or not



# Message Size – tinyOCSP Response

-> A tiny OCSP Response is 275 bytes, compared to OCSP of 1600+ bytes,

This gives approximately an 83% reduction of the OCSP response size.

-> the tinyOCSP profile removes signerCert (leveraging ResponderList) from the OCSP response and removes the DER ASN1 structure, instead uses cbor for encoding and C509 conversion of X509 profiles

# Transport Overhead in EDHOC

-> staple-req size in EAD\_1 is determined by length of responderList which can be made NULL in the case of out of band agreement

-> An EDHOC\_MESSAGE2 including staple-resp in EAD\_2 can go up to 700 bytes which is still well within the range for a constrained node to handle



# Implementation

-> Implemented tinyOCSP into openssl 3.0.5<sup>[7]</sup> maintaining regular functionality for OCSP (PR tbd)

->P.O.C extension of Stefan Hristosov's uosocore-uedhoc<sup>[8]</sup> library to handle EAD items that can affect the state of the protocol (Critical EADs) and linked with openssl tinyOCSP to acquire a tinyOCSP response (PR TBD)

->Testing environment uses an NRF52840 as constrained Initiator and Responder is a linux computer.

[7]<https://github.com/openssl/openssl>

[8]<https://github.com/eriptic/uoscore-uedhoc>

# Summary

->Showed a vector and the overhead of OCSP stapling in EDHOC to acquire certificate-revocation information in Resource Constrained Environments

->Introduced tinyOCSP which is an OCSP response profile leveraging c509

# Next Steps

->Two Pull requests to be done

-> Power consumption overhead measurement of EDHOC with certificate revocation vs without.

->An internet draft regarding use of EAD items for certificate revocation (If found appropriate)

Thank you