# ML-KEM for TLS 1.3

## draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement

<u>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement/</u> <u>https://github.com/dconnolly/draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement</u>

## A pure-PQ ciphersuite for TLS 1.3

- No purely post-quantum ciphersuites
- Fills in the other side of draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design
- ML-KEM-1024 supports TLS users who need to comply with the CNSA
  2.0 draft: no hybrid, NIST security level V, FIPS-approved algorithm
- Clean key agreement, no hybrid duplicate shares or mixing and matching logic, if PQ-only works for your applications

## New NamedGroups: MLKEM768, MLKEM1024



### Client sends encaps key, server replies with ciphertext

#### struct {

```
NamedGroup group;
opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
} KeyShareEntry;
```

These are transmitted in the `extension\_data` fields of `KeyShareClientHello` and `KeyShareServerHello` extensions:

#### struct {


KeyShareEntry client\_shares<0..2^16-1>;
} KeyShareClientHello;

struct {
 KeyShareEntry server\_share;
} KeyShareServerHello;

 $\sim \sim \sim$ 

NNN

#### KEM shared secret is input to Handshake Secret derivation



## FAQs

#### Should this be Recommended = Y?

I don't think so, at least not yet. It should be optional

#### What about PQ signatures too?

Let's do key agreement in one document and signatures in another: the signatures are big and may be much harder to design into TLS 1.3 than KEM key agreement.

#### Isn't this too early?

Considering the long timelines for adoption, I don't think so

#### Just use hybrid!

Some users cannot use hybrid, and some will not do more than one PQ transition. Having a PQ-only option seems necessary eventually, let's make a start

#### I don't trust PQ crypto, it's too young!

CRYSTALS-Kyber was published <u>7 years ago</u>, LWE schemes are <u>older</u> than <u>that</u>. Elliptic curves were first published in ~1985, wg adopted for TLS in *1998*, NIST curves standardized in 1999, RFC in *2006*! We're older and wiser now, but even so this timeline seems in line with major crypto assumption changes in TLS in the past.

## **Questions?**

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