
draft-ietf-sidrops-rfc6482bis

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





Why a -bis on the ROA profile spec?

I submitted Errata 7079 to document an oversight regarding the presence of RFC3779 *AS Identifiers extensions* in ROA EE certificates.






















Network Working Group Internet-Draft

Obsoletes: <u>6482</u> (if approved)

Intended status: Standards Track

Expires: 11 May 2023

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A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) draft-ietf-sidrops-rfc6482bis-01

Abstract

This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block. This document obsoletes RFC 6482.

The -bis goals:

- Clarify the requirements for presence/absence of IP Address and AS Identifiers X.509 certificate extensions
- Strengthening of the ASN.1 formal notation
- Incorporate all Verified Errata
- Provide an example of ROA payload
- Improve readability
- Maintain full compatibility with what's deployed

IP Address and AS Identifiers X.509 certificate extensions in ROA EEs

- All ROAIPAddress entries must be contained by the IP Address certificate extension.
- On the other hand, the ASID is an arbitrary value set by the IP Address resource holder.
- Documenting that the *AS Identifiers* extension MUST NOT be present, aids future developers in understanding the *ASID* does not need to be contained in the certificate chain.



Feasibility of disallowing AS Identifiers

- There are 0 (zero) ROAs in the wild (out of 134,230 ROAs) that contain an *AS Identifiers* extension in their EE certificate (9-Nov-2022)
- No known Open source CA implementations set the extension in ROA EEs.
- Open source RP implementations either ignore the presence of the extension, or mark the ROA as invalid (if it were present).



Strengthening the ASN.1 notation

```
RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
 version [0]
                      INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
 asID
                      ASID.
 ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE [-(SIZE(1..MAX))-] {+(SIZE(1..2))+} OF ROAIPAddressFamily
ASID ::= INTEGER {+(0..4294967295)+}
ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
 addressFamily OCTET STRING [-(SIZE (2..3)),-] {+(SIZE(2)),+}
 addresses
                      SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress
ROAIPAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
 address
          IPAddress,
 maxLength
                   INTEGER \{+(0...128)+\} OPTIONAL
IPAddress ::= BIT STRING {+(SIZE(0..128))+}
```



Strengthening the ASN.1 notation

```
RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
 version [0]
                       INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
 asID
                       ASID.
                      SEQUENCE [-(SIZE(1..MAX))-] {+(SIZE(1..2))+} OF ROAIPAddressFamily
 ipAddrBlocks
ASID ::= INTEGER {+(0..4294967295)+}
                                          III. 100% compatible with every published ROA!!!!
ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
 addressFamily OCTET STRING [-(SIZE (2..3)),-] {+(SIZE(2)),+}
 addresses
                       SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress
ROAIPAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
 address
                       IPAddress,
                       INTEGER \{+(0...128)+\} OPTIONAL
 maxLength
IPAddress ::= BIT STRING {+(SIZE(0..128))+}
```

Incorporating Verified Errata

- Errata 3166: EE certificate MUST NOT use "inherit" element
- Errata 5881: missing id-ct-routeOriginAuthz
 Object Identifier in ASN.1 notation
- Errata 5609: Table of Contents missing IANA Considerations entry



Appendix B. Example ROA eContent Payload

Below an example of a DER encoded ROA eContent is provided with annotation following the '#' character.

```
$ echo 302402023CCA301E301C04020002301630090307002001067C208C30090307002A0EB2400000 \
   xxd -r -ps \
   openssl asn1parse -i -dump -inform DER
   0:d=0 hl=2 l= 36 cons: SEQUENCE
                                                      # RouteOriginAttestation
   2:d=1 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER
                                               : 3CCA
                                                      # asID 15562
   6:d=1 hl=2 l= 30 cons: SEQUENCE
                                                      # ipAddrBlocks
   8:d=2 hl=2 l= 28 cons: SEQUENCE
                                                         ROAIPAddressFamily
                               OCTET STRING
  10:d=3 hl=2 l=
                  2 prim:
                                                          addressFamily
     0000 - 00 02
                                                         IPv6
  14:d=3 hl=2 l= 22 cons:
                                                          addresses
                               SEQUENCE
  16:d=4 hl=2 l= 9 cons:
                                SEQUENCE
                                                           ROATPAddress
  18:d=5 hl=2 l= 7 prim:
                                 BIT STRING
                                                            address
     0000 - 00 20 01 06 7c 20 8c
                                                             2001:67c:208c::/48
  27:d=4 hl=2 l= 9 cons:
                                SEQUENCE
                                                           ROAIPAddress
         hl=2 l=
                                 BIT STRING
                                                            address
  29:d=5
                    7 prim:
     0000 - 00 2a 0e b2 40
                                                             2a0e:b240::/48
     0007 - <SPACES/NULS>
```



Questions? Feedback?

Please email feedback to

sidrops@ietf.org, or draft-ietf-sidrops-rfc6482bis@ietf.org

or, open issues at

https://github.com/job/draft-rfc6482bis

