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# Extended YANG Data Model for DOTS

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# Outline


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- DDoS Attack Trends and Problems
- Potential Solution and Implementation
- Questions

# DDoS Attack Trends and Problems

## ➤ More frequent


- **7.9 million** DDoS attacks happened in the first half year of 2023, **31%** increase year over year.



# DDoS Attack Trends and Problems

## ➤ Hyper-volumetric

- The largest attack in 2023 — **201M requests per second (rps)**, almost 8 times larger than 2022's.



## ➤ High defense costs

- To counter randomly occurring DDoS attacks, **long-term procurement and operation of large-scale DDoS defense resources** come at a very high cost.

# DDoS Attack Trends and Problems


## ➤ More Intelligent

- 50% of DDoS use **more than two vectors**.
- “**Fast Flooding**” can suddenly spike to a high level for a short duration.




## ➤ Hard to detect

- For ISP, Sampling-based attack detection usually takes **more than 1 minute**.
- New types of attacks are emerging, and intelligent attacks occur more frequently, both are difficult to detect.



# Problem 1




For operator :

- Detect attacks in minutes (sampling based)
- Have enough resources

For enterprise:

- Detect attacks in seconds
- Limited resources, can not mitigate Gbps-level attack traffic



# Problem 1

Visibility:

Attack features: A SYN Flood, average packet length is 44

Network telemetry message: pps, bps...

Intelligence: A same attack happened a minute ago

The Enterprise  
(DOTS Client)

The Operator  
(DOTS Server)



Resources:

Devices: Several scrubbing cluster

Capacity: Can filter Tb attack traffic


➤ Original DOTS  
"vendor-id": 32473,  
"attack-id": 92,  
"start-time": "1641172809",  
"attack-severity": "high"

➤ What we need

- Structured attack feature data model

~~"attack-description": "DNS amplification Attack: \ This attack is a type of reflection attack in which attackers \ spoof a target's IP address. The attackers abuse vulnerabilities \ in DNS servers to turn small queries into larger payloads."~~

# Problem 2



- Client needs to know the mitigation capabilities that the server can provide in order to make the right decision.
- What we need
  - mitigation capacity data model, including strategy and capacity

# Requirement: Data Model Extension


## ➤ DOTS Signaling Function

- Issue and response mitigation requests
  - Need attack features for and mitigation recommendations
- Exchange network telemetry information
  - Need more detailed baseline and intelligence
- pre-configuration
  - Need mitigation capacity and baseline
- Registration and certification

# Implementation & Experiment

## ➤ Topology Diagram

- We built a test bed to verify the mitigation effects of DDoS attacks.
- We developed a simplified DOTS client and server.
- We realized the extended data model for transportation using HTTP.
- Experimental scene is same as Problem 1.



Type: SYN Flood



Feature: {

avg-packet-length: 33,

duplicate-message": "xxxx"}

# Experiment

## ➤ Results



- Using the attack features, The time to start mitigation was reduced by **43%**(139s→79s).
- The devices in the test bed have a data forwarding delay of 30s.
- By inference, in the network, **the mitigation time can be reduced from minute level to second level.**

# Questions

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- We were applying DOTS to our collaboration framework but found some important data models(e.g. attack features) that were not yet defined.
- Operators and security vendors are both care about the extended data model, it determines the capacity of co-mitigation.
- For DOTS has concluded, where can we advance this I-D?

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Thanks!