# DRAFT-OUNSWORTH-PQ-COMPOSITE-KEYS/SIGS/KEM

# DRAFT-PALA-KLAUSSNER-COMPOSITE-KOFN

IETF 116 – LAMPS

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#### **CHANGES SINCE 116**

Major overhaul.

2

- Aligned alg combinations with OpenPGP WG, resulting in:
  - Signatures: 14 explicit + 3 generic pairings
    - Hash-then-sign versions of generics added.
  - KEMs: 10 explicit + 2 generic pairings

>ASN.1 modules (mostly) complete and compiling.



- > KEM combiner function is academically-sound.
  - > I published draft-ounsworth-cfrg-kem-combiners jointly with Aron Wussler (OpenPGP) and Stavros Kousidis (BSI), and I piggy-back on that multi-KDF construction here.
- KofN mode draft progressing (Max and Jan).
- draft-ounsworth-pg-composite-keys/sigs/kem -- draft-pala-klaussner-composite-kofn




#### COMPOSITE DRAFTS READY FOR ADOPTION

CFRG:

draft-ounsworth-cfrg-kem-combiners-03

LAMPS: draft-ietf-lamps-cms-kemri



# **SIGNATURES (17)**

- id-Dilithium3-RSA-PSS
- id-Dilithium3-RSA-PKCS15-SHA256
- id-Dilithium3-ECDSA-P256-SHA256
- id-Dilithium3-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256
- id-Dilithium3-Ed25519
- id-Dilithium5-ECDSA-P384-SHA384
- id-Dilithium5-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA384
- id-Dilithium5-Ed448
- id-Falcon512-ECDSA-P256-SHA256
- id-Falcon512-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256
- id-Falcon512-Ed25519
- id-SPHINCSplusSHA256128sSimple-ECDSA-P256-SHA256
- id-SPHINCSplusSHA256128sSimple-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256
- id-SPHINCSplusSHA256128sSimple-Ed25519
- id-alg-composite
- id-alg-composite-sha256
- id-alg-composite-sha512



# **KEMS (12)**

- id-Kyber512-ECDH-P256-KMAC128
- id-Kyber512-ECDH-brainpoolP256r1-KMAC128
- id-Kyber512-X25519-KMAC128
- id-Kyber768-RSA-KMAC256
- id-Kyber768-ECDH-P256-KMAC256
- id-Kyber768-ECDH-brainpoolP256r1-KMAC256
- id-Kyber768-X25519-KMAC256
- id-Kyber1024-ECDH-P384-KMAC256
- id-Kyber1024-ECDH-brainpoolP384r1-KMAC256
- id-Kyber1024-X448-KMAC256
- id-composite-kem-KMAC128
- id-composite-kem-KMAC256



#### **HASH-THEN-SIGN**

- > Currently, PQ algorithms are used without pre-hashing.
- There are situations where hash-then-sign is the preferred path
  - > Performance over large data / large amount of signatures
  - Signing different data when using hybrid approaches
- Informal conversations with NIST indicate
  - > There are no security concerns over the extra hash dependency
  - > SHA256 and SHA512 algorithms should be considered
- We propose the definition of OIDs for hash-n-sign for PQC and Generic Composite



draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-keys/sigs/kem

#### K-OF-N


- > Composite implements the "AND" paradigm.
- There are situations where devices might be able to validate K signatures out of the N present in a composite situation
  - Devices not fully upgraded (limitations)
  - > Switch to a different subset of algorithms (cyclic migration)
  - Implementation issues for new algorithms (agile processes)
- During a transitioning period when the confidence in one or more specific algorithms might be still strong, K of N can provide the long-term confidence
  - Same structure as Composite Crypto, but a key parameter that is used to indicate K (Integer)





#### Draft available for review

- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-pala-klaussner-composite-kofn/
- > Open Questions (need help)
  - > Specify only K ?
  - > Specify Key BitMask (i.e., BitMask w/ 1 or 0 to indicate MUST or MAY) ?
  - Specify K and optionally the Key BitMask?
- Backward Compatibility considerations
  - > Behaves like Composite if Key Optional Params are absent





## **ALGORITHM REVOCATION: THE ISSUE**

- > When multiple algorithms are used in a PKI, there might be many situations where one or more algorithms should not be trusted anymore but others are still trusted
  - Mixed-Algorithm PKIs (e.g., Root, Intermediate, and End-Entities)
  - > Hybrid PKIs (Composite or other)
- Single Algorithm PKIs are Out of Scope (crypto dependency)
- Differently from the normal revocation use-case (individual incidents)
  - > algorithmic failure is a systemic issue
  - Scalability issue with the size of the certificate population
- > We suggest a compact way to provide efficient mass-revocation



### **ALGORITHM REVOCATION: APPROACH**

- A new system could be deployed to deal with algorithm revocation, or
- > We can extend the revocation system in a backward compatible fashion
  - > Add algorithm-based revocation alongside individual serial-number revocation
- An extension for CRLs and OCSP responses can be defined
  - > A list of revoked algorithms identifiers, or
  - > A list of revoked algorithms identifiers and associated start invalidity date, or
  - More complex structures
- No extra procedures needed for distributing the information
- Integrates in today's processes and fit automation requirements



## **ALGORITHM REVOCATION: CALL TO ACTION**

- Scalable, Simple, and Cost-Effective Algorithm revocation procedures are needed to provide algorithm management over time
- The proposed approach provides a mass-revocation mechanism
  - Scalable Independent from the certificates' population size
  - Simple Integrates with current revocation checking procedures
  - Cost-effective Short crypto-periods suggests multiple migrations
- Call to Actions
  - Looking for Collaborators
  - > Looking for Use-Cases that might require more complex solution (did we miss something here?)
- Looking forward to future discussions



#### **OPEN DESIGN QUESTIONS**

Combine into one draft?

> 17 Sigs, 12 KEMs. Too many? Not enough? Debate! GO!

>ASN.1 problems (we need an adult):

- 1. How to carry EC P256 / brainpoolp256 params?
- 2. We need KEM wrapped versions of ECDH-ES (ex.: kema-ECDH, kema-x25519, etc), but they don't exist. With more protocols only supporting KEM interfaces (ex.: HPKE RFC9180), it probably makes sense to define these separately from the composite stuff. I'm happy to co-author if someone else volunteers
- Discussion on the details of hash-then-sign and K-of-N



# Adoption?



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