

OSCORE-capable Proxies

draft-ietf-core-oscore-capable-proxies-01

Marco Tiloca, RISE
Rikard Höglund, RISE

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Scope: update to RFC 8613

- 1. Define the use of OSCORE in a communication leg including a proxy**
 - › Between origin client/server and a proxy; or between two proxies in a chain
 - › Not only an origin client/server, but also an intermediary can be an “OSCORE endpoint”
 - 2. Define rules to escalate the protection of CoAP options**
 - › If possible, encrypt and integrity-protect an option originally defined as Class U or I for OSCORE
 - 3. Explicitly admit a nested OSCORE protection – “OSCORE-in-OSCORE”**
 - E.g., first protect end-to-end over $C \leftrightarrow S$, then further protect the result over $C \leftrightarrow P$
 - Typically, at most 2 OSCORE “layers” for the same message
 - › 1 end-to-end + 1 between two adjacent hops
 - Possible to seamlessly apply 2 or more OSCORE layers to the same message
- › **Focus on OSCORE, but the same applies “as is” to Group OSCORE**

Since IETF 118

- › Received comments from Christian Amsüss [1] and Göran Selander – Thanks!
 - › Submitted version -01 before the cut-off for IETF 119
 - › Summary of latest updates
 - Updated and added references
 - Various editorial fixes and readability improvements
 - Fixed notation in the examples of Appendix A
 - Onion CoAP [2] mentioned as use case
 - Considered also the CoAP options Proxy-Cri and Proxy-Scheme-Number [3]
 - Revised escalation of CoAP option protection
 - Revised processing of incoming requests
- } Details in the next slides

[1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/core/9sPP9cAMDO5GFwZ4XeJng_bSnwQ/


[2] <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-amsuess-t2trg-onion-coap/>

[3] <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-core-href/>

Escalation of CoAP Option Protection

- › **Now listed as a point of update to RFC 8613**
- › **Section 3.1 – Revised and simplified escalation rules, with inline examples**
 - An outgoing message to protect includes an option OPT
 - OPT is originally defined as Class U or I for OSCORE
 - Should OPT be treated as if being of Class E instead?
- › **Same rationale as usual: encrypt and integrity-protect whenever it is possible**
 - Three cases are defined, as “Any CoAP option OPT such that all the following conditions hold”
 - If there is a match, the option is treated as if being of Class E, otherwise as per its original Class
 - Added new state diagram in Appendix B; adapted version also in the next slide
- › **Unexpected but good side effect**
 - When no proxies are involved, then Uri-Host and Uri-Port are encrypted
 - Backward compatible with endpoints that do not implement this update

Encryption of Class U/I Options



Processing of incoming requests (1/2)

› Authorization checks before OSCORE decryption

- Already required before proceeding with a forwarding; Christian proposed this addition
- Check if the Security Context is available and in an allow-list associated with the alleged sender
- Preserve location anonymity of an origin server, as warranted by a reverse-proxy in front of it

› Göran: “authorization” is a particular case of something more general

- Revised: “authorized operation” → “acceptable operation”
- Both for a proxy to forward and for any OSCORE endpoint to decrypt an incoming request
- The endpoint decides based on its local configuration and/or authorization enforcement

› For reverse-proxies

- Considered also the Uri-Host and Uri-Port options as Proxy-related options that influence the process

Processing of incoming requests (2/2)

- › **Comply with a special case at a forward-proxy, as noted by Christian**
 - If the request can be forwarded and the target URI authority points to the proxy itself, ...
 - then the proxy has to directly consume the request, see Section 5.7.2 of RFC 7252

- › **An endpoint SHOULD define the maximum number of OSCORE layers that it is able to apply (remove) when processing an outgoing (incoming) CoAP message**
 - Consistent with the application security requirements, also suggested by Christian
 - Bounded by the maximum active OSCORE Security Contexts at the endpoint
 - Bounded by the number of intermediate OSCORE endpoints explicitly set up
 - At a receiving endpoint, the OSCORE decryption fails if the limit is reached
 - Practical upper bound on the loop-based decryption of incoming messages

- › **Updated state diagram in Appendix C; adapted version in the backup slides**
 - We did manage to squeeze in the additions suggested by Christian 😊

Next steps

› Closer look at:

- Processing of the Hop-Limit option (RFC 8768)
- Addition of an outer option, after producing the corresponding, encrypted inner option (e.g., Observe)

› Handling multiple responses to the same request, if also protected by a proxy

- Same rationale and approach as in *draft-ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm*

› Extend the security considerations

› More examples of message exchanges in Appendix A

- E.g., with a reverse-proxy, with a chain of proxies

› "OSCORE-in-OSCORE" named as "Matryoscore" ?

› Comments and reviews are welcome!

Thank you!

Comments/questions?

<https://github.com/core-wg/oscore-capable-proxies>

Backup

Motivation

- › **A CoAP proxy (P) can be used between client (C) and server (S)**
 - A security association might be required between C and P
- › **Good to use OSCORE between C and P**
 - Especially, but not only, if C and S already use OSCORE end-to-end
- › **This is not defined and not admitted in OSCORE (RFC 8613)**
 - C and S are the only considered “OSCORE endpoints”
 - It is forbidden to double-protect a message, i.e., both over C ↔ S and over C ↔ P


Use cases

- › **Section 2.1, CoAP group communication through a proxy [4]**
 - The proxy identifies the client before forwarding
- › **Section 2.2, Observe multicast notifications with Group OSCORE [5]**
 - The client securely provides the Ticket Request to the proxy
- › **Sections 2.3 and 2.4, OMA Lightweight Machine-to-Machine (LwM2M)**
 - The LwM2M Client uses the LwM2M Server as a proxy towards External Application Servers
 - The LwM2M Server uses the LwM2M Gateway as a reverse-proxy towards External End Devices
- › **Further use cases are listed in Section 2.5**
 - Transport indication through trusted proxies – *draft-ietf-core-transport-indication*
 - CoAP performance measurements involving on-path probes – *draft-ietf-core-coap-pm*
 - EST over OSCORE through a CoAP-to-HTTP proxy – *draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-oscore*
 - OSCORE-protected “onion forwarding”, a la TOR – *draft-amsuess-t2trg-onion-coap*
 - Proxies as entry point to a firewalled network

Use cases


1. CoAP Group Communication with Proxies

- *draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-proxy*
- CoAP group communication through a proxy
- P must identify C through a security association



2. CoAP Observe Notifications over Multicast


- *draft-ietf-core-observe-multicast-notifications*
- If Group OSCORE is used for end-to-end security ...
- ... C provides P with a Ticket Request obtained from S
- That provisioning should be protected over $C \leftrightarrow P$



Use cases


3. LwM2M Client and external Application Server

- From the *L2wM2M Transport Binding* specification:
 - › OSCORE can be used between a LwM2M endpoint and a non-LwM2M endpoint, via the LwM2M Server
- The LwM2M Client may use OSCORE to interact:
 - › With the LwM2M Server (LS), as usual; and
 - › With an external Application Server, via LS acting as proxy



4. Use of the LwM2M Gateway

- It provides the LwM2M Server with access to:
 - a) Resources at the LwM2M Gateway
 - b) Resources at external End Devices, through the LwM2M Gateway, via dedicated URI paths
- In case (b), the LwM2M Gateway acts, at its core, as a reverse-proxy



Use case 3 – LwM2M

› OMA LwM2M Client and External Application Server

– *Lightweight Machine to Machine Technical Specification – Transport Binding*

OSCORE MAY also be used between LwM2M endpoint and non-LwM2M endpoint, e.g., between an Application Server and a LwM2M Client via a LwM2M server. Both the LwM2M endpoint and non-LwM2M endpoint MUST implement OSCORE and be provisioned with an OSCORE Security Context.

- The LwM2M Client may register to and communicate with the LwM2M Server using OSCORE
- The LwM2M Client may communicate with an External Application Server, also using OSCORE
- The LwM2M Server would act as CoAP proxy, forwarding traffic outside the LwM2M domain

