IETF 118 in Prague
Thursday November 9, 2023, 15:00-16:30 (UTC + 1)
Meetecho:
https://meetings.conf.meetecho.com/ietf118/?group=cfrg&short=&item=1
Notes: https://notes.ietf.org/notes-ietf-118-cfrg
Chairs: Stanislav Smyshlyaev (SS), Nick Sullivan (NS), and Alexey
Melnikov (AM)
Four new RFCs.
Ready for RGLC. Needed by IETF PPM WG.
Open questions: GitHub issues #299, #306, #287, and #110.
Ask for editorial reviews as well.
Simon: Is Poplar1 adequately reviewed?
Chris: Not as well reviewed as Prio3, but it will probably stay.
The BBS Signature Scheme is very stable and well reviewed. Working on
Blind BBS signatures, but wonder whether it should be added to the base
document or put in a separate one.
Chris: Does anyone in the IETF need this work?
Vasilis: Interest from outside the IETF, and once published there may be
others.
Orie: It is useful in the COSE CWT.
Unknown: Useful for credentialing system so that you do not need a
separate one for each verifier.
Want to add discussion of indeferentiability.
Jonathan: Still interested in verification without decryption.
Andrey: I rememeber.
Chris: I was interested in indeferentiability, but it is a different
paradigm.
Chris: Do you need both full commitment and key commitment?
Andrey: Full commitement is harder to achieve, so they need to both be
discussed.
Chris: Maybe few choices is better for non-cryptographers.
Many ways to misunderstand and misuse AEADs.
The researchers identify three big theoretical classes, that also allow
to capture most practical attacks: (1) Integrity and Privacy, (2)
Collision Resistance, and (3) Nonce Reuse.
Andrey: What are your future plans? Can you help with
draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-properties?
Alex: Want to look at other primatives, not just AEAD. Willing to talk
about your draft.
One-hot verifiability and path verifiability together thwart a malicious
client.
Chris Wood: What about multiple cooperating malicious clients?
Dimitris: Need to do more investigation about multiple cooperating
malicious clients. The run time would not be increased.
Chris Patton: More flexible than Poplar. Need to finish the analysis.
Improvements in detecting side channels over the network in RSA using
PKCS#1 v1.5.
Chris: What is the function of this draft?
Hubert: Stop using RSA using PKCS#1 v1.5. Also, give something to move
to.
Chris: Ready for adoption call?
Hubert: Yes.
Bob: We have old hardware in aviation industry. Hard to move in those
environments.
Want to make you aware of this work. Build a Merkle Tree, and then sign
the root. Others have worked on similar ideas, and want to bring them
all together in the CFRG.
Chris Wood: Not specific to any particular signature algorithm?
David: Correct.
Orie: A construction similar to this is being used in SCITT.
Chris: Does this make a difference for post-quantum?
David: Want your usecases to consider.
SS: The chairs are planning to announce RGLCs for the two selected PAKEs
soon.