DRAFT-OUNSWORTH-PKIX-KEY-ATTESTATION

IETF 116 – LAMPS

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
MOTIVATION

- ➤ CA/B Ballots <u>CSC-13</u> and <u>CSC 17</u> require <u>code signing certificates to be generated and stored in HSMs by 1 June 2023.</u>
- ▶ HSMs today don't tend to support any key attestation format, and where they do it's a wild west of proprietary formats.
- Goal: avoid CAs needing to implement dozens of proprietary formats.
- ▶ WebAuthn / RATS / EAT is not a good fit:
 - > We would need to define a WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format to carry the attributes that we care about for HSMs.
 - Needing to support WebAuthn / CBOR inside HSM boundaries to then put that data into an ASN.1/DER CSR is ... weird.
- Timeline: no way we'll make Standard + Adoption by 1 June 2023, but maybe within the year?

TECHNICAL OVERVIEW


▶ Design principle: "Just an X.509 cert chain with some new v3 extensions".

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TECHNICAL OVERVIEW -- EXTENSIONS

- Still in flux and under debate.
- ▶ We want to put key policy info in a few v3 extensions throughout the cert chain:
 - DeviceInformation / DeviceSubkeyInformation / ApplicationKeyInformation
 - Key Use we'll probably put this in EKU (may need new EKU types)
 - ➤ Key Policies high level, vendor-agnostic
 - ➤ Exportable: true/false
 - Recoverable: true/false
 - ➤ Imported: true/false
 - Detailed key policies in vendor-specific opaque blob vendorinfo.





SUPPORTIVE VENDORS

- **Entrust**
 - ▶ Both Entrust CA and nShield HSM
- ▶ Crypto4A
- ▶ Forntanix
- ➤ Keyfactor

I'm looking for more supporters. I'll be starting a bi-weekly author's meeting after 116.



Adoption?

(I suppose "because LAMPS" this actually needs a charter change?)

(Dispatch? is there a better place than LAMPS?)

