## Private Attribution

PEARG, IETF 116


**Martin Thomson** 



-----

0000

ata



M BUREAU OF TRANSPORTATION TOKYO METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT Tokyo Motro Co., Ltd. C 2020.0



#### Identifiers

Access cards or credit cards provide a unique user/traveller identifier

Travellers tap the card to enter and exit the system

The distance between entry and exit can determine the fare due

Designing a privacy-preserving system for charging fares based on route is a homework exercise

## Train Tracking

Many subway systems use tracking to monitor usage Traveller identifiers are logged on entry and exit

Cash payments or entry-only tracking (as in NYC, right) provide less information

Queries of logs can reveal system utilization and can inform capacity planning



#### Logs are a Privacy Risk

Logs contain extensive records on the movements of people Each entry includes a time, a location, and an identifier ...and maybe more

Pseudonymous identifiers provide no meaningful privacy protection

## Requirements

Be able to collected **aggregated** information about journeys Protect details of individual user journeys

# Design

- 4 2 4

VERS!

**3 INBORE** 

1.

asiagourmet 💼

nings ridi

VERSICHERUNGEN

MACHT& MODE

1

10 (J) 10 (1)

S COFFEE

A


Grates Pres

STARE

VE

=="\

# You hand the packets to the attacker to deliver



Issue people sealed tokens on entry


...then collect them at the exit

#### **Privacy Mechanisms**

Tokens need to be anonymous (or maybe really low entropy) ...or the token is just another identifier Tokens need to be authenticated ...or people can lie Opening tokens needs to be delayed ...or the timing reveals who it refers to Random delays and anonymizing proxies might work An aggregation system (PPM WG) can be faster

#### Token-Based Design Properties

**Tokens are ephemeral** 



They are returned at the exit and only apply for that trip Users carry tokens from the entrance to the exit The information that a token provides is limited This is generally good for privacy, with some caveats ...but this is inherently inflexible Aggregation can help some of the worse aspects

- Delays
- Unknown anonymity set size



## Attribution

Attribution informs just about every aspect of advertising

Placement Creatives How much to spend Attribution measures events that occur in different contexts to the same person

> DANCE YOURSELF CLEAN HERITARIA



*"How many people saw the ad then came to the show?"* 

13

#### Attribution is More Complex

#### Entering

Happens once per trip

Exiting

Happens once per trip


**Contextual data is irrelevant** 

Showing ads ...or clicking ads ...or decided not to show an ad Happens 0..n times

Purchasing the product ...or just visiting the site ...or any outcome Happens 0..n times

Context is everything

## Interoperable Private Attribution



along with contextual info







G

### IPA: Attribution in MPC

A site gathers events from multiple sites and uses contextual data to formulate a query









MPC decrypts identifiers and performs attribution



#### MDC in IDA

Multi-party computation can perform any computation ... without revealing individual inputs All you need is additions and multiplications ... and money: complex computations can be very expensive **IPA uses a three-party, honest-majority MPC** ...replicated secret sharing provides performance ...and almost information theoretic security guarantees **IPA is mostly generic MPC** Sorting groups inputs by the (hidden) identifier **Attribution is computed over adjacent inputs** 

#### **Differential Privacy**

IPA uses ( $\epsilon$ ,  $\delta$ )-differential privacy to hide individual contributions Sites get a query budget that renews each epoch/week Privacy loss is bounded by time and number of sites involved Each site has their own budget **Budgets are renewed weekly** Goal is to limit privacy loss rate Each query of the MPC uses up budget Sites trade off noise with the number of queries Values for  $\varepsilon$  and  $\delta$  not decided

## Sensitivity Capping for DP

#### **Encrypted identifiers are bound to**

The site that requested them The epoch/week they are requested

The type of event: source (ad) or trigger (purchase)

Sites commit to using a single MPC (3 nodes)

#### Two types of query: source and trigger

Source queries can only contain source events from one site Trigger queries can only contain trigger events from one site That one site expends its budget to make a query Site budgets are split evenly between the two types of query

#### IPA: Advantages and Challenges

IPA offers more flexibility for advertisers than alternatives Contextual information can be selected at query time Less need for special fraud prevention mechanisms

#### Flexibility might hurt accountability

DP provides bounds on privacy loss, but no one understands DP The content of queries cannot be easily inspected and understood

#### **MPC** performance is a challenge

Current implementation has plausible costs at small scale Scaling to meet needs of large advertising businesses is hard

#### Status

IPA is still active research
 Feasibility largely established
 Finer details of algorithms still being worked out
 Meta and partners are running trials

Ongoing work in the PATCG and PATWG in the W3C
Other proposals are also being considered
Protocols will likely go to IETF PPM WG

