ML-KEM for TLS 1.3

draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement/
https://github.com/dconnolly/draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement

A pure-PQ ciphersuite for TLS 1.3

- No purely post-quantum ciphersuites
- Fills in the other side of draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design
- Needed because there are no documents that describe KEM-only key agreement in TLS
- If PQ-only works for your applications, clean key agreement, no hybrid duplicate shares or mixing and matching logic
- ML-KEM-1024 supports FIPS users who need to comply with the CNSA 2.0 draft
- I want to be able to do it 🐴

New NamedGroups: MLKEM768, MLKEM1024

```
enum {

      ...,

       /* ML-KEM Key Agreement Methods */
       mlkem768(0x0768),
       mlkem1024(0x1024)

      ...,

} NamedGroup;
```

Client sends encaps key, server replies with ciphertext

```
struct {
    NamedGroup group;
    opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
} KeyShareEntry;
```

These are transmitted in the `extension_data` fields of `KeyShareClientHello` and `KeyShareServerHello` extensions:

```
~~~
    struct {
        KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1>;
    } KeyShareClientHello;

    struct {
        KeyShareEntry server_share;
    } KeyShareServerHello;
~~~
```

KEM shared secret is input to Handshake Secret derivation

FAQs

Can’t you just get a codepoint instead of adopting a document?

There are no documents that describe KEM-only key agreement in TLS, so not really

Should this be Recommended = Y? MTI?

No. It should be optional

What about PQ signatures too?

Nah; this is easy, adopting PQ signatures is looking like a hard design problem and are out of scope here

Isn’t this too early?

Considering the long timelines for adoption, I don’t think so

Just use hybrid!

Some users cannot use hybrid, and some will not do more than one PQ transition. Having a PQ-only option seems necessary eventually, let’s make a start

I don’t trust PQ crypto, it’s too young!

CRYSTALS-Kyber was published 7 years ago, LWE schemes are older than that. Elliptic curves were first published in ~1985, wg adopted for TLS in *1998*, NIST curves standardized in 1999, RFC in *2006*! We’re older and wiser now, but even so this timeline seems in line with major crypto assumption changes in TLS in the past.

Questions?

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