Robust and Privacy-Preserving DS

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Problems MIMI Needs to Solve:

- **Access Control**
  Only members of a group should be able to see/send messages

- **Spam & Abuse Filtering**
  Prevent users from receiving, or provider from storing abusive messages

- Many other things…

Why that’s not great:

- **Invalid Commits**
  Providers can end up “enforcing” acceptance of broken Commits

- **No Membership Privacy**
  Requires that all handshake messages must be public

Current Approach:

Provider inspects Commit messages to learn & enforce & modify membership.

What about pseudonyms?

- Implementation baggage in terms of who can be added to groups and when
- Same issue with invalid Commits

What would be better?
Ideal MLS Group
In reality, forks are inevitable:

The DS provides an invalid Commit. What should I do?

Give up?

Allows any malicious user to DoS a group
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- Give up?
  - Allows any malicious user to DoS a group
- Externally rejoin group?
  - Introduces a lot of really difficult security concerns
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- Give up?
  - Allows any malicious user to DoS a group

- Externally rejoin group?
  - Introduces a lot of really difficult security concerns

- Ignore it?
  - Same as how any other invalid packet would be handled
  - No security or DoS concerns but introduces forks
In reality, forks are inevitable:
Support forks by putting each epoch in a “box”
Give each “box” a unique ID

ID is used to read & write messages in a given box
How does reading messages work?
How does Access Control work?

ID is used to read & write messages in a given box

+ ID is derived from MLS key schedule

= Only group members allowed
Why does this help with invalid Commits?

Allowed to exist! But never accessed
How does Spam Filtering Deletion work?

Forks which were created and never accessed by anyone else: 👎
Why does this help Membership Privacy?

When group membership is encrypted, hub provider has NO visibility into other Service Providers’ users
I don’t want to do a lot of roundtrips

If a Service Provider is confident that a series of epochs will be requested together, they can be provided proactively

“I would like to read messages in box A”

(Hash box IDs that we’re not sure the requester knows)