

# The Hashed Token SASL Mechanism

draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-ht-00

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- application protocols using a persistent connection
- connection re-establishment becomes more frequent
- connection re-establishment takes a long time

XMPP login takes too long...

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- Note: Numbers are from my FOSDEM 2015 talk [4]
- Numbers are with 80ms round-trip

Phase	Time
TCP connect <small>incl. DNS</small>	60ms
Client-Server Initial Stream	80ms
TLS <small>RFC 6120 § 9.1.1</small>	420ms
SASL <small>RFC 6120 § 9.1.2</small>	470ms
Compression <small>XEP-138</small>	160ms
Stream Management <small>XEP-198</small>	190ms
Roster retrieval <small>using versioning</small>	80ms
Privacy List <small>already set</small>	80ms
Total (Real)	1750ms
Total (Sum. Parts)	1540ms

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### **SASL-HT [5]**

SASL-HT token used to authenticate

### *Fast Authentication Streamlining Tokens (XEP-0483) [7]*

### **SASL-HT [5]**

obtain token

## **The Hashed Token SASL Mechanism (SASL-HT)**

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## Hashed Token

### Token

- quick re-authentication using a token
- token is obtained after authentication via “strong” SASL mechanism
- token is required to
  - be generated by a cryptographically secure random number generator
  - contain at least 128 bits of entropy
- application-protocol specific extension to obtain token required, for example the XMPP Extension Protocols (XEPs):
  - *Fast Authentication Streamlining Tokens* [7]
  - *Instant Stream Resumption* [3]

## Hashed Token

### Hash

- token is protected by cryptographically secure hash
- SASL-HT uses the TLS channel-binding data as key for the HMAC function
- additional benefit: *mutual authentication*
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
### Channel Binding

- unfortunately not all environments support channel binding
- therefore, SASL-HT specifies the NONE channel-binding type


# SASL-HT Authentication Sequence

**Client/Initiator**


**Server/Responder**



# SASL-HT Authentication Sequence




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




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## Current Status

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- XEP-FAST [7] gained a lot of traction within the XMPP ecosystem
- XEP-FAST uses SASL-HT
- therefore, SASL-HT has been implemented by various XMPP software

- responder message can now signal an error condition

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- how to deal with the wire format change, given that there are already deployments of the previous wire format?
  - Rename mechanism to HT2-\*?
  - Ignore?
  - ...

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## TLS o-RTT Data

- SASL-HT [5] and XEP-ISR [3] require the TLS o-RTT data to exclusively contain the authentication data
- XEP-FAST [7] requires the TLS o-RTT data to also contain further data (like feature negotiation or commands)

Thanks for your attention

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Questions?

## References

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- [1] Dave Cridland, Thilo Molitor, and Matthew Wild. ***Extensible SASL Profile***. XEP 0388. Version 1.0.2. XMPP Standards Foundation, Feb. 7, 2017–Aug. 6, 2024. URL: <https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0388.html>.
- [2] Dave Cridland et al. ***Extensible Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)***. Internet-Draft draft-melnikov-sasl2-02. Work in Progress. Internet Engineering Task Force, Dec. 2, 2024. 10 pp. URL: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-melnikov-sasl2/02/>.
- [3] Florian Schmaus. ***Instant Stream Resumption***. XEP 0397. Version 0.1.1. XMPP Standards Foundation, Feb. 12, 2016–Nov. 3, 2018. URL: <https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0397.html>.

- [4] Florian Schmaus. “**XMPP and Android. Creating stable, reliable, push-enabled and battery friendly XMPP connections on Android**”. Talk. Free and Open source Software Developers’ European Meeting (FOSDEM) 2015 (Université Libre de Bruxelles, Jan. 31–Feb. 1, 2015). Jan. 31, 2015. URL: [https://archive.fosdem.org/2015/schedule/event/xmpp\\_and\\_android/](https://archive.fosdem.org/2015/schedule/event/xmpp_and_android/).
- [5] Florian Schmaus and Christoph Egger. ***The Hashed Token SASL Mechanism***. Internet-Draft draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-ht-00. Work in Progress. Internet Engineering Task Force, Feb. 21, 2025. 11 pp. URL: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-ht/00/>.
- [6] Kevin Smith and Matthew Wild. ***Bind 2***. XEP 0386. Version 1.0.1. XMPP Standards Foundation, Feb. 8, 2017–July 2, 2024. URL: <https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0386.html>.
- [7] Matthew Wild. ***Fast Authentication Streamlining Tokens***. XEP 0484. Version 0.2.0. XMPP Standards Foundation, Oct. 19, 2022–June 30, 2024. URL: <https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0484.html>.