ALPN for RADIUS

MD5 IS DEAD
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USE APPLICATION-LAYER PROTOCOL NEGOTIATION

‣ Start with (D)TLS
‣ Port 2083
‣ Add ALPN negotiation
‣ Can do different application-layer protocols

GOAL: remove dependency on MD5
PROFILE: RADIUS/V1.1

- User-Password etc. are encoded as “text”, protected by TLS.
- Message-Authenticator is ignored
- CHAP, MS-CHAP, etc. can still be transported
- No changes to other attribute encoding
TRANSPORT != AUTHENTICATION METHODS

- Proxies do not decode or interpret CHAP, etc.
- Home servers control which authentication methods they support
- Changing the transport method does not change the data being transported
- Avoiding MD5 for client -> server TLS connections means:
  - that session can still transport MD5-related data
  - The home server can still do MD5 hashes on CHAP, etc.
REPURPOSE THE AUTHENTICATOR FIELD

- 16-octet unused field in the packet header
- Add 32-bit request / reply token (extended ID)
- Add flags:
  - Client Security - this packet used secure transport
  - Server Security: Require secure transport for replies
- Implemented in GitHub branch. ~2K diff
CHANGES FROM SRADIUS

› SRADIUS bad, ALPN good!
› Many more cleanups and checks around corner cases
› Many more explanations of corner cases and guidance to implementors
› The document is pretty close to being done