AI Agent Protocol Security

Hackathon Plan



Security aspects includes:

- Identity
- Authentication
- Authorization
- Privacy

What is MCP (Model Context Protocol)?

- An open protocol that standardizes how applications provide context to LLMs from Anthropic
- Think of MCP like a USB-C port for AI applications.



Figure 3. Technical composition of an illustrative AI agent, adapted from He et al. (2024).



MCP uses OAuth for secure authorization in two main scenarios:
between MCP clients and MCP servers, and for user interactions with external APIs via the MCP server.
OAuth acts as a secure intermediary, allowing MCP clients (like AI models or applications) to access protected resources on an MCP server or external APIs without directly sharing user credentials



Attack Example: Malicious MCP Package

https://www.catonetworks.com/blog/cato-ctrl-exploiting-model-context-protocol-mcp/

- a malicious MCP package is downloaded by a victim and used to read a file with Cursor AI.
- The package unexpectedly triggers the opening of a calculator (instead of file reading)



Attack Example: Abuse of Legitimate MCP Server

https://www.catonetworks.com/blog/cato-ctrl-exploiting-model-context-protocol-mcp/

- a user installs a legitimate MCP server, which acts as a bridge between Claude (AI model) and a user's files. It provides Claude with access to local files, which allows file read/write.
- an attacker crafting a document with malicious prompts and tricking the victim into uploading it to Claude 3.7 Sonnet where the MCP server is installed. The hidden prompt is triggered, manipulating the MCP server on the victim's device and encrypting their files. This demonstrates how even a legitimate MCP installation can be exploited.

Attack step: embed this paragraph (malicious prompt) in the document and hide it



It is important to build trust between MCP server and client

From Regulation Viewpoint (EU AI Act)

- Two factors: (a) does the AI Agent use large models (b) is it applied to high-risk applications



Figure 4. Illustrative overview of the applicability of the EU AI Act to AI agents.
The size of the circles does not represent the number of actors within each segment.



Figure 5. Decision tree presenting the logic for assessing the applicability of the EU AI Act to AI agents.

Potential and initial actions

An initial study by the future society lists suggestions for different roles
https://thefuturesociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Report-Ahead-of-the-Curve-Governing-AI-Agents-Under-the-EU-AI-Act-4-June-2025.pdf

Allocation of Governance Obligations Across Actors in the AI Agent Value Chain

Pillar	Measure	(GPAISR) Model Provider	(High-risk) System Provider	(High-risk) System Deployer
4.1 Agent Risk Assessments	4.1.1 Risk Identification	Map broad, high-level pathways to harm from agentic capabilities	Develop detailed risk scenarios specific to deployment context	Use the AI Office template to conduct fundamental rights impact assessments
	4.1.2 Risk Evaluation	Conduct general capability testing via standardised benchmarks	Perform continuous & iterative use-case specific testing reflecting operational conditions	Conduct fundamental rights impact assessments & use risk evaluation tools to guide go/no-go decisions
4.2 Transparency Tools	4.2.1 Agent Identifiers	Build core agent identification infrastructure & provide agent card templates	Implement & maintain agent IDs for specific deployment context	Ensure agent identification remains intact, accurate & recorded
	4.2.2 Real-Time Monitoring	Develop configurable monitoring capabilities & set default alert thresholds	Set context-appropriate thresholds & response protocols, provide feedback on alert accuracy	Monitor the agent, report risks & suspend use (if needed)
	4.2.3 Activity Logs	Develop & maintain detailed logging infrastructure for agent activity	Implement logging with deployment-specific detail & retention policies	Retain automatically generated logs
	4.2.4 Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs)	Define broad boundaries for agent use & key constraints	Review & adhere to model provider AUPs, develop supplementary policies for specific use cases	Follow both model & system providers' AUPs
4.3 Technical Deployment Controls	4.3.1 Real-Time Action Refusal	Build multi-level filtering frameworks for agent outputs	Add domain-specific filters & monitor effectiveness	Review filter performance, report issues & refine mitigation
	4.3.2 Emergency Shutdowns	Create automated & manual shutdown infrastructure linked to monitoring	Define graduated response protocols & investigation procedures	Test shutdown protocols, train staff & log incidents

- Security landscape of AI agents

Risk Mechanism	Key Characteristics	Potential Consequences
Autonomous Long-Term Planning	1. Extended autonomous operation 2. Complex action sequences with minimal oversight 3. Goal pursuit over long time horizons	A. Deception and scheming B. Deviation from intended behaviours C. Multiple consequential decisions in rapid succession D. Cascading effects difficult to halt or reverse E. Covert pursuit of misaligned goals F. Disabling oversight mechanisms
Direct Real-World Interaction	4. API interfaces to external systems 5. Access to external tools 6. Integration with critical infrastructure 7. Integration into personal lives	G. Dramatically expanded scale of harm H. Significant societal impact I. Magnified negative consequences of malfunction J. Amplified harm from misuse, emotional dependence enabling manipulation, and erosion of interpersonal relationships

- Agent Identities contribute to transparency
  - Currently no definition of Agent ID

- When this happens (in networking scenarios), what can be implemented
  - Alternative subsystem as substitute of AI agents?

What We Achieved: Identity





Message Flow

AI agent

DID

- Identifier
- Profile

Document

- **Type:** AI agent
- **Provider**: vendor of AI agent (ali-qwen)
- **Description**: function/capabilities of AI agent (AI assistant)
- **Protocol**: (MCP/A2A)
- **Transparency**: methods to implement AI transparency (no/database/PDL)

ToolBox

DID

- Identifier
- Profile

Document

- **Type:** toolbox
- **Description:** tools names



What We Achieved: Authorization





Message Flow





What Next


IDM
MCP security
A2A security
Security tools
1. Identity
1. Identity
MCP server
Authorization:
verify token/VC
Encryption
...
2. Authentication
3. Authorization
6. Call security tools
AI agent1
4. Authentication
5. Authorization
AI agent2
7. Call security tools

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Thank you.