#### New Cryptography at the IETF



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Cryptography is a *tool* and often times only part of a solution

Examples:

Public key encryption in TLS ECH, MLS, and OHTTP PAKE in WhatsApp end-to-end encrypted backups Privacy Pass in Apple's Private Access Tokens Signatures with selective disclosure in Verifiable Credentials

Briefly survey high-level features and usage considerations for some new cryptography and security specifications



# **Tool: Public Key Encryption**

#### Purpose: encrypt application data under a public key





# **Tool: Public Key Encryption**

Examples: TLS ECH, MLS, OHTTP / ODoH, DAP

Considerations:

How to authenticate the public key? How to distribute the public key?

Reference: <u>RFC 9180</u> (CFRG)





Purpose: establish a shared secret authenticated by a password



# **Protocol: PAKE**



Examples: Device pairing (Thread / Matter), end-to-end encrypted backup (WhatsApp), secure channel establishment

Considerations:

Would public key authentication be better? Do both parties need the password (for policy enforcement)? Is the attacker able to brute force "login" attempts?

References: <u>draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque</u>, <u>draft-irtf-cfrg-cpace</u> (CFRG)



# **Protocol: Private Aggregation**

Purpose: privately compute aggregate functions without learning individual aggregate inputs





# **Protocol: Private Aggregation**

Examples: Private aggregation (DiviiUp), Exposure Notification Private Analytics (Apple / Google)

Considerations:

How are non-collusion requirements guaranteed? How does the aggregate function fit into the privacy threat model?

How are aggregation parameters configured and distributed?

References: draft-jetf-ppm-dap (PPM)



### **Protocol: Private Authorization**

# Purpose: authorize clients without revealing unique client information





## **Protocol: Private Authorization**

Examples: CAPTCHA solution signal (Cloudflare Privacy Pass), Private Access Tokens (Apple), Sybil attack prevention (Distributed Aggregation Protocol)

Considerations:

What signal is the client providing when authorizing? Are replay and token hoarding attacks a concern?

References: draft-ietf-privacypass-architecture



### **Protocol: Selective Disclosure**

Purpose: selectively disclose a subset of attributes authorized by an issuer





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# **Protocol: Selective Disclosure**

Examples:

- Digital Driver's License
- Proof of Vaccinations
- Redacted Trade / Supply Chain Documents

References:

- draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt
- <u>vc-jose-cose (W3C)</u>
- imda.gov.sg/.../international-trade-and-logistics/tradetrust
- ISO mDoc

# Takeaway



Cryptography is a *tool*, and tools can be harmful

Anti-patterns:

- 1. "How can I implement and deploy the cryptography I found in this new paper?"
- $\rightarrow$  Focus on problems, not solutions
- 2. "We can just plug in <X> and it should be fine"
- $\rightarrow$  Demand formal security analysis when using these tools
- 3. "If we modify things like <X> then tool <Y> will work for us"
- $\rightarrow$  Collaborate with people working on standards!