IETF 126 SIDROps Agenda
Chairs:
SECRETARY: Krishnaswamy Ananthamurthy (kriswamy AT cisco.com)
Tuesday Session III, July 21, 2026 - 120 Minutes
- 14:00 - 16:00 Vienna (CEST)
- 05:00 -> 07:00 PDT (San Francisco)
- 08:00 -> 10:00 EDT (New York)
- 12:00 -> 14:00 UTC
- 20:00 -> 22:00 CST (Beijing)
- 22:00 -> 00:00 AEST (Sydney)
Room: Grand Klimt Hall 2
AGENDA
0. Administration
- Speakers: Russ/Luigi/Krishna
- Agenda Bashing
- Status reports for WG drafts
- 5 Minutes (Cumulative Time: 5 Minutes)
1. ASPA Document Cluster Coordination
- Speaker: various, Job Snijders to lead discussion
Rüdiger: Unexpected ASPA behavior has been observed in some
implementations. Should there be operational considerations documented
for these cases?
Job: The ASPA Verification and ASPA Profile drafts already cover the
relevant security considerations.
Rüdiger: Is there any operational advice for transit providers?
Job: If a peering device is leaking routing information, the recommended
operational response is to shut down the affected session.
Jishnu Roy: Regarding Cache Reset, how many cache resets should a client
be expected to handle?
Job: There are currently no specific considerations documented. This
would be a good topic to explore in future drafts.
Jeff Haas: Implementation guidance may need to include operational
considerations for these scenarios.
2. Update on Erik Synchronisation
- Speaker: Job Snijders
- Duration: 10 minutes (Cumulative Time: 30 Minutes)
- Expected outcome: community feedback
- Abstract: Erik Synchronization is a data replication system
using Merkle trees, a content-addressable naming scheme,
concurrency control using monotonically increasing sequence
numbers, and HTTP transport. The protocol's design is intended
to be efficient, fast, easy to implement, and robust in the face
of partitions or faults in the network.
- Datatracker link:
3. IPv6 Mapping Prefix PDU for the RPKI-Router Protocol
- Speaker: Guozhen Dong
- Desired Duration: 10 minutes (Cumulative Time: 40 Minutes)
- Expected outcome: Community feedback
- Datatracker Link:
4. RPKI-based Validation with Prioritized Resource Data
- Speaker: Jia Zhang / Nan Geng
- Desired Duration: 10 minutes (Cumulative Time: 50 Minutes)
- Expected outcome: Community feedback on the updated framework
and guidance on next steps
- Abstract: This draft discusses how operators may use signed RPKI
data together with supplemental or locally configured
routing-security data in local validation and filtering
workflows. It focuses on priority-safe handling, so that
supplemental data can support local routing policy without
changing or silently overriding authoritative RPKI semantics.
The presentation will summarize the latest updates, clarify the
deployment models and operational trade-offs, and ask the
working group for feedback on terminology, document scope, and
next steps.
- Datatracker Link:
Job: Route prioritization can introduce routing churn, which is a
significant operational concern.
Jia: Prioritization provides greater flexibility for customers, allowing
them to implement policies that best suit their operational needs.
Jeff Haas: This is a legitimate problem that needs to be addressed. The
working group should first establish a clear taxonomy of use cases and
behaviors, and then develop or support a draft that addresses these
issues.
5. Post-Quantum Cryptography for the RPKI
- Speaker: Tomoki Yoshikawa
- Desired Duration: 10 minutes (Cumulative Time: 60 Minutes)
- Expected outcome: Community feedback on the proposed scope,
algorithm selection, and migration approach.
- Abstract: This draft discusses the use of post-quantum signature
algorithms in the RPKI, with ML-DSA-65 as the primary candidate.
The presentation will introduce the proposal, initial evaluation
results, and open migration considerations.
- Datatracker Link:
-
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-yoshikawa-sidrops-pqc-rpki/
Russ: RFC 6489 already defines the algorithm transition
process. The draft should be restructured to align with or
build upon the existing specification.
Tomoki: Agree.
Bob: If RSA is broken, then the transition CA certificate
that relies on RSA would also be compromised.
Tomoki: Agree.
Tim: The topic of subtree switches requires further
discussion and is better handled on the mailing list.
Russ: Agree.
6. ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification for BGP Export
- Speaker: Jia Zhang
- Desired Duration: 10 minutes (Cumulative Time: 70 Minutes)
- Expected outcome: community feedback and whether call for WG
adoption
- Abstract: This draft describes how ASPA-based AS_PATH
verification can be applied at BGP export time to detect and
prevent route leaks before propagation. The presentation will
summarize the latest updates, explain the current procedure
including neighbor-AS-augmented verification and OTC
interaction, and ask the working group whether we could call for
WG adoption.
- Datatracker Link:
-
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-zhang-sidrops-aspa-egress/
Alex: The wording around inadvertent propagation needs to be
clarified.
Jia: Let's continue the discussion on the mailing list.
Alex: The treatment of local AS prepending is confusing and
needs further clarification.
Jia: Let's take that discussion to the mailing list as well.
Jeff Haas: The handling of private AS numbers should also be
discussed.
Jia: Thanks.
7. Update on Autonomous System Relationship Authorization (ASRA) Drafts
- Speaker: K. Sriram
- Duration: 15 minutes (Cumulative Time: 85 Minutes)
- Expected outcome: Community feedback on the proposed ASRA drafts
- Abstract: ASRA fills in a significant gap in the ASPA method by
adding the capability to detect fake links in the AS_PATHs in
BGP Updates propagated from providers to customers. ASRA
achieves this by allowing an AS to register additional AS
relationships, i.e., customers and lateral peers. It is
complementary to ASPA.
- Datatracker link:
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-geng-sidrops-asra-profile/
-
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sriram-sidrops-asra-verification/
Maria: Expressed concerns about the scalability and impact
of larger databases.
SriRam: Acknowledged the concern and thanked Maria for the
feedback.
Yangfei: Asked whether ASPA takes precedence over ASRA.
SriRam: Clarified that ASRA does not take precedence over
ASPA.
Tomas: Raised a scenario involving lateral peers, where AS3
does not have ASPA information.
SriRam: Responded that no explicit additional information is
required for verification in that scenario.
Alex: Noted that Transient IX route server deployments have
specific concerns and that ASRA does not fully address those
cases.
SriRam: Suggested continuing the discussion on IX-specific
scenarios in person.
8. Requirements for Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Relying Parties
- Speaker: Yingying Su
- Duration: 10 minutes (Cumulative Time: 95 Minutes)
- Expected outcome: community feedback
- Abstract: This document provides a single reference point for
requirements for RP software for use in RPKI. It cites
requirements that appear in several RPKI RFCs and related
specifications, making it easier for implementers to become
aware of these requirements. This document updates RFC8897 to
reflect changes to the requirements and guidance specified in
the relevant RPKI standards.
- Datatracker Link:
9. Measuring propagation time of RPKI validity changes in the dataplane
- Speaker: Alexander Männel
- Desired Duration: 10 in minutes (Cumulative Time: 105 Minutes)
- Expected outcome: Providing insights, community feedback
- Abstract: We found that RPKI propagation on the dataplane is at
least one order of magnitude slower than plain BGP.
Invalid-to-valid transitions require 9-12 minutes,
valid-to-invalid transitions need 30-42 minutes to be effective
at 50% of our vantage points. Our measurements are performed
from CAIDA Ark vantages points. By using the staging repository
for the RIPE RPKI repository, we can perform a baseline
measurement before the RPKI ecosystem reacts to potential ROA
changes and track how quickly paths change by continuously
performing traceroutes towards affected prefixes.
Jeff Haas: Pointed out that the "last man standing" problem
known in BGP also applies to this work.
Alex: Yes.
Job: Thanked the authors for their research and contributions.
Alex: Thanks.
10. RPKI to router protocol over QUIC
- Speaker: Jishnu Roy
- Duration: 5 minutes (Cumulative Time: 110 Minutes)
- Expected outcome: Community feedback on the proposal
- Abstract: The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to
Router Protocol provides a simple but reliable mechanism to
receive cryptographically validated RPKI prefix origin data and
router keys from a trusted cache. QUIC provides practical and
secure semantics for the RTR protocol, particularly fast
connection establishment and multi-stream carrying, thereby
reducing the time required to complete RTR data synchronization.
- Datatracker Link:
11. Source Address Validation Using SOAs
- Speaker: Minglin Jia
- Desired Duration: 5 minutes (Cumulative Time: 115 Minutes)
- Expected outcome: community feedback
- Abstract: This update simplifies SOA by publishing only AS-level
service profiles in RPKI, using them to establish channels for
further SAV information exchange, thereby reducing repository
storage and update-latency impacts.
- Datatracker Link:
Buffer 5 Minutes (Cumulative Time: 120 Minutes)
IF (BY ANY CHANCE) TIME ALLOWS
- Speaker: Weiqiang Cheng
- Desired Duration: 10 minutes (including Q&A)
- Expected outcome: community feedback
- Abstract:This draft analyzes RPKI/ROV deployment gaps and
cross-plane information asymmetry, describes operational side
effects, and frames the problem space for future work, without
proposing new protocols.
- Datatracker Link:
A.2 Operational Monitoring of RPKI Repositories Health and Safety
- Speaker: Yonghong Fu
- Desired Duration: 5 minutes including Q&A
- Expected outcome: community feedback
- Abstract: This draft provides operational guidance for
monitoring the health and safety of RPKI repositories on a
per-publication point basis. It defines measurable indicators
related to reachability, availability, and content integrity,
and explains how these metrics can be used to detect degraded
performance or potentially unsafe behavior.
- Datatracker Link:
A.3 A Profile for Source Prefix Authorizations (SPAs)
- Speaker: Kamiel Braet
- Desired Duration: 10 in minutes (including Q&A)
- Expected outcome: Community feedback on the proposed RPKI SPA
Profile of Source-Selective BGP usage
- Abstract: This draft defines the RPKI SPA profile that enables
prefix holder to authorize source prefixes for source constraint
routing usage.
- Datatracker Link:
A.4 A Publication-Point-Based Incremental Validation Procedure for RPKI Relying Parties
- Speaker: Yingying Su
- Desired Duration: 10 minutes (including Q&A)
- Expected outcome: community feedback
- Abstract: This document describes a publication-point-based
incremental validation procedure for RPKI RPs. The procedure is
intended to reduce redundant validation work after incremental
repository synchronization, while preserving the same validation
result as a full top-down validation over the same repository
snapshot, trust anchor set, validation policy, and validation
time. This document does not change the syntax or validation
semantics of any RPKI object.
- Datatracker Link:
A.5 Risk of Stealthy BGP Hijacking under Incomplete Adoption of Route Origin Validation (ROV)
- Speaker: Yi Xu
- Desired Duration: 10 minutes (Cumulative Time: 83 Minutes) 85
- Abstract: This document describes how incomplete adoption of ROV
makes stealthy BGP hijacking less visible on the control plane
while still capable of diverting traffic.
- Datatracker Link:
A.6 Source Pre-validation in RPKI ROV
- Speaker: Mingqing Huang
- Desired Duration: 10 minutes
- Expected outcome: community feedback
- Abstract: This document defines a BCP for source pre-validation:
an originating AS checks its intended BGP announcement against
its local RPKI cache before sending it to eBGP neighbors. The
goal is to reduce the number of self-inflicted invalid routes,
improve global routing stability, and encourage wider and more
confident deployment of ROV drop policies across the Internet -
including the long tail of stub and small regional ASes.
- Datatracker Link:
A.7 PAVA (PAth VAlidation): an alternative to ASPA
- Speaker: Maxence Fléchier
- Desired Duration: 10 minutes (including Q&A)
- Expected outcome: Community feedback on the proposed algorithm,
focus of the work and limitations
- Abstract: This draft defines a new scheme for PATHSEC that makes
use of the DNS to distribute information safely using a unique
representation of AS relationships depending on the NLRI. It
also describes a new verification algorithm.
- Datatracker Link:
A.8 RPKI Relying Party Benchmarking Methodology
- Speaker: Lancheng Qin
- Desired Duration: 10 minutes (including Q&A)
- Expected outcome: community feedback
- Abstract: This document defines a benchmarking methodology for
evaluating RPKI Relying Party (RP) implementations in controlled
laboratory environments. The methodology focuses on whether RP
implementations correctly perform required validation steps and
on the performance of these operations.
- Datatracker Link:
A.9 BGP Communities for Security Policy Intent
- Speaker: Yangfei Guo
- Desired Duration: 5 minutes (including Q&A)
- Expected outcome: community feedback
- Abstract: This draft defines BGP security Large Communities to
convey ROV policies to downstream networks.
- Datatracker Link:
A.10 Selectively Synchronizing RPKI Data to Routers
- Speaker: Yu Fu
- Duration: 10 minutes (including Q&A)
- Expected outcome: We had showed the implementation in the
IETF125 Hackathon project. The main objective of the
presentation is for the WG adoption.
- Abstract: This document proposes to filter out RPKI data by type
based on enhanced SLURM filters. Only the RPKI data types that
the network or routers are interested in will appear in the
Relying Party's output.
- Datatracker Link: