

ML-KEM for TLS 1.3

draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement/>

<https://github.com/dconnolly/draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement>

A pure-PQ ciphersuite for TLS 1.3

- No purely post-quantum ciphersuites
- Fills in the other side of [draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design](#)
- Needed because there are no documents that describe KEM-only key agreement in TLS
- If PQ-only works for your applications, clean key agreement, no hybrid duplicate shares or mixing and matching logic
- ML-KEM-1024 supports FIPS users who need to comply with the CNSA 2.0 draft
- I want to be able to do it 🐎

New NamedGroups: MLKEM512, MLKEM768, MLKEM1024

```
enum {  
  
    ...,  
  
    /* ML-KEM Key Agreement Methods */  
    mlkem512(0x0200),  
    mlkem768(0x0201),  
    mlkem1024(0x0202)  
  
    ...,  
  
} NamedGroup;
```

Codepoints allocated:

512	MLKEM512	Y	N	[draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement-03]	FIPS 203 version of ML-KEM-512
513	MLKEM768	Y	N	[draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement-03]	FIPS 203 version of ML-KEM-768
514	MLKEM1024	Y	N	[draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement-03]	FIPS 203 version of ML-KEM-1024

Client sends encaps key, server replies with ciphertext

```
struct {  
    NamedGroup group;  
    opaque key_exchange<1..216-1>;  
} KeyShareEntry;
```

These are transmitted in the `extension_data` fields of `KeyShareClientHello` and `KeyShareServerHello` extensions:

```
~~~~  
struct {  
    KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..216-1>;  
} KeyShareClientHello;  
  
struct {  
    KeyShareEntry server_share;  
} KeyShareServerHello;  
~~~~
```


KEM shared secret is input to Handshake Secret derivation

```

      v
      Derive-Secret(., "derived", "")
      |
      v
shared_secret -> HKDF-Extract = Handshake Secret
~~~~~
      |
      +-----> Derive-Secret(...)
      +-----> Derive-Secret(...)
      |
      v
      Derive-Secret(., "derived", "")
      |

```

KEM shared secret is input to Handshake Secret derivation



Etc

- Added MLKEM-512 per request
- Aligned thrown errors with [draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-mlkem](#)
- Preliminary implementation done for rustls fork
- Cited by CNSA 2.0 TLS Profile draft: [draft-becker-cnsa2-tls-profile/](#)
- DTLS: Y
- Recommended: N
- Make ephemeral a MUST, not an implied SHOULD, by 8446?
 - Related:
<https://github.com/post-quantum-cryptography/draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-mlkem/pull/25>
- 🎉

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