

Not at the Zone Cut!



What is this about?

- Where to put the new extensible delegation info?
- **Fundamental design choice** -- with consequences
 - Affected software
 - Ease to deploy
 - May impact requirements

What design choice?

- At the parent side of the zone cut

- Elsewhere in the zone

- For the sake of example we reference

[draft-wesplaap-deleg-00](#)

[draft-homburg-deleg-incremental-deleg-00](#)

- Both originate from IETF 118 Hackathon
- Both based on SVCB (*irrelevant for this talk*)

example.com.	3600	IN	NS	...
example.com.	3600	IN	DS	...
example.com.	3600	IN	DELEG	...

example.com.	3600	IN	NS	...
example.com.	3600	IN	DS	...
example._deleg.com.	3600	IN	SVCB	...

The zone cut makes child authoritative

- `example.com. 3600 IN NS ...`
- Everything at or below `example.com.` is not authoritative in the `com.` zone *(except DS & NSEC)*
- It will not be signed by **unmodified signers**
- It will not be returned by **unmodified name servers**
 - Instead the delegation is returned
- If it is signed by `com. DNSKEY`, then **unmodified validating resolvers** will consider it BOGUS

... thus ...

- `example.com. 3600 IN DELEG ...`
- ... new authoritative in the parent RRs require:
 - Modified DNSSEC signers
 - Modified name servers
 - For returning it in referral response
 - For returning it when queried for it
 - Modified DNSSEC validators
- Apart from new delegation mechanism (modified resolver)

... on the other hand

- `example._deleg.com. 3600 IN SVCB ...`
- Semantics with respect to what is authoritative remain
- Is authoritative in the `com.` zone
- It will be signed by **unmodified signers**
- It will be returned by **unmodified name servers**
- **unmodified DNSSEC validators** will validate it
- implementation in the resolver only, already makes it work

... on the other hand

- Semantics with respect to what is authoritative remain
- The conventional methods to alias remain functional
 - Outsource delegation to one operator:
`example._deleg.com. 3600 IN CNAME _dns.operator.com.`
 - Outsource the operation of delegations to an operator:
`_deleg.com. 3600 IN DNAME delegs4com.operator.com.`

Downgrade protection

- New authoritative in the parent RRs will **not** be returned by **unmodified name servers**
 - They cannot be queried for by the resolver
 - [draft-wesplaap-deleg-00](#) uses a DNSKEY flag to signal support by **all** authoritative servers serving the zone
 - No separation of concern
-
- Authoritatively provisioned extensible delegations supports incremental deployment on authoritative servers

But, but, but,

- Every non extensible delegation zone will get two queries!?
 - NSEC(3) RRs shows that `_deleg.com.` does not exist
 - Cost: 1 query per zone
 - *Or else require DNSKEY flag*
- What about unsigned zones?
 - Needs explicit `_deleg.com.` query
 - Cost: 1 more query per zone
 - *Or else require authoritative support for unsigned zones*

At the zone cut

- Name servers, signers, resolvers all need to change
- New aliasing mechanisms
- All name servers serving a zone need to be upgraded
- 0 extra queries

Not at the zone cut

- Can work with resolver implementation only
- CNAME and DNAME
- None, mixed or full deployment on name servers all work fine
- Can work with 0 extra queries


Not a new notion!

- DELEG Panel Discussion at

<https://419.consulting/encrypted-dns/f/deleg-the-hairy-dns-camel>



We can generalize. Back to some mistakes that I think DNSEC has made. And one is to put the DS record at the delegation point.



- Questions
- Comments