

Reliable Transparency and Revocation Mechanisms


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Problem Statement

- Certificate Transparency's security is based on an assumption that log operators are perfect and independent, which has been broken repeatedly
- Monitoring CT is deeply unrealistic for “normal” people
- When CT detects a mis-issued certificate, there is no resolution!

What is Key Transparency?

Most transparency logs:




Key Transparency logs:



What is Key Transparency?

Most transparency logs:



Key Transparency logs:



Makes it easy to:

1. Find things that exist
2. **Find things that don't exist**

How does this system work?



TLS Client



TLS Server

I would like to use this
certificate for names X, Y, ...



Transparency
Logs

How does this system work?



TLS Client



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
Sure, here's proof that:

- This certificate is logged
for those names
- There's no revocation
for this certificate



Transparency
Logs

How does this system work?




Security

	Certificate Transparency	This Draft
Stateless Client	Secure assuming no collusion	Secure assuming no collusion
Stateful Client	Secure assuming no collusion	Secure regardless of collusion

Revocation



TLS Server



Revocation



TLS Server

I would like to use this cert



Sure, here's proof that:

- This certificate is logged
- ~~— There's no revocation for this certificate~~



Transparency
Logs

CA

Short-Lived Certificates

Reduction in certificate lifetime =
corresponding increase in CT log
throughput

CA renewal is a single point-of-failure
=> Revocation is slow

This Draft

Longer-lived certs are just as secure as
shorter-lived certs & are less burden on logs

Automatic failover between logs prevents
cascading outages

Questions?

Is this a good approach?

Should we keep working on it?