

# **A Path Verification Solution based on SRv6**

draft-jliu-tpp-srv6-00

Brisbane Meeting @ IETF 119, March 2024

Jun Liu

Tsinghua University

# Contents

- What is Path Verification for?
- Existing works.
- Path Verification Solution on SRv6.
- Core Use Case.

# What is Path Verification for?

- **Packet tampering and source spoofing.**
- **Path deviation.**
  - Router hop pass.
  - Router addition.
  - Out-of-order forwarding.
- **Denial of Service (DoS).**
- **Privacy leak.**

# Existing works-Two ways

- **Verifying the planned paths– if it is trusted and authorized.**
  - [ICING] Naous, J., "Verifying and enforcing network paths with ICING", 2011.
  - [OPT] Kim, T H J., "Lightweight source authentication and path validation", 2014.
- **Verifying the traversed paths-if the packet has actually traversed.**
  - [PPV] Wu, B., "Enabling efficient source and path verification via probabilistic packet marking", 2018.
  - [RFL] Wu, B., "Robust and lightweight fault localization", 2017.

**New Challenge:** Ensure that the integrity of the original path is not destroyed when the network flow is forwarded by untrusted nodes

# Terminology

- MAC: Message Authentication Code, a technology to confirm the integrity and conduct certification.
- SRH: [\[RFC8754\]](#)Source Routing Head.
- SRv6: [\[RFC8986\]](#)Segment Routing over IPv6.
- Dos: Denial of Service.
- Tag: Mark a packet as part of a class or group of packets. This field Initialized with a timestamp value to represent a unique session.
- Segments Left: Number of remaining routing segments, defined in [\[RFC8200\]](#) Section 4.4.
- SID: the label of the intermediate router.
- SL: Segments List, an ordered list of SID.
- IR: Intermediate Router, routers participating in packet forwarding in the path.

# Path Verification Solution on SRv6

Handle the predetermined forwarding path risks caused by untrusted intermediate routers.

The specific functional goals are as follows:


- **Source and path verification.**

- Extends the existing SRv6 routing header .
- Lightweight operations.

- **Privacy protection.**

- **Fault localization.**

- Provides distributed path verification and centralization-based fault localization.



**SR-TPP Process**

Reduce the header overhead and introduce privacy protection in the path verification mechanism.


# Initialization

- **Path Initialization.**


- Use the local key of each SR router and the path creation time-->generate the session key using hash function with session initiation timestamp.
- Notify the sender of the session key and IP address of the entire path.

- **Package Initialization.**

- Initialize the Tag field of the SRH when the path was created.
- Generate its SID and write into the Segment List(SL) .
- Calculate MAC(SID) and insert into SL for subsequent SID generation.



SRv6 header format



Path Initialization Process

# Verification

- **Path Initialization Key generation.**

- ❑ Intermediate Router (IR) computes the session key using the IR's local key and timestamp.
- ❑ The key generation is stateless.

- **Upstream verification.**


- ❑ IR generates a MAC with the partial segment list from the packet Header and the payload.
- ❑ Verifies SL and update by upstream router.

- **Obtain downstream IP address.**

- ❑ IR then parses the SID with K to obtain the IPv6 address of its downstream router.

- **Replace header.**

- ❑ router replaces the source and destination field of IPv6 Header with itself IPv6 address and its downstream router's IPv6 address.



**Path Verification Process**



# Fault location&Security Analysis


- **Fault location.**

- Payload alteration by the upstream router.
- Malicious redirection by other routers.

- **Security Analysis.**

- Packet alteration.
- Path deviation.
- Denial-of-Service (DoS).
- Privacy leaks.

# Core Use Case: Proof of TPP-processing



\*DELL XPS (IntelCorei 79700, 3GHZ, 8core, 16GB, Ubuntu)

# Normative References

- [RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200, DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>>.
- [RFC8754] Filshill, C., Ed., Dukes, D., Ed., Previdi, S., Leddy, J., Matsushima, S., and D. Voyer, "IPv6 Segment Routing Header (SRH)", RFC 8754, DOI 10.17487/RFC8754, March 2020, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8754>>.
- [RFC8986] Filshill, C., Ed., Camarillo, P., Ed., Leddy, J., Voyer, D., Matsushima, S., and Z. Li, "Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6) Network Programming", RFC 8986, DOI 10.17487/RFC8986, February 2021, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8986>>.

Path Verification solution on SRv6  
Thank you! Questions?

Brisbane Meeting @ IETF 119, March 2024

Jun Liu

[juneliu@tsinghua.edu.cn](mailto:juneliu@tsinghua.edu.cn)

draft-jliu-tpv-srv6-00