


# Chunked Oblivious HTTP Messages

*draft-ietf-chunked-ohttp-02*

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# Chunked OHTTP

Chunked OHTTP allows encrypting and decrypting requests and responses in separate chunks



Allows the use of Binary HTTP's "indeterminate" mode

Takes advantage of HPKE's support for multiple messages

Still is a **single** HTTP request-and-response transaction

# Updates in -02

Guidance for incremental processing by relays

Links to `draft-kazuho-httpbis-incremental-http`

Reiterate security properties around forward secrecy

Like "basic" OHTTP, messages are not forward secret until the key configuration changes

Don't assume that incremental processing of chunks gives you forward secrecy between chunks

# The "Incremental" header field

Signal to relays in both requests and responses that the content should be forwarded incrementally

```
POST /request.example.net/proxy HTTP/1.1
Host: proxy.example.org
Content-Type: message/ohttp-chunked-req
Incremental: ?1
```

Without this, intermediaries will often pend up POST request and response bodies

This provides a signal separate from the content type to request incremental delivery

# Remaining issues

Issue #5: Negotiating use of chunked

Issue #7: Maximum chunk size

Issue #27: Replayability & interactivity

# Negotiating use

## Issue #5

We had a discussion at IETF 119

Media types are enough to signal what is being used

"Just try" using chunking seems like the consensus option

We need to provide some guidance still

Proposal:

If you know you need to use Chunked OHTTP for a particular use case, use it (via the media type); if it fails, that's the same as OHTTP failing overall

If you want to use Chunked OHTTP opportunistically, try using the media type. Add a privacy/security note that without consistency checks this could lead to differentiated behavior between clients

If the client uses the chunked media type for a request, the gateway **MUST** use the chunked media type for the response, for simplicity

# Maximum chunk size

## Issue #7

We also discussed this at 119

Add a minimum supported maximum chunk size for interoperability — the value an implementation will assume peers are willing to hold in memory and decrypt at once

Proposal:

"Implementations **MUST** support  $2^{16}$ -byte chunk sizes. Implementations **SHOULD** limit chunk sizes to that value unless otherwise configured."

# Replayability & interactivity

## Issue #27

If chunked messages are not interactive (all request chunks end before any response chunks start), then a malicious relay replaying chunks won't have an impact

If messages are interactive (interleaved request and response chunks), we need to add considerations for the impact of a malicious relay replaying chunks



# Next steps

Complete formal analysis and test vectors —  
please help if possible!

More interop testing

Track dependency on Incremental header field

Are we almost done?