

RADIUS + DTLS

<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-dekok-radext-dtls-00.txt>

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Introduction

- Crypto-agility is required
- *Forward* security is useful
 - We don't want to re-visit RADIUS security
- RADIUS currently has ad-hoc security
 - authentication (MD5 signatures)
 - encryption (MD5 and xor's)
- -00 draft has expired
 - New draft will be issued post-IETF

Datagram TLS

- RFC 4347 (DTLS) has been published
- TLS over UDP (with some minor changes)
- Other WG's are using it
- OpenSSL supports it
 - Implementations of DTLS clients & servers exist
- Does not change RADIUS operational model
 - UDP...

DTLS and Crypto-Agility

- TLS would appear to solve all crypto-agility requirements
 - Strong integrity checks
 - Strong encryption
 - Cryptographic negotiation
 - Designed by people who understand crypto
- Re-inventing crypto work is dangerous

Simple changes to code

- <http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/papers/dtls.pdf>

```
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    s = socket(...);
    SSL_init()
    ...
    send(s, ...) -> SSL_write(...)
    ...
    recv(s, ...) -> SSL_read(...)
```

RADIUS compatibility

- DTLS and RADIUS packets are orthogonal
 - less than one chance in 2^{128} that packets can be confused
- RADIUS + DTLS can re-use the same ports
 - Simplifies deployment
 - No IANA considerations.

Diameter compatibility

- RADIUS + DTLS is a RADIUS transport layer change
- No changes to the RADIUS protocol
 - No messages, attributes, or enumerations
- Therefore **no Diameter impact**

Discussion?

- No changes to draft from -00
- Slides have been presented at multiple IETF's
- Feedback has been positive
- All known requirements and issues have been addressed with this proposal.