

FIDO Device Onboard (FDO) Update to IETF IOTOPS


2023-11-09 Geoffrey Cooper, Intel Corporation Co-Chair FIDO IOT Technical Working Group


2023/11 – FDO news at a glance

- Implementors "gone public"
 - <u>Dell Edge</u>
 - IBM OpenHorizon
 - Exxon (blogged)
- Independent Implementations

LF-Edge (Intel)	Java/C	X86 focus
VinCSS	Go / C	μProc (ESP32)
<u>RedHat</u>	Rust	Linux focus

- FDO 1.1 specification held steady to help implementors
 - 6 app notes published (1 pending)
 - FDO TPM spec (more later)
 - https://fidoalliance.org/specifications/downlo ad-iot-specifications/
- FIDO Alliance FDO Certification
 - FIDO conformance testing kickoff
 - Certification of implementations started (low security levels so far)
 - https://fidoalliance.org/fido-device-onboard/





How FDO is the same and different from IETF onboarding protocols (BRSKI, SZTP)

Feature	Mechanism	How same	How different
IETF foundations	Transport, Encoding	TCP (TLS)	CBOR, COSE, EAT
Discovery of server	Network discovery. Rendezvous Server.	Escape to use network discovery (RV Bypass)	Application server required, no change to or reliance on network.
Authorization via Supply Chain	Ownership Voucher	One voucher per device	Signed incrementally to each owner, permits routing in supply chain.
Mutual Authentication	Digital Signature	Device Certificate	Server authorized via Ownership Voucher
Encryption	TLS-like	KEX + Encrypted Messages	Implemented in FDO, not in TLS
Onboarding	ServiceInfo Modules	Usually download files, like everyone else	Sub-protocols with base functions for onboarding. Can be extended for custom non-shell applications.
Non-IETF protocols	Stream & Network independence	Runs over TCP most of the time	Can run over non-IP streams (with RV bypass) 5

FDO in TPM Specification – Review Draft

- Review Draft 10/2023 (to be posted shortly to FIDO Alliance web site)
- Standard for Storing FDO credentials in the TPM
 - You do <u>NOT HAVE TO</u> store FDO credentials in the TPM (e.g., if there isn't one!)
- When you DO have a TPM, features:
 - TPM's with credentials in the chip
 - Discovery of credentials (e.g., Linux startup)
 - Determine if FDO has run already (or needs to be run)
 - Use credentials to run FDO, of course!
 - Update credentials to run FDO again
 - Lock access to credentials until reboot
- Basic Security model:
 - System configuration must allow FDO to examine TPM for credentials before system normal startup. Could be BIOS or OS startup scripting.
 - FDO runs, or does not run
 - FDO locks credentials in TPM until next boot

FDO in TPM Specification (2)

- Credentials are separated by security status
 - Keys/Secrets
 - Active flag (whether to run FDO or not)
 - Other FDO parameters
 - Ownership Voucher (optional, used to help TPM chip vendor initialize FDO on behalf of the eventual OS that will run it)
- Classes of credentials are assigned to known addresses in the TPM
- Security configuration for each is specified in the spec

Please read and review!

Thanks for your time