draft-ietf-geopriv-lis-discovery

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Before publication

- Open issues
  - Appropriate forgery protection
  - URI scheme
- Need a few more people to review the document
DNS forgery options

Three options:
- No protection
- draft-ietf-dnsext-forgery-resilience (informative ref?)
- DNSSEC (this isn’t going to be implemented)

Proposal:
- Inform, then leave the choice relatively open
- “An access network SHOULD provide forgery protection, which MAY include support for DNSSEC.”
- No explicit mandate for hosts
URI scheme

- Option: A held[s]: URI scheme to identity a URI as being for HELD (and LCP)
  - Justification: some special behaviour is needed to avoid errors from middlebox involvement
  - Useful if no contextual information is assigned a URI

- Author’s proposal: http:/https: URIs only
  - An LCP URI must be a product of discovery
  - Discovery process provides necessary context
  - Text to this effect in the current draft