STIR for MLS
IETF 119 (Brisbane)
STIR WG
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STIR for (Secure) Messaging

• -01 draft by myself and Richard Barnes
  • Sort of a sequel to a recently-advanced draft about the application of STIR to messaging (now RFC9475), especially messaging sessions (including RCS)
• Recent talk about integrating Message Layer Security (MLS, RFC9420) into RCS has made for a potentially interesting interaction here
  • MLS is also in play in the work in MIMI
  • Lots of messaging still uses telephone numbers as identifiers
  • Be nice if MLS had a story for telephone number identifiers
• Our -01 draft specifies two (and a half) approaches
Approach 1: Certs

• Define an MLS Credential Type for RFC8226 certificates
  • MLS already has a credential type for X.509, so this new Type is specific to X.509 certs with the TNAuthList extension

• Note that this could work for either TNAuthLists with SPCs or TNs – including individual TNs
  • Note however that with SPC certs, they don’t communicate any specific TN
    • Basically, it would be up to the application using MLS to communicate the identifier of a group member
      • The assurance to groups would be “carrier A asserts the user’s TN”
  • With individual TNs, say via delegate certs, this would have similar properties to SIPBRANDY
    • This is probably the most secure mode overall for integration

• Properties of SPC vs. TNs certs are fairly different – but not so different that we propose them as different MLS Credential Types
Approach 2: PASSporTs

- Define an MLS Credential Type for PASSporTs (RFC8225)
  - PASSporTs makes it explicit which identifier to use for a group member – the “orig” value of the PASSporT
    - Also, we can RCD etc to provide additional information about the group member for the application using MLS
  - The “mky” PASSporT claim can carry a hash over a public key used for MLS
    - Note however that if the PASSporT is signed by an SPC cert, the security association is with the SPC-cert holder (e.g. carrier), not the end user device as such
- PASSporT expiry would need to be handled carefully – message sessions can be long-lived
Relationship to mimi-identity

• Some preliminary work has been done in the MIMI group on how identity should be asserted
  • Currently description is good for Service Specific Identifiers, but the present doc may help with how TNs might be asserted as identities in MIMI

• More coordination and integration to be done in all this

• Also relates to the discovery problem in MIMI
  • Broadly, why we should trust that a given messaging provider is an appropriate route for messages to a telephone number
  • Interested people could look at my draft-peterson-mimi-idprover
    • Does some ACME integration for proof-of-possession of telephone numbers
Next steps

• Obviously there’s plenty to flesh out here
  • Probably much will hinge on what MLS integration for RCS ends up looking like
  • More work to be done in MIMI

• Perhaps too early for adoption still