

# DTLS over SNMP

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# Motivation

- Support X.509 Certificate Authentication
- Support for a UDP based security solution
  - TCP vs UDP performance in bad networks is still a problem

# The Resulting Document


- draft-hardaker-isms-dtls-tm-01
- Closely aligns in structure the SSH document
- Compliant with the TSM security model expectations

# DTLS

- Defined in RFC4347
- DTLS is functionally identically to TLS
- Uses the same on-the-wire format
  - X.509 certificates for authentication.

*(Editor's Note: I'm not a DTLS expert; hopefully Eric is here!)*

# DTLS Architecture Overview



# DTLS Considerations

- TLS relies on TCP for session demultiplexing
  - Does not contain an in-protocol session identifier
- UDP doesn't provide session demultiplexing
  
- Result: we have to define how to demultiplex multiple connections
  - Need a unique key to latch to a DTLS session
  - Key: src addr, srt port, dst addr, dst port

## X509 Certificates to securityName

- X509 Certificates use a very different naming structure
- The *Issuer*: field identifies who handed out the certificate
- The *Subject*: field typically identifies a user and contains:
  - Location information (C: Country, ST: State)
  - Organization information (O: Name, OU: Unit)
  - Personal Information (CN: Common Name)

# Client X.509 Certificate Examples

## Example: My Fedora User Certificate

- Subject: C=US, ST=North Carolina, O=Fedora Project, OU=Fedora User Cert, **CN=hardaker/emailAddress=wjhns174@hardakers.net**
- Issuer: C=US, ST=North Carolina, L=Raleigh, O=Fedora Project, OU=Fedora Project CA, CN=Fedora Project CA/emailAddress=admin@fedoraproject.org

## Example: Fedora CA

- XXX...

## Server X.509 Certificate Examples

### Example: The Fedora Server Certificate

- Subject: C=US, ST=North Carolina, L=Raleigh, O=Fedora Project, OU=Fedora Project CA, **CN=Fedora Project CA/emailAddress=admin@fedoraproject.org**
- Issuer: C=US, ST=North Carolina, L=Raleigh, O=Fedora Project, OU=Fedora Project CA, CN=Fedora Project CA/emailAddress=admin@fedoraproject.org

### Example: The www.ietf.org HTTPS Certificate

- Subject: O = \*.ietf.org, OU = Domain Control Validated, CN = **\*.ietf.org**
- Issuer: CN = Starfield Secure Certification Authority, OU = http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository, O = Starfield Technologies, Inc., L = Scottsdale, ST = Arizona, C = US

## X.509 Subject to securityName Mapping

- The *Subject* field **is** the identifying field.
- The *Common Name (CN)* tag within it is typically the *account name*
- It is paired with the *Issuer* field to be unique
- Potential ways to be mapped into a securityName:
  - Take the **CN** in raw form
  - Map the **CN** to a securityName
- This mapping is configured through DTLSTM-MIB tables

# DTLSTM-MIB

- Domain and Address definitions
- Counters
- Configuration
  - dtlstmCertificateToSNTable
  - dtlstmParamsTable
- Conformance statements

## Incoming securityName Selection

- The dtlstmCertificateToSNTable maps incoming certificates to securityNames.
- Two modes:
  - Accept the CN directly from trusted CAs
  - Map a Subject to specific securityName

### dtlstmCertificateToSNTable

Column	Value
dtlstmCertID(1)	1
dtlstmCertIssuerDN(2)	Fedora...
dtlstmCertMapType(3)	specified (or byCN)
dtlstmCertIssuer*	...
dtlstmCertSubject*	C=US, ST=North Carolina ...
dtlstmCertSecurityName(4)	wes
dtlstmCertStorageType(5)	nonVolatile
dtlstmCertRowStatus(6)	createAndGo

# Outgoing Certificate Selection

- The dtlstmParamsTable maps an outgoing securityName to a certificate.
- The certificate is referenced by a Issuer and Subject

## dtlstmParamsTable

Column	Value
snmpTargetParamsName(1)	wes
dtlstmCertIssuer*	...
dtlstmParamsSubject(1)	C=US, ... CN=hardaker...
dtlstmParamsStorageType(2)	nonVolatile
dtlstmParamsRowStatus(3)	createAndGo

# Issues

- A few MIB changes needed
- Awaiting completion of the other documents before WG consideration
- Need people to review it
- DTLS implementations are still few
  - OpenSSL: implemented but poorly documented
  - GnuTLS: not implemented