https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jr0JaXfKj68
\nI dropped out for a moment there
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:12:19Z"}, {"author": "Alexey Melnikov", "text": "We can hear you Brendan
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:12:49Z"}, {"author": "Alexey Melnikov", "text": "But you might not hear us
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:12:58Z"}, {"author": "Carsten Bormann", "text": "+1 MCR don't break it up
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:13:51Z"}, {"author": "Alexey Melnikov", "text": "@Brandan: Listen to audio/read minutes. I think we had 3 speakers saying against lots of little documents.
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:16:53Z"}, {"author": "Brendan Moran", "text": "Thanks!
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:17:05Z"}, {"author": "Brendan Moran", "text": "That was the whole deck
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:18:02Z"}, {"author": "Henk Birkholz", "text": "ack!
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:18:18Z"}, {"author": "Christian Ams\u00fcss", "text": "Isn't CoAP-over-TCP the baseline for CoAP-over-TLS?
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:31:01Z"}, {"author": "Christian Ams\u00fcss", "text": "OK, I think that's also John's answer.
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:31:12Z"}, {"author": "Dominique Barthel", "text": "@John, you will find a first stab at SCHC-compressed security for CoAP (DTLS vs. OSCORE vs. no security) inEffective interoperability and security support for constrained IoT networks
\nMarion Dumay, Dominique Barthel, France Laurent Toutain, Julien Lecoeuvre
\nOrange Labs, IMT Atlantique, Acklio (FRANCE)
\n2021 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM)
\nFebruary 2, 2022
Getting support in ACME would make a lot of things MCR and I contemplated in IoTSF much simpler :-)
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:36:27Z"}, {"author": "Brendan Moran", "text": "If this fixes my NAS onboarding issues, I will be very happy
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:38:34Z"}, {"author": "Alexey Melnikov", "text": "@Brendan: do you have a clarifying question or are you happy to wait till the end of the presentation?
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:44:32Z"}, {"author": "Christian Ams\u00fcss", "text": "In the IoTSF proposal we had the rough plan to allow entities in the Internet (eg. vendors) to run a (from mixing the terminologies here) \"global site specific\" domain. It gains us usability with today's browser, and loses the assurance that the device is \"local\", but is that even a goal?
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:45:15Z"}, {"author": "Brendan Moran", "text": "Clarification has happened :)
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:45:21Z"}, {"author": "Christian Ams\u00fcss", "text": "(my question can wait to the end, I'll queue up then)
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:45:42Z"}, {"author": "Christian Ams\u00fcss", "text": "\"This is a local device, it will only steal local babies\" ;-0
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:47:35Z"}, {"author": "Brendan Moran", "text": "Christian, that sounds like DANE
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:52:37Z"}, {"author": "Christian Ams\u00fcss", "text": "I explored it from the PoV of constrained devices, but yes, DANE-but-still-getting-you-an-ACME-cert.
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:53:46Z"}, {"author": "Michael Richardson", "text": "Don't try to solve the enterprise case.
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:54:48Z"}, {"author": "Michael Richardson", "text": "DANE doesn't help because the home doesn't have DNS beyond .local
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:55:14Z"}, {"author": "Michael Richardson", "text": "We can use the non-certificate versions of DANE into .local, but browsers don't speak that.
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:55:46Z"}, {"author": "Christian Ams\u00fcss", "text": "I won't hold the queue any longer, but: It doesn't need to be the vendor that provides that service (issuing the certs and doing DDNS), that could be outsourced.
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:55:47Z"}, {"author": "Michael Richardson", "text": "@chairs, I would like to have a design team meeting on this document.
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:56:05Z"}, {"author": "Christian Ams\u00fcss", "text": "If possible please CC me in the invite, I'm not regularly reading the list.
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:56:34Z"}, {"author": "Michael Richardson", "text": "20 years... on an inkjet.... hahahaha. But... yes, on a laser, easily.
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:56:50Z"}, {"author": "Christian Ams\u00fcss", "text": "I'll respond offline to the 20-years-on-market and billions-of-device.
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:56:58Z"}, {"author": "Michael Richardson", "text": "all your yogurt are belong to Wes
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:57:49Z"}, {"author": "Alexey Melnikov", "text": "@Michael: possibly. There is clearly lots of interest in the topic. Henk and I will discuss.
", "time": "2023-03-31T03:58:30Z"}, {"author": "Wes Hardaker", "text": "I meant to talk about inclusion issues with css/js too. so all your yogurt belongs to the peanut butter which belongs to Wes.
", "time": "2023-03-31T04:01:04Z"}, {"author": "John Preu\u00df Mattsson", "text": "Agree that presentation in ACME would be good
", "time": "2023-03-31T04:01:08Z"}, {"author": "Wes Hardaker", "text": "or better, REQUIRED
", "time": "2023-03-31T04:01:30Z"}, {"author": "John Preu\u00df Mattsson", "text": "It the doc decribing the problem, decribing existing solutions, or standardizing a solution?
", "time": "2023-03-31T04:01:58Z"}, {"author": "Michael Richardson", "text": "The problem is not, how do we hack the Browsers, the question is how do we introduce new trust anchors into the variety of operating systems, in a home-user friendly way. Ideally, the browser could be told about restrictions on that trust anchor.
", "time": "2023-03-31T04:03:10Z"}, {"author": "Christian Ams\u00fcss", "text": "Aren't browsers already (at least partially) ignoring what's in the OS store?
", "time": "2023-03-31T04:03:41Z"}, {"author": "Michael Richardson", "text": "@Warren, the captive portal people are basically going in the wrong direction as well.
", "time": "2023-03-31T04:03:44Z"}, {"author": "Wes Hardaker", "text": "@Christian Ams\u00fcss many actually use the OS store, from my understanding.
", "time": "2023-03-31T04:04:07Z"}, {"author": "John Preu\u00df Mattsson", "text": "I don't see why compromised printer is a bigger problem than compromised ietf.org showing a bank login
", "time": "2023-03-31T04:07:39Z"}, {"author": "Christian Ams\u00fcss", "text": "I think the larger issue is what if you have a local compromised ACME server, that suddenly browsers trust, and then it starts issuing bank.com certs instead of printer.local -- and that's an issue of configuring root certs to limit what they may do.
", "time": "2023-03-31T04:08:21Z"}]