KDF for content encryption

IETF 118
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Summary of the attack disclosed by Falko and Johannes

Attacker intercepts a CMS Authenticated-Enveloped-Data content [RFC5083] that uses either AES-CCM or AES-GCM [RFC5084].

Then, the attacker turns the intercepted content into a "garbage" CMS Enveloped-Data content [RFC5652] that is composed of AES-CBC guess blocks.

Then, send the "garbage" to the victim, and the victim shares the result of the decryption with the attacker. If any of the transformed plaintext blocks match Ht, then the attacker learns the plaintext for that block.
Mitigation of the attack

*The attack is thwarted if the identifier for the encryption algorithm cannot be changed.*

Proposal has three parts:

• Assign OID for an unprotected attribute to indicate this mitigation is being used

• Potential recipients include the OID (no parameters) in S/MIME Capabilities to advertize support for this mitigation

• Encryption with $CEK' = HKDF(CEK, AlgorithmIdentifier)$
Example (1 of 2)

CEK = c702e7d0a9e064b09ba55245fb733cf3

The AES-128 CGM AlgorithmIdentifier:
algorithm=2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.6
parameters=GCMParameters:
   aes-nonce=0x5c79058ba2f43447639d29e2

In hex: 301b0609608648016503040106300e040c5c79058ba2f43447639d29e2

CEK' = HKDF(CEK, AlgorithmIdentifier)
CEK' = 4ae85bd6d45e990a401e5f8fc093d6d2
Example (2 of 2)

CEK = c702e7d0a9e064b09ba55245fb733cf3

The AES-128 CBC AlgorithmIdentifier:
  algorithm=2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2
  parameters=AES_IV=0x651f722ffd512c52fe072e507d72b377

In hex:
301d06096086480165030401020410651f722ffd512c52fe072e507d72b377

CEK' = HKDF(CEK, AlgorithmIdentifier)
CEK' = 474fd8239b7fa5e011862a59465ab369
EnvelopedData

EnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE {
    version CMSVersion,
    originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OriginatorInfo OPTIONAL,
    recipientInfos RecipientInfos,
    encryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo,
    unprotectedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnprotectedAttributes OPTIONAL }

EncryptedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    contentType ContentType,
    contentEncryptionAlgorithm ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
    encryptedContent [0] IMPLICIT EncryptedContent OPTIONAL }
EncryptedData

EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE {
  version CMSVersion,
  encryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo,
  unprotectedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnprotectedAttributes OPTIONAL }

EncryptedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
  contentType ContentType,
  contentEncryptionAlgorithm ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
  encryptedContent [0] IMPLICIT EncryptedContent OPTIONAL }

New OID goes here

Encrypt with HKDF(CEK, ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier)
AuthEnvelopedData

AuthEnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE {
  version CMSVersion,
  originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OriginatorInfo OPTIONAL,
  recipientInfos RecipientInfos,
  authEncryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo,
  authAttrs [1] IMPLICIT AuthAttributes OPTIONAL,
  mac MessageAuthenticationCode,
  unauthAttrs [2] IMPLICIT UnauthAttributes OPTIONAL }

EncryptedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
  contentType ContentType,
  contentEncryptionAlgorithm ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
  encryptedContent [0] IMPLICIT EncryptedContent OPTIONAL }

AEAD Encrypt with HKDF(CEK, ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier)

New OID goes here
Works with all flavors of RecipientInfo

- KeyTransRecipientInfo [RFC5652]
- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo [RFC5652]
- KEKRecipientInfo [RFC5652]
- PasswordRecipientInfo [RFC5652]
- KeyTransPSKRecipientInfo [RFC8696]
- KeyAgreePSKRecipientInfo [RFC8696]
- KEMRecipientInfo [I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-kemri]
Design Rationale

• Use HKDF with SHA-256, and avoid negotiation of a KDF

• If the attacker removes the OID from the unprotected attributes, then the recipient will use a different key to try to decrypt the content
  • The attack fails
  • The recipient is denied access to the "garbage" message content

• If the attacker changes the algorithm identifier, then the recipient will use a different key to try to decrypt the content
  • The attack fails
  • The recipient is denied access to the "garbage" message content
Way Forward

- Publish an Internet-Draft with this mitigation
- Proceed with publication of draft-ietf-lamps-cms-kemri
- Early assignment of the new OID
- Gain development and deployment experience
- Publish as standards-track RFC
- Publish rfc8551bis to require this mitigation (S/MIME 4.1)