

# EAP Multiple Pre-Shared Keys (EAP-MPSK) Method

draft-yan-emu-eap-multiple-psk-00

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# Problem

- The existing PSK-based EAP methods assumed that only one PSK had been configured on a pair of EAP peer and server.
  - > EAP-GPSK [RFC5433]
  - > EAP-PSK [RFC4764]
  - > EAP-SAKE [RFC4763]
  - > EAP-PAX [RFC4746]
- Using a single PSK does not provide perfect forward secrecy [RFC5433]
- Compromise of the PSK leads to
  - > compromise of recorded past sessions
  - > impersonating the peer and server
  - > compromise future sessions




Figure 1: EAP-GPSK: Successful Exchange

The full EAP-GPSK protocol is as follows:

GPSK-1:

```
ID_Server, RAND_Server, CSuite_List
```

GPSK-2:

```
SEC_SK(ID_Peer, ID_Server, RAND_Peer, RAND_Server, CSuite_List, CSuite_Sel, [ ENC_PK(PD_Payload_Block) ] )
```

GPSK-3:


```
SEC_SK(RAND_Peer, RAND_Server, ID_Server, CSuite_Sel, [ ENC_PK(PD_Payload_Block) ] )
```

GPSK-4:

```
SEC_SK( [ ENC_PK(PD_Payload_Block) ] )
```

# Using multiple PSKs is one solution

- Traditional manual configuration of PSKs
  - > lacks automation
  - > less efficient
- Quantum keys generated by a quantum network<sup>[1]</sup>
  - > automatically obtained through a network
  - > offline implanted for mobile devices
  - > easy to get plenty of PSKs
- Using each PSK only once
  - > perfect forward secrecy
  - > compromising a used PSK cannot
    - impersonate the peer and server
    - influence future sessions



[1] ITU-T FG QIT4N D2.2 Quantum information technology for networks use cases: Quantum key distribution network

# Existing works related to multiple PSKs

- Existing works supporting the negotiation among multiple PSKs
  - > TLS [RFC 8446]
  - > IPsec [RFC 8784, draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-qr-alt-09]
- Existing methods of storing and transferring PSKs
  - > RFC 6030
  - > RFC 6031

# Key Management Issue: PSK identity collisions

- Different PSK configuration manners:
  - > traditional manual configuration
  - > obtained through quantum key generators
- Lack of a unified plan for PSK IDs
  - > in different configuration methods
  - > even among different quantum key generators
- Two PSK identities may clash
- Multiple PSKs should be managed by category
  - > classified by the key producer

# Future work

- We plan to modify the EAP-GPSK to support the negotiation of a PSK among multiple PSKs.
- The details of the negotiation needs to be discussed.
- It can be negotiated by
  - > a key list, such as TLS [RFC 8446]
  - > a key ID, such as IPSec [RFC 8784]

# Thank you!

## Questions?

Anyone interested to collaborate on the draft ?