SAVI in a LISP network
draft-ramanathan-lisp-savi-01

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Purpose – Document procedures for Source Address Validation of LISP Endpoint Identifiers (EID)

Savi Architecture – Source Address Validation entities validate IP addresses by tracking address assignments and *binding* the address to a specific *anchor*. Two main strategies for validating:

- Rely on DHCP assignment “authority” to allow Source address [RFC7513]
- First Come First Serve (ND, SLAAC, applicable to ARP) [RFC6620]

Key Features – The specification focusses on FCFS SAVI and describes SAVI – LISP interaction to support

- EID mobility
- IP Theft prevention
- Fast roaming

Updates on the draft

Version – Uploaded version 01.

New Section Added – Considerations with Ephemeral EIDs (draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity)

- Addresses integration with Ephemeral EIDs for source anonymity.
- SAVI provides critical source address validation for short lived addresses.
- Ensures proper authorization of Ephemeral EIDs before onboarding.

Other considerations –

- The procedures in this draft can be extended for DHCP based source address validation. This can enhance protection against spoofing attacks.
- MAC is used as anchor and hence unique for a binding. Considerations need to be taken in terms of MAC randomization.

Next Steps

- Is this of interest to the WG?
- Practical implementation in production