

# Implementation Considerations for Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)

*draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-impl-cons-02*

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# Recap

- › **Scope: considerations on side-topics related to the implementation of EDHOC [1]**
  - Those topics are out of scope for EDHOC itself
- › **Topics that are currently covered**
  - Handling of EDHOC sessions and derived applications keys, if become invalid
  - Trust models for learning peers' public authentication credentials on-the-fly
  - Branched, side-processing of incoming EDHOC messages. This includes:
    - › Fetching and validation of authentication credentials
    - › Processing of EAD items, which may play a role in validating authentication credentials
  - Guidelines/advice on using EDHOC over CoAP with Block-wise transfers
- › **Explored cases in point, in addition to plain EDHOC**
  - EDHOC and OSCORE profile of ACE --- *draft-ietf-ace-edhoc-oscore-profile*
  - Lightweight authorization using EDHOC --- *draft-ietf-lake-authz*

# Updates since version -01

## Aligned content on the EDHOC and OSCORE profile of ACE

- › **In general terms, an access token is bound to AUTH\_CRED\_C**
  - AUTH\_CRED\_C is the public authentication credential of the ACE client (C), i.e.:
    - › CRED\_I, if the EDHOC forward message flow is used
    - › CRED\_R, if the EDHOC reverse message flow is used
- › **Uploading of the access token to the ACE resource server (RS)**
  - C uses a dedicated EAD item defined in the EDHOC and OSCORE profile
    - › The exact EDHOC message to use depends on the EDHOC message flow used
  - Alternatively, the ACE Authorization Server can upload the access token [2]
- › **Clarified associations and binding**
  - (Access token)  $\leftrightarrow$  (EDHOC Session, OSCORE Security Context)
  - Re-running EDHOC binds the same access token with the new session and context

# Updates since version -01

## Improved trust model for learning authentication credentials of other peers in EDHOC

- Section 3.0 defines the possible trust policies LEARNING and NO-LEARNING
- › **NO-LEARNING “as-is” would defeat some use cases altogether**
  - The ACE profile defined in *draft-ietf-ace-edhoc-oscore-profile*
    - › The ACE RS is meant to learn AUTH\_CRED\_C from the access token within an EAD item
  - The lightweight authorization method defined in *draft-ietf-lake-authz*
    - › The device U is meant to learn the credential of V (CRED\_R) when confirmed by a voucher
- › **Admitted use-case specific exceptions for the NO-LEARNING policy**
  - *NO-LEARNING: according to this policy, the peer P trusts CRED only if P is already storing CRED at message reception time, **unless in cases where situation-specific exceptions apply and are deliberately enforced (see below).***
  - If an acceptable exception applies, the outcome is like if the LEARNING policy was used
  - The steps on message side-processing and related diagrams were updated accordingly

# Updates since version -01

## Practical exceptions to NO-LEARNING: presence of specific EAD items

### › In the EDHOC and OSCORE profile

- The EAD item transporting the access token that includes AUTH\_CRED\_C
- Already explained in Section 3.1

### › In the method of *draft-ietf-lake-authz*

- The EAD item of EDHOC message\_2 transporting the voucher
- TODO: add a short Section 3.2 explaining this

### › **Note: the current Section 4.4.1 is moot and can be safely removed**

- Message handling for the EDHOC and OSCORE profile with NO-LEARNING w/o exceptions
- The text covers a non-problem – Thanks Göran and Rikard for the discussion!
- No applicable exceptions → Only ID\_CRED\_X is left to consider
- This is sufficient to consistently fail or continue the message processing

# Updates since version -01

## Guidelines on using EDHOC with CoAP and Block-wise transfers

### › Revised Section 5 to be more general and consistent

- The original text came from a removed appendix of *draft-ietf-core-oscore-edhoc*
- It was written to cover mainly the EDHOC + OSCORE combined request

### › Generalization

- Avoid the impression that Block-wise cannot be used in general
- Block-wise can be used on a data body consisting of (connection ID and) an EDHOC message

### › Related fixes

- Renamed items used when evaluating conditions, e.g., s/SIZE\_APP/SIZE\_BODY
- Corrected sentence on what can be fragmented when using the EDHOC + OSCORE request
  - › Not the combined request, but rather the plain application data that it transports

# Mail from Geovane

Sent to the LAKE mailing list on 2024-08-05, 09:36 UTC

## › “Advertising lake-authz support”

- *double processing of message\_2: it has been argued that EDHOC clients might receive and process message\_2 more than once. On the other hand, correct implementations should maintain a state machine and avoid processing messages in unexpected states (note: maybe this point could be added as an implementation consideration in Marco’s draft).*

## › From Section 5.1 of RFC 9528:

- *EDHOC messages SHALL be processed according to the current protocol state.*
- *Different instances of the same message MUST NOT be processed in one EDHOC session. Note that processing will fail if the same message appears a second time for EDHOC processing in the same EDHOC session because the state of the protocol has moved on and now expects something else.*

## › No addition should be needed in this document

# Next steps

## › On learning authentication credentials

- New section 3.2 to clarify specific exception to NO-LEARNING policy for *draft-ietf-lake-authz*
- Remove the current Section 4.4.1 as moot
- Consistency checks between authentication credential in ID\_CRED\_X and in an EAD item
  - › Placeholder notes in Section 4.4.2

## › Security considerations

## › Appendix with example certificates to plug-in for testing

## › Process comments and reviews as they come – Please do chime in!

- Feedback and input from authors/implementors of *-lake-authz* and *-lake-ra* are welcome



# Thank you!

<https://github.com/lake-wg/edhoc-impl-cons>