IETF 120 LSR Minutes

Chairs:
Acee Lindem (acee.ietf@gmail.com)
Chris Hopps (chopps@chopps.org)
Yingzhen Qu (yingzhen.ietf@gmail.com)

WG Page: https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/lsr/about/
Materials: https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/120/session/lsr

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Friday Session I 9:30 - 11:30, July 26, 2024

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  1. 09:30
    Meeting Administrivia and WG Update
    Chairs (10 mins)

  2. 09:40

    IS-IS Distributed Flooding Reduction

    https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lsr-distoptflood/history/

    Tony P (10 mins)

  1. 09:50
    ### Optional IS-IS Fragment Timestamping {#optional-is-is-fragment-timestamping}

    https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rigatoni-lsr-isis-fragment-timestamping/

    Tony P (10 mins)

  1. 10:00
    ### Improved OSPF Database Exchange Procedure {#improved-ospf-database-exchange-procedure}

    https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hegde-lsr-ospf-better-idbx/
    Acee Lindem (10 mins)

  1. 10:10
    ### OSPF Adjacency Suppression {#ospf-adjacency-suppression}

    https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-cheng-lsr-ospf-adjacency-suppress/

    Liyan Gong/Changwang Lin

  1. 10:20
    ### IGP-based Source Address Validation in Intra-domain Networks {#igp-based-source-address-validation-in-intra-domain-networks}

    https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-li-lsr-igp-based-intra-domain-savnet/

    Lancheng Qin

  1. 10:30
    ### IGP Reverse Metric Algorithm {#igp-reverse-metric-algorithm}

    https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ppsenak-lsr-igp-reverse-spf-algo/

    Les Ginsberg

  1. 10:40
    ### IGP Extensions for Optimized SRv6 SID Advertisement {#igp-extensions-for-optimized-srv6-sid-advertisement}

    https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-cheng-lsr-extension-opt-srv6-sid-adv/

    Liyan Gong/Weiqiang Cheng

  1. 10:50
    ### IGP Color-Aware Shortcut {#igp-color-aware-shortcut}

    https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-cheng-lsr-igp-shortcut-enhancement-04

    Changwang Lin

Chat History:

Jeffrey Haas
00:04:25

Yingzhen is quiet at the speaker mic. Is that mic actually on?

Christian Hopps
00:05:46

I can hear OK, quieter than Acee, but still audible for me

Jeffrey Haas
00:06:06

Either the gain is turned down too low, or she's being picked up by the
chairs' mic.

Jeffrey Haas
00:06:14

@meetecho could you check

Christian Hopps
00:06:31

definitely sounds different for me

Christian Hopps
00:06:48

sounds like she's talking directly into the mic in front of her for me

Lorenzo Miniero
00:07:09

We've raised the gain a bit, is it better?

Christian Hopps
00:07:17

maybe the mic isn't getting mixed into all the right channels?

Jeffrey Haas
00:09:12

not really much better. given how close they are to the mic, I think
it's simply off.

Christian Hopps
00:09:22

It's definitely not off

Christian Hopps
00:09:33

I'm hearing it just fine Jeff, and I'm remote :)

Yingzhen Qu
00:09:49

the mic is on

Yingzhen Qu
00:09:56

how about now?

Christian Hopps
00:10:06

It's still fin Yingzhen

Christian Hopps
00:10:48

Something is wrong with the audio going to Jeff's setup or on his setup
\:)

Jeffrey Haas
00:11:01

I'm similarly remote. chair mic is a blast, tony is only ok.

Jeffrey Haas
00:11:27

it's audible, just not as loud as I'd expect. so consider me an outlier.

Dan Voyer
00:31:26

I'm told that the audio is not that great, did we raise this somewhere ?

Padma Pillay-Esnault
00:33:20

FYI Yingzhen you are barely audible at the back of the room

David Lamparter
00:34:06

coin flip >_<

Yingzhen Qu
00:35:24

@Padma thanks, I'll try to be louder.

Henk Smit
00:40:19

Timestamps might seem a bit useful. But you can just as well get the
timestamp via Netconf/Yang from the originating router. Imho, we
shouldn't put unnecessary cruft in the protocol when not necessary.
Henk Smit
00:40:30

https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1925.html
Rule 12. (My favorite rule).

Ketan Talaulikar
00:41:52

+1 for "less funky timestamp"

Christian Hopps
00:42:01

Like Acting on forwardign to try and synchronize

Bruno Decraene
00:43:31

like anti-replay for auth?

Ketan Talaulikar
00:47:00

This is not something to push into BGP-LS. We don't push LSP/LSA
refreshes (w/o any changes) into BGP-LS.

Jeffrey Haas
00:48:11

I've not studied the draft, but fundamentally something like bgp-ls can
put a second timestamp in to its announcement that "this is when I got
the received tlv". The best you can do is display the stamp shipped, the
local received stamp and let something do the subtraction math.

Jeffrey Haas
00:49:57

Stick to rfc 8877. Just stick to 64 bits.

David Lamparter
00:51:15

i meant the TAI-UTC offset...

David Lamparter
00:52:31

(if the IERS makes good on their promise to abolish leap seconds it
won't matter)

Tony Przygienda
01:27:19

You cannot q”just add something” on receival in link state

Tony Przygienda
01:28:07

The TA-UTC is interesting discussion

Jeffrey Haas
01:39:10

To Les's point, do you really want to contaminate the general purpose
tag type with an application specific (that needs to be coordinated)
value?

Alvaro Retana
01:41:04

A couple of observations on the last presentation (SAV): (1) some/all
(?) of the information that would go in the new tag can be inferred/is
already available in the LSDB (no need to duplicate); (2) the blocklists
at the border should also consider internal-to-the-AS interfaces
(subnets), even if transit-only.

Jeffrey Haas
01:42:27

IMO, the major thing that needs to be flagged is "ownership" for the
subnet. As I noted to Les in a hallway conversation, there's nothing
similar to the rpki used by bgp to be used by the igp to declare the
"truth" of such tagging of ownership.

Jeffrey Haas
01:42:48

Similarly as discussed with Les, there's nothing an igp could really do
about this being wrong.

Jeffrey Haas
01:43:00

The threat model is going to heavily impact the deployment model.

Jie Dong
01:43:53

which data plane would be used for Flex-Algo with this calc type?

Liyan Gong
01:43:55

3)This implies that the stale LSA updates or purges have been flooded by
the restarting neighbor prior to the Router-LSA or Network-LSA
containing a link to the restarting router.
---to Acee, if the stale lsas on the neighbor router are maxage, they
will not be added into retransmit list instead of DD(10.3 of RFC2328).
So the start router have the chance to refresh the stale lsas throuth
flooding flow instead of request flow, so the order your slides
mentioned can not be assured. This optimization will cause the solution
not to take effect.

Alvaro Retana
01:45:26

Jeffrey Haas said:

IMO, the major thing that needs to be flagged is "ownership" for the
subnet. As I noted to Les in a hallway conversation, there's nothing
similar to the rpki used by bgp to be used by the igp to declare the
"truth" of such tagging of ownership.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2154

Jeffrey Haas
01:49:23

I was unaware of that. Thanks, Alvaro.

Based on a quick flip through, it's fine for signing, but only covers
the public keying in the general sense rather than the rooted form we
see in RPKI. I'm unclear on a quick read whether there's enough here
that can be leveraged for RPKI and would love to hear the opinion of
someone that's familiar with both of these.

Jeffrey Haas
01:50:02

Meanwhile, I have homework.

Lancheng Qin
01:50:12

@Alvaro (1) Yes, actually we only need to add the new information; (2)
what do you mean by "internal-to-the-AS interfaces"?

Nan Geng
01:55:56

@ jeff this draft only focuses on the validation of source prefixes
owned by the local network (AS).

Jeffrey Haas
01:58:18

@nan I understand that. But the security model is "if you have a router
in the igp, it must be trusted". That can mean either:
1) You will implicitly trust all networks injected into the igp as
"valid" sources of truth.
2) You should evaluate the networks via an external source of truth.

2 has additional igp considerations outside of SAV purposes. That is,
it's a security problem.

Nan Geng
02:00:56

The security problem seems not specific for sav.

Alvaro Retana
02:01:23

Lancheng Qin said:

@Alvaro (1) Yes, actually we only need to add the new information; (2)
what do you mean by "internal-to-the-AS interfaces"?

On 2: you need to block packets sourced from inside the AS. Any address
that belongs to AS1, not just the edge subnets.