Anomalous Behavior with Anonymous Tickets

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Setup of Anomaly

The AS Exchange takes place as usual, producing TGT and k_{TC} :

$$C \leftarrow \frac{\text{KRB-AS-REQ}}{\text{KRB-AS-REP}(TGT, k_{TC})}$$
 K

The client C requests a regular and an anonymous ticket (both for S) using TGT:

- C KRB-TGS-REQ (Regular, based on TGT) T
- C KRB-TGS-REQ (Anonymous, based on TGT) T

The TGS T replies, but the intruder I switches the tickets (undetected by C):

$$C \leftarrow \{SK_{Anon}, Anon, ...\}k_{S}, \{SK_{C}, ...\}k_{TC} \qquad \{SK_{C}, C, ...\}k_{S}, \{SK_{C}, ...\}k_{TC}$$

$$C \leftarrow \{SK_C, C, ...\}k_S, \{SK_{Anon}, ...\}k_{TC}$$

$$= \{SK_{Anon}, Anon, ...\}k_S, \{SK_{Anon}, ...\}k_{TC}$$

- ·C has wrong beliefs about data
- Undesirable, but doesn't violate desian goals. However....
- • SK_C and SK_{Anon} are service keys generated for regular and anonymous tickets.
- \cdot {m}k is the encryption of m with k.

Options for Final Step

1. C's name is leaked when she tries to contact S anonymously:

$$C = \{SK_C, C, ...\}k_S, \{Anon, t\}SK_{Anon} \}$$

Intruder actions integral if this message's integrity is protected [Tom].

2. Alternatively, C sends each type of request. The request with anonymous ticket gives error, but I fixes other request by replaying first authenticator.

$$C \qquad \qquad \{SK_{Anon}, Anon, ...\}k_{S}, \{C, t\}SK_{C} \qquad \qquad S$$

$$C \xrightarrow{\{SK_C, C, ...\}k_S, \{Anon, t\}SK_{Anon}} T \xrightarrow{\{SK_C, C, ...\}k_S, \{C, t\}SK_C} S$$

I then tampers with error message so that it names C. C believes anonymous request accepted (no error), regular request failed; reverse is true instead.

·C's name is leaked or she has wrong beliefs about which type of request succeeded/failed.

Conclusions

- u No violations of authentication or confidentiality, but anomalous behavior
 - Possible to leak C's name (even if link to S is integrity protected)
 - Possible for C to have reversed view of which type of request has been accepted
- u Are these (or related issues) of practical concern?
- u We should be aware of possibility for these types of problems.